IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`
`LUMINATI NETWORKS, LTD.,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`TESO LT, UAB, OXYSALES, UAB,
`and METACLUSTER LT, UAB,
`
`Defendants.
`
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`
`Case No. 2:19-cv-00395-JRG
`
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION OPINION AND ORDER
`
`In this patent case, Plaintiff Luminati Networks, Ltd. (“Plaintiff”) alleges infringement of
`
`U.S. Patents 10,257,319, 10,484,510, and 10,469,614 by Defendants Teso LT, UAB, Oxysales,
`
`UAB, and Metacluster LT, UAB (collectively, the “Defendants”). Dkt. No. 126 at 4. Each of these
`
`patents relates to improving speed and bandwidth efficiency when accessing data over the Internet.
`
`See ’319 Patent at 1:23–25; ’510 Patent at 1:26–28; ’614 Patent at 1:19–23.
`
`Generally, the parties have two types of disputes. First, they dispute the scope of
`
`three similar terms across the patents: “client device,” “first server,” and “second server.”
`
`Second, Defendants contend some of the asserted claims are indefinite. Having considered
`
`the parties’ briefing along with arguments of counsel at a November 17, 2020 hearing, the Court
`
`resolves these disputes as follows.
`
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`I.
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`A.
`
`The ’319 Patent and ’510 Patent
`
`These two patents, which share the same specification,1 concern “Internet communication,
`
`and more particularly, . . . improving data communication speed and bandwidth efficiency on the
`
`Internet.” ’319 Patent at 1:23–25; see also ’510 Patent at 1:26–28. The patents explain how, as
`
`Internet bandwidth consumption continues to increase, users experience slower speeds, content
`
`owners pay more for hosting and bandwidth costs, and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) incur
`
`higher infrastructure costs. ’319 Patent at 1:29–53; ’510 Patent at 1:32–56.
`
`The patents describe two prior-art attempts to address these problems. First, some systems
`
`use “proxy servers” located logically between client devices and web servers. The proxy servers
`
`request content from various web servers and store, or “cache,” that content for future use by other
`
`client devices that request the same content. This speeds access to the data for devices that are
`
`geographically close to a proxy server, provided that proxy server has the necessary storage space
`
`and bandwidth for all of the content likely to be requested. See generally ’319 Patent at 2:08–23.
`
`The patents, however, caution against using proxy servers for large-scale (e.g., global)
`
`solutions as having insufficient storage for all the data available on the Internet. Such
`
`implementations would require an extensive capital investment, and proxy servers are poorly
`
`suited for dynamic data.2 Id. at 2:24–39.
`
`Second, as an alternative to proxy servers, the patents describe peer-to-peer file sharing, a
`
`process by which files are stored on many computers accessible through the Internet. This provides
`
`1 The ’510 Patent’s underlying application was a continuation of the ’319 Patent’s underlying
`application. ’510 Patent at (60).
`
`2 “Dynamic data” does not exist until created in response to the request of a client device. ’319
`Patent at 1:65–2:05.
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`multiple sources for files and therefore speeds access to these files. See generally ’319 Patent at
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`2:40–52. This approach, however, requires a file index tracking the location of all shared content.
`
`Id. at 2:52–58. While this works well for files in relatively low demand, the cost of storing and
`
`maintaining a large index for all available Internet content is cost prohibitive. Id. at 2:59–3:01. As
`
`with proxy servers, peer-to-peer file sharing also does not effectively address the use of dynamic
`
`data. Id. at 3:01–03.
`
`The patents purport to address these problems with a system that, relative to the prior art,
`
`“provides for faster and more efficient data communication within a communication network.” Id.
`
`at 3:13–15. Specifically, the patents describe a system in which a client device intercepts
`
`communication requests (e.g., a web request for content) to a server from requesting applications
`
`(e.g., web browsers). The client device transmits intercepted requests to an acceleration server,
`
`which returns a list of agents associated with the targeted server’s IP address. The request is then
`
`sent to these agents, which respond with a list of peers that have previously seen some or all of the
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`requested content. The client then downloads the data from these peers rather than the server,
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`which speeds up file transfer, reduces congestion by fetching content from multiple sources, and
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`offloads data transfers from web servers to nearby peers. ’319 Patent at (57).
