throbber
Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
`
`Paper 13
`Date: December 5, 2022
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.,
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC., and APPLE INC.,
`Petitioner,
`v.
`SMART MOBILE TECHNOLOGIES LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`
`IPR2022-01004
`Patent 9,614,943 B1
`
`
`
`Before HYUN J. JUNG, NATHAN A. ENGELS, and
`MONICA S. ULLAGADDI, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`JUNG, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`DECISION
`Granting Institution of Inter Partes Review
`35 U.S.C. § 314
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR2022-01004
`Patent 9,614,943 B1
`
`I.
`INTRODUCTION
`A. Background and Summary
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Samsung Electronics America, Inc.,
`and Apple Inc. (collectively, “Petitioner”) filed a Petition (Paper 2, “Pet.”)
`requesting institution of an inter partes review of claims 1–9 and 12–20 of
`U.S. Patent No. 9,614,943 B1 (Ex. 1001, “the ’291 patent”). Smart Mobile
`Technologies LLC (“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response (Paper 6,
`“Prelim. Resp.”). After receiving authorization, Petitioner filed a Reply to
`the Preliminary Response (Paper 7, “Prelim. Reply”), and Patent Owner
`filed a Sur-reply (Paper 8, “Prelim. Sur-reply”).
`Under 35 U.S.C. § 314, an inter partes review may not be instituted
`“unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail
`with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon
`consideration of the Petition in view of the present record and for the reasons
`explained below, we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable
`likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims.
`Thus, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–9 and 12–20 of
`the ’943 patent on all presented challenges. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S.
`Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018).
`B. Real Parties in Interest
`Petitioner identifies Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Samsung
`Electronics America, Inc., and Apple Inc. as real parties in interest. Pet. 88.
`Patent Owner only identifies itself as a real party in interest. Paper 4, 1.
`C. Related Matters
`The parties identify Smart Mobile Techs. LLC v. Samsung Electronics
`Co., Ltd., 6:21-cv-00701 (W.D. Tex.) as a related matter. Pet. 89; Paper 4,
`1.
`
`2
`
`

`

`IPR2022-01004
`Patent 9,614,943 B1
`We instituted an inter partes review of a related patent. Samsung
`Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Smart Mobile Techs. LLC, IPR2022-00766, Paper 14
`(PTAB Oct. 26, 2022) (Decision Granting Institution). Another related
`patent is challenged in IPR2022-01005.
`D. The ’943 Patent (Ex. 1001)
`The ’943 patent issued on April 4, 2017 from an application filed on
`September 17, 2012, which is a continuation application of several
`previously filed continuation and continuation-in-part applications, the
`earliest of which was filed on December 16, 1996. Ex. 1001, codes (22),
`(45), (63), 1:8–18.
`The ’943 patent states that an unfulfilled need exists for multiple
`transmitters and receivers (“T/R”) in a cellular telephone or mobile wireless
`device (“CT/MD”). Ex. 1001, 1:48–49. Figure 5A of the ’943 patent is
`reproduced below.
`
`
`
`Figure 5A shows a “a dual antenna, dual T/R unit in a CT/MD
`interfacing with a dual processor.” Ex. 1001, 2:15–16. Dual antenna 508
`and dual T/R unit 504 interface with dual processor 506 in dual band
`system 500. Id. at 4:39–41. System 500 can communicate through
`outputs 510, which can be “fibre optic channel, ethernet, cable, telephone, or
`other.” Id. at 4:44–47.
`
`3
`
`

