Case 1:21-cv-01443-MKB-SJB Document 49 Filed 03/08/22 Page 1 of 15 PageID #: 1050
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
`
`
`
`UNICORN GLOBAL, INC. and
`HANGZHOU CHIC INTELLIGENT
`TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD.,
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`v.
`
`DGL GROUP, LTD.,
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`
`Case No. 1:21-cv-1443-MKB-SJB
`
`
`
` Hon. Margo K. Brodie, U.S.D.J.
` Hon. Sanket J. Bulsara, U.S.M.J.
`
`
`
`Jury Trial Demanded
`
`
`
`
`DEFENDANT DGL GROUP, LTD.’S RESPONSIVE CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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` DGL Exhibit 1022
`Page 0001
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`

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`Case 1:21-cv-01443-MKB-SJB Document 49 Filed 03/08/22 Page 2 of 15 PageID #: 1051
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 1
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`
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`I.
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`II. DISPUTED CLAIM TERMS ................................................................................... 2
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`A. Electric balance vehicle ............................................................................................. 2
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`B. Controller ................................................................................................................... 5
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`C. Controlling motors ..................................................................................................... 9
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`III. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 11
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` DGL Exhibit 1022
`Page 0002
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`

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`Case 1:21-cv-01443-MKB-SJB Document 49 Filed 03/08/22 Page 3 of 15 PageID #: 1052
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`
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`Page(s)
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`Cases
`
`Bell Commc'ns Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Commc’ns Corp.,
`55 F.3d 615 (Fed. Cir. 1995)......................................................................................................5
`
`Catalina Mktg. Int’l v. Coolsavings.com, Inc.,
`289 F.3d 801 (Fed. Cir. 2001)....................................................................................................5
`
`Eon Corp. IP Holdings v. Silver Spring Networks,
`815 F. 3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016).............................................................................................1, 9
`
`Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. ITT Industries, Inc.,
`452 F. 3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2006).................................................................................................6
`
`Medrad, Inc. v. MRI Devices Corp.,
`401 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005)..................................................................................................2
`
`O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co.,
`521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008)..............................................................................................6, 9
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)..........................................................................................1, 2, 6
`
`TiVo, Inc. v. Echostar Communs. Corp.,
`516 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2008)................................................................................................10
`
`Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Symantec Corp.,
`811 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..................................................................................................1
`
`Verizon Services Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp.,
`503 F. 3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2007)...........................................................................................6, 10
`
`Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic,
`90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996)....................................................................................................8
`
`Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co.,
`442 F. 3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2006).................................................................................................2
`
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`- ii -
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` DGL Exhibit 1022
`Page 0003
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`

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`Case 1:21-cv-01443-MKB-SJB Document 49 Filed 03/08/22 Page 4 of 15 PageID #: 1053
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
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`The parties dispute the meaning of only three terms in this patent litigation. Black letter
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`law of claim construction requires the Court, not a jury, to construe those terms. Plaintiffs’
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`suggestion that “no construction is needed” for any of those terms, however, essentially and
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`improperly puts that responsibility in the jury’s hands.
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`Plaintiffs consistently state the wrong legal standard by arguing that no construction is
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`required because each of the disputed terms allegedly has “a readily understood plain and ordinary
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`meaning.” See ECF 45 at 8, 10, 11. The question here is not whether the disputed terms have a
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`readily understood meaning, but rather what the meaning of each disputed term is in the context
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`of the ‘107 Patent. More specifically, the task is to determine “the meaning that the term would
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`have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention . . . .” Phillips
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`v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005). “Importantly, the person of ordinary
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`skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in
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`which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the
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`specification.” Id. at 1313. The Federal Circuit has further explained that “the question is not
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`whether there is a settled ordinary meaning of the terms in some abstract sense of the words.
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`Rather, as we recently explained, ‘The only meaning that matters in claim construction is the
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`meaning in the context of the patent.’” Eon Corp. IP Holdings v. Silver Spring Networks, 815 F.
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`3d 1314, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359,
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`1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
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`Plaintiffs repeatedly insist that DGL’s proposed constructions are unsupported by the ‘107
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`Patent. This is plainly not the case. Based on the context of the disputed terms in the ‘107 Patent
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`- 1 -
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` DGL Exhibit 1022
`Page 0004
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`