`
`The claims are specific to HTTP requests and recite a client device acting as an
`
`intermediary between two servers. Claim 1 of the ’319 Patent requires a client device to:
`
`receiv[e], from the second server, [a] first content identifier;
`
`send[], to the first server over the Internet, a Hypertext Transfer
`Protocol (HTTP) request that comprises the first content
`identifier;
`
`receiv[e] the first content from the first server over the Internet in
`response to the sending of the first content identifier; and
`
`send[] the first content . . . to the second server, in response to the
`receiving of the first content identifier.
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`’319 Patent at 19:16–32. Similarly, Claim 1 of the ’510 Patent requires the client device to:
`
`establish[] a Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) connection with
`a second server;
`
`send[], to [a] web server over an Internet, the first content identifier;
`
`receiv[e], the first content from the web server over the Internet in
`response to the sending of the first content identifier; and
`
`send[] the received first content, to the second server over the
`established TCP connection, in response to the receiving of the
`first content identifier.
`
`’510 Patent at 19:18–31. As the term suggests, the “first content identifier” is some identifier that
`
`allows the system to identify the requested content, such as a checksum of the content. See, e.g.,
`
`’310 Patent at 15:20–22 (“The chunk request that the client sends to each of the peers is the
`
`checksum of the data that the client seeks to receive, which is the key (identifier) of the chunk.”).
`
`B.
`
`The ’614 Patent
`
`The ’614 Patent concerns similar subject matter. Much like the ’319 Patent and ’510 Patent,
`
`the claims recite a client device communicating with a server over the Internet, but the client device
`
`only sometimes acts as a proxy. Luminati characterizes this as dynamically shifting between two
`
`states—either acting as a proxy or not acting as a proxy—based on some criteria. See Dkt. No. 126
`
`at 3. The state-determining criteria might be, for example, the outcome of a random number
`
`generator, ’614 Patent at 92:30–35, the physical location of the client device, id. at 92:47–49, the
`
`time a client device signs up with a server, id. at 93:31–34, or the IP addresses of the various
`
`devices, id. at 93:22–30.
`
`In Claim 1, the state-determining criteria is the amount of resource utilization. That claim
`
`recites the steps of:
`
`initiating, by the client device, communication with [a] first server
`over the Internet in response to connecting to the Internet, the
`communication comprises sending, by the client device, the first
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`identifier to the first server over the Internet;
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`when connected to the Internet, periodically or continuously
`determining whether the resource utilization satisfies the
`criterion;
`
`responsive to the determining that the utilization of the resource
`satisfies the criterion, shifting to the first state or staying in the
`first state;
`
`responsive to the determining that the utilization of the resource
`does not satisfy the criterion, shifting to the second state or
`staying in the second state;
`
`responsive to being in the first state, receiving, by the client device,
`a request from the first server; and
`
`performing a task, by the client device, in response to the receiving
`of the request from the first server,
`
`’614 Patent at 172:50–67 (emphasis added). The performed “task” requires:
`
`receiving, by the client device, the first content identifier from
`the first server;
`
`sending, by the client device, the first content identifier to the
`web server;
`
`receiving, by the client device, the first content from the web
`server in response to the sending of the first content
`identifier; and
`
`sending, by the client device, the received first content to the
`first server.
`
`Id. at 173:5–13.
`
`II.
`
`GENERAL LEGAL STANDARDS
`
`A.
`
`Construction of Claim Terms and Phrases
`
`“[T]he claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to
`
`exclude.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting
`
`Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
`
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`As such, if the parties dispute the scope of the claims, the court must determine their meaning. See,
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`e.g., Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d 1295, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see
`
`also Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996), aff ’g, 52 F.3d 967, 976
`
`(Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
`
`When construing claims, “[t]here is a heavy presumption that claim terms are to be given
`
`their ordinary and customary meaning.” Aventis Pharm. Inc. v. Amino Chems. Ltd., 715 F.3d 1363,
`
`1373 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13). “Courts are required therefore ‘look
`
`to the words of the claims themselves … to define the scope of the patented invention.’” Id.