`

`IPR2022-01004
`Patent 9,614,943 B1
`“The multiple processors 506 allow for parallel and custom
`processing of each signal or data stream to achieve higher speed and better
`quality of output.” Ex. 1001, 4:54–56. Alternatively, there can be “a single
`processor that has the parallelism and pipeline capability built in for
`handling one or more data streams simultaneously.” Id. at 4:56–59.
`Processors 506 include “DSP, CPU, memory controller, and other elements
`essential to process various types of signals.” Id. at 4:59–61.
`“The processor contained within the CT/MD 502 is further capable of
`delivering the required outputs to a number of different ports such as optical,
`USB, cable and others” and “capable of taking different inputs, as well as
`wireless.” Ex. 1001, 4:63–67. “Thus the CT/MD 502 has universal
`connectivity in addition to having a wide range of functionality made
`possible through the features of multiple antennas, multiple T/R units 504
`and processors 506.” Id. at 5:3–6.
`“[T]he CT/MD may use one or more transmission protocols as
`deemed optimal and appropriate,” and “the CT/MD determines the required
`frequency spectrum, other wireless parameters such as power and signal to
`noise ratio to optimally transmit the data.” Ex. 1001, 11:8–10, 11:12–15.
`The CT/MD has “the ability to multiplex between one or more transmission
`protocols such as CDMA, TDMA to ensure that the fast data rates of the
`optical network or matched closely in a wireless network to minimize the
`potential data transmission speed degradation of a wireless network.” Id. at
`11:15–20.
`Also, the ’943 patent states “by having each of the data streams
`sampled at differing clock frequencies the performance can be better
`optimized.” Ex. 1001, 4:36–38. “Each channel may be sampled and
`
`4
`
`

`

`IPR2022-01004
`Patent 9,614,943 B1
`clocked individually as necessary to optimally process each data stream and
`combine the individual data packets.” Id. at 7:50–52.
`E. Illustrative Claim
`The ’943 patent includes 20 claims, of which Petitioner challenges
`claims 1–9 and 12–20. Of the challenged claims, claims 1, 5, 8, and 12 are
`independent, and claim 1 is reproduced below.
`1.
`A wireless communication device comprising:
`a plurality of antennas; and
`a communication component coupled to the plurality of
`antennas, the communication component including a processor,
`a transmitter, and a receiver,
`wherein the communication component is configured to
`communicate via a first frequency band using a wireless
`communication protocol; and
`wherein one or more subtasks are assigned to one or more
`channels, and the one or more channels are sampled and clocked
`individually; and
`
`wherein the processor comprises multiple ones of the one
`or more channels and is further configured to process a first data
`stream and a second data stream in parallel.
`Ex. 1001, 11:63–12:9.
`Independent claims 5, 8, and 12 also recite a “wireless communication
`device” and the limitations “a plurality of antennas,” “a communication
`component coupled to the plurality of antennas, the communication
`component including a processor, a transmitter, and a receiver,” “wherein
`one or more subtasks are assigned to one or more channels, and the one or
`more channels are sampled and clocked individually,” and “wherein the
`processor comprises multiple ones of the one or more channels and is further
`configured to process a first data stream and a second data stream in
`parallel.” Ex. 1001, 12:26–30, 12:42–47, 12:55–59, 13:1–6, 13:17–21,
`
`5
`
`

