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`Case 3:21-cv-01166-M Document 70 Filed 03/23/22 Page 1 of 2 PageID 1675Case 3:21-cv-01166-M Document 70 Filed 03/23/22 Page 1 of 2 PageID 1675
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`DALLAS DIVISION
`
`HIGH ENERGY OZONE LLC d/b/a FAR-UV
`STERILRAY and S. EDWARD NEISTER,
`
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`LARSON ELECTRONICS LLC,
`
`Defendant.
`
`C.A. No. 3:21-cv-01166-M
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`DEFENDANT LARSON ELECTRONICS LLC’S
`RULE 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS
`
`Pursuant to N.D. Tex. L.R. 7.1, Defendant Larson Electronics LLC (“Larson”) respectfully
`
`moves this Court to dismiss Count III of Plaintiffs High Energy Ozone LLC d/b/a Far-UV
`
`Sterilray’s and S. Edward Neister’s Second Amended Complaint, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the
`
`Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
`
`The grounds for this motion are further set forth in Larson’s Opening Brief in Support of
`
`its Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, which is being filed contemporaneously herewith.
`
`EXHIBIT 1031
`
`1
`
`

`

`
`
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`Dated: March 23, 2022
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.
`
`By: /s/ David B. Conrad
`David B. Conrad
`conrad@fr.com
`Texas Bar No. 24049042
`Lance E. Wyatt
`wyatt@fr.com
`Texas Bar No. 24093397
`
`1717 Main Street, Suite 5000
`Dallas, Texas 75201
`(214) 747-5070 (Telephone)
`(214) 747-2091 (Facsimile)
`
`ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT
`LARSON ELECTRONICS LLC.
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`The undersigned certifies that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document
`
`has been served on March 23, 2022, to all counsel of record who are deemed to have consented to
`
`electronic service via the Court’s CM/ECF system.
`
`/s/ David B. Conrad
`David B. Conrad
`
`2
`
`

`

`
`
`Case 3:21-cv-01166-M Document 70-1 Filed 03/23/22 Page 1 of 12 PageID 1677Case 3:21-cv-01166-M Document 70-1 Filed 03/23/22 Page 1 of 12 PageID 1677
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`
`
`HIGH ENERGY OZONE LLC d/b/a FAR-UV
`STERILRAY and S. EDWARD NEISTER,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`LARSON ELECTRONICS LLC,
`
`Defendant.
`
`C.A. No. 3:21-cv-01166-M
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`LARSON ELECTRONICS LLC’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ITS
`RULE 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS
`
`3
`
`

`

`
`
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`I.
`
`PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ......................................................................................... 1
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`II. STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................................................................... 2
`
`III. LEGAL STANDARDS .......................................................................................................... 3
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`A complaint must state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face under
`Rule 12(b)(6). ...........................................................................................................3
`
`A claim of direct infringement of a method claim under § 271(a) requires
`actual performance of its steps. ................................................................................4
`
`A claim of indirect infringement under § 272(b) or (c) require knowingly
`inducing or knowledge of infringement. ..................................................................4
`
`IV. ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................... 5
`
`A.
`
`HEO3 has not pled sufficient facts to support infringement because
`Larson’s products are not directed to human or animal tissue.................................5
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`HEO3 has not sufficiently pled direct infringement ....................................5
`
`HEO3 has not sufficiently pled indirect infringement .................................6
`
`B.
`
`The Court should dismiss Count III of HEO3’s SAC with prejudice because
`granting leave to amend would be futile. .................................................................8
`
`V. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................... 8
`
`4
`
`

`

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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`Aristocrat Techs. Australia Pty Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech.,
`709 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013)..............................................................................................4, 5
`
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
`556 U.S. 662 (2009) ...............................................................................................................3, 8
`
`Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc.,
`424 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2005)..........................................................................................4, 6, 7
`
`Cuvillier v. Sullivan,
`503 F.3d 397 (5th Cir. 2007) .................................................................................................3, 4
`
`Hart v. Bayer Corp.,
`199 F.3d 239 (5th Cir. 2000) .....................................................................................................8
`
`Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Tech., Inc.,
`134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014) ...............................................................................................................4
`
`Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc.,
`463 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2006)..................................................................................................5
`
`U.S. ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp.,
`355 F.3d 370 (5th Cir. 2004) (“If such an allegation is contradicted by the contents of an
`exhibit attached to the pleading, then indeed the exhibit and not the allegation controls.”) .....6
`
`Rogers v. City of Yoakum,
`660 F. App’x 279 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Because the exhibits attached to [plaintiff’s] complaint
`contradict his allegations, we assume the facts in the exhibit to be true.”) ...........................6, 7
`
`U.S. ex rel. Willard v. Humana Health Plan of Tex. Inc.,
`336 F.3d 375 (5th Cir. 2003) .....................................................................................................8
`
`Other Authorities
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)........................................................................................................1, 3, 5, 7
`
`5
`
`

