UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`____________________________________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`____________________________________________
`
`
`APPLE INC.,
`
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`CPC PATENT TECHNOLOGIES PTY, LTD.,
`
`Case IPR2022-00602
`
`U.S. Patent No. 9,665,705
`____________
`
`
`PETITIONER APPLE INC.’S REPLY
`TO CPC’S PATENT OWNER RESPONSE
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 1
`I.
`II. CPC PROVIDES NO REBUTTAL TO MATHIASSEN’S
`TEACHING OF OUTPUTTING THE “ACCESSIBILITY
`ATTRIBUTE” RESPONSIVE TO A CAR
`OWNER/ADMINISTRATOR’S BIOMETRIC ........................................ 1
`III. MATHIASSEN’S SERIES OF FINGERPRINT
`REPRESENTATIONS IS A SERIES OF BIOMETRIC SIGNAL
`ENTRIES ....................................................................................................... 5
`IV. CPC’S LACK OF MOTIVATION TO COMBINE
`ARGUMENTS HAVE NO BASIS IN FACTS OR THE LAW ............... 7
`A.
`CPC’S “PUSH-BUTTON” THEORY FOR MODIFYING MATHIASSEN ........... 7
`B.
`CPC’S “COMPUTER ART” THEORY REGARDING MCKEETH AND
`ANDERSON ........................................................................................... 11
`CPC RESORTS TO BODILY INCORPORATION ARGUMENTS ................... 14
`CPC’S MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES REGARDING THE PROPOSED
`GROUND .............................................................................................. 15
`V. CPC PRESENTS NO NEW ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING ITS
`COMPLAINTS OF ANDERSON .............................................................. 19
`VI. THE CITED ART RENDERS OBVIOUS POPULATING THE
`DATABASE ACCORDING TO THE INSTRUCTION ......................... 22
`VII. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ....................................................................... 25
`A.
`“CONFIGURED TO” VS. “CAPABLE OF” ................................................. 25
`VIII. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 26
`
`
`
`C.
`D.
`
`
`
`
`
`i
`
`

`

`
`Cases:
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`Acclarent, Inc. v. Ford Albritton, IV, IPR2017-00498, Paper 40 (PTAB Jul
`9, 2018) ................................................................................................................... 28
`Aspex Eyewear, Inc., v Marchon Eyewear, Inc., 672 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir.
`2012) ....................................................................................................................... 28
`Cisco Systems, Inc. v. K.Mizra LLC, IPR2021-00594, Paper 35 (Aug. 12,
`2022) ....................................................................................................................... 12
`Draftkings Inc., v. Interactive Games LLC, IPR2020-01107, Paper 39
`(PTAB Jan. 4, 2021) ............................................................................................... 12
`Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., v. Lynk Labs, Inc., IPR2021-01368, Paper 49 (Jan.
`27, 2023) ................................................................................................................. 16
`In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656 (Fed. Cir. 1992) .............................................................. 12
`In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ......................................................... 12
`In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ............................................... 22
`Ingenico Inc. v. Ioengine LLC, IPR2019-00416, Paper 62 (PTAB Sept. 10,
`2020) ....................................................................................................................... 19
`Intel Corp. v. Health Discovery Corp., IPR2021-00550, Paper 36 (Sept. 6,
`2022) ....................................................................................................................... 10
`Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 2020-2092, 2022 WL 880681 (Fed. Cir.
`Mar. 24, 2022) ........................................................................................................ 11
`Intel Corp. v. PACT XPP Schweiz AG, No. 2022-1037, 2023 WL 2469631 at
`*4-5 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 13, 2023) ................................................................................ 11
`
`Intel Corporation v. Parkervision Inc., IPR2020-01265, Paper 44 (PTAB
`Jan. 21, 2022) ............................................................................................................ 3
`INVT SPE LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 46 F.4th 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2022) ............... 27
`Keynetik, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., No. 2022-1127 (Fed. Cir. Feb.
`15, 2023) ................................................................................................................... 9
`
`ii
`
`

