Case 6:21-cv-00579-ADA Document 46 Filed 01/28/22 Page 1 of 25
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`WACO DIVISION
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`SCRAMOGE TECHNOLOGY LTD.,
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`
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`
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`Plaintiff,
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`
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`v.
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`APPLE INC.,
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`
`
`
`
`Case No. 6:21-cv-00579-ADA
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Defendant.
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`
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`PLAINTIFF SCRAMOGE TECHNOLOGY LTD.’S RESPONSIVE
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`Page 1 of 25
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`GOOGLE EXHIBIT 1007
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`Case 6:21-cv-00579-ADA Document 46 Filed 01/28/22 Page 2 of 25
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
`1.
`DISPUTED TERMS ............................................................................................... 1
`A. “Receiving Space” ’565 Patent, Claims 1 and 12; ’740 Patent, Claims
`1-3, 6, 7, 8, and 16 ........................................................................................... 1
`i. No construction of “receiving space” is necessary ......................................... 1
`ii. A construction of “receiving space” should not import extraneous
`limitations ........................................................................................................ 4
`B. “overlaps the receiving space in a [second] direction parallel to the
`upper surface of the substrate” ’565 Patent, Claims [1], 12 ............................ 8
`C. “a first region in which at least one of the first layer and the second
`layer overlaps the wireless power receiving coil in a vertical direction
`perpendicular to an upper surface of the shielding unit” ’842 Patent,
`Claims 1 and 19 ............................................................................................. 11
`D. “reception space in a predetermined area” ’842 Patent, Claim 15 ................ 16
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 19
`
`I.
`
`II.
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`
`
`i
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`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITES
`
`
`
`Cases
`
`Arlington Indus., Inc. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc.,
`345 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2003)............................................................................................. 5, 12
`
`AstraZenaca LP v. Apotex, Inc.,
`633 F.3d 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2010)................................................................................................... 4
`
`Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Hartford Life Ins. Co.,
`359 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2004)................................................................................................. 10
`
`Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.,
`977 F.2d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1992)................................................................................................. 13
`
`CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.,
`288 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002)................................................................................................. 14
`
`Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Rsch. Organisation v. Buffalo Tech. (USA), Inc.,
`542 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008)................................................................................................. 15
`
`Epos Techs Ltd. v. Pegasus Techs.,
`766 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2014)............................................................................................. 4, 17
`
`Evolusion Concepts, Inc. v. HOC Events, Inc.,
`No. 2021-1963, 2022 WL 128577 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 14, 2022) ...................................................... 5
`
`Exmark Mfg. Co. Inc. v. Briggs & Stratton Corp.,
`830 F. App’x 305 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 6, 2020) .................................................................................. 5
`
`Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp.,
`755 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2014)................................................................................................... 1
`
`Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P.,
` 424 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2005 ................................................................................................... 8
`
`Kara Tech. Inc. v. Stamps.com Inc.,
`582 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2009)................................................................................................. 17
`
`Koito Mfg. Co. v. Turn-Key-Tech, LLC,
`381 F.3d 1142 (Fed. Cir. 2004)................................................................................................. 14
`
`Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc.,
`358 F.3d 898 (Fed. Cir. 2004)................................................................................................... 18
`
`
`
`ii
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`

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`
`Mentor Graphics Corp. v. EVE-USA, Inc.,
`851 F.3d 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2017)................................................................................................... 9
`
`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instrus., Inc.,
`572 U.S. 898 (2014) .................................................................................................................... 8
`
`Nuance Commc’ns, Inc. v. Vlingo, Corp.,
` No. 1:09-cv-00585-LPS, 2011 WL 3948803 (D. Del. Sept. 7, 2011) ....................................... 3
`
`Omega Eng’g, Inc, v. Raytek Corp.,
`334 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2003)................................................................................................... 1