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`Case 1:21-cv-01443-MKB-SJB Document 49 Filed 03/08/22 Page 5 of 15 PageID #: 1054
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`and the law guiding claim construction, the Court should adopt the constructions proposed by
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`DGL.
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`II.
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`DISPUTED CLAIM TERMS
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`A. Electric balance vehicle
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`Plaintiffs first argue that the term “electric balance vehicle” has a “readily understood plain
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`and ordinary meaning,” and the Court should therefore decline to construe this term. ECF 45 at 8.
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`First, this is not the legal standard. Plaintiffs’ suggestion that the term has a facially apparent
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`“plain and ordinary meaning” would not be sufficient, even if it were true. See Medrad, Inc. v.
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`MRI Devices Corp., 401 F.3d 1313, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“We cannot look at the ordinary
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`meaning of the term ... in a vacuum. Rather, we must look at the ordinary meaning in the context
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`of the written description and the prosecution history.”) (internal citations omitted). The Court
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`must interpret the claims “in the context of the entire patent, including the specification.” Phillips,
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`415 F.3d at 1313.
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`Second, Plaintiffs offer no support for this argument beyond a conclusory statement from
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`their expert that “‘electric balance vehicle’ is a common term used to describe the hoverboard
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`products in this case.” ECF 45 at 8 (quoting Dr. Hartup’s Declaration, ECF 45-4 at 6). Not only
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`is such conclusory evidence insufficient, but by relying on the accused hoverboard products in this
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`case, Plaintiffs advocate an approach that is verboten by controlling law. See Wilson Sporting
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`Goods Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 442 F. 3d 1322, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“claims may not
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`be construed with reference to the accused device.”). Plaintiffs’ improper proposal to apply the
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`“plain and ordinary meaning” of “electric balance vehicle” and then summarily equate that
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`meaning to the accused products is manifestly misguided
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` DGL Exhibit 1022
`Page 0005
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`

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`Case 1:21-cv-01443-MKB-SJB Document 49 Filed 03/08/22 Page 6 of 15 PageID #: 1055
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`As DGL explained in its Opening Brief, the Court should construe this term as “a vehicle
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`that automatically maintains its balance.” ECF 46 at 7–12. Plaintiffs incorrectly and without
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`support assert that DGL’s proposal is “unsupported by the specification, file history and any other
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`intrinsic evidence.” ECF 45 at 8. The specification of the ‘107 Patent explains that the disclosed
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`arrangement “improve[s] the self-balance of the vehicle body.” Ex. 1 at 3:32–34; see also 10:10–
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`12. Additionally, the specification of the ‘107 Patent identifies three exemplary references that
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`explain how the vehicle of the ‘107 Patent may operate, and each of these references would be
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`understood by one of ordinary skill in the art as describing a vehicle that automatically balances
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`itself as explained in detail in DGL’s opening brief. ECF 46 at 10–11.
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`Although Plaintiffs resist acknowledging the automatic balancing capability of the claimed
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`“electric balance vehicle” here, they have not been so circumspect in the past. In prior litigation
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`over the ‘107 Patent,1 Dr. Hartup—the same expert Plaintiffs rely on here—opined that an accused
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`product met the limitation of “an electric balance vehicle” because that product “is a self-balancing
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`vehicle.” See Ex. 15 at p. 9; Ex. 16 at pp. 2, 24, and 37. This prior opinion of Plaintiffs’ expert
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`further supports the fact that “an electric balance vehicle” is a vehicle that automatically maintains
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`its balance, as DGL has proposed.
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`Plaintiffs also argue that DGL’s proposed construction “would include balance vehicles
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`which are not electric in nature and would include balance vehicles with alternate source [sic] of
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`power which are clearly not intended to fall within the scope of the claims . . . .” ECF 45 at 9.
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`This ignores the crux of DGL’s proposed construction, which is directed at whether the vehicle
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`automatically maintains its balance, rather than the power source for the vehicle. DGL
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`1 Unicorn Global, Inc., and Hangzhou Chic Intelligent Technology Co., Ltd. v. E-Link Technology
`Co., Ltd., STKE, e_Power, US Weixun, Nancys Shop, Smalife, and Wormwhole USA, Civil Action
`No. 1:20−cv−04127.
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` DGL Exhibit 1022
`Page 0006
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`

