Paper 8
`Trials@uspto.gov
`Entered: July 1, 2022
`Tel: 571-272-7822
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`CODE200, UAB, TESO LT, UAB, METACLUSTER LT, UAB, and
`OXYSALES, UAB,
`Petitioner,
`v.
`BRIGHT DATA LTD.,
`Patent Owner.
`
`IPR2022-00353
`Patent 11,044,344 B2
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Before THOMAS L. GIANNETTI, SHEILA F. McSHANE, and
`RUSSELL E. CASS, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`McSHANE, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`
`DECISION
`Granting Institution of Inter Partes Review
`35 U.S.C. § 314
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Major Data Ex. 1125
`Major Data UAB v. Bright Data Ltd.
`IPR2022-00915
`Page 1 of 26
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`
`Trials@uspto.gov
`Entered: July 1, 2022
`Tel: 571-272-7822
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`CODE200, UAB, TESO LT, UAB, METACLUSTER LT, UAB, and
`OXYSALES, UAB,
`Petitioner,
`v.
`BRIGHT DATA LTD.,
`Patent Owner.
`
`IPR2022-00353
`Patent 11,044,344 B2
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Before THOMAS L. GIANNETTI, SHEILA F. McSHANE, and
`RUSSELL E. CASS, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`McSHANE, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`
`DECISION
`Granting Institution of Inter Partes Review
`35 U.S.C. § 314
`
`
`
`
`
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`Major Data Ex. 1125
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`Patent 11,044,344 B2
`
`I. INTRODUCTION
`Code200, UAB; Teso LT, UAB; Metacluster LT, UAB; and Oxysales,
`UAB (collectively, “Petitioner”)1 filed a Petition (Paper 1, “Pet.”) requesting
`inter partes review of claims 1, 2, 6–11, 13, 16, 18–25, 29–34, 36, 39, and
`41–46 (the “challenged claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 11,044,344 B2 (Ex.
`1002, “the ’344 patent”). Patent Owner, Bright Data Ltd., filed a
`Preliminary Response (Paper 6, “Prelim. Resp.”).
`The Board has authority to determine whether to institute an inter
`partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Under 35 U.S.C.
`§ 314(a), we may not authorize an inter partes review unless the information
`in the petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable
`likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the
`claims challenged in the petition.”
`For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has
`established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at
`least one claim. We therefore institute inter partes review as to all of the
`challenged claims of the ’344 patent and all of the asserted grounds of
`unpatentability in the Petition.
`
`II. BACKGROUND
`
`
`
`A. Related Matters
`The parties identify several court proceedings that involve patents
`related to the ’344 patent. Pet. 2–3; Paper 5, 2–3. In particular, the parties
`identify Luminati Networks Ltd. v. Teso LT, UAB, et al., No. 2:19-cv-395
`
`
`1 Petitioner identifies coretech lt, UAB as another real party-in-interest. Pet.
`1.
`
`2
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`(E.D. Tex.) (“the Teso district court litigation”). The parties do not,
`however, identify any district court cases that involve the ’344 patent. Id.
`The parties also identify several inter partes reviews for patents
`related to the ’344 patent, but similarly, none of these cases challenged
`claims of the ’344 patent. Pet. 3–5; Paper 5, 1–2. In addition, the parties
`identify ex parte reexaminations ordered for related patents, Control No.
`90/014,875 and Control No. 90/014,876. Pet. 8; Paper 5, 2.
`
`B. The ’344 Patent
`The ’344 patent is titled “System Providing Faster And More Efficient
`Data Communication” and issued on June 22, 2021, from an application
`filed on October 24, 2019. Ex. 1002, codes (22), (45), (54). The patent is
`subject to a terminal disclaimer. Id. at code (*). The application for the
`’344 patent claims priority to several applications, including U.S.
`Provisional Application No. 61/249,624, filed October 8, 2009. Id. at code
`(60).
`
`The ’344 patent is directed to addressing the “need for a new method
`of data transfer that is fast for the consumer, cheap for the content distributor
`and does not require infrastructure investment for ISPs.” Ex. 1002, 1:54–56.