`

`KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) ............................................... 14
`MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir.
`2015) ....................................................................................................................... 16
`Micron Tech., Inc. v. Unification Technologies LLC, IPR2021-00343, Paper
`42 (PTAB July 8, 2022) .......................................................................................... 11
`ParkerVision, Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc., 903 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ........... 27, 28
`Personal Web Techs., LLC v. Apple, Inc., 848 F.3d 987 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ............. 10
`PNC Bank, N.A., v. United Services Automobile Association, IPR2021-
`01070, Paper 68 (PTAB Jan. 19, 2023) .................................................................. 19
`Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 (PTAB Aug. 24,
`2022) ....................................................................................................................... 19
`
`Regulations:
`37 C.F.R. § 42.6 ...................................................................................................... 33
`37 C.F.R. § 42.6(e) ................................................................................................. 33
`37 C.F.R. § 42.8 ...................................................................................................... 32
`37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b) ................................................................................................. 3
`37 C.F.R. § 42.24 .................................................................................................... 32
`
`
`
`
`
`iii
`
`

`

`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`The proposed Ground of Mathiassen-McKeeth-Anderson requires two
`
`minimal modifications to Mathiassen to render obvious the challenged independent
`
`claims. First, Mathiassen’s biometric security system is modified to output a duress
`
`and/or alert condition, per McKeeth, responsive to a user’s biometric signature.
`
`Mathiassen already contemplates outputting various commands based on different
`
`user-inputted biometric signals, indicating a duress and/or alert condition based on
`
`a particular inputted biometric requires only simple programming. Second,
`
`Mathiassen is modified to recognize a touch duration, per Anderson, of the
`
`fingerprint representation on the fingerprint sensor. Mathiassen already receives a
`
`series of fingerprint representations of touch/no-touch movements on the fingerprint
`
`sensor, so modifying Mathiassen to recognize a duration of a touch/no-touch
`
`requires simple programming. Because Mathiassen is a strong reference, and the
`
`Petition and supporting Declaration provide a thorough analysis supported by factual
`
`underpinnings, CPC presents arguments having no legal and factual basis.
`
`II. CPC PROVIDES NO REBUTTAL TO MATHIASSEN’S TEACHING
`OF OUTPUTTING THE
`“ACCESSIBILITY ATTRIBUTE”
`RESPONSIVE
`TO A CAR OWNER/ADMINISTRATOR’S
`BIOMETRIC
`The Parties agree to apply the District Court’s construction for the claimed
`
`“accessibility attribute” as an “attribute that establishes whether and under which
`
`conditions access to the controlled item should be granted to a user[.]” (Paper 1,
`
`
`
`1
`
`

`

`Petition, 6; Paper 17, Patent Owner Response, 6). CPC contends Mathiassen teaches
`
`a binary “whether” access is granted and does not teach “under which conditions[.]”
`
`(Paper 17, 14-17).
`
`The Petition relies on McKeeth for teaching two accessibility attributes
`
`(duress and alert), whereas the ’705 Patent’s independent claims only require
`
`outputting a single accessibility attribute. (Paper 1, 17-22; Ex. 1003, ¶¶ 143-148).
`
`CPC does not dispute McKeeth teaches two accessibility attributes. (Paper 17, 18-
`
`25 (CPC only arguing motivation to combine for McKeeth)). Therefore, even if the
`
`Board determines Mathiassen does not teach an accessibility attribute, McKeeth
`
`teaches such.
`
`Contrary to CPC’s assertions, Apple maintains the accessibility attribute
`
`requires establishing “whether and under which conditions” access should be
`
`granted. CPC’s argument only addresses Apple’s mapping of Mathiassen for
`
`“whether” access is granted, thus mischaracterizing the mapping. (Paper 17, 14-15).
`
`CPC does not address the Petition’s mapping and Declaration support establishing
`
`Mathiassen teaches “under which conditions” access is granted. (Paper 1, 19-20; Ex.
`
`1003, ¶¶ 140-142).
`
`Mathiassen teaches a car owner/administrator requesting access to car door
`
`locks. (Paper 1, 19; Ex. 1004, Mathiassen, [0175-0182]). The Petition mapped, with
`
`Declarant support,
`
`that Mathiassen’s car owner/administrator
`
`is granted
`
`2
`
`