`

`IPR2022-01004
`Patent 9,614,943 B1
`14:1–6; see also Prelim. Resp. 4 n.1, 9 n.2 (noting that the final wherein
`clauses of the independent claims are “identical in relevant part”).
`The remaining limitations of independent claims 5, 8, and 12 differ
`from claim 1 and require, for example, “at least one additional transmitter”
`(claim 5), “at least one additional receiver” (claim 8), and “a first set of
`antennas . . . and a second set of antennas” (claim 12). Ex. 1001, 12:31–32,
`12:60–61, 13:23–28.
`F. Asserted Prior Art and Proffered Testimonial Evidence
`Petitioner identifies the following references as prior art in the
`asserted ground of unpatentability:
`Name
`Billström
`Pillekamp
`Johnston
`Raleigh
`
`Exhibit
`1010
`1009
`1006
`1005
`
`Reference
`US 5,590,133, issued Dec. 31, 1996
`US 5,594,737, issued Jan. 14, 1997
`US 5,784,032, issued July 21, 1998
`US 6,144,711, filed Aug. 27, 1997, issued Nov. 7,
`2000
`EP 0 660 626 A2, published June 28, 1995
`WO 98/27748, published June 25, 1998
`
`Byrne
`WO748
`
`1008
`1007
`
`Pet. 2. Petitioner states that “[t]he references qualify as prior art to the ’943
`patent’s earliest claimed priority date (06/04/1999; ‘Critical Date’),” but
`“Petitioner does not concede that the ’943 patent is entitled to priority.” Id.
`According to Petitioner, Byrne, Pillekamp, and Billström are prior art under
`§ 102(b); Raleigh and WO748 are prior art under § 102(e); and Johnston is
`prior art under §§ 102(a) and (e).1 Id. Petitioner also provides a Declaration
`of Dr. Michael Allen Jensen. Ex. 1003.
`
`
`1 The relevant sections of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”),
`Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (Sept. 16, 2011), took effect on March 16,
`2013. Because the ’943 patent claims priority to an application filed before
`
`
`6
`
`

`

`IPR2022-01004
`Patent 9,614,943 B1
`G. Asserted Grounds
`Petitioner asserts that claims 1–9 and 12–16 are unpatentable on the
`following grounds:
`Claim(s) Challenged 35 U.S.C.

`1, 5–9
`103(a)
`3, 4
`103(a)
`12
`103(a)
`13, 14
`103(a)
`1, 2, 5–9
`103(a)
`3, 4
`103(a)
`12, 15, 18–20
`103(a)
`13, 14
`103(a)
`16, 17
`103(a)
`
`Byrne
`Byrne, WO748
`Byrne, Johnston, Pillekamp
`Byrne, Johnston, Pillekamp, Billstrom
`Raleigh, Byrne
`Raleigh, Byrne, WO748
`Raleigh, Byrne, Pillekamp
`Raleigh, Byrne, Pillekamp, Billstrom
`Raleigh, Byrne, Pillekamp, WO748
`
`Reference(s)/Basis
`
`Pet. 1.
`
`II. ANALYSIS
`
`A. Legal Standards
`“In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the
`onset to show with particularity why the patent [claim] it challenges is
`unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed.
`Cir. 2016). This burden of persuasion never shifts to Patent Owner.
`Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378
`(Fed. Cir. 2015). The Board may authorize an inter partes review if we
`determine that the information presented in the Petition shows that there is a
`reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one
`of the claims challenged in the petition. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
`
`
`that date, our citations to 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 in this Decision are to
`their pre-AIA versions. See also Pet. 2 (stating but not conceding that “the
`’943 patent’s earliest claimed priority date” is “06/04/1999”).
`
`7
`
`

`

`IPR2022-01004
`Patent 9,614,943 B1
`Petitioner contends that the challenged claims of the ’943 patent are
`unpatentable under § 103(a). Pet. 1. A claim is unpatentable under § 103(a)
`if the differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are
`such that the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time
`the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which
`said subject matter pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,
`406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of
`underlying factual determinations, including: (1) the scope and content of
`the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the
`prior art; (3) the level of skill in the art; and (4) where in evidence, so-called
`secondary considerations. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18
`(1966). When evaluating a combination of teachings, we must also
`“determine whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known
`elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” KSR, 550 U.S. at
`418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Whether a
`combination of elements produces a predictable result weighs in the ultimate
`determination of obviousness. Id. at 416–417.
`B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art
`Petitioner asserts that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had
`a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering,
`computer science, or a related field, and at least two years of experience
`related to the design or development of wireless communication systems, or
`the equivalent.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 27–28). Petitioner also states that
`“[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional
`experience, or significant experience in the field could substitute for formal
`education.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 27–28).
`
`8
`
`