`
`(quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)) (ellipsis in
`
`original). The “ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would
`
`have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the
`
`effective filing date of the patent application.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313 (citations omitted). This
`
`“person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the
`
`particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent,
`
`including the specification.” Id.
`
`“[I]ntrinsic evidence is the primary resource” for claim construction. See Power-One, Inc.
`
`v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., 599 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing id. at 1312). For certain claim
`
`terms, “the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood by a person of skill in the art may
`
`be readily apparent even to lay judges, and claim construction in such cases involves little more
`
`than the application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words.” Phillips,
`
`415 F.3d at 1314 (citation omitted). But for claim terms with less-apparent meanings, “the court
`
`looks to ‘those sources available to the public that show what a person of skill in the art would
`
`have understood disputed claim language to mean.” Id. (quoting Innova, 381 F.3d at 1116). “Those
`
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`sources include ‘the words of the claims themselves, the remainder of the specification, the
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`prosecution history, and extrinsic evidence concerning relevant scientific principles, the meaning
`
`of technical terms, and the state of the art.’” Id. (quoting Innova, 381 F.3d at 1116).
`
`B.
`
`Indefiniteness
`
`“[A] patent is invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the specification
`
`delineating the patent, and the prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those
`
`skilled in the art about the scope of the invention.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572
`
`U.S. 898, 901 (2014). The patent “must be precise enough to afford clear notice of what is
`
`claimed,” but that consideration must be made while accounting for the inherent limitations of
`
`language. Id. at 909 (citations omitted).
`
`Defendants base some of their indefiniteness challenges on an apparent lack of antecedent
`
`basis for certain recited limitations. A claim is not necessarily indefinite if the body of the claim
`
`recites additional limitations not found in the preamble. See Energizer Holdings, Inc. v. Int’l Trade
`
`Comm’n, 435 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“The failure to provide explicit antecedent basis
`
`for terms does not always render a claim indefinite.”). The question is whether the claim
`
`adequately notifies the public of the scope of the patentee’s right to exclude. See id. (“When the
`
`meaning of the claim would reasonably be understood by persons of ordinary skill when read in
`
`light of the specification, the claim is not subject to invalidity upon departure from the protocol of
`
`‘antecedent basis.’”).
`
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`III.
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`LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART
`
`The level of ordinary skill in the art is the level of skill of a hypothetical person who is
`
`presumed to have known the relevant art at the time of the invention. In resolving the level of
`
`ordinary skill, courts consider the types of and solutions to problems encountered in the art, the
`
`speed of innovation, the sophistication of the technology, and the education of workers active in
`
`the field. See In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also KSR Int’l Co. v.
`
`Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007) (“A person of ordinary skill in the art is also a person of
`
`ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”).
`
`Here, the parties generally agree on the proper level of skill in the art. Defendants assert
`
`“[a] person of ordinary skill . . . would have at least a bachelor’s degree in Computer Science or
`
`related field (or equivalent experience), as well as two or more years of experience working with
`
`and programming networked computer systems.” Dkt. No. 138 at 2 n.1. Luminati contends a
`
`person of ordinary skill
`
`had a Master’s Degree or higher in the field of Electrical Engineering, Computer
`Engineering, or Computer Science or as of that time had a Bachelor’s Degree in the
`same fields and two or more years of experience in Internet communications.
`
`Dkt. No. 126 at 9.
`
`To the extent there are differences between the proffered levels of skill, the parties concede
`
`those differences are not material to construing the disputed terms or resolving Defendants’
`
`assertions of indefiniteness. Neither party challenges the other’s proffered level of skill or provides
`
`any analysis of the differences. Nor does either party contend the proper construction of the
`
`disputed terms or the correct resolution to the indefiniteness challenges turn on which level of skill
`
`the Court finds proper.