`

`“unconditional” or “full” access. (Paper 1, 19-20; Ex. 1003, ¶¶ 140-142). CPC does
`
`not address the Petition’s mapping that a car owner/administrator has unconditional
`
`or full access. The Board should waive future arguments by CPC rebutting the
`
`Petition’s mapping at pages 19-20 and Ex. 1003, ¶¶ 140-142 addressing the “under
`
`which conditions” component of the construction. Intel Corporation v. Parkervision
`
`Inc., IPR2020-01265, Paper 44, 67-68 (PTAB Jan. 21, 2022) (citing 37 C.F.R. §
`
`42.23(b) and Consolidated TPG).
`
`CPC argues Mathiassen “does not provide any incremental condition to
`
`access[.]” (Paper 17, 15). Applying CPC’s own theory of what satisfies “under
`
`which conditions[,]” Mathiassen’s granted car owner/administrator access is an
`
`“incremental condition” to access. The car owner/administrator is granted access
`
`(i.e., whether access is granted) and the access is full or unconditional (i.e., granted
`
`access without any conditions, due to, for example, being a car owner/administrator).
`
`(Paper 1, 18-19; Ex. 1003, ¶ 140).
`
`CPC has no viable argument rebutting Mathiassen’s teaching of the claimed
`
`“accessibility attribute[.]” First, Mathiassen’s car owner/administrator access is
`
`substantially similar to the “access” accessibility attribute described in the ’705
`
`Patent. (Paper 1, 19; Ex. 1003, ¶ 142). The ’705 Patent describes an “access”
`
`accessibility attribute where access is granted without conditions based on the user’s
`
`biometric matching “a legitimate signature in the database[,]” as also taught in
`
`3
`
`

`

`Mathiassen. (Paper 1, 18) (citing Ex. 1001, 12:15-24). The ’705 Patent also
`
`describes an administrator enrolling a first finger for administrator access and
`
`another finger for ordinary user access, thus distinguishing a user requesting
`
`administrator access (e.g., access without conditions) from ordinary access. (Ex.
`
`1001, 10:49-53; id. at 10:54-55 (describing class overlap, such as a stored signature
`
`belonging to an administrator in the duress class); Ex. 1089, 21:6-12 (Dr. Easttom
`
`opining the “[’705 Patent] describes both standard users and administrative use[r]s
`
`that have different access”)). Even the claims of the ’705 Patent recite that an
`
`“accessibility attribute compris[es] an access attribute if the biometric signal
`
`matches” a stored biometric signature. (Ex. 1001, Claim 3, 16:34-39).
`
`Therefore, the ’705 Patent describes outputting an accessibility attribute that
`
`includes “access” without any conditions, which satisfies the “under which
`
`conditions” construction component. Because the ’705 Patent also describes an
`
`administrator access as an exemplary access without conditions, as compared to an
`
`ordinary user, and because Mathiassen teaches a substantially similar car
`
`owner/administrator granted access, Mathiassen teaches an accessibility attribute, as
`
`claimed.
`
`Second, even CPC’s own declarant, Dr. Easttom, admits administrator access
`
`is an “accessibility attribute” encompassed within the ’705 Patent’s claims:
`
`Q. So would an administrator whose signature is stored in the database
`
`4
`
`