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`Case 1:21-cv-01443-MKB-SJB Document 49 Filed 03/08/22 Page 7 of 15 PageID #: 1056
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`acknowledges that the claimed vehicle in the ‘107 Patent is electric. See, e.g., ECF 46-2, 10:35.
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`To resolve this dispute, DGL would agree to a construction of “an electric vehicle that
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`automatically maintains its balance.”
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`Plaintiffs also argue that DGL’s proposed construction is improper because “[i]t is clear
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`from the specification that the electric self-balancing vehicle described in the ‘107 Patent does not
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`automatically maintain its balance until a user steps onto the pedals.” ECF 45 at 9 (citing Dr.
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`Hartup’s Declaration, ECF 45-4 at 7). DGL’s proposed construction, however, does not suggest
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`otherwise. Rather, Plaintiffs’ citation to the text of the ‘107 Patent actually supports DGL’s
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`proposed construction, as it explains that “the electric self-balancing vehicle 100 in the
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`embodiment achieves automatic balance after sensing the stamping instead of balancing once the
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`power supply is turned on.” Ex. 1 at 8:24–26 (emphases added). In this regard, Plaintiffs and
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`DGL appear to agree that the electric balance vehicle recited in the claims of the ‘107 Patent
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`automatically maintains its balance. Plaintiffs may take issue with precisely when that balancing
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`occurs, but this does not change the underlying fact that the vehicle of the ‘107 Patent
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`automatically maintains its balance.
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`Finally, Plaintiffs attempt to dismiss the limiting effect of the claim term “electric balance
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`vehicle” because it is part of the preamble. ECF 45 at 9. Plaintiffs argue that a preamble is not
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`limiting where the preamble only states a purpose or intended use for the invention. Id. But this
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`is only half the rule. The entire rule provides that, “a preamble limits the invention if it recites
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`essential structure or steps, or if it is necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality to the claim.
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`Conversely, a preamble is not limiting where a patentee defines a structurally complete invention
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`in the claim body and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for the invention.”
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` DGL Exhibit 1022
`Page 0007
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`

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`Case 1:21-cv-01443-MKB-SJB Document 49 Filed 03/08/22 Page 8 of 15 PageID #: 1057
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`Catalina Mktg. Int’l v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (internal
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`quotations omitted).
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`Plaintiffs offer no evidence to show that the preamble of the ‘107 Patent is not limiting
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`under this rule. Nothing in the Declaration of Dr. Hartup supports Plaintiffs’ position. In fact, Dr.
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`Hartup relies on an incorrect standard and states “[i]t is my understanding that terms in the
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`preamble of a claim are generally not limiting. They generally refer to the purpose or usage of the
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`claimed invention.” ECF 45-4 at 6. Characterizing the preamble as “generally not limiting” is
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`incorrect, as the Federal Circuit has identified “guideposts” for assessing whether a preamble has
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`patentable weight. Catalina Mktg., 289 F.3d at 808. For example, “dependence on a particular
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`disputed preamble phrase for antecedent basis may limit claim scope because it indicates a reliance
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`on both the preamble and claim body to define the claimed invention.” Id. (citing Bell Commc’ns
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`Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Commc’ns Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 620 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Here, the preamble
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`provides an antecedent basis for elements recited in asserted claim 19 (as well as claim 2), thus
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`indicating that the patentee relied on the preamble to define the invention, and evidencing an intent
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`for the preamble to limit the scope of the claims. See id. Thus, the intrinsic evidence of the claims
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`themselves refutes Plaintiffs’ unsupported attorney argument that preamble is not limiting.
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`In view of the foregoing, the Court should find that the preamble is limiting and construe
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`the term “electric balance vehicle” to mean “a vehicle that automatically balances itself.”
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`B. Controller
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`Plaintiffs argue that “the term ‘controller’ … has a readily understood plain and ordinary
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`meaning and simply does not require construction.” ECF 45 at 10. Again, Plaintiffs’ suggestion
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`that this term has a facially apparent “plain and ordinary meaning” ignores the requirement that
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`claim terms must be interpreted “in the context of the entire patent.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313.
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`- 5 -
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` DGL Exhibit 1022
`Page 0008
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`