`

`IPR2022-01004
`Patent 9,614,943 B1
`At this stage, Patent Owner does not propose a level of ordinary skill
`and does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal. See generally Prelim. Resp.
`Based on the preliminary record, we adopt Petitioner’s asserted level
`of ordinary skill only to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood
`that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims
`challenged in the Petition.2
`C. Claim Construction
`In an inter partes review based on a petition filed on or after
`November 13, 2018, the claims are construed
`using the same claim construction standard that would be used to
`construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. [§] 282(b),
`including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary
`and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of
`ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to
`the patent.
`37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2021); see Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,
`1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
`Petitioner states that “no formal claim constructions are necessary in
`this proceeding.” Pet. 2. Patent Owner does not propose an interpretation
`for any term. See generally Prelim. Resp.
`At this preliminary stage, we determine that no claim term requires
`express interpretation.3 Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375
`(Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . .
`
`
`2 Petitioner proposed the same level of ordinary skill in IPR2022-00766 and
`IPR2022-01005, which we also adopted in those proceedings to determine
`whether there was a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with
`respect to at least one of the challenged claims.
`3 We also determined that no claim term in IPR2022-00766 and IPR2022-
`01005 required express interpretation.
`
`9
`
`

`

`IPR2022-01004
`Patent 9,614,943 B1
`that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the
`controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200
`F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
`D. Asserted Obviousness Based on Byrne
`Petitioner contends that Byrne teaches or suggests the limitations of
`claim 1 and 5–9 with citations to the record. Pet. 4–23. Petitioner asserts
`with citations to the record that one of ordinary skill in the art would have
`found it obvious that Byrne’s cordless and cellular channels are sampled and
`clocked individually and that Byrne’s microprocessor processes data on
`those channels separately. Id. at 10–17.
`Patent Owner responds that Petitioner fails to show Byrne discloses
`“wherein the processor comprises multiple ones of the one or more channels
`and is further configured to process a first data stream and a second data
`stream in parallel” and the “one or more channels are sampled and clocked
`individually.” Prelim. Resp. 4–14.
`For the reasons that follow, Petitioner shows a reasonable likelihood
`of prevailing with respect to at least one claim.
`1. Byrne (Ex. 1008)
`Byrne particularly relates “to a radio telephone operable for more than
`one system.” Ex. 1008, 1:2–3. Figure 1 of Byrne is reproduced below.
`
`10
`
`

`

`IPR2022-01004
`Patent 9,614,943 B1
`
`
`Figure 1 is a block diagram of a cellular cordless telephone system.
`Ex. 1008, 6:19–20, 6:36–37. Cellular cordless telephone system 100
`includes cordless base stations 114, 116, 118 that communicate with cellular
`cordless telephone (“CCT”) 200 via antennas 112, 119, 122. Id. at 6:38–47.
`System 100 also includes cellular base station 130 with receive antenna 132
`and transmit antenna 134 for communicating with CCT 200. Id. at 7:4–10.
`Byrne describes that its CCT 200 uses cordless telephone systems “CT-2 or
`DECT4 which are digital systems” and GSM or DCS (Digital Cellular
`System) cellular telephone systems. Id. at 1:41–44, 7:19–24, 10:53.
`CCT 200 includes antenna 228 for cordless communication and
`antenna 238 for cellular communication. Ex. 1008, 7:13–15. Figure 2 of
`Byrne is reproduced below.
`
`
`4 Pillekamp indicates that DECT stands for “Digital European Cordless
`Telecommunication.” Ex. 1009, 2:59–60.
`
`11
`
`