`

`be a legitimate user?
`A. The user would certainly be legitimate.
`Q. And if that legitimate user is granted access, would the system output
`an access attribute?
`A. Well, I believe it outputs an accessibility attribute that is now
`saying whether or not to grant them access in our hypothetical, yes,
`would be the answer to that. Under what conditions? Well, they are
`an administrator so we’re going to grant them a much broader access
`than a standard user. So, yes, an accessibility attribute would be
`output from that process.
`
`(Ex. 1089, 21:20–22:7).1
`
`Because (1) Mathiassen teaches a substantially similar administrator access
`
`as described in the ’705 Patent; and (2) because CPC’s own declarant admits that an
`
`administrator granted “broader access” is a type of accessibility attribute,
`
`Mathiassen teaches an accessibility attribute, as claimed, including “under which
`
`conditions” access is granted.
`
`III. MATHIASSEN’S SERIES OF FINGERPRINT REPRESENTATIONS
`IS A SERIES OF BIOMETRIC SIGNAL ENTRIES
`CPC argues that Mathiassen’s “finger movements” do not involve a biometric
`
`signal because “something more than the fingerprint sensor” tracks the finger
`
`movements. (Paper 17, 19). CPC additionally argues Mathiassen’s fingerprint
`
`sensor in conjunction with Mathiassen’s translation means “is not acting like a
`
`
`1 Emphases added unless otherwise noted.
`
`5
`
`

`

`fingerprint sensor.” Id. CPC concludes, without explanation, that there would have
`
`been no motivation to “arrive at a duress signal[.]” Id. at 19-20.
`
`CPC ignores Mathiassen’s teachings that the finger movements on the
`
`fingerprint sensor are obtained from a “series of consecutive fingerprint
`
`representations[,]” where the representations comprise the user’s fingerprint
`
`minutiae, i.e., biometric information. (Ex. 1004, [0192], [0050] (disclosing capturing
`
`the user’s fingerprint), [0177-0178]; Ex. 1003, ¶¶ 163-164, 205 (opining the “series
`
`of consecutive fingerprint representations” indicate “omni-directional finger
`
`movements across the sensor”), 128 (opining fingerprint data generated by the pre-
`
`processing block are biometric signals); Paper 1, 11, 14-15 (discussing the
`
`“biometric signal” is the user’s fingerprint images reduced to minutiae); Ex. 1089,
`
`27:14-17 (Dr. Easttom agreeing fingerprint representations are the user’s
`
`fingerprint)).
`
`Mathiassen teaches the system “store[s] a series of consecutive fingerprint
`
`representations generated by the fingerprint sensor signal capturing and pre-
`
`processing block (5C).” (Ex. 1004, [0192]); Ex. 1089, 26:21–28:2 (Dr. Easttom
`
`agreeing recording (i.e., storing) a fingerprint representation is an “entry of a
`
`biometric signal”)). Movement analyzing means analyzes the obtained series of
`
`fingerprint representations to measure movements across the fingerprint sensor. (Ex.
`
`1004, [0192]). The translation software then categorizes and translates the obtained
`
`6
`
`

`

`omni-directional finger movements to a specific command. Id. Because Mathiassen
`
`teaches the series of fingerprint representations applied to the fingerprint sensor
`
`are analyzed and categorized to finger movements ([0192]), Mathiassen teaches the
`
`user’s series of finger movements includes a biometric signal, contrary to CPC’s
`
`assertions. (Ex. 1003, ¶ 205).
`
`Dr. Easttom opines, without factual support or discussion of Mathiassen, that
`
`the “finger movements” are “distinct from fingerprints themselves[.]” (Ex. 2013,
`
`¶ 53). Dr. Sears disagrees, opining Mathiassen’s omni-directional finger movements
`
`are analyzed from the fingerprint representations. (Ex. 1090, Supp. Dec. of Dr.
`
`Andrews Sears, ¶¶ 9-13). The movement analyzing means analyzes the fingerprint
`
`representations to determine the finger movement ([0192]), further confirming
`
`Mathiassen teaches the claimed “receiving a series of entries of the biometric
`
`signal.” Id. at ¶ 9.
`
`IV. CPC’S LACK OF MOTIVATION TO COMBINE ARGUMENTS
`HAVE NO BASIS IN FACTS OR THE LAW
`A. CPC’s “Push-Button” Theory for Modifying Mathiassen
`CPC’s primary argument for why there allegedly would have been no
`
`motivation to modify Mathiassen to include McKeeth’s output of a duress signal and
`
`Anderson’s determination of a fingerprint press duration is that “a push button is the
`
`simpler solution[.]” (Paper 17, 25, 30, 23 (“Mathiassen could have been modified
`
`7
`
`