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`Code200, UAB v. Bright Data Ltd.
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`IV.
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`AGREED CONSTRUCTIONS
`
`The Court construes the following terms as agreed by the parties:3
`
`Claim Term / Phrase
`
`Construction
`
`preamble
`’319 Patent cl.1
`’510 Patent cl.1
`’614 Patent cl.1
`
`web server
`’510 Patent cls.1 & 16
`’614 Patent cls.1 & 29
`
`limiting
`
`plain and ordinary meaning
`
`receiving, from the second server, the first
`content identifier
`’319 Patent cl.1
`
`plain and ordinary meaning
`
`during, as part of, or in response to, a start up
`’319 Patent cl.2
`
`plain and ordinary meaning
`
`during, as part of, or in response to, a start up
`or power-up
`’510 Patent cl.2
`
`plain and ordinary meaning
`
`in response to connecting to the Internet
`’614 Patent cl.1
`
`plain and ordinary meaning
`
`connected to the Internet
`’614 Patent cl.1
`
`plain and ordinary meaning
`
`performing a task, by the client device, in
`response to the receiving of the request from
`the first server
`’614 Patent cl.1
`
`plain and ordinary meaning
`
`above or below the threshold
`’614 Patent cl.17
`
`plain and ordinary meaning
`
`3 See Dkt. No. 126 at 9–10.
`
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`hardware component
`’614 Patent cls.18–20
`
`message that comprises a status
`’614 Patent cls.25–26
`
`plain and ordinary meaning
`
`plain and ordinary meaning
`
`V.
`
`CONSTRUCTIONS OF DISPUTED TERMS
`
`A.
`
`client device (’319 Patent cls.1, 2, 14, 17, 22, 24, and 25; ’510 Patent cls.1, 2, 8,
`10, 13, 15, 18, and 19)
`
`Luminati’s Proposed
`Construction
`
`Defendants’ Proposed
`Construction
`
`consumer computer
`
`plain and ordinary meaning
`
`According to Luminati, the specification defines “client device” as a “consumer computer.”
`
`Dkt. No. 126 at 10 (citing ’319 Patent at 2:44–46). The Court should construe the term this way,
`
`says Luminati, for two reasons. First, although Luminati does not necessarily disagree with the
`
`Court’s preliminary construction,4 a jury can more easily understand “consumer computer.” See
`
`Dkt. No. 176 at 9:08–10 (“we think that a consumer computer is . . . easier for the jury to
`
`understand”). Second, Luminati claims the patentee distinguished client devices from servers
`
`during the prosecution, a concept better captured by its proposal than the Court’s preliminary
`
`construction. Id. at 8:21–9:01 (“we believe that the way that client device is used in these particular
`
`patents . . . is consumer device and consumer computer and specifically not servers”); see also
`
`Dkt. No. 126 at 11–12.
`
`Defendants counter that Luminati’s proposed construction conflicts with the specification,
`
`Luminati’s earlier admissions in this case, the common understanding of the phrase, and the
`
`4 Based on its initial review of the briefs, the Court preliminarily construed this term as
`“communication device that is operating in the role of a client.”
`
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`Court’s construction of the term in a prior case. Dkt. No. 138 at 1–2. They criticize Luminati for
`
`relying on three lines from the ’319 Patent that refer in passing to computers of consumers when
`
`describing a prior-art peer-to-peer network. Id. at 6. They further argue the specification does not
`
`clearly redefine “client device” to mean a “consumer computer.” Id. at 6–7. If the term must be
`
`construed, Defendants urge the same construction previously adopted by the Court in another case:
`
`“a device that is operating in the role of a client by requesting services, functionalities, or resources
`
`from other devices.” Id. at 5–6; id. at 6 n.4.
`
`Beginning with Luminati’s lexicographical argument, the Court finds the language on
`
`which Luminati relies is not sufficient to redefine the meaning of the term to “consumer computer.”