`The ’344 patent states that other “attempts at making the Internet faster for
`the consumer and cheaper for the broadcaster,” such as proxy servers and
`peer-to-peer file sharing, have various shortcomings. Id. at 1:58–3:3. The
`’344 patent provides a system and method “for faster and more efficient data
`communication within a communication network,” such as in the network
`illustrated in Figure 3, reproduced below. Id. at 3:13–16, 4:3–5.
`
`3
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`Figure 3, above, is a schematic diagram depicting communication network
`100 including a number of communication devices. Ex. 1002, 4:54–61.
`Client 102 is capable of communicating with peers 112, 114, and 116, as
`well as with one or more agents 122. Id. at 4:56–58. Web server 152 may
`be “a typical HTTP server, such as those being used to deliver content on
`any of the many such servers on the Internet.” Id. at 4:63–67. Acceleration
`server 162 includes acceleration server storage device 164 with an
`acceleration server database, which “stores Internet Protocol (IP) addresses
`of communication devices within the communication network 100 having
`acceleration software stored therein.” Id. at 5:11–16.
`
`In operation, a client may request a resource on the network, for
`example, through the use of an Internet browser. Ex. 1002, 12:62–13:3. If
`server 152 is the target of the request, the client sends the IP address of
`server 152 to acceleration server 162. Id. at 13:8–13. Acceleration server
`
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`162 then prepares a list of agents that can handle the request, which includes
`communication devices “that are currently online, and whose IP address is
`numerically close to the IP of the destination Web server 152.” Id. at
`13:19–29. The client then sends the original request to the agents in the list
`to find out which “is best suited to be the one agent that will assist with this
`request.” Id. at 13:31–36. The connection established between the agent
`and client may be a Transmission Control Protocol [TCP] connection. Id. at
`17:61–64.
`Each agent responds to the client with information as to “whether the
`agent has seen a previous request for this resource that has been fulfilled,”
`and “which can help the client to download the request information from
`peers in the network.” Ex. 1002, 13:51–58. The client selects an agent
`based on a number of factors, and the selected agent determines whether
`data stored in its memory or the memory of the peers “still mirrors the
`information that would have been received from the server itself for this
`request.” Id. at 13:64–14:1, 14:35–38. If the selected agent does not have
`the necessary information to service a request, it may “load the information
`directly from the server in order to be able to provide an answer to the
`requesting client.” Id. at 14:62–67.
`
`
`C. Illustrative Claim
`The ’344 patent has 46 claims. Claims 1 and 24 are the only
`independent claims. Claim 1 is illustrative of the claimed subject matter and
`is reproduced below, with bracketed designations added to the limitations for
`reference purposes.
`1. [pre] A method for use with a web server that stores a first
`web-page identified by a first Uniform Resource Locator (URL), the
`method by a first client device comprising:
`
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`[a] communicating with a second server;
`[b] receiving, from the second server, the first URL;
`[c] sending, to the web server over the Internet, the first URL;
`[d] receiving, the first web-page from the web server over the
`Internet in response to the sending of the first URL; and
`[e] sending the received first web-page to the second server, in
`response to the receiving of the first URL.
`Ex. 1002, 19:16–25.
` D. Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability
`Petitioner challenges the patentability of claims 1, 2, 6–11, 13, 16, 18–
`25, 29–34, 36, 39, and 41–46 of the ’344 patent on the following grounds:
`Claims Challenged
`35 U.S.C. §2
`Reference(s)
`1, 2, 6, 7, 16, 18–23
`102(b)
`Crowds3
`1, 2, 6, 7, 16, 18–23,
`24, 25, 29, 30, 39,
`41–46
`8, 9, 31, 32
`10, 11, 13, 33, 34, 36
`
`103(a)
`
`103(a)
`103(a)
`
`Crowds
`
`Crowds, RFC 11224,
`Crowds, RFC 26165
`
`
`2 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125
`Stat. 284, 287–88 (2011), amended 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103, effective
`March 16, 2013. Because the ’344 patent claims priority to a provisional
`application that was filed before this date, with Petitioner not contesting that
`priority, the pre-AIA versions of §§ 102 and 103 apply. See Ex. 1002, code
`(60).
`3 Michael K. Reiter, Crowds: Anonymity for Web Transactions, ACM
`Transactions on Information and System Security, Vol. 1, No. 1, November
`1998, at 66–92 (Ex. 1004).
`4 Requirements for Internet Hosts – Communication Layers, Network
`Working Group, RFC 1122, October, 1989 (Ex. 1040).
`5 Hypertext Transfer Protocol—HTTP/1.1, Network Working Group, RFC
`2616, The Internet Society, 1999 (Ex. 1006).
`
`6
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`Pet. 10–12.
`
`III. DISCRETIONARY DENIAL
`Under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d), when determining whether to institute an
`
`inter partes review, “the Director may take into account whether, and reject
`the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art
`or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” In evaluating
`arguments under § 325(d), we use
`[a] two-part framework: (1) whether the same or substantially the
`same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the
`same or substantially the same arguments previously were
`presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of first part of
`the framework
`is satisfied, whether
`the petitioner has
`demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the
`patentability of challenged claims.
`Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH,
`IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential)
`(“Advanced Bionics”); see also Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. B. Braun
`Melsungen AG, IPR2017-01586, Paper 8 at 17–18 (PTAB Dec. 15, 2017)
`(precedential as to Section III.C.5, first paragraph) (listing factors to
`consider in evaluating the applicability of § 325(d)) (“Becton Dickinson”).
`
`Both parties acknowledge that Crowds, RFC 1122, and RFC 2616
`were considered before the Patent Office during the prosecution of the ’344
`patent, so the first part of the two-part Advanced Bionics framework is
`satisfied. See Pet. 64.; Prelim. Resp. 7.
`
`Under part two of the Advanced Bionics framework, Becton Dickinson
`factors (c), (e), and (f) are considered in the evaluation of whether the
`examiner erred during prosecution. Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 10–11.
`Becton Dickinson identifies these factors as (c) the extent to which the
`
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`asserted art was evaluated during examination, including whether the prior
`art was the basis for rejection; (e) whether Petitioner has pointed out
`sufficiently how the examiner erred in its evaluation of the asserted prior art;
`and (f) the extent to which additional evidence and facts presented in the
`Petition warrant reconsideration of the prior art or argument. Becton
`Dickinson, Paper 8 at 17–18.
`
`Petitioner argues that although Crowds, RFC 1122, and RFC 2616
`were considered by the Patent Office during the prosecution of the ’344
`patent, the examiner materially erred in allowing the claims. Pet. 64–71.
`More specifically, Petitioner asserts that the examiner did not issue prior art
`rejections, only obviousness-type double patenting rejections, in the
`prosecution of the ’344 patent, which were overcome with a terminal
`disclaimer filed by the applicant. Id. at 64–65. Petitioner further contends
`that with the supporting testimony of Dr. Freedman (which was unavailable
`to the examiner), the Petition demonstrates that Crowds discloses and
`teaches the claims at issue, and therefore demonstrates the examiner’s
`material error. Id. at 65. Petitioner argues that Crowds discloses all the
`limitations that the examiner relied upon, as well as the first device that
`performs receiving and sending, and “[t]his alone is evidence of material
`error by the Examiner.” Id. Petitioner additionally asserts that Crowds is
`more material than prior art that the examiner relied upon in rejections in the
`prosecution of U.S. Patent No. 10,491,712, the parent of the application for
`the ’344 patent, and U.S. Patent No. 10,257,319, a grandparent of the
`application for the ’344 patent. Id. at 66–71.
`
`Patent Owner responds that we should deny the Petition under
`§ 325(d) because Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the examiner erred in a
`
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`manner material to the patentability of the challenged claims. Prelim. Resp.
`7–32. Patent Owner asserts that the examiner was familiar with the ’344
`patent specification, which was common to 33 of the 37 patent applications,
`because the same examiner was involved in all their prosecutions. Id. at 8–
`9. Patent Owner argues also that the examiner was also familiar with
`Crowds, RFC 1122, and RFC 2616 because those references had been cited
`in many of the prosecutions of the applications in the family of the ’344
`patent. Id. at 9–15. Patent Owner contends that the examiner was familiar
`with the claim language in the family of applications because the examiner
`had issued a double-patenting rejection in this case over some of the claims
`of the related patents. Id. at 16–20. Patent Owner further asserts that the
`rejections show that the examiner was aware that the patents operated
`“within the same second server ↔ first client device ↔ web server
`architecture, which Examiner Nguyen recognized as being unique.” Id. at
`16.
`Patent Owner provides a table comparing the claim language of claim
`
`1 of the ’344 patent to that of other related patents. Prelim. Resp. 17–20.
`Patent Owner argues that the prosecution histories of the patents that it
`identifies as related are relevant to the second part of Advanced Bionics
`framework, and the same examiner had considered similar claim limitations
`in the related patent as well as the Crowds, RFC 1122, and RFC 2616
`references. Id. at 20. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner fails to show
`material error in its arguments related to other prior art because the fact that
`the examiner did not issue rejections as set forth in the grounds is not
`material error. Id. at 21–28.
`
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`Under factor (c) and based on the record before us, the fact that
`Crowds was not the basis of rejection in the prosecution of the ’344 patent
`nor was identified by the parties as the basis of rejection in any of the related
`patents weighs strongly against exercising our discretion to deny institution
`under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). See Becton Dickinson, Paper 8 at 17; see also
`Kayak Software Corp. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., CBM2016-00075, Paper
`No. 16 at 11 (PTAB Dec. 15, 2016) (informative). As such, the record does
`not demonstrate the extent to which the Examiner considered Crowds alone
`or in combination with RFC 1122 and RFC 2616, as asserted in this Petition
`and applied to the challenged claims.
`
`Under factors (e) and (f), and as discussed infra at Section IV.D,
`Petitioner has provided sufficient evidence that Crowds discloses every
`limitation of the independent claim of the ’344 patent. Additionally, the
`examiner did not have the benefit of the claim construction of the district
`court, which we have adopted here (infra Section IV.B), which included
`broad constructions of the terms “client device” and “second server.” We
`also consider these factors to weigh strongly against exercising our
`discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).
`
`Accordingly, in view of the issues addressed above, we determine that
`the evidence supports that the Office erred in a manner material to the
`patentability of challenged claims.
`
`For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded to exercise our
`discretion under § 325(d) to deny institution.
`
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`IV. ANALYSIS
`A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art
`
` According to Petitioner, a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have
`had at least a bachelor’s degree in Computer Science or related field (or
`equivalent experience), and two or more years’ experience working with and
`programming networked computer systems” as of the date of the invention.
`Pet. 12–13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 30).
`
`Patent Owner submits that a person of ordinary skill in the art “had a
`Master’s Degree or higher in the field of Electrical Engineering, Computer
`Engineering, or Computer Science or as of that time had a Bachelor’s
`Degree in the same fields and two or more years of experience in Internet
`Communications.” Prelim. Resp. 33 (citing Ex. 2017 ¶ 21). Patent Owner
`acknowledges, however, that the parties’ respective proposed qualifications
`“are not materially different, at least in terms of affecting an institution
`decision in this IPR.” Id.
`
`For the purposes of this Decision, we adopt the assessment offered by
`Petitioner as it is consistent with the ’344 patent and the prior art before us.6
`See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We note
`that, at this juncture, we agree with Patent Owner that the proposed
`qualifications are not materially different and our assessment of the merits of
`the Petition, as discussed below, would remain the same under either parties’
`proposed qualifications.
`
`
`6 The parties are encouraged to address the impact, if any, of differences in
`the level of qualifications on the anticipation and obviousness analyses in
`any subsequent briefing.
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`B. Claim Construction
`In this inter partes review, claims are construed using the same claim
`construction standard that would be used to construe the claims in a civil
`action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b). 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2021). Under the
`principles set forth by our reviewing court, the “words of a claim ‘are
`generally given their ordinary and customary meaning,’” as would be
`understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of
`the invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
`(en banc) (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582
`(Fed. Cir. 1996)). “In determining the meaning of the disputed claim
`limitation, we look principally to the intrinsic evidence of record, examining
`the claim language itself, the written description, and the prosecution
`history, if in evidence.” DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek,
`Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at
`1312–17).
`In particular, Petitioner points to two claim construction orders in the
`Teso district court litigation—an original order (Ex. 1011) and a
`supplemental order (Ex. 1014)—and argues they should apply. Pet. 14–17.
`Petitioner refers to Patent Owner’s arguments in the Teso litigation that
`asserted that the terms required various software or hardware characteristics
`and that interchangeable devices could not be both a “client device” and a
`“server,” and argues that the district court rejected those arguments. Id. at
`14 (citing Ex. 1011, 11–12; Ex. 1014, 7–11; Ex. 1026, 14, 19). Petitioner
`contends that Patent Owner relied on its arguments related to a “server” as
`the only basis to distinguish Crowds from the claims of related patents. Id.
`at 14–15 (citing Ex. 1046, 2). Petitioner further contends that the district
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`court clarified that “second server” is a device that is operating in the role of
`a server and that is not the first client device, and under the plain meaning,
`this means a device operating in the role of a server. Id. at 15–16. Petitioner
`argues that Patent Owner’s assertion that a device can only be a client or
`server is contradicted by RFC 2616, which states that with regard to a
`“server,” “[a]ny given program may be capable of being both a client and a
`server; our use of these terms refers only to the role being performed by the
`program for a particular connection” Id. at 16 (citing Ex. 1006, 8).
`Petitioner contends that the specification of the ’344 patent is
`consistent with the plain meaning of the terms, as interpreted by the district
`court. Pet. 16–17. Petitioner refers to Figure 3 of the ’344 patent where
`“client 102 is the only device that that the patent discloses forwarding URLs
`to agent 122 (as performed by the claimed ‘second server’).” Id. at 16
`(citing Ex. 1002, 13:31–36, Fig. 3) (emphases in original). Petitioner also
`refers to other portions of the specification which are alleged to support that
`client and agent are distinguished solely based on role, and not separate
`hardware or operating systems. Id. at 17 (citing Ex. 1002, 9:20–25; Ex.
`1003 ¶ 50).
`Patent Owner agrees that the district court’s claim constructions
`should be used. Prelim. Resp. 34–35. Patent Owner asserts, however, that
`the district court’s additional guidance indicated that “[t]he patents do not
`include servers as a type of ‘communication device,’” and confirmed “that
`servers must be configured to be servers.” Id. at 35 (citing Ex. 1014, 10).
`Patent Owner refers to the district court’s statement that “component can be
`configured to operate in different roles—so long as it does not
`‘simultaneously serve as more than one of: the client device, the first
`
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`server/second server, and the web server.’” Id. (citing Ex. 1014, 10). Patent
`Owner argues that Petitioner is “seeking a broader construction for the term
`‘second server’ to remove the requirement that it be a server.” Id. at 36. In
`support, Patent Owner refers to the district court’s supplemental claim
`construction order, which states that “[t]he Court is not changing the
`construction of ‘first server’ and ‘second server,’ as this understanding is
`already embedded in those terms’ construction.” Id. (citing Ex. 1014, 11).
`Patent Owner also disagrees with Petitioner’s assertion that the issue of the
`scope of the server was the sole basis that Patent Owner used to distinguish
`Crowds from the independent claims because the district court referred to
`the use of non-traditional client servers. Id. at 37–38.
`Patent Owner also disagrees with Petitioner’s description of the
`elements of Figure 3 of the ’344 patent. Prelim. Resp. 38 (citing Pet. 16).
`Patent Owner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would
`understand that both client 102 and agent 122 . . . are client devices” and not
`that client 102 is a “second server” and agent 122 is a “first client device,” as
`Petitioner asserts. Id. at 38 (citing Ex. 2017 ¶ 44).
`Patent Owner has failed to consider some of the district court’s
`statements regarding the construction of terms. Specifically, the district
`court stated that “a component can be configured to operate in different
`roles—so long as it does not ‘simultaneously serve as more than one of: the
`client device, the first server/second server, and the web server.’” Ex. 1014,
`10. That is, although the district court determined that a single component
`could not simultaneously serve more than one function at any particular
`time, it stated that different components could operate in different roles. Id.
`More particularly, in the discussion of “server” terms, the district court
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`indicated that the function of a component, not its structure, serves to define
`the term. Id. at 7–10. For instance, the district court adopted the language
`“a device that is operating in the role of” for the term “client device.” See
`id. at 10. Further, the district court found that the contention “that a client
`device is specifically not a server—is not supported by the specification.”
`Ex. 1011, 11. The district court also stated that “[t]he patents do not include
`servers as a type of ‘communication device,’ but that is not sufficient to
`construe ‘client device’ as unable to act as a server in all cases.” Id. at 12
`(emphasis added).
`We credit the district court’s interpretation of the claim terms.
`Accordingly, for the purposes of this decision we adopt the construction of a
`“client device” as “communication device that is operating in the role of a
`client.” Ex. 1011, 12. Additionally, we construe the term “second server”
`as “server that is not the client device” (id. at 14), consistent with the district
`court’s clarification (Ex. 1014, 8, 11).
`We determine that we need not expressly construe any other claim
`terms to resolve the parties’ disputes on the current record. See Nidec Motor
`Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed.
`Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and
`only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid
`Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).
`C. Principles of Law
`A claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102 if a prior art reference
`discloses each and every limitation of the claimed invention, either explicitly
`or inherently. Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043, 1047 (Fed. Cir.
`1995); see MEHL/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1365
`
`15
`
`Major Data Ex. 1125
`Major Data UAB v. Bright Data Ltd.
`IPR2022-00915
`Page 15 of 26
`
`
`
`IPR2022-00353
`Patent 11,044,344 B2
`(Fed. Cir. 1999) (“To anticipate, a claim a prior art reference must disclose
`every limitation of the claimed invention . . .;” any limitation not explicitly
`taught must be inherently taught and would be so understood by a person
`experienced in the field); In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388, 390
`(Fed. Cir. 1991) (the dispositive question is “whether one skilled in the art
`would reasonably understand or infer” that a reference teaches or discloses
`all of the limitations of the claimed invention).
`A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the
`differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that
`the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the
`invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
`subject matter pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406
`(2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying
`factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art;
`(2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art;
`(3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) when in evidence, objective
`indicia of nonobviousness. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18
`(1966).
` D. Anticipation of Claims 1, 2, 6, 7, 16, and 18–23 by Crowds
`
`Petitioner contends that claims 1, 2, 6, 7, 16, and 18–23 are
`anticipated by Crowds. Pet. 17–43. To support its contentions, Petitioner
`provides explanations as to how Crowds discloses each claim limitation. Id.
`Petitioner also relies upon the Freedman Declaration (Ex. 1003) to support
`its positions. Patent Owner argues that Crowds is inconsistent with the
`claims and does not disclose all the claim limitations. Prelim. Resp. 42–52.
`
`16
`
`Major Data Ex. 1125
`Major Data UAB v. Bright Data Ltd.
`IPR2022-00915
`Page 16 of 26
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`
`IPR2022-00353
`Patent 11,044,344 B2
`
`We begin our discussion with a brief summary of Crowds, and then
`address the evidence and arguments presented.
`
`
`1. Crowds (Ex. 1004)
`
`Crowds is an article that “introduce[s] a new approach for increasing
`the privacy of web transactions.” Ex. 1004, 2.7 In this approach, a user
`joins a “crowd” of other users, wherein the user’s request to a web server is
`passed to a random member of the crowd, and possibly forwarded to one or
`more other members, prior to being submitted to the end server. Id. In this
`way, “[w]hen the request is eventually submitted, it is submitted by a
`random member, thus preventing the end server from identifying its true
`initiator.” Id. In Crowds, a user is represented “by a process on her
`computer called a jondo (pronounced ‘John Doe’ and meant to convey the
`image of a faceless participant).” Id. at 8. “When the jondo is started, it
`contacts a server called the blender to request admittance to the crowd.” Id.
`Exemplary paths for web requests from crowd users are shown in Figure 2,
`reproduced below:
`
`
`7 Unless otherwise stated, citations to exhibits use the page numbers
`identified by the parties.
`
`17
`
`Major Data Ex. 1125
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`IPR2022-00915
`Page 17 of 26
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`Patent 11,044,344 B2
`
`
`
`In Figure 2 of Crowds, above, when a jondo receives a user request from a
`browser, it “initiates the establishment of a random path of jondos that
`carries its users’ transactions to and from their intended web servers.” Ex.
`1004, 8. For example, the paths in Figure 2 among the jondos labeled 1 to 6
`are as follows: “1 → 5 → server; 2 → 6 → 2 → server; 3 → 1 → 6 →
`server; 4 → 4 → server; 5 → 4 → 6 → server; and 6 → 3 → server.” Id.
`“[S]erver replies traverse the same path as the requests, only in reverse.” Id.
`at 9.
`
`
`2. Discussion
`
`a. Claim 1
`
`
`Petitioner asserts that Crowds discloses the claimed web server that
`
`stores a web-page identified by a first Uniform Resource Locator [URL],
`and with a first client device. Pet. 20–21 (citing 1003 ¶¶ 69–71). Petitioner
`refers to annotated Figure 2 of Crowds, reproduced below.
`
`18
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`Major Data Ex. 1125
`Major Data UAB v. Bright Data Ltd.
`IPR2022-00915
`Page 18 of 26
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`IPR2022-00353
`Patent 11,044,344 B2
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`
`
`As shown in Petitioner’s annotated version of Figure 2 of Crowds, above,
`Petitioner refers to the path 5→4→6→server (highlighted in green), with
`boxed “5” mapped to the web server. Pet. 21. As shown, Petitioner
`identifies jondo 6 as the first client device (jondo 6). Id.
`
`Petitioner argues that Crowds discloses limitation 1[a] because a
`person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that jondo 6 is operating
`in the role of a client, and that jondo 6 communicates with jondo 4, which
`operates in the role of a server. Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 72). More
`specifically, Petitioner asserts that “jondo 6 is a communication device
`because it is a device (user’s computer) that, due at least in part to the jondo
`application residing on it, facilitates communication between other devices,
`including web server 5 and jondo 4 in the Mapped Path.” Id. (citing Ex.
`1003 ¶ 73; Ex. 1004, 8–9). Petitioner also contends that “[j]ondo 6 operates
`in the role of a client at least because, as the web request originating at jondo
`
`19
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`Major Data Ex. 1125
`Major Data UAB v. Bright Data Ltd.
`IPR2022-00915
`Page 19 of 26
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`IPR2022-00353
`Patent 11,044,344 B2
`5 is traveling to web server 5 in the Mapped Path, jondo 6 is serving as a
`client of web server 5.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 73; Ex. 1004, 8–9).
`
`Petitioner asserts that limitation 1[b] is performed by Crowds because
`jondo 6 receives a URL from jondo 4. Pet. 23 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 76).
`Petitioner refers to Crowds disclosure that a user selects the jondo on her
`computer as her web proxy in her web browser for all services, including
`HTTP, and the request can result in “a retrieved web page.” Id. (citing Ex.
`1004, 8, n.1, 14, 17)
`
`For limitation 1[c], Petitioner asserts that Crowds discloses that jondo
`6 sends the first URL it received from jondo 4 to web server 5. Pet. 25
`(citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 79). Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary
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