`

`by adding a physical push button to generate a duress signal.”)). CPC’s theory fails
`
`for several reasons.
`
`First, it would have been far simpler to modify Mathiassen to output a duress
`
`signal by simply programming the system to recognize an inputted fingerprint
`
`representation indicating a duress condition, as mapped in the Petition, rather than
`
`CPC’s strained push-button theory. Mathiassen already teaches a fingerprint sensor
`
`and corresponding processor that (1) recognize fingerprint representations and
`
`corresponding finger movements across the fingerprint sensor (e.g., “touch/no-touch
`
`finger movement sequences”); (2) output various commands according to the
`
`fingerprint movements; and (3) are capable of enrolling more than one fingerprint
`
`or fingerprint movement for a user for the purpose of commanding the system, “[a]s
`
`an additional safety feature.” (Ex. 1004, [0192]; Paper 1, 22-24; Ex. 1003, ¶¶ 127-
`
`129, 164-171, 205-210, 220-225). CPC even admits “if the sole purpose of
`
`modification were to enable sending additional signals, Mathiassen already provides
`
`the mechanism for doing so without modifications taught in other references.”
`
`(Paper 17, 29).
`
`As Dr. Sears opined, the modification to Mathiassen to recognize and output
`
`a duress signal would have required simply enrolling another fingerprint or finger
`
`movement (as already taught by Mathiassen) and encoding another command (e.g.,
`
`duress or alert) into the command table (which is also taught in Mathiassen). (Ex.
`
`8
`
`

`

`1003, ¶¶ 167, 224-225). Thus, the Mathiassen modification is relatively trivial given
`
`Mathiassen already includes the necessary hardware and software components for
`
`instructing commands via fingerprints and finger movement sequences, including
`
`detecting touch/no-touch finger movement sequences of a particular duration (as
`
`modified by Anderson). (Ex. 1003, ¶¶ 221, 224-225). Per Dr. Sears, a POSITA
`
`would already have the expertise to implement the required re-programming. Id. at
`
`¶¶ 164-167, 224-225. Dr. Sears detailing the modified function of the software and
`
`opining such modification would be “simple” is “sufficient to establish a reasonable
`
`expectation of success[,]” as writing code to achieve the identified functions “is
`
`within the skill of the art.” Keynetik, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 2022-1127,
`
`2023, WL 2003932 at *2 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 15, 2023).
`
`Rather than respond to Dr. Sears’s extensive discussion for why Mathiassen’s
`
`modifications would have been obvious, CPC falsely asserts Apple and Dr. Sears
`
`made a “blind assumption that these references could be combined without
`
`explaining how the resulting combination would be achieved.…” (Paper 17, 21). Far
`
`from a “blind assumption[,]” Apple and Dr. Sears provided a thorough analysis
`
`underscored with factual support. (Paper 1, 22-24, 36-37; Ex. 1003, ¶¶ 162-171, 205-
`
`210, 220-225). Regardless, a proper legal analysis for obviousness does not address
`
`whether the reference could be combined, but why it would have been obvious to
`
`combine the references. Intel Corp. v. Health Discovery Corp., IPR2021-00550,
`
`9
`
`