`
`As used by the specification, “consumer” simply means a consumer of content, as opposed to a
`
`broadcaster of that content. See ’319 Patent at 1:54–57 (describing “[t]he need for a new method
`
`of data transfer that is fast for the consumer, cheap for the content distributor and does not require
`
`infrastructure investment for ISPs”); see also id. at 1:58–59 (“There have been many attempts at
`
`making the Internet faster for the consumer and cheaper for the broadcaster.”). Notably,
`
`“consumer” does not appear in connection with the description of the claimed inventions, and the
`
`lines on which Luminati relies are not a clear and explicit statement by the patentee for the disputed
`
`term. See Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (noting
`
`lexicography requires “a clear and explicit statement by the patentee” and any “‘implied’
`
`redefinition must be so clear that it equates to an explicit one”).
`
`Luminati’s second argument—that a client device is specifically not a server—is not
`
`supported by the specification. The patents use a number of terms that require hardware of some
`
`sort, such as communication device, first server, second server, and acceleration server. Each
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`“communication device” may act as a client,5 peer, or agent. ’319 Patent at 4:48–49; see also id.
`
`at 3:17–26 (referring to a client communication device, an agent communication device, and a peer
`
`communication device). The patents do not include servers as a type of “communication device,”
`
`but that is not sufficient to construe “client device” as unable to act as a server in all cases.
`
`Generally, “[n]egative claim limitations are adequately supported when the specification describes
`
`a reason to exclude the relevant limitation.” Santarus, Inc. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 694 F.3d 1344,
`
`1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Luminati cites to no such reason in the ’319 or ’510 Patents.
`
`Except for Luminati’s request for a negative limitation, the parties agree with the Court’s
`
`preliminary construction. See Dkt. No. 176 at 11:13–16, 16:06–07. That construction is consistent
`
`with the extrinsic evidence proffered by Luminati in its L.R. 4-2 disclosures. See Dkt. No. 138-3
`
`at 1–2 (citing sources that define “client” as, for example, “[t]he role adopted by an application
`
`when it is retrieving and/or rendering resources”). The Court therefore adopts its preliminary
`
`construction and construes:
`
`•
`
`“client device” as “communication device that is operating in the role of a client.”
`
`B.
`
`first server (’319 Patent cl.1, 21)
`
`Luminati’s Proposed
`Construction
`
`Defendants’ Proposed
`Construction
`
`web server
`
`plain and ordinary meaning
`
`Claim 1 of the ’319 Patent recites “[a] method . . . for use with a first server that comprises
`
`5 “Client device” appears only once in the specification with reference to the disclosed
`embodiments, where it is used synonymously with “client.” See ’319 Patent at 6:41–47 (“While
`the present description refers to a request from the client originating from an Internet browser, . . . a
`request may originate from an email program or any other program that would be used to request
`data . . . by the client device.”).
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`a web server that is a Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) server that responds to HTTP requests.”
`
`’319 Patent at 19:16–19. Luminati claims its construction would be helpful to a jury by minimizing
`
`jury confusion but does not explain what that confusion might be. Dkt. No. 126 at 13. Defendants
`
`argue such a construction is unnecessary. Dkt. No. 138 at 8.
`
`Luminati claims its construction is consistent with the claim language, but consistency does
`
`not give rise to a dispute over claim scope. Nor has Luminati provided any convincing explanation
`
`about how there might be jury confusion.6 In accordance with the Court’s preliminary construction,
`
`this term should be given its plain and ordinary meaning.7
`
`C.
`
`second server (’319 Patent cl.1, 17, 21, and 24; ’510 Patent cl.1, 2, 8, 15, and
`18)
`
`Luminati’s Proposed
`Construction
`
`Defendants’ Proposed
`Construction
`
`a server that is not the client device or web
`server
`
`plain and ordinary meaning
`
`The parties dispute whether the second server must be a distinct device from the client
`
`device and the web server. Luminati argues its construction would assist the jury by clarifying that
`
`the server and client devices are different devices. Dkt. No. 126 at 13. Defendants counter that
`
`Luminati’s construction would improperly import a limitation into the claim language. Dkt.
`
`No. 138 at 8–9.