`

`IPR2022-01004
`Patent 9,614,943 B1
`
`
`Figure 2 is a block diagram of a cellular cordless telephone. Ex. 1008,
`6:22–23, 7:25–26. CCT 200 also includes microprocessor 210, cordless
`telephone transceiver 220, and cellular telephone transceiver 230. Id. at
`7:27–30. Microprocess 210 “is adapted to operate in accordance with the
`flow charts illustrated in Figures 3–4.” Id. at 7:56–58; see also id. at 8:44–
`9:30 (describing steps used by microprocessor 210 for receiving and placing
`cellular or cordless telephone calls), 9:31–10:8 (describing the monitoring of
`availability of cellular and cordless systems).
`When operating as a cordless telephone, “microprocessor 210
`enable[s] cordless receiver 221 and cordless transmitter 222.” Ex. 1008,
`8:16–18. “[M]icroprocessor 210 controls the CCT 200 in a similar way
`when operating as a cellular telephone, but appropriately modified for the
`signal[]ing protocols and data encryption used in the cellular system.” Id. at
`8:29–33. Byrne states that “signal[]ing protocols, data encryption
`
`12
`
`

`

`IPR2022-01004
`Patent 9,614,943 B1
`techniques and the like used in respective telephone systems are well known
`in the art.” Id. at 8:33–35.
`“CCT 200 may operate, as far as a user is concerned, simultaneously
`as a cellular telephone and a cordless telephone.” Ex. 1008, 8:3–6. Byrne
`clarifies that “CCT 200 can be arranged such that both cellular and cordless
`operations are in progress at the same time.” Id. at 8:6–9.
`2. Claim 1
`Petitioner argues that Byrne teaches the preamble of claim 1, “[a]
`wireless communication device,” if it is limiting, because Byrne teaches a
`cellular cordless telephone. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 69; Ex. 1008, 7:11–
`13); Ex. 1001, 11:63; see also Pet. vii (labeling the preamble “1[pre]”).
`Petitioner also argues that, because Byrne teaches antenna 228 for cordless
`communication and antenna 238 for cellular communication, Byrne teaches
`“a plurality of antennas.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 70; Ex. 1008, 7:13–15);
`Ex. 1001, 11:64; see also Pet. vii (labeling the limitation “1[a]”).
`For “a communication component coupled to the plurality of
`antennas, the communication component including a processor, a
`transmitter, and a receiver,” Petitioner contends that Byrne teaches its CCT
`has (1) cordless transceiver 220 with cordless receiver 221 and cordless
`transmitter 222, (2) cellular transceiver 230 with cellular receiver 231 and
`cellular transmitter 232, and (3) microprocessor 210. Pet. 6–7 (citing
`Ex. 1003 ¶ 71; Ex. 1008, 7:26–32, 7:56–8:2, Fig. 2); Ex. 1001, 11:65–67;
`see also Pet. vii (labeling the limitation “1[b]”). Petitioner also contends
`that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that transceivers
`220, 230 and microprocessor 210 would be a communication component
`coupled to antennas 228, 238. Id. at 7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 72).
`
`13
`
`

`

`IPR2022-01004
`Patent 9,614,943 B1
`For “wherein the communication component is configured to
`communicate via a first frequency band using a wireless communication
`protocol,” Petitioner argues that Byrne teaches its CCT operating on cordless
`protocols and frequency bands and cellular protocols and frequency bands.
`Pet. 7–8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 73; Ex. 1008, 7:19–24); Ex. 1001, 12:1–3; see
`also Pet. vii (labeling the limitation “1[c]”).
`For “wherein one or more subtasks are assigned to one or more
`channels, and the one or more channels are sampled and clocked
`individually,” Petitioner argues that Byrne teaches subtasks and channels in
`a manner consistent with the ’943 patent’s disclosure. Pet. 8 (citing
`Ex. 1001, 7:1–8:41, Figs. 9–12; Ex. 1003 ¶ 77); Ex. 1001, 12:4–6; see also
`Pet. vii (labeling the limitation “1[d]”). According to Petitioner, the ’943
`patent describes multiple transceivers processing multiple data streams, and
`“[e]ach subtask being processed can be assigned to a separate channel.” Id.
`(citing Ex. 1001, 7:1–8:16, Figs. 10, 11).
`Petitioner contends that, because Byrne describes cordless and cellular
`channels, Byrne teaches two channels as separate communication pathways
`for two data streams that are processed separately. Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003
`¶ 77). Petitioner specifically contends that Byrne teaches cordless audio
`channel 240 and cellular audio channel 250, and that cordless and cellular
`subtask are assigned to cordless and cellular channels, respectively. Id. at 8–
`10 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 74–76; Ex. 1008, 6:36–8:43, Fig. 2; Ex. 1042, 1:55–
`2:8, Ex. 1043, 4:23–5:59; Ex. 1044, 4:23–5:59).
`Petitioner also contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would
`have found it obvious that Byrne’s cordless and cellular radio channels are
`sampled and clocked individually according to different specifications
`required in the respective protocols.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 78)
`
`14
`
`