`

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`Defendant Larson Electronics LLC (“Larson”) moves to dismiss Count III of Plaintiffs
`
`High Energy Ozone LLC’s and S. Edward Neister’s (collectively, “HEO3”) Second Amended
`
`Complaint (“SAC”) with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to
`
`state a claim upon which relief can be granted. HEO3 does not allege facts plausibly showing that
`
`Larson is infringing or has infringed U.S. Patent No. 11,246,951 (the “’951 Patent”). In particular,
`
`HEO3 does not allege any facts that Larson’s accused products are directed to disinfecting “human
`
`or animal tissue” as required by each of the claims of the ’951 Patent. Larson’s product catalogs
`
`and consumer information that HEO3 consistently cites throughout its SAC repeatedly emphasize
`
`that the intended uses for the products are for disinfecting surfaces, equipment, and the air. None
`
`of the product information relied on by HEO3 plausibly suggests that Larson intends its products
`
`to be used to disinfect human or animal tissue. In fact, Larson’s product pages, attached to the
`
`SAC as exhibits, warn customers against exposure: “UV-C light can cause temporary or permanent
`
`loss of vision, and temporary acute redness or ulceration (mild to severe sunburn) to exposed skin.
`
`To prevent exposure, do not operate the device in any application that allows UV-C light to be
`
`visible during operation.” (See Dkt. 67-6, 67-7, 67-8, 67-9, 67-10, 67-11 (emphasis added)).
`
`I.
`
`PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
`
`HEO3 filed this lawsuit on May 21, 2021, accusing Larson of infringing U.S. Patent Nos.
`
`8,975,605 and 9,700,642. (Dkt. 1.) On January 18, 2022, HEO3 filed a First Amended Complaint
`
`asserting the allowed, soon-to-issue claims of the ’480 Application. (Dkt. 47 at ¶¶ 105–131.) The
`
`’480 Application is titled “Method and Apparatus for Sterilizing and Disinfecting Air and Surfaces
`
`and Protecting a Zone from External Microbial Contamination” and was filed on July 10, 2017.
`
`On March 9, 2022, HEO3 filed the SAC asserting the ’951 Patent that issued from the ’480
`
`Application. (Dkt. 67 at ¶¶ 105–131.) HEO3 alleges that Larson’s Microplasma Board Products
`
`and Excimer Lamp Products infringe the claims of the ’951 Patent. (Dkt. 67 at ¶¶ 105-131.)
`
`6
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`

`

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`II.
`
`STATEMENT OF FACTS
`
`The three patents asserted in the SAC (U.S. Patent Nos. 8,975,605, 9,700,642, and
`
`11,246,951) (collectively “Asserted Patents”) describe using UV light for “disinfecting and
`
`sterilizing” surfaces and substances. (’642 Patent at Abstract, 1:22–31; ’605 Patent at Abstract,
`
`1:15–22.) As explained in the previous Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, the ’642 and ’605
`
`Patents both claim a process or method for destroying a microorganism’s DNA or RNA based on
`
`photon wavelength and DNA absorption. (Dkt. 21 at 4-6.)
`
`The ’951 Patent, like the ’605 and ’642 Patents, describes using ultraviolet (“UV”) light
`
`for “disinfecting and sterilizing … surfaces contaminated with microorganisms and toxic
`
`substances.” (Dkt. 67-3 at Abstract.) Additionally, each allowed claim of the ’951 Patent requires
`
`directing 222 nm wavelength photons to “human or animal tissue.” (Id. at cl. 1.) Claim 1, the sole
`
`independent claim of the ’951 Patent, is representative of the remaining claims:
`
`1. A process for destroying a DNA or RNA of a microorganism on a substance or
`on a surface comprising the steps of:
`
`generating photons of a wavelength corresponding to a peak adsorption
`wavelength of proteins, or DNA, or RNA, the wavelength being 222 nm;
`
`directing the photons to a substance or surface to be disinfected, whereby
`the photons are generated to destroy a plurality of chemical bonds within
`the proteins, DNA, or RNA of the microorganisms; and
`
`wherein the substance or surface to be disinfected is human or animal
`tissue.
`
`(Id. at cl. 1 (emphasis added).)
`
`The Accused Products are Larson’s Microplasma Boards, Excimer Lamps, and Excimer
`
`Bulbs. (Dkt. 67 at ¶¶ 27–49.) The Accused Products include excimer lamps that offer “a powerful
`
`and sleek lighting solution for restaurants, businesses, busy locations and occupied areas.” (Dkt.
`
`67-9 at 2.) The product descriptions for these lamps explain the potential applications for these
`
`7
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`

`

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`products including: “[s]anitation, disinfection, restaurants, retails spaces, lobbies, commercial
`
`locations, industrial parks, schools, public transportation hubs, airports, office buildings, medical
`
`centers and more.” (Dkt. 67-9 at 2.) These lamps are effective at “kill[ing] 99% of viruses, bacteria,
`
`mold and spores.” (Dkt. 67-9 at 2). The product description for these products do not provide any
`
`instruction to use these products for the purposes of disinfecting human or animal tissue. (See
`
`generally, Dkt. 67-5 - 67-12.) Rather, they teach away from such exposure. (See Dkt. 67-5, 67-6
`
`at 2, 67-7 at 2-3, 67-8 at 2, 67-9 at 2, 67-10 at 2-3, 67-11 at 2, 67-12 at 2-3.)
`
`III.
`
`LEGAL STANDARDS
`
`A.
`
`A complaint must state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face under
`Rule 12(b)(6).
`
`A complaint that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted may be dismissed
`
`under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint
`
`“must provide the plaintiff’s grounds for entitlement to relief—including factual allegations that
`
`when assumed to be true raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Cuvillier v. Sullivan,
`
`503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Complaints that do
`
`not “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
`
`on its face’” should be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
`
`556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
`
`Although factual allegations are taken as true, legal conclusions are given no deference—those
`
`matters are left for the court to decide. See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (noting “the tenet that a court
`
`must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
`
`conclusions”). “[W]hen the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of
`
`entitlement to relief [as a matter of law], this basic deficiency should . . . be exposed at the point
`
`8
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`

`

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`of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.” Cuvillier, 503 F.3d at
`
`401 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
`
`B.
`
`A claim of direct infringement of a method claim under § 271(a) requires
`actual performance of its steps.
`
`Direct infringement of a method claim cannot occur unless a defendant actually performs
`
`every step of the method. See Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Tech., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111,
`
`2117 (2014); Aristocrat Techs. Australia Pty Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech., 709 F.3d 1348, 1353 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2013) (“[D]irect infringement requires a single party to perform every step of a claim
`
`method.”). Thus, if a defendant does not actually perform every step of a method claim, that
`
`defendant cannot be liable for infringing the claim under a theory of direct infringement. See
`
`Aristocrat Techs., 709 F.3d at 1353.
`
`C.
`
`A claim of indirect infringement under § 272(b) or (c) require knowingly
`inducing or knowledge of infringement.
`
`Indirect infringement can be based on either induced infringement under § 272(b) or
`
`contributory infringement under § 272(c). To succeed on induced infringement, a plaintiff must
`
`show that there has been direct infringement and “that the alleged infringer knowingly induced
`
`infringement and possessed specific intent to encourage another’s infringement.” Cross Med.
`
`Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (internal
`
`citation and quotation marks omitted). To succeed on contributory infringement, a plaintiff must
`
`show that an act of direct infringement occurred, “that defendant knew that the combination for
`
`which its components were especially made was both patented and infringing[,] and that
`
`defendant’s components have no substantial non-infringing uses.” See id. (internal citation and
`
`quotation marks omitted).
`
`9
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`

`

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`IV.
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`A.
`
`HEO3 has not pled sufficient facts to support infringement because Larson’s
`products are not directed to human or animal tissue.
`
`Larson respectfully requests that the Court dismiss Count III of HEO3’s SAC for failure to
`
`state a claim upon which relief can be granted. HEO3 has not pled facts that plausibly suggest that
`
`Larson has practiced the patented method or caused others to practice the patented method.
`
`HEO3’s SAC does not contain facts sufficient to support a claim of direct or indirect infringement
`
`of any claims of the ’951 Patent. Therefore, Count III of its SAC should be dismissed.
`
`1.
`
`HEO3 has not sufficiently pled direct infringement
`
`To show direct infringement of a process patent claim, HEO3 must plead facts that
`
`plausibly suggest that Larson actually performed every step of the asserted claims. See Aristocrat
`
`Techs., 709 F.3d at 1353.
`
`Even under the forgiving standard of Rule 12(b)(6), when all of HEO3’s factual allegations
`
`are accepted as true and viewed in a light most favorable to HEO3, there are no allegations in the
`
`SAC that could plausibly demonstrate that Larson performed every step of the claimed method of
`
`disinfecting human or animal skin. HEO3 has not even attempted to make such a showing. HEO3
`
`has only alleged that the Accused Products are capable of performing the claimed methods because
`
`they are safe to use near humans. (See, e.g., Dkt. 67 at ¶¶ 117, 120, 123.) This is plainly insufficient
`
`because all claims require actually using the product on humans, to disinfect their skin. See Ormco
`
`Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Method claims are only
`
`infringed when the claimed process is performed, not by the sale of an apparatus that is capable of
`
`infringing use.”).
`
`HEO3 should not receive any benefit of the doubt at this pleading stage because the
`
`evidence it relies upon shows the opposite of its claim that the products are used to disinfect human
`
`10
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`

`

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`or animal skin. See Rogers v. City of Yoakum, 660 F. App’x 279, 285 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Because
`
`the exhibits attached to [plaintiff’s] complaint contradict his allegations, we assume the facts in
`
`the exhibit to be true.”); see also U.S. ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 355 F.3d 370,
`
`377 (5th Cir. 2004) (“If such an allegation is contradicted by the contents of an exhibit attached to
`
`the pleading, then indeed the exhibit and not the allegation controls.”). Larson’s product pages
`
`warn customers against exposure: “UV-C light can cause temporary or permanent loss of vision,
`
`and temporary acute redness or ulceration (mild to severe sunburn) to exposed skin. To prevent
`
`exposure, do not operate the device in any application that allows UV-C light to be visible during
`
`operation.” (See Dkt. 67-6 at 1, 67-7 at 2, 67-8 at 2, 67-9 at 2, 67-10 at 2, 67-11 at 2 (emphasis
`
`added)). This is precisely the type of contradiction that justifies dismissal. See Rogers, 660 F.
`
`App’x at 285.
`
`Because HEO3 has not pleaded a single fact plausibly suggesting that Larson has used its
`
`products to disinfect human or animal skin, HEO3’s direct infringement allegation must be
`
`dismissed.
`
`2.
`
`HEO3 has not sufficiently pled indirect infringement
`
`A claim of indirect infringement would require direct infringement as well as “knowingly
`
`induced infringement… [with] specific intent” or that the “defendant knew that the combination
`
`for which its components were especially made was both patented and infringing.” See Cross Med.
`
`Prods, 424 F.3d at 1312. There are no allegations in the SAC that could plausibly demonstrate
`
`indirect infringement either under induced or contributory infringement. As explained above, both
`
`induced and contributory infringement require direct infringement, but HEO3 has not alleged a
`
`single plausible instance in which Larson products have been used to disinfect “human or animal
`
`tissue.” Cross Med. Prods., 424 F.3d at 1312.
`
`11
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`

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`HEO3 also provides no support plausibly suggesting that Larson had specific intent to
`
`induce infringement. See id. HEO3 asserts only that Larson’s acts of “providing at least spec
`
`sheets, instructions, white papers…” induces customers to use the Accused Products in an
`
`infringing manner. (Dkt. 67 at ¶ 125.) HEO3, however, points to no instruction by Larson to use
`
`the products to disinfect “human or animal tissue.” (See e.g., Dkt. 67-5 at 1, 5; Dkt. 67-6 at 2.)
`
`Consequently, HEO3 has failed to plausibly allege that Larson induced its customers to infringe
`
`the ’951 Patent. To the contrary, Larson’s product pages warn customers against exposure: “UV-
`
`C light can cause temporary or permanent loss of vision, and temporary acute redness or ulceration
`
`(mild to severe sunburn) to exposed skin. To prevent exposure, do not operate the device in any
`
`application that allows UV-C light to be visible during operation.” (See Dkt. 67-6 at 1, 67-7 at 2,
`
`67-8 at 2, 67-9 at 2, 67-10 at 2, 67-11 at 2 (emphasis added)). When the contents of cited exhibits
`
`contradict the allegations in the complaint as they do here, the exhibits control and dismissal of
`
`the complaint is proper. See Rogers, 660 F. App’x at 285 (affirming dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)
`
`where the exhibits contradicted the allegations in the claim).
`
`Likewise, HEO3 has failed to plausibly allege contributory infringement because Larson
`
`did not know that the combination for which its components were “infringing[,] and that
`
`defendant’s components have no substantial non-infringing uses.” See Cross Med. Prods., 424
`
`F.3d at 1312 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). All of Larson’s material cited in the
`
`SAC show that Larson designs, markets, and instructs its customers to use the Accused Products
`
`for “disinfecting … equipment and the air.” (See, e.g., Dkt. 67-5 at 1.) These genuine scenarios
`
`are not infringing uses of the product because the disinfection targets are not human or animal
`
`skin. The evidence on which HEO3 relies demonstrates that HEO3’s allegations of contributory
`
`infringement fail at every step because there was no direct infringement, Larson had no knowledge
`
`12
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`

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`of infringement, and there was a substantial non-infringing use—the very use that Larson teaches
`
`in all of the cited product information.
`
`As the evidence cited in HEO3’s SAC shows, there is nothing to suggest that Larson’s
`
`products infringe the claims of the ’951 Patent, either directly or indirectly, and consequently,
`
`HEO3 has not presented “a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
`
`(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
`
`B.
`
`The Court should dismiss Count III of HEO3’s SAC with prejudice because
`granting leave to amend would be futile.
`
`This Court should dispose of this case by dismissing HEO3’s SAC with prejudice because
`
`leave to amend would be futile. A court should not grant a plaintiff leave to amend its complaint
`
`in the face of a motion to dismiss if “there is no indication [that the plaintiff] will be able to allege
`
`the necessary” elements of the plaintiff’s claim. U.S. ex rel. Willard v. Humana Health Plan of
`
`Tex. Inc., 336 F.3d 375, 387 (5th Cir. 2003). Therefore, a court should not grant leave to amend if
`
`“the defect is simply incurable.” Hart v. Bayer Corp., 199 F.3d 239, 248 n.6 (5th Cir. 2000). As
`
`Larson’s product literature attached to HEO3’s SAC demonstrates, Larson does not use or instruct
`
`its customers to use its products to disinfect human or animal tissue.
`
`V.
`
`CONCLUSION
`
`For the foregoing reasons, Larson respectfully requests that the Court dismiss Count III of
`
`HEO3’s SAC for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Because leave to amend
`
`would be futile, Larson requests dismissal with prejudice.
`
`13
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`Dated: March 23, 2022
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.
`
`By: /s/ David B. Conrad
`
`David B. Conrad
`conrad@fr.com
`Texas Bar No. 24049042
`Lance Wyatt
`wyatt@fr.com
`Texas Bar No. 24093397
`
`1717 Main Street, Suite 5000
`Dallas, Texas 75201
`(214) 747-5070 (Telephone)
`(214) 747-2091 (Facsimile)
`
`ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT
`LARSON ELECTRONICS LLC
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`The undersigned certifies that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document
`
`has been served on March 23, 2022, to all counsel of record who are deemed to have consented to
`
`electronic service via the Court’s CM/ECF system.
`
`/s/ David B. Conrad
`David B. Conrad
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`14
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`Case 3:21-cv-01166-M Document 70-2 Filed 03/23/22 Page 1 of 1 PageID 1689Case 3:21-cv-01166-M Document 70-2 Filed 03/23/22 Page 1 of 1 PageID 1689
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
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`HIGH ENERGY OZONE LLC d/b/a FAR-UV
`STERILRAY and S. EDWARD NEISTER,
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`
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`LARSON ELECTRONICS LLC,
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`Defendant.
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`C.A. No. 3:21-cv-01166-M
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING LARSON ELECTRONICS LLC’S
`RULE 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS
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`Having carefully considered Defendant Larson Electronics, LLC’s 12(b)(6) Motion to
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`Dismiss, it is HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED.
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`IT IS SO ORDERED.
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`Dated: ___________________, 2022
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`BARBARA M. G. LYNN
`CHIEF JUDGE
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`15
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