`
`Both the claims and specification show that the client device and second server are different
`
`6 But see Dkt. No. 145 at 3 n.1 (citing a clerical error in Luminati’s opening brief as evidence of
`potential jury confusion).
`
`7 At the hearing, neither party objected to the Court’s preliminary construction of “plain and
`ordinary meaning.”
`
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`devices. Claim 1 of the ’510 Patent, for example, recites that the client device establishes a TCP
`
`connection with the second server over the Internet. ’510 Patent at 19:21–23. Such a connection
`
`would not be required if the first client device and second server were the same device. This, of
`
`course, is consistent with the purpose of the disclosed inventions—to improve speed and
`
`bandwidth efficiency between different devices through the Internet. Id. at 1:26–27.
`
`The tougher question is whether the second server and web server can be the same device.
`
`Client, peer, agent, and server are roles a device can perform. Nothing in the intrinsic record
`
`suggests one device cannot perform both the role of a web server and a second server. To construe
`
`the claim in such a way would improperly import a limitation into the claim language. Accordingly,
`
`the Court will provide its preliminary construction of this term to the jury and construes:
`
`•
`
`“second server” as “server that is not the client device.”8
`
`D.
`
`client device (’614 Patent cl.1, 2, 4–6, 9, 15, 18–19, 25, and 28)
`
`Luminati’s Proposed
`Construction
`
`Defendants’ Proposed
`Construction
`
`a device using a client dedicated operating
`system and operating in the role of client by
`requesting services, functionalities, or resources
`from the server
`
`plain and ordinary meaning
`
`Luminati claims the need for a construction based on its belief that Defendants will
`
`otherwise “assert that client devices and servers are interchangeable general use computers.” Dkt.
`
`No. 126 at 16. Because such an assertion is inconsistent with the claim language, says Luminati,
`
`it asks for a construction “clarifying that client devices use a client dedicated operating system.”
`
`Id. It argues the prosecution history disavows any broader scope of the term. Id. at 17.
`
`8 Neither party objected to the Court’s preliminary construction for this term.
`
`Code200, UAB v. Bright Data Ltd.
`Code200's Exhibit 1017
`Page 14 of 24
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`Defendants respond that a client device is simply a device acting in the role of a client. Dkt.
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`No. 138 at 9. They deny that they will claim client devices and servers are interchangeable general
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`use computers. Id. at 11. Moreover, they contend there is no basis for the client device requiring
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`“a client dedicated operating system.” Id. at 10–11.
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`Luminati’s position is not persuasive. It cites nothing from the intrinsic record showing a
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`client device must have a “client dedicated operating system.” Rather, Luminati cites passages
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`from the specification that, at best, merely acknowledge that a client dedicated operating system
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`is typical in a client device. See, e.g., ’614 Patent at 7:06–09 (“[a] client device . . . typically
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`receives information resources, services, and applications from servers, and is using a client
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`dedicated or oriented operating system” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 75:45–47 (“Each of the
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`network elements herein, such as the first, second, and third devices, may store, operate, or use, a
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`client operating system . . . .” (emphasis added)). But Luminati does not explain what composes a
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`“client dedicated operating system,” how that phrase is different from a “client oriented operating
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`system,” or why the disputed term should be construed to include the former rather than the latter.
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`Regardless, Defendants deny that they will assert that client devices are interchangeable
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`general use computers, undercutting Luminati’s proffered need for construction and resolving the
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`dispute about claim scope. Given that Luminati provides no other reason for why construction of
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`this term is necessary, and because the parties generally agree that a “client device,” as recited in
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`the claims of the ’614 Patent, operates in the role of a client, there appears to be no meaningful
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`dispute to resolve. The Court, in accordance with its preliminary construction, construes this term:
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`•
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`“client device” as “device operating in the role of a client by requesting services,
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`functionalities, or resources from the server.”9
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`9 Neither party objected to the Court’s preliminary construction for this term.
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`Code200, UAB v. Bright Data Ltd.
`Code200's Exhibit 1017
`Page 15 of 24
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`E.