`

`IPR2022-01004
`Patent 9,614,943 B1
`(emphasis in original). Petitioner further contends that one of ordinary skill
`in the art “would have recognized and/or found obvious that Byrne’s
`cordless and cellular channels require or at least benefit from separate and
`individual sampling and clocking.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 78).
`Petitioner additionally contends that it was well known to sample
`continuous signals and reconstruct signals from a set of samples and that
`many receivers sample a signal at higher than twice the bandwidth of the
`signal, also called the Nyquist rate. Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 79; Ex. 1020,
`4–5, 10; Ex. 1024, 10; Ex. 1026, 6; Ex. 1030). Petitioner provides examples
`of such sampling in the DECT and GSM protocols and argues that one of
`ordinary skill in the art “would have recognized and/or found obvious that
`the DECT and GSM systems, which are examples of standards used for
`Byrne’s cordless and cellular channels, are sampled individually at different
`rates that accommodate different bandwidths.” Id. at 11–12 (citing Ex. 1003
`¶ 80; Ex. 1024; Ex. 1025; Ex. 1026; Ex. 1035, 4:14–18; Ex. 1036, 3:4–7;
`Ex. 1039, 3).
`According to Petitioner, a clock would provide timing to a processor
`and an analog-to-digital converter (“ADC”) that would be used to sample a
`received signal. Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 81; Ex. 1038, 1, 3, 4, 6; Ex. 1039,
`4–5, 10, 11–15). Petitioner, thus, argues that one of ordinary skill in the art
`would have understood that the clock driving the ADC at a
`receiver is the same as, or at least derived from, a clock driving
`the computational processor, as the samples created by the ADC
`stream into and are processed by the processor, and therefore the
`samples from the ADC should be synchronized with the
`computations at the processor.
`Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 81; Ex. 1039, 4–5, 11–15).
`
`15
`
`

`

`IPR2022-01004
`Patent 9,614,943 B1
`Petitioner also argues that the clock rate would control processor
`speed and be associated with the data rate. Pet. 12–13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 81;
`Ex. 1038, 2–4; Ex. 1039, 1–4). Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill
`in the art “would have recognized and/or found obvious that the dependence
`among various parameters including the sampling rate, the processor clock
`rate, the information data rate, and the computational requirements results in
`a clocking rate that is determined for each communication protocol.” Id. at
`13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 82).
`Petitioner provides examples of the data rate, channels, and other
`parameters for DECT and GSM. Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1014, 13; Ex. 1018, 1;
`Ex. 1038, 3; Ex. 1039, 3). Petitioner argues that one of ordinary skill in the
`art would have known “that a processor (such as in, or associated with, a
`transceiver) and its clock rate in each of these systems depends on the
`computational demands determined based on these parameters.” Id. at 13–
`14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 83; Ex. 1020, 10; Ex. 1029, 4–5). Petitioner also
`argues that, because DECT and GSM parameters differ, one of ordinary skill
`in the art “would have found it obvious that Byrne’s cordless (e.g., DECT)
`channel is clocked separately and differently from Byrne’s cellular (e.g.,
`GSM) channel.” Id. at 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 83; Ex. 1008, 7:39–49).
`In Petitioner’s view, Byrne’s processors and associated components
`supporting cordless and cellular channels would need to be clocked
`differently for different data rates and communication parameters, and, thus,
`one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious that Byrne’s
`cordless and cellular channels are sampled and clocked individually at their
`separate receivers. Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 84). Petitioner also argues that
`“the ’943 patent’s limited disclosure of individual sampling and clocking
`
`16
`
`