`
`Orion IP, LLC v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC,
` 516 F. Supp. 2d 720 (E.D. Tex. 2007) ....................................................................................... 3
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)................................................................................................. 11
`
`Plantronics, Inc. v. Aliph, Inc.,
` 724 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2013).................................................................................................. 7
`
`R2 Sols. LLC v. Deezer S.A.,
`No. 4:21-CV-122, 2022 WL 36240 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 4, 2022) ................................................... 11
`
`Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc.,
`222 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000)................................................................................................. 14
`
`SightSound Techs., LLC v. Apple Inc.,
`809 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2015)................................................................................................... 6
`
`SkinMedica, Inc. v. Histogen Inc.,
`727 F.3d 1187 (Fed. Cir. 2013)................................................................................................... 4
`
`Softspikes LLC v. MacNeill Eng’g Co., Inc.,
`No. CV 08-469 (GMS), 2010 WL 11031657 (D. Del. Apr. 29, 2010) ....................................... 3
`
`Sonix Tech. Co. v. Pubs. Int’l, Ltd.,
` 844 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2017).................................................................................................. 8
`
`Steel Recovery, LLC v. X-Body Equip., Inc.,
`808 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2015)................................................................................................... 7
`
`Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC,
`669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012)................................................................................................... 1
`
`Toshiba Corp. v. Imation Corp.,
`681 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2012)............................................................................................. 1, 16
`
`
`
`iii
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`TQP Dev., LLC v. Ticketmaster Ent., Inc.,
`No. 2:09-CV-00279, 2011 WL 4458430 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 2011) ....................................... 16
`
`Twist, Inc. v. B GSE Grp., LLC,
` No. 3:19-cv-00583-MOC-DSC, 2021 WL 2210892 (W.D.N.C. June 1, 2021) ........................ 9
`
`Whirlpool Corp. v. Ozcan,
`No. 2:15-CV-2103-JRG, 2016 WL 7474517 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 29, 2016) ................................... 9
`
`Xoft, Inc. v. Cytyc Corp.,
`No. C-05-05312 RMW, 2007 WL 1241990 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2007) ................................... 16
`
`
`
`iv
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`I. INTRODUCTION
`
`
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`Plaintiff Scramoge Technology Ltd. (“Scramoge”) submits this claim construction brief in
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`response to Apple’s opening claim construction brief (Dkt. No. 43 (“Br.”)) to construe terms of
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`U.S. Patent Nos. 9,806,565 (“the ’565 Patent”) and 10,622,842 (“the ’842 Patent”).
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`1.
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`DISPUTED TERMS
`A.
`
`“Receiving Space” ’565 Patent, Claims 1 and 12; ’740 Patent, Claims
`1-3, 6, 7, 8, and 16
`
`Scramoge’s Proposed Construction
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`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`
`Plain and ordinary meaning
`
`empty space for the connecting unit extending
`from one surface of the substrate to an opposing
`surface of the substrate
`
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`Apple and Google improperly seek a construction of “receiving space” that imports
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`numerous limitations that are unnecessary and contradict the intrinsic record.1
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`i.
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`No construction of “receiving space” is necessary
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`Claim terms “are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by
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`a person of ordinary skill in the art when read in the context of the specification and prosecution
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`history.” Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012). “There
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`are only two exceptions to this general rule: 1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his
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`own lexicographer, or 2) when the patentee disavows the full scope of the claim term either in the
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`specification or during prosecution.” Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1371
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2014) (citation omitted); see also Toshiba Corp. v. Imation Corp., 681 F.3d 1358, 1369
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Absent disclaimer or lexicography, the plain meaning of the claim controls.”);
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`Omega Eng’g, Inc, v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“We indulge a ‘heavy
`
`
`1 Apple and Google also seek a construction of “receiving space” for U.S. Patent No. 10,804,740
`(“the ’740 Patent”), which is a continuation of the ’565 Patent. Dkt. No. 44 (“Joint Br.”) at 30.
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`
`
`1
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`presumption’ that claim terms carry their full ordinary and customary meaning ….”). Apple and
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`Google cannot identify any definition or disavowal that would justify limiting the ordinary
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`meaning of “receiving space” to their unduly narrow construction.