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`first server (’614 Patent cl.1)
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`Luminati’s Proposed
`Construction
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`Defendants’ Proposed
`Construction
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`a server that is not the client device or web
`server
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`plain and ordinary meaning
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`For the same reasons set forth in Part V.C. supra, the Court will provide its preliminary
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`construction of this term to the jury and construes:
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`•
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`“first server” as “server that is not the client device.”10
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`VI.
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`INDEFINITENESS
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`A.
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`Indefiniteness of “the first IP address” (’319 Patent cl.2) and “the first client
`IP address” (’510 Patent cl.2)
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`Claim 2 of the ’319 Patent recites “a first message [that] comprises the first IP address, the
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`MAC address, or the hostname.” ’319 Patent at 19:37–40 (emphasis added). Similarly, Claim 2 of
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`the ’510 Patent recites “a first message [that] comprises the first client IP address, the MAC
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`address, or the hostname.” ’510 Patent at 19:37–39 (emphasis added). But neither of these claims,
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`nor the claims from which they respectively depend, recites “a first IP address” or “a first client IP
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`address.” Defendants therefore argue these claims are indefinite because they recite a claim term
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`without an antecedent basis.
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`More specifically, Defendants assert these claims leave a person of ordinary skill unable to
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`determine what IP address must be in the first message, for two reasons. First, they argue “the first
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`IP address” or “first client IP address” could refer to the IP address of the first client device, the
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`first server, or the second server. Dkt. No. 138 at 15. Second, they argue the IP address may refer
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`10 Neither party objected to the Court’s preliminary construction for this term.
`
`Code200, UAB v. Bright Data Ltd.
`Code200's Exhibit 1017
`Page 16 of 24
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`to one of multiple IP addresses for a single device. Id. at 15–16. Defendants claim Luminati
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`provides no way to resolve these possibilities, and instead relies on a conclusory statement of its
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`expert. Id. at 16.
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`Neither argument is convincing. From the context of the claim language, a person of
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`ordinary skill would not think the “first client IP address” is associated with any network device
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`other than the first client device. Each Claim 2 recites the step of “sending, by the first client device,
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`during, as part of, or in response to, a start-up [or power up] of the first client device, a first
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`message” that includes device-identifying information—specifically, the MAC address or
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`hostname. ’319 Patent at 19:36–40 (emphasis added); see also ’510 Patent at 19:35–39. Clearly,
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`this language requires the client device to identify itself on startup to the second server. See ’319
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`Patent at 11:63–12:04 (describing how communication devices “sign up” with an acceleration
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`server using the hostname, IP addresses, and MAC addresses of the device’s interfaces). A person
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`of ordinary skill would not conclude that the first client device sends identifying information of
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`another communication device as part of its initiation process, as that would serve no purpose.
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`Defendants’ second argument confuses breadth with indefiniteness. Each Claim 2 refers to
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`one IP address. A person of ordinary skill would understand the claim language to only require an
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`IP address that identifies the client device, just like the MAC address or hostname. That there might
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`be multiple IP addresses satisfying that criteria does not render the claim indefinite. The Court
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`therefore finds that these claims are not indefinite.
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`B.
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`Indefiniteness of “determining, by the first client device, that the received first
`content, is valid” (’319 Patent cl.14; ’510 Patent cl.10)
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`In their briefing, Defendants assert that the patents do not inform a person of ordinary skill
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`what it means for the first content to be “valid.” Dkt. No. 126 at 17. They offer a host of
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`possibilities, such as whether the first content was generated from a trusted (rather than untrusted)
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`Code200, UAB v. Bright Data Ltd.
`Code200's Exhibit 1017
`Page 17 of 24
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`source, whether the content has been modified, and whether the content is truthful. Id. at 18.
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`Luminati counters that a person of ordinary skill would understand that the at-issue phrase requires
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`determining whether the cached data is the same as the data that would have been received directly
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`from the server. Dkt. No. 126 at 22.
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`The specification supports Luminati’s position. The patents teach methods of providing
`