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`Case 1:21-cv-01443-MKB-SJB Document 49 Filed 03/08/22 Page 9 of 15 PageID #: 1058
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`Here, the parties dispute whether the term “controller,” in the context of the ‘107 patent, refers to
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`a single controller or encompasses multiple controllers. For this reason, “the ‘ordinary’ meaning
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`of [controller] does not resolve the parties’ dispute, and claim construction requires the court to
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`determine what claim scope is appropriate in the context of the patents-in-suit.” See O2 Micro
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`Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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`Plaintiffs erroneously assert that DGL’s construction of “a single controller” is unsupported
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`by the Patent’s specification. ECF 45 at 10. In fact, there are multiple instances where the
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`specification of the ‘107 Patent not only describes the invention as having a single controller, but
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`goes on to describe the advantages of having only one controller. For example, the ‘107 Patent
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`explains that “[i]n the present invention, only one power supply 81 and one controller 82 are
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`required to simultaneously control the two hub motors 4, so that the assembling is easier, the
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`wiring is more convenient, and the repairing of the sold electric self-balancing vehicle 100 returned
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`to the factory is more convenient.” Ex. 1 at 7:28–33 (emphases added); see also id. at 3:14–34;
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`10:5–12. This description of “the present invention” is particularly important, because “[w]hen a
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`patent thus describes the features of the ‘present invention’ as a whole, this description limits the
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`scope of the invention.” Verizon Services Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 503 F. 3d 1295, 1308
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`(Fed. Cir. 2007); see also Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. ITT Industries, Inc., 452 F. 3d 1312, 1318 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2006).
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`Plaintiffs cannot point to any intrinsic evidence that contradicts or otherwise undermines
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`the statement in the specification of the ‘107 Patent that “the present invention” requires “one
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`controller.” Instead, Plaintiffs note that “[t]he specification states that ‘the controller in the present
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`invention controls the self-balancing vehicle to achieve a self-balancing state and controls the
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`wheels…belongs to the prior art, and will not be described herein for a concise purpose.” ECF 45
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` DGL Exhibit 1022
`Page 0009
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`

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`Case 1:21-cv-01443-MKB-SJB Document 49 Filed 03/08/22 Page 10 of 15 PageID #: 1059
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`at 10. Plaintiffs use this quote to introduce various passages in the ‘107 Patent that describe “how
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`a controller could work in the present invention,” concluding that construing the term “controller”
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`to mean a single controller would “improperly limit [this term] to just one embodiment disclosed
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`in the specification.” ECF 45 at p. 10. This description of “[h]ow the controller 82 in the present
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`invention controls the self-balancing vehicle” (Ex. 1 at 8:57–58) does not suggest the structure of
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`the controller. The examples of how the controller could work have no bearing on whether the
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`vehicle of the ‘107 Patent includes a single controller.
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`In other words, in the context of the ‘107 Patent, the operation of the controller is irrelevant
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`to the question whether the claimed “controller” should be construed as “a single controller.”
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`Plaintiffs have not argued, and the ‘107 Patent does not suggest, that the exemplary control
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`methods require more than a single controller. To the contrary, the ‘107 Patent describes the
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`invention (not merely a preferred embodiment) as having a single controller, explaining that
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`“according to the invention…[t]he power supply and the controller are disposed in two parts of
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`the vehicle body, respectively. Therefore, one power supply and one controller can control the
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`two hub motors simultaneously.” Id. at 3:19–30 (emphasis added); see also id. at 7:28–33, 10:5–
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`12.
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`Plaintiffs’ statement that “[t]he plain and ordinary meaning of a controller would be readily
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`understood by even one of less than ordinary skill [because] [t]he purpose and behavior of the
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`controller is well established by the specification of the ‘107 Patent . . .” is both hyperbole and
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`irrelevant. ECF 45 at 11. A person of “less than ordinary skill” has no role to play in claim
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`construction. Moreover, the “purpose and behavior” of the controller is not at issue here. Rather,
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`the dispute is over the number of controllers in the claimed vehicle. As discussed above, the
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` DGL Exhibit 1022
`Page 0010
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`

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`Case 1:21-cv-01443-MKB-SJB Document 49 Filed 03/08/22 Page 11 of 15 PageID #: 1060
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`specification of the ‘107 Patent supports DGL’s proposed construction that the term “controller”
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`means a single controller.
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`Plaintiffs rely on the Declaration of Dr. Hartup to support its construction of the term
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`“controller,” but Dr. Hartup’s opinions are strikingly similar to the Declaration of Dr. Eric. H.
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`Maslen (Ex. 17), the expert retained by Plaintiffs in prior litigation concerning the ‘107 Patent.2
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`Dr. Hartup does not identify the Declaration of Dr. Maslen in the list of materials he reviewed, yet
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`Dr. Hartup adopts a position that is an almost verbatim reproduction of Dr. Maslen’s position.
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`Compare ECF 45-4 at 7–10 with Ex. 17 at 6–9. Although Dr. Hartup repeats the same opinions
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`from Dr. Maslen’s declaration, he ignores the positions that Dr. Maslen took in his deposition.
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`There, Dr. Maslen explained his position that a controller “means one controller.” Ex. 5 at 42:19–
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`43:2; see also id. at 40:4–7, 42:1–10, 56:16–57:3. In all cases, Dr. Hartup’s selective adoption of
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`Dr. Maslen’s opinion is insufficient to overcome the intrinsic evidence that the invention of the
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`‘107 Patent requires one controller. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 (Fed.
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`Cir. 1996) (“extrinsic evidence in general, and expert testimony in particular, may be used only to
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`help the court come to the proper understanding of the claims; it may not be used to . . . contradict
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`the import of other parts of the specification.”).
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`Plaintiffs alternatively propose that “controller” means “a piece of equipment that controls
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`the operation of another piece of equipment.” ECF 45 at 10, 11. Plaintiffs offer no support for
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`this construction. Nothing in the intrinsic or extrinsic evidence describes a controller as “piece of
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`equipment,”3 nor is there any evidence that a controller controls “another piece of equipment.”
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`2 Unicorn Global, Inc., Hangzhou Chic Intelligent Technology Co., Ltd., and Shenzhen Uni-Sun
`Electronic Co., Ltd. v. Golabs, Inc. d/b/a GOTRAX, Wal-Mart Inc., Wal-Mart Stores Texas, LLC,
`and Wal-Mart.com USA LLC, Civil Action No. 3:20-cv-02023
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`3 Notably, Plaintiffs do not rely on their expert’s declaration for support, likely because their
`expert’s opinion on this alternative construction is conclusory, at best. See ECF 45-4 at 7–8. Dr.
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` DGL Exhibit 1022
`Page 0011
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`

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`Case 1:21-cv-01443-MKB-SJB Document 49 Filed 03/08/22 Page 12 of 15 PageID #: 1061
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`Moreover, the claims themselves expressly state that the controller is “configured to control the
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`hub motors” / “controls the motors” / “configured for controlling the first and second hub
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`motors”—the disputed terms discussed in the section below. Plaintiffs’ proposal endeavors to
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`rewrite the claims—without any legal support—in a way that would leave the jury in a hopeless
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`state of confusion.
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`In view of the foregoing, the Court should construe the term “controller” to mean a single
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`controller.
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`C. Controlling motors
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`Plaintiffs argue that the terms “configured to control the hub motors” / “controls the
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`motors” / “configured for controlling the first and second hub motors” have “a readily understood
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`plain and ordinary meaning and require no construction.” ECF 45 at 11. Plaintiffs’ proposal again
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`seems to rely on the “ordinary meaning of the terms in some abstract sense of the words,” but
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`“[t]he only meaning that matters in claim construction is the meaning in the context of the patent.’”
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`Eon Corp. IP Holdings, 815 F. 3d 1314 at 1321. Here, the parties dispute whether the controllers,
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`in the context of the ‘107 Patent, must control both of the hub motors. Plaintiffs’ proposal that the
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`Court use the “ordinary” meaning of controller “does not resolve the parties’ dispute.” See O2
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`Micro Int’l Ltd., 521 F.3d at 1361.
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`Plaintiffs incorrectly assert “there is nothing in the specification or claims [that] precludes
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`embodiments of the controller as multiple boards” and wrongly conclude the disputed terms
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`“should not be limited to a single controller that ‘controls both motors’ as suggested by
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`Hartup’s declaration merely cites dictionary definitions that do not even support his alternative
`construction for the term “controller,” as they define the term as “a piece of mechanism that
`controls or regulates motion” or a “subsystem that generates the input to the plant or process.” Id.
`Plaintiffs have identified nothing that supports construing a “controller” to mean “a piece of
`equipment that controls the operation of another piece of equipment.”
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` DGL Exhibit 1022
`Page 0012
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`

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`Case 1:21-cv-01443-MKB-SJB Document 49 Filed 03/08/22 Page 13 of 15 PageID #: 1062
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`Defendant.” ECF 45 at 12 (quoting Dr. Hartup’s Declaration, ECF 45-4 at 11–12). Plaintiffs
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`ignore that the ‘107 Patent specifies, “[i]n the present invention, only one power supply 81 and
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`one controller 82 are required to simultaneously control the two hub motors.” Ex. 1, 7:28–30
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`(emphases added); see also id. at 1:3:19–30 (“according to the invention…one controller can
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`control the two hub motors simultaneously.”) (emphasis added). Such express descriptions of the
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`invention are limiting. See Verizon Services Corp., 503 F. 3d 1295 at 1309. (“When a patent thus
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`describes the features of the ‘present invention’ as a whole, this description limits the scope of the
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`invention.”); see also TiVo, Inc. v. Echostar Communs. Corp., 516 F.3d 1290, 1300 (Fed. Cir.
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`2008) (finding that the specification’s use of the phrase “the invention” in discussing certain
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`features limits the scope of the claims).
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`Plaintiffs’ reliance on various passages in the specification of the ‘107 Patent to support
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`their construction is misplaced because none of these passages address the number of controllers
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`that control the motors. See ECF 45 at 12. Dr. Hartup’s opinions on these terms are almost
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`verbatim reproductions of the statements made by Dr. Maslen. Compare ECF 45-4 at 10–11 with
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`Ex. 17 at 14–16. Once again, however, Plaintiffs’ ignore that Dr. Maslen, the progenitor of those
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`theories, understood that “what’s disclosed by the claim is a [single] controller that controls both
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`hub motors entirely.” Ex. 5 at 36:7–9; see also id. at 37:12–16.
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`Plaintiffs alternatively propose that these disputed terms should be construed to mean
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`“cause the hub motors to drive the corresponding wheels.” ECF 45 at 10–11. Plaintiffs once again
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`do not support this construction. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ proposal does not address the dispute over
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`whether the controller controls both hub motors. Instead, their proposed construction only adds
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`an unnecessary explanation that the hub motors “drive the corresponding wheels,” when the claims
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`themselves already expressly recite this function. See Ex. 1, claim 1 (“the controller is configured
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`- 10 -
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` DGL Exhibit 1022
`Page 0013
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`

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`Case 1:21-cv-01443-MKB-SJB Document 49 Filed 03/08/22 Page 14 of 15 PageID #: 1063
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`to control the hub motors to drive the two wheels to rotate”), claim 10 (“the controller controls the
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`motors to drive the wheels to rotate”), claim 25 (“the controller [is] configured for controlling the
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`first and second hub motors to drive the first and second wheels to rotate”). In short, there is no
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`evidence supporting this construction, and adopting it would confuse the jury.
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`In view of the foregoing, the Court should construe the terms “configured to control the
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`hub motors” / “controls the motors” / “configured for controlling the first and second hub motors,”
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`to mean that the controller controls both motors.
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`III. CONCLUSION
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`For the foregoing reasons and the reasons stated in its opening claim construction brief,
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`DGL respectfully requests that the Court adopt its construction of the disputed claim terms
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`discussed in this brief and as set forth in its Opening Brief.
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`Dated: March 8, 2022
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`/s/ Steven M. Auvil
`Steven M. Auvil (admitted pro hac vice)
`Bryan J. Jaketic (admitted pro hac vice)
`SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS (US) LLP
`4900 Key Tower, 127 Public Square
`Cleveland, Ohio 44114
`Telephone: 216-479-8023
`Facsimile: 216-479-8780
`Email: steven.auvil@squirepb.com
`Email: bryan.jaketic@squirepb.com
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`Rachael A. Harris (admitted pro hac vice)
`SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS (US) LLP
`2550 M. St, NW
`Washington, DC 20037
`Telephone: 202-457-6000
`Facsimile: 202-457-6315
`Email: rachael.harris@squirepb.com
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`Attorneys for DGL Group, Ltd.
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`- 11 -
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` DGL Exhibit 1022
`Page 0014
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`Case 1:21-cv-01443-MKB-SJB Document 49 Filed 03/08/22 Page 15 of 15 PageID #: 1064
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`The undersigned hereby certifies that the foregoing was filed on March 8, 2022 using the
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`Court’s CM/ECF System. Service will be made upon the parties through the CM/ECF System.
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`/s/ Steven M. Auvil
`Steven M. Auvil
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` DGL Exhibit 1022
`Page 0015
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