`

`IPR2022-01004
`Patent 9,614,943 B1
`aligns with Byrne’s description” and knowledge in the art. Id. at 14–15
`(citing Ex. 1001, 4:32–38, 7:50–52; Ex. 1003 ¶ 85).
`For “wherein the processor comprises multiple ones of the one or
`more channels and is further configured to process a first data stream and a
`second data stream in parallel,” Petitioner argues that the ’943 patent
`provides a limited disclosure of channels in processors, and that Byrne
`teaches or would have rendered obvious a processor with parallel cordless
`and cellular channels. Pet. 15–16 (citing Ex. 1001, 4:24–29; Ex. 1003 ¶ 86;
`Ex. 1008, 7:25–43, Fig. 2); Ex. 1001, 12:7–9; see also Pet. vii (labeling the
`limitation “1[e]”). Petitioner also argues that Byrne can operate
`simultaneously as a cordless and cellular telephone, and thus, one of
`ordinary skill in the art would have understood, or found obvious, cordless
`and cellular data streams are being processed in parallel. Id. at 16–17 (citing
`Ex. 1003 ¶ 87; Ex. 1008, 8:2–15).
`Petitioner further argues that, if the limitation requires a single
`processor, Byrne teaches single microprocessor 210 and that it would have
`been known or obvious to use a single processor with multiple channels for
`processing cordless and cellular communications. Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1001,
`4:15–31; Ex. 1003 ¶ 87; Ex. 1008, 7:26–9:30, Figs. 2, 3; Ex. 1045;
`Ex. 1046). Petitioner additionally contends that Byrne teaches processing
`data streams because it uses digital protocols for cordless and cellular voice
`and control data. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 88; Ex. 1008, Abstr., 7:15–24, 8:16–
`23, 8:29–38).
`
`17
`
`

`

`IPR2022-01004
`Patent 9,614,943 B1
`a) Preliminary Response
`(1) “processor . . . configured to process a first data stream
`and a second data stream in parallel”
`Patent Owner responds that Byrne fails to disclose a “processor” that
`“is configured to process a first data stream and a second data stream in
`parallel.” Prelim. Resp. 1. According to Patent Owner, Byrne’s “processor
`does not process data streams at all, let alone in parallel” and, instead,
`“handles control logic for switching between the two modes.” Id.; see also
`id. at 4 (citing Pet. 8–9; Ex. 1001, 12:7–9), 9 (arguing similarly).
`In particular, Patent Owner argues that Byrne’s processor “controls
`call switching logic” and does not process any “data stream.” Prelim.
`Resp. 5 (citing Ex. 1008, 7:56–8:2, Figs. 3, 4). Patent Owner contends that
`Byrne’s Figures 3 and 4 do not show “any functionality for processing the
`incoming data stream.” Id. at 5–6 (citing Ex. 1008, Figs. 3, 4). Patent
`Owner also contends that Byrne describes its microprocessor as enabling
`receivers and transmitters and monitoring signals from those components but
`does not describe processing cellular or cordless signals. Id. at 6–7 (citing
`Ex. 1008, 8:16–32, 9:27–30).
`Patent Owner also argues that Petitioner fails to connect the alleged
`data streams to the microprocessor because Petitioner fails to explain “how
`the signal from the antenna is processed into an audio signal . . . without
`ever interacting with the microprocessor.” Prelim. Resp. 7–8 (citing Pet. 16;
`Ex. 1008, Fig. 2). In Patent Owner’s view, cordless signals from antenna
`228 go to band pass filter 270, cordless receiver 221, and then to cordless
`audio 240, and cellular signals follow a similar pathway. Id. Patent Owner
`contends that “the cordless and cellular communication components of
`Byrne do not rely on the microprocessor for processing the incoming
`
`18
`
`