`
`The term “receiving space” is a term that a jury will readily understand based on its plain
`
`and ordinary meaning. The patent specification, figures, and claims all make clear that the
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`“receiving space” is a “space” in one or more layers of the claimed wireless power receiver. See,
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`e.g., ’565 Patent at 8:27-29 (“Referring to FIG. 11, the magnet substrate 100 is formed with a
`
`receiving space 130 having a structure the same as that of the connecting unit 300.”); 16:55-58 (“a
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`receiving space having the shape identical to the shape of the connecting unit 300 may be formed
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`in the first dual-side adhesive layer 710.”). For example, Figures 11 and 26 depict receiving space
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`130 as a “space” in either the magnetic substrate 100 (Fig. 11) and/or adhesive layer 710 (Fig. 26):
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`
`
`
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`
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`Further, the claims make clear in what layer(s) of the wireless power receiver the “receiving space”
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`is formed—namely, within a “substrate,” “magnetic substrate,” and/or “adhesive layer.” See, e.g.,
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`’565 Patent, Claim 1 (“a substrate comprising a receiving space of a predetermined shape formed
`
`therein”); ’740 Patent, Claim 1 (“a magnetic substrate comprising a first receiving space and a
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`
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`2
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`second receiving space”); and ’740 Patent, Claim 6 (“an adhesive layer comprising a receiving
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`space”).2 To that end, the ’565 and ’740 Patents use the term “receiving space” to mean a “space”
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`in one or more specified layers according to its plain and ordinary meaning. See, e.g., Softspikes
`
`LLC v. MacNeill Eng’g Co., Inc., No. CV 08-469 (GMS), 2010 WL 11031657, at *3 (D. Del. Apr.
`
`29, 2010) (holding “opening” subject to its plain and ordinary meaning).
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`
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`The other aspect of the term simply clarifies that there is something (namely, a “connecting
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`unit”) that is “received” in the “receiving space.”3 There is nothing remarkable about the ’565 and
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`’740 Patents’ use of the term in this manner. See, e.g., Nuance Commc’ns, Inc. v. Vlingo, Corp.,
`
`No. 1:09-cv-00585-LPS, 2011 WL 3948803, at *10-11 (D. Del. Sept. 7, 2011) (holding
`
`“receiving” term subject to plain and ordinary meaning); Orion IP, LLC v. Mercedes-Benz USA,
`
`LLC, 516 F. Supp. 2d 720, 734-35 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (holding “receiving” term subject to plain and
`
`ordinary meaning). The ’565 and ’740 Patents’ specification, figures, and claims all confirm that
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`the “receiving space” is meant to “receive” the “connecting unit” in some fashion—for example,
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`the “connecting unit” can be positioned with, overlap, or be disposed in the “receiving space.”
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`See, e.g., ’565 Patent at 2:14-23 (“positioning the connecting unit in the receiving space”); 2:45-
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`49 (“According to one embodiment, the connecting unit is disposed in the receiving space of the
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`magnetic substrate”); ’740 Patent, Claim 6 (“a connecting unit overlapping the receiving space”).
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`Indeed, Apple and Google agree that the “receiving space” is simply a “space” meant to “receive”
`
`the “connecting unit” based on the teachings of the ’565 and ’740 Patents—evidencing that the
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`term is understood under its plain and ordinary meaning. See Br. at 5 (“Each time the ’565 Patent
`
`describes the receiving space, it does so in a way that makes it clear that the space is ‘for the
`
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`2 All emphasis added unless stated otherwise.
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` 3
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` As described herein, the claims separately recite the relationship between “receiving space” and
`“connecting unit,” so there is no need to further specify this relationship with a claim construction.
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`
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`3
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`connecting unit’—that is, the connecting unit is what is ‘received’ in that space.”). Because the
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`term “receiving space” is clearly understood under its plain and ordinary meaning, no construction
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`of the term is proper or necessary.
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`ii.
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`A construction of “receiving space” should not import extraneous
`limitations
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`The term “receiving space” should not be rewritten to import the extraneous limitation that
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`the “receiving space” “extend[] from one surface of the substrate to an opposing surface of the
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`substrate.” Br. at 6-7. First, the proposed construction only applies to a “substrate.” But the ’565
`
`and ’740 Patents teach that the “receiving space” may also reside in an “adhesive layer.” See ’565
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`Patent at 16:55-58 (“a receiving space having the shape identical to the shape of the connecting
`
`unit 300 may be formed in the first dual-side adhesive layer 710.”). To that end, claims 6 and 16
`
`of the ’740 Patent recite “an adhesive layer comprising a receiving space” and do not require that
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`a receiving space reside in a “magnetic substrate” or a “substrate.”4 ’740 Patent at Claims 6, 16.
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`Apple and Google’s proposed construction, therefore, requires the Court to read limitations into at
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`least claims 6 and 16 of the ’740 Patent and would improperly eviscerate a claimed embodiment.
`
`See Epos Techs Ltd. v. Pegasus Techs., 766 F.3d 1338, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (a “claim
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`construction that excludes a preferred embodiment … is rarely, if ever correct and would require
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`highly persuasive evidentiary support.”) (citation omitted).
`
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`4 It is for this reason that Apple’s and Google’s reliance on AstraZeneca LP is unpersuasive. Br.
`at 5. By contemplating that the receiving space may reside in a “substrate,” “magnetic substrate,”
`and/or “adhesive layer,” this is not a situation where the patentee uses the claim term to only have
`a single meaning with respect to the location of the “receiving space.” Br. at 5 (citing AstraZenaca
`LP v. Apotex, Inc., 633 F.3d 1042, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). Similarly, the patentee did not
`“disclaim[]” the meaning of “receiving space” or otherwise limit its scope with “definitive remarks
`in the written description.” Id. (citing SkinMedica, Inc. v. Histogen Inc., 727 F.3d 1187, 1196 (Fed.
`Cir. 2013) and Comput. Docking Station Corp. v. Dell, Inc., 519 F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
`
`
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`4
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`Apple and Google also fail to justify importing the limitation that the receiving space
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`“extend[] from one surface of the substrate to an opposing surface of the substrate.” Apple and
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`Google rely solely on their interpretation of certain figures in the ’565 and ’740 Patents to justify
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`importing this limitation. Br. at 6-7. But the Federal Circuit has “repeatedly held that it is not
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`enough that the only embodiments, or all of the embodiments, contain a particular limitation to
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`limit claims beyond their plain meaning.” Evolusion Concepts, Inc. v. HOC Events, Inc., No.
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`2021-1963, 2022 WL 128577, at *5 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 14, 2022) (citations and quotations omitted);
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`see also Arlington Indus., Inc. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., 345 F.3d 1318, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
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`(defendant “invites us to import a limitation from the preferred embodiments to restrict the
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`meaning of a claim term. We have consistently warned against this approach to claim construction,
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`which is seldom justified.”). For example, in Exmark Mfg. Co., the Federal Circuit explained that
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`“[a]lthough the figures in the specification depict some distance between the front wall and
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`corresponding flow control baffle, … these exemplary illustrations are not sufficient to impose a
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`spatial separation requirement on claim language that is otherwise silent as to any required baffle-
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`wall spacing.” Exmark Mfg. Co. Inc. v. Briggs & Stratton Corp., 830 F. App’x 305, 311 (Fed. Cir.
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`Oct. 6, 2020). Here too, simply because some of the figures may appear to show that the “receiving
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`space” spans the entirety of the depicted magnetic substrate, the Court cannot impose a
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`requirement that the receiving space span the entirety of a substrate when the claims are “otherwise
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`silent.” Id. Indeed, the ’565 Patent makes clear that “[a]lthough embodiments have been described
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`with reference to a number of illustrative embodiments thereof, it should be understood that
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`numerous other modifications and embodiments can be devised by those skilled in the art that will
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`fall within the spirit and scope of the principles of this disclosure.” ’565 Patent at 19:3-8; see also
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`id. at 19:8-12 (“various variations and modifications are possible in the component parts and/or
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`5
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`arrangements of the subject combination arrangement within the scope of the disclosure, the
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`drawings and the appended claims.”).
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`Additionally, Apple and Google’s proposed construction is contradicted by Figure 12 and
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`the related disclosures. For example, in connection with Figure 12, the ’565 Patent explains: “The
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`connecting unit 300 has a thickness equal to or smaller than a thickness of the magnetic substrate
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`100.” Id. at 8:42-43. The ’565 Patent further provides that “[t]he connecting unit 300 may be
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`disposed in the receiving space 130 of the magnetic substrate 100.” Id. at 8:46-47. As such, “[i]f
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`the thickness of the connecting unit 300 is equal to or smaller than the thickness of the magnetic
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`substrate 100, … the overall thickness of the wireless power receiver 1000 can be reduced as much
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`as the thickness of the connecting unit 300.” Id. at 8:48-52. From this discussion of Figure 12, it
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`does not follow—as Apple and Google suggest—that the receiving space would necessarily extend
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`throughout the entirety of the substrate in instances where the thickness of the connecting unit is
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`less than the thickness of the substrate. This is because positioning the connecting unit in a
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`receiving space that is less than the thickness of the substrate will achieve the purpose of reducing
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`the thickness of the wireless power receiver.
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`Even more problematic, imposing this limitation into the term “receiving space” would
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`also eliminate certain claimed embodiments of other related patents to the ’565 Patent. As Apple
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`and Google acknowledge, the Federal Circuit has cautioned that patents that derive from the same
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`parent application and share common terms are to be construed consistently. See Joint Br. at 30
`
`(citing SightSound Techs., LLC v. Apple Inc., 809 F.3d 1307, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Where
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`multiple patents ‘derive from the same parent application and share many common terms, we must
`
`interpret the claims consistently across all asserted patents.’”)) (citation omitted). Here, similar to
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`the ’740 Patent, U.S. Patent Nos. 10,270,291 (“the ’291 Patent”) and 10,277,071 (“the ’071
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`Patent”) are continuations of the ’565 Patent (i.e., the ’291, ’071, and ’740 Patents are all direct
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`descendants of the ’565 Patent and share the same patent application). Several claims of the ’291
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`and ’071 Patents provide that “a thickness of the magnetic substrate is the same as a thickness of
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`the receiving space.” ’291 Patent, Claims 2, 12, 19; see also ’071 Patent, Claims 2, 12, 19. These
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`claims evidence that the patentee expressly contemplated situations where the “receiving space”
`
`would not be the same thickness of the substrate (i.e., the “receiving space” does not extend from
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`“one surface of the substrate to an opposing surface of the substrate”). As such, these claims would
`
`be rendered meaningless if the Court adopts Apple and Google’s proposed construction.5 See also
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`Plantronics, Inc. v. Aliph, Inc., 724 F.3d 1343, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (proposed construction
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`“would improperly limit the broadly drafted claims to one preferred embodiment (thereby
`
`excluding others) or would be the result of improperly importing a limitation from the specification
`
`into the claims.”).
`
`Finally, Apple and Google’s construction is contradicted by Apple’s IPR on the ’565
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`Patent, where it argues that: “it was well known to POSITAs in the electrical arts that when
`
`manufacturing printed circuit boards that will contain embedded components, ‘recesses’ or
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`‘openings’ (receiving spaces) are formed in the layers of the circuit board to accommodate the
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`embedded components.” Ex. 1 (Apple ’565 IPR) at 30, 33. Apple’s identification of the supposed
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`“receiving space” in the prior art does not extend throughout the entirety of the substrate from one
`
`surface to the other:
`
`
`5 Apple and Google’s reliance on Advanced Steel Recovery is inapposite because the construction
`is not “supported by the claims.” Br. at 7 (citing Adv. Steel Recovery, LLC v. X-Body Equip., Inc.,
`808 F.3d 1313, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“As properly understood, the district court's construction is
`supported by the claims and specification”) (emphasis added)). It is also for this reason that their
`reliance on Hologic and TDM Am., LLC are unpersuasive—the claims of the ’291 and ’071 Patents
`make clear that patentee envisioned that the “receiving space” may be a different thickness than
`the magnetic substrate and so reliance only on the patent figures is improper. Id.
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`
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`7
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`
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`Accordingly, the Court should reject Apple and Google’s improper construction.
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`B.
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`“overlaps the receiving space in a [second] direction parallel to the
`upper surface of the substrate” ’565 Patent, Claims [1], 12
`
`Scramoge’s Proposed Construction
`
`Apple’s Proposed Construction
`
`Plain and ordinary meaning
`
`Apple is wrong that the phrase “overlaps the receiving space in a direction parallel to the
`
`Indefinite
`
`upper surface of the substrate” is indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2. Br. at 9. It is Apple’s
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`burden to prove indefiniteness by clear and convincing evidence, which it cannot do. See Sonix
`
`Tech. Co. v. Pubs. Int’l, Ltd., 844 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2017). A claim is not indefinite so
`
`long as it informs a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) about the scope of the invention
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`with “reasonable certainty.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instrus., Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 910 (2014).
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`“Absolute precision” in claim language is “unattainable.” Id.; see also Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest
`
`Mfg., L.P., 424 F.3d 1374, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[A] patentee need not define his invention with
`
`mathematical precision in order to comply with the definiteness requirement.”) (citation omitted).
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`As a threshold matter, Apple does not submit any evidence from a POSITA to support its
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`attorney argument. Moreover, Apple fails to even identify the level of skill for a POSITA. Thus,
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`Apple’s criticisms are purely conjecture and attorney argument. This is insufficient to prove
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`indefiniteness by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Twist, Inc. v. B GSE Grp., LLC, No.
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`3:19-cv-00583-MOC-DSC, 2021 WL 2210892, at *8 (W.D.N.C. June 1, 2021) (“Without
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`evidence from a POSITA, the Court cannot conclude this claim is indefinite.”); Whirlpool Corp.
`
`v. Ozcan, No. 2:15-CV-2103-JRG, 2016 WL 7474517, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 29, 2016) (“Instead
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`of submitting evidence, such as an expert declaration, to demonstrate the understanding of a person
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`of ordinary skill in the art, Yunda relies entirely on attorney argument…. The Court finds such
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`argument unpersuasive.”).
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`Here, the ’565 Patent specification, figures, claims, and prosecution history teach the
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`meaning of the phrase “overlaps the receiving space in a [second] direction parallel to the upper
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`surface of the substrate” in a way that is readily understandable. Specifically, this phrase clarifies
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`that the “connecting unit” is positioned in a manner that is “parallel” (as opposed to, say, vertical)
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`to the substrate. See, e.g., ’565 Patent, Claims 1, 12. This orientation is plainly taught by at least
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`Figures 11, 12, 26, and 27:
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`See, e.g., Mentor Graphics Corp. v. EVE-USA, Inc., 851 F.3d 1275, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“A
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`skilled artisan viewing Figures 11 and 19 would readily understand …. the meaning of ‘near’ with
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`reasonable certainty.”). As such, the ’565 Patent makes clear that the disputed claim language
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`describes the position of the connecting unit in a manner that is reasonably certain.6
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`
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`Apple’s argument that there is something improper about the ’565 Patent claims requiring
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`both that the connecting unit be “disposed in the receiving space” and that the connecting unit also
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`“overlap the receiving space in a direction parallel to the upper surface of the substrate” is
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`unpersuasive. Br. at 10-11. These limitations concern two different positional aspects of the
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`“connecting unit.” First, the use of the term “disposed in” refers to the relationship of the
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`connecting unit to the “receiving space.” See, e.g., ’565 Patent, Claim 12 (“the connecting unit is
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`disposed in the receiving space”). The ’565 Patent family contemplates that the “connecting unit”
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`may have different orientations with respect to the “receiving space”—for example, it may
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`“overlap” the receiving space, as opposed to being “disposed in” the receiving space. Compare,
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`e.g., ’740 Patent, Claim 6 (“a connecting unit overlapping the receiving space”) with ’565 Patent,
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`Claim 1 (“the connecting unit is disposed in the receiving space”). As such, this aspect of the
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`claims refers to whether or not the connecting unit needs to be within (i.e., “disposed in” as
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`opposed to “overlapping”) the receiving space.
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`Second, the ’565 Patent claims use the phrase “overlaps the receiving space in a direction
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`parallel to the upper surface of the substrate” clarifies the orientation of the connecting unit to the
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`substrate. See ’565 Patent Claims 1, 12. Specifically, the claim language clarifies that the
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`“connecting unit” be oriented such that some (or all) of the connecting unit is parallel to the upper
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`6 Apple’s argument that the terms “overlap” and “parallel” are not mentioned in the specification
`is unpersuasive. These terms are used in accordance with their plain and ordinary meaning, and
`the cited figures demonstrate that the terms are used in a way that is reasonably certain. See, e.g.,
`Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 359 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The
`failure to define the term is, of course, not fatal, for if the meaning of the term is fairly inferable
`from the patent, an express definition is not necessary”).
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`Case 6:21-cv-00579-ADA Document 46 Filed 01/28/22 Page 16 of 25
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`surface of the substrate (as depicted in Figures 11, 12, 26, and 27, for example), as opposed to
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`being vertically oriented in the receiving space. Taken together, there is nothing contradictory or
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`redundant about specifying that the “connecting unit” (1) be “disposed in” the receiving space and
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`(2) be at least (in part) “parallel” (as opposed to vertical) to the upper surface of the substrate. For
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`these reasons, the phrases have different meanings and do not implicate issues of claim
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`differentiation. As such, Apple cannot sustain its burden to demonstrate invalidity by clear and
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`convincing evidence because the phrase clarifies the orientation of the claimed components with
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`reasonable certainty.
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`C.
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`“a first region in which at least one of the first layer and the second
`layer overlaps the wireless power receiving coil in a vertical direction
`perpendicular to an upper surface of the shielding unit” ’842 Patent,
`Claims 1 and 19
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`Scramoge’s Proposed Construction
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`Apple’s Proposed Construction
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`Plain and ordinary meaning
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`Apple cannot sustain its burden to demonstrate that Claims 1 and 19 of the ’565 Patent are
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`Indefinite
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`invalid by clear and convincing evidence. Apple does not actually dispute that the term is
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`understood with reasonable certainty under its plain and ordinary meaning. Rather, Apple
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`complains that the limitation was “improperly added during prosecution and [is] inconsistent with
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`the specification as originally filed.” Br. at 12. As such, Apple is actually complaining about the
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`adequacy of written description or enablement, which is not proper on claim construction. See,
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`e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting “we have certainly not
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`endorsed a regime in which validity analysis is a regular component of claim construction.”); see
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`also R2 Sols. LLC v. Deezer S.A., No. 4:21-CV-122, 2022 WL 36240, at *21 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 4,
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`2022) (“Defendants’ argument appears to be more akin to a challenge as to the adequacy of written
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`description or enablement, which are not at issue in these claim construction proceedings.”). While
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`Apple may seek to raise its arguments during expert discovery, Apple fails to raise any
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`indefiniteness issue to be addressed here as part of claim construction.
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`To be certain, a POSITA would understand the meaning of the phrase “a first region in which
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`at least one of the first layer and the second layer overlaps the wireless power receiving coil in a vertical
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`direction perpendicular to an upper surface of the shielding unit” with reasonable certainty. The claim
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`language is readily ascertainable through its plain and ordinary meaning. See, e.g., Arlington Indus.,
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`Inc., 345 F.3d at 1325 (“Claim terms are presumed to be given their ordinary and customary
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`meaning.”). The plain and ordinary meaning of the disputed phrase is evidenced by the ’842 Patent
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`claims, specification, and figures. For example, Figures 9 and 10 depict “a first region 411” where at
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`least one of the first or second layer 405 overlaps the receiving coil 340 in a vertical direction:
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`The two Figures depict different means for incorporating the shielding unit 380 into the circuit
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`board 301, but are otherwise the same for purposes of depicting how at least one layer overlaps
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`the receiving coil.7 For example, w