`

`Paper 36, 30-31 (PTAB Sept. 6, 2022) (petitioner must show “why” a POSITA
`
`would have combined references); Personal Web Techs., LLC v. Apple, Inc., 848
`
`F.3d 987, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (whether references “could be combined” is a
`
`“deficient” argument in establishing obviousness). CPC’s push-button theory does
`
`not rebut why the modification is allegedly non-obvious.
`
`Second, CPC’s push-button theory fails because Mathiassen applies
`
`fingerprint access to car locking systems to “prevent” non-authorized use. (Ex. 1004,
`
`[0145]; Ex. 1003, ¶ 150). Because Mathiassen is concerned with blocking un-
`
`authorized users, a simple push button (with no biometric identification) would not
`
`have blocked un-authorized use, and thus a POSITA would not have been motivated
`
`to include a push button, as CPC purports. (Ex. 1090, ¶¶ 2-8). Unlike a push button,
`
`fingerprint recognition would have differentiated an authorized user from an un-
`
`authorized user, thus identifying an authorized user under duress. (Ex. 1090, ¶ 4).
`
`Third, CPC’s argument that there would have been an allegedly simpler
`
`modification to Mathiassen is irrelevant to the legal analysis for obviousness. (Paper
`
`17, 22-24 (discussing McKeeth), 30-31 (discussing Anderson)). Obviousness does
`
`not require “a particular combination” to be “most desirable[.]” Intel Corp. v.
`
`Qualcomm Inc., No. 2020-2092, 2022 WL 880681, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 24, 2022);
`
`Micron Tech., Inc. v. Unification Technologies LLC, IPR2021-00343, Paper 42, 50-
`
`51 (PTAB July 8, 2022); Intel Corp. v. PACT XPP Schweiz AG, No. 2022-1037,
`
`10
`
`

`

`2023 WL 2469631 at *4-5 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 13, 2023). Dr. Sears explained why
`
`combining Mathiassen with McKeeth to output a duress and alert attribute and with
`
`Anderson to detect duration variations in the series of fingerprint presses was
`
`desirable. (Ex. 1003, ¶¶ 150-161, 220-223). Obviousness does not require the
`
`proposed combination be “preferred[] or ‘optimal[]’” over an allegedly simpler push
`
`button. Draftkings Inc., v. Interactive Games LLC, IPR2020-01107, Paper 39, 52-53
`
`(PTAB Jan. 4, 2021) (citing In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201-02 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
`
`B. CPC’s “Computer Art” Theory Regarding McKeeth and Anderson
`CPC argues a POSITA would not have looked to McKeeth or Anderson to
`
`solve the problem of Mathiassen’s car locking system security, stating McKeeth and
`
`Anderson “do[] not teach an automotive embodiment[,]” but are “computer art[,]”
`
`and this is a “major distinction between these references.” (Paper 17, 20-21, 29-30).
`
`As an initial note, it is unclear the legal basis for CPC’s argument, which is
`
`that a POSITA would not look to McKeeth or Anderson for modifying Mathiassen.
`
`CPC’s argument reads like a non-analogous art discussion, although the question of
`
`non-analogous art is whether the cited prior art references are analogous to the
`
`patent-in-suit, i.e., the ’705 Patent. In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658-659 (Fed. Cir.
`
`1992) (“prior art is analogous” when the reference is within the field of endeavor of
`
`the asserted patent); Cisco Systems, Inc. v. K.Mizra LLC, IPR2021-00594, Paper 35,
`
`38 (PTAB Aug. 12, 2022).
`
`11
`
`

`

`CPC does not argue that McKeeth and Anderson are non-analogous to the ’705
`
`Patent, and could not. The ’705 Patent is directed to utilizing fingerprint recognition
`
`to access controlled items, such as a secure door lock or a PC’s “electronic key
`
`circuit[.]” (Ex. 1001, 6:17-20). McKeeth and Anderson are directed to utilizing
`
`fingerprints and/or various access codes (e.g., Anderson’s durational finger presses)
`
`for accessing a controlled item, similar to Mathiassen’s teaching of using
`
`fingerprints to access a car locking system and fingerprint representations of finger
`
`movement sequences to instruct a command. (Ex. 1005, Abstract, 3:52-4:2, 4:29-36;
`
`Ex. 1006, Abstract, 7:4-11; Ex. 1004, [0175-0186], [0192]). Therefore, Mathiassen,
`
`McKeeth, and Anderson is each analogous art to the ’705 Patent for at least the
`
`reasons provided herein and, in the Petition and supporting documents.
`
`Regarding CPC’s arguments, characterizing McKeeth and