`

`IPR2022-01004
`Patent 9,614,943 B1
`cordless or cellular signal” and “the only thing the microprocessor does
`regarding the audio is control the audio switch.” Id. at 8 (citing Ex. 1008,
`8:39–43, Fig. 2). Patent Owner, thus, contends that Byrne does not disclose,
`and Petitioner fails to show, that Byrne’s “microprocessor processes the data
`streams into audio” and processes data streams on a single microprocessor.
`Id.
`
`Patent Owner further argues that Byrne’s processor is not configured
`to process cellular and cordless data streams in parallel. Prelim. Resp. 8.
`Patent Owner contends that Byrne switches between cordless and cellular
`communications in accordance with preferences and that Byrne’s audio
`switch further indicates that Byrne handles calls separately, not at the same
`time. Id. at 8–9 (citing Ex. 1008, 1:1–3, 1:30–32). Patent Owner also
`contends that Byrne teaches away from parallel processing because it states
`that “if components are shared between cellular and cordless parts, cellular
`and cordless operations can be performed at different times.” Id. at 9 (citing
`Ex. 1008, 8:9–15).
`(2) “one or more channels are sampled and clocked
`individually”
`Patent Owner also responds that Byrne fails to disclose “one or more
`channels are sampled and clocked individually.” Prelim. Resp. 1. In Patent
`Owner’s view, Petitioner recognizes that Byrne does not disclose the
`limitation and attempts to add it with obviousness arguments and declarant
`testimony. Id. at 1, 9 (citing Pet. 10). Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s
`attempt to rely on purported knowledge in the art for a missing limitation
`should be rejected. Id. at 10.
`Patent Owner views Petitioner as “making an argument for
`obviousness based on the ‘common knowledge’ of a [person of ordinary
`
`19
`
`

`

`IPR2022-01004
`Patent 9,614,943 B1
`skill in the art]” but the argument fails based on the analytical framework of
`Arendi S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc., 832 F.3d 1355, 1361–1362 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
`Prelim. Resp. 10–11. Using Arendi, Patent Owner argues that there is no
`dispute that (1) Byrne does not disclose the “sampled and clocked
`individually” limitation, and that (2) the limitation “plays a major role in the
`subject matter claimed in the ’943 patent” because “the ’943 patent claims
`were specifically allowed because this limitation was added to the claims”
`and the Specification describes the importance. Id. at 11–12 (citing Pet. 4;
`Ex. 1001, 4:32–38, 7:50–52). Patent Owner contends that “it would be
`inappropriate” to use purported knowledge in the art to supply a missing
`limitation. Id. at 12.
`Patent Owner also argues that the Petition lacks analysis as to why
`one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Byrne
`in the manner proposed and, at best, shows that the ordinary skilled artisan
`would have had the capacity to add the limitation after having been informed
`of it. Prelim. Resp. 12. Patent Owner contends that showing capacity to
`make the modification is insufficient as a motivation to make the
`modification. Id. Patent Owner likens Petitioner’s argument to a Board
`proceeding where institution was denied because the asserted reference
`disclosed general information about a functionality and did not disclose the
`specific function to be modified. Id. at 12–13 (citing Lenovo Holding Co. v.
`InterDigital Tech. Corp., IPR2020-01514, Paper 11, 37 (PTAB Apr. 15,
`2021); Pet. 11–12). Patent Owner also contends that Petitioner relies on
`declarant testimony that is similarly deficient and lacks evidentiary support.
`Id. at 13 (citing Pet. 14; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 81–82, 84; Ex. 1038; Ex. 1039).
`Patent Owner, thus, contends that Petitioner cannot rely on ordinary
`knowledge for the missing “sa

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket