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UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`STMicroelectronics, Inc.,
`
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`Ocean Semiconductor LLC,
`
`Patent Owner
`
`Case IPR2022-00681
`Patent No. 6,968,248
`
`
`
`
`
`PATENT OWNER’S RELIMINARY RESPONSE
`
`Under 35 U.S.C. § 42.107
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Mail Stop PATENT BOARD
`Patent Trial and Appeal Board
`U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
`P.O. Box 1450
`Alexandria, VA 22313-1450
`Submitted Electronically via PTAB E2E
`
`
`
`

`

`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1
`II.
`STATEMENT OF FACTS .............................................................................. 2
`III. THE PETITION MAY NOT CONTAIN ANY ASSERTIONS NOT
`ALREADY AT ISSUE IN APPLIED MATERIALS ....................................... 2
`IV. STMICRO MUST WITHDRAW ITS CLAIMS IF AMAT WITHDRAWS
`THE APPLIED MATERIALS PETITION ....................................................... 4
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 6
`
` I.
`
`V.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`i
`
`

`

`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`Apple Inc. v. UNILOC 2017 LLC,
`IPR2020-00854, Paper 9 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 28, 2020) ............................................5, 6
`Facebook, Inc. v. Windy City Innovations, LLC,
`973 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2020) .............................................................................. 3
`General Plastic Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha,
`IPR2016-01357, Paper 19 (PTAB Sept. 6, 2017) .................................................. 4
`SAS Institute, Inc. v. Iancu,
`138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018)............................................................................................ 5
`Statutes
`35 U.S.C. § 314 .......................................................................................................... 4
`35 U.S.C. § 316 .......................................................................................................... 5
`37 C.F.R. § 42 .................................................................................................. passim
`
`
`
`
`
`ii
`
`

`

`TABLE OF EXHIBITS
`
`Description
`February 9, 2022 Decision Granting Institution of Inter Partes Review
`
`Exhibit
`2001
`
`iii
`
`

`

`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`Through the undersigned Counsel, Patent Owner, Ocean Semiconductor,
`
`LLC (“Ocean” or “Patent Owner”) submits the following Patent Owner
`
`Preliminary Response pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.107 (a). See also 37 C.F.R. §
`
`42.107 (b).
`
`Petitioner STMicroelectronics, Inc. (“STMicro” or “Petitioner”) filed a
`
`Petition for Inter Partes Review of U.S. Patent No. 6,968,248 (the “’248 patent”)
`
`on March 9, 2022. (IPR2022-00680, Paper No. 1 (“Petition”).) The Petition was
`
`filed with an accompanying Motion for Joinder (Paper No. 3 (“Motion for
`
`Joinder”)) requesting that this matter be joined with an already-pending matter,
`
`Applied Materials, Inc. v. Ocean Semiconductor LLC, IPR2021-01342 (P.T.A.B.)
`
`(the “AMAT IPR”). As discussed in more detail below, Ocean does not oppose
`
`the Motion for Joinder, provided that: (1) the Petition does not contain any
`
`arguments not already set forth in the AMAT IPR; and (2) if Applied Materials,
`
`Inc. (“AMAT”) withdraws its contentions in the co-pending AMAT IPR, STMicro
`
`must also withdraw each of its Grounds from this matter.
`
`1
`
`

`

`II.
`
`STATEMENT OF FACTS
`On December 31, 2020, Ocean filed a district court action against STMicro
`
`in the Western District of Texas.1 Ocean accuses STMicro of infringement of
`
`various patents—including the ’248 patent—directed to semiconductor
`
`manufacturing methods based on the use of accused tools and software. The
`
`accused tools and software are either developed internally by STMicro or
`
`purchased from a third-party.
`
`Soon after Ocean brought this district court action, AMAT brought the
`
`AMAT IPR challenging the validity of the ’248 patent. On February 9, 2022, the
`
`Board granted institution of AMAT’s petition in the AMAT IPR. (See Ex. 2001.)
`
`One month after the Board’s institution of the AMAT IPR—but nearly fifteen
`
`months after Ocean filed the district court complaint against STMicro—STMicro
`
`filed the instant Petition and Motion for Joinder.
`
`III. THE PETITION MAY NOT CONTAIN ANY ASSERTIONS NOT
`ALREADY AT ISSUE IN APPLIED MATERIALS
`The Board, at its discretion, may join an IPR with a co-pending instituted
`
`IPR. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b). The party requesting joinder—here Petitioner—is
`
`not permitted to bring new issues from its petition to the already-instituted IPR.
`
`See Facebook, Inc. v. Windy City Innovations, LLC, 973 F.3d 1321, 1336 (Fed.
`
`
`1 Ocean Semiconductor LLC v. STMicroelectronics Inc., No. 6:20-cv-01215 (W.D.
`
`Tex.).
`
`2
`
`

`

`Cir. 2020) (“[T]he unambiguous meaning of § 315(c) is that it allows the Director
`
`discretion to join a person as a party to an already-instituted IPR but does not
`
`permit the joined party, by virtue of the joinder decision alone, to bring new issues
`
`from a second proceeding into the existing proceeding”) (emphasis original); see
`
`also id. at 1336 (emphasis original):
`
`The final committee report states that under § 315(c), “[t]he
`Director may allow other petitioners to join an inter partes . . .
`review.” H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 76 (2011), as reprinted
`in 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. 67, 100 (emphasis added). Like the
`statutory language itself, this contemplates allowing a person to
`join an already-instituted IPR as a party but not to bring with it
`its new issues.
`
`Here, the Petitioner is unequivocal in affirmatively averring that it is arguing
`
`nothing new beyond the issues already raised in the AMAT IPR:
`
`The Applied Materials [AMAT] IPR concerns the same patent
`and the same claims as ST’s Petition. The prior art-related
`portions of ST’s Petition and supporting expert declaration are
`substantively identical to those submitted in the Applied
`Materials IPR. Petitioner here asserts that the same claims are
`obvious over the same prior art based on the same arguments
`supported by the same expert as in the Applied Materials IPR.
`
`(Motion for Joinder at 1.)
`
`To the extent that the Board agrees, Ocean does not dispute this fact. Even
`
`so, should the Board ever determine that an argument raised by STMicro is
`3
`
`

`

`inconsistent or new when compared with the issues currently pending in the
`
`AMAT IPR, or if STMicro in due course files a brief or raises an issue distinct
`
`from the briefs and issues raised by AMAT now or at any point during the AMAT
`
`IPR proceeding, Ocean reserves the right to object to STMicro’s new arguments
`
`and move to reverse joinder and/or dismiss the IPR proceeding as statutorily time-
`
`barred.
`
`IV.
`
`STMICRO MUST WITHDRAW ITS CLAIMS IF AMAT
`WITHDRAWS THE APPLIED MATERIALS PETITION
`The purpose of the AIA—and, subsequently, inter partes review
`
`proceedings—is clear: “[T]o establish a more efficient and streamlined patent
`
`system that will improve patent quality and limit unnecessary and
`
`counterproductive litigation costs.” H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 40 (2011); see
`
`also General Plastic Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, IPR2016-
`
`01357, Paper 19 at 16 (PTAB Sept. 6, 2017) (precedential as to § II.B.4.i) (“In
`
`exercising discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a), we are
`
`mindful of the goals of the AIA—namely, to improve patent quality and make the
`
`patent system more efficient by the use of post-grant review procedures”).
`
`To that end, the Board has stated that it must be aware of potential abuse of
`
`the post-grant review process “by repeated attacks on patents.” Id. at 16-17.
`
`Indeed, the Board has expressly warned against the inefficiencies created by
`
`instances where a Petitioner seeking joinder might continue a proceeding which
`
`4
`
`

`

`would otherwise be terminated. See Apple Inc. v. UNILOC 2017 LLC, IPR2020-
`
`00854, Paper 9 at 4 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 28, 2020) (“Petitioner’s understudy argument is
`
`not persuasive here where . . . should Microsoft settle, Petitioner would stand in to
`
`continue a proceeding that would otherwise be terminated”).
`
`More specifically, the Board’s concern regarding a joined party’s ability to
`
`continue litigation rests in the “follow-on” petitioner’s ability to effectively
`
`contravene the controlling authority of: (1) 37 CFR § 42.101(b), requiring that
`
`petitions be filed no more than one year after the date on which the petitioner is
`
`served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent; and (2) 35 U.S.C. §
`
`316(a)(11), requiring that a final determination issue not later than one year after
`
`the date on which the Director notices institution of review. Indeed, the Board’s
`
`concerns are consistent with Supreme Court precedent. See SAS Institute, Inc. v.
`
`Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (2018) (“[T]he petitioner’s petition, not the Director’s
`
`discretion, is supposed to guide the life of the litigation.”).
`
`In other words, a petitioner may only bypass the one-year bars of these
`
`statutes when the petition is filed with an accompanying request for joinder
`
`under 37 CFR § 42.122(b). Without joinder, the petitioner would be explicitly
`
`time-barred from challenging the validity of the patent-at-issue by way of an IPR
`
`petition because the petitioner is a defendant served with a district court complaint
`
`more than one year ago alleging infringement of the patent.
`
`5
`
`

`

`As noted above, the Petitioner here (STMicro) is a defendant served with a
`
`complaint more than one year prior to the filing of the instant Petition that asserted
`
`the ‘248 patent. As such, without an accompanying request for joinder, Petitioner
`
`STMicro is time-barred from filing the Petition challenging the validity of the ’248
`
`patent. See 37 CFR § 42.101(b).
`
`As recognition of the fact that STMicro’s Petition would be time-barred
`
`under 37 C.F.R. § 42.101(b), STMicro filed a request for joinder under 37 CFR §
`
`42.122(b). Indeed, what would be the purpose of the Motion for Joinder if not to
`
`bypass the one-year bar? The only reasonable answer is that, as noted above, such
`
`a request is the only means available to Petitioner STMicro to bypass the one-year
`
`time-bar of 37 C.F.R. § 42.101(b).
`
`Given all of the above, STMicro must not be permitted to “continue a
`
`proceeding that would otherwise be terminated.” Apple, IPR2020-00854, Paper 9
`
`at 4. To do so would allow STMicro to flout multiple Federal statutes, P.T.A.B.
`
`precedential opinions, and Supreme Court precedent by proceeding in a matter
`
`where it would otherwise have been explicitly barred. Thus, should AMAT
`
`withdraw or otherwise dismiss its contentions in the AMAT IPR (for whatever
`
`reason), STMicro must similarly be ordered to withdraw its Petition.
`
`V.
`
`CONCLUSION
`For the foregoing reasons, Ocean does not oppose the Motion for Joinder so
`
`long as: (1) the Petition does not, and will not, contain any arguments different
`
`6
`
`

`

`from the Petition in the AMAT IPR; and (2) STMicro will be ordered to withdraw
`
`each of its asserted Grounds in the matter should AMAT withdraw or dismiss its
`
`contentions in the AMAT IPR.
`
`Dated: June 9, 2022
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`s/ Timothy Devlin
`Timothy Devlin (Lead Counsel)
`Registration No. 41,706
`Alex Chan
`Registration No. 52,713
`DEVLIN LAW FIRM LLC
`1526 Gilpin Avenue
`Wilmington, DE 19806
`Telephone: (302) 449-9010
`Facsimile: (302) 353-4251
`
`Attorney for Patent Owner
`
`7
`
`

`

`CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT
`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.24(d), the undersigned certifies that there are
`
`1,428 words in this paper, excluding any table of contents, table of authorities,
`
`mandatory notices under 37 C.F.R. § 42.8, certificate of word count, certificate of
`
`service, or appendix of exhibits. This certification relies on the word count of the
`
`word-processing system used to prepare this paper.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`s/ Timothy Devlin
`Timothy Devlin (Lead Counsel)
`Registration No. 41,706
`Alex Chan
`Registration No. 52,713
`DEVLIN LAW FIRM LLC
`1526 Gilpin Avenue
`Wilmington, DE 19806
`Telephone: (302) 449-9010
`Facsimile: (302) 353-4251
`tdevlin@devlinlawfirm.com
`
`Attorney for Patent Owner
`
`8
`
`

`

`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served
`
`electronically via electronic mail on June 9, 2022 on the following counsel of
`
`record for Petitioners:
`
`LEAD COUNSEL
`
`Tyler R. Bowen
`(Reg. No. 60,461)
`PERKINS COIE LLP
`2901 N. Central Avenue,
`Suite 2000
`Phoenix, Arizona 85012
`Telephone: (602) 351-8000
`Facsimile: (602) 648-7000
`Email: bowen-ptab@perkinscoie.com
`
`
`Counsel for STMicroelectronics, Inc.
`BACKUP COUNSEL
`
`Philip A. Morin
`(Reg. No. 45,926)
`PERKINS COIE LLP
`11452 El Camino Real,
`Suite 300
`San Diego, California 92130
`Telephone: (858) 720-5700
`Facsimile: (858) 720-5799
`Email: morin-ptab@perkinscoie.com
`Chad S. Campbell
`Pro hac vice to be submitted
`PERKINS COIE LLP
`2901 N. Central Avenue,
`Suite 2000
`Phoenix, Arizona 85012
`Telephone: (602) 351-8000
`Facsimile: (602) 648-7000
`Email: campbell-ptab@perkinscoie.com
`
`
`/s/ Timothy Devlin
` Timothy Devlin
`
`
`
`9
`
`
`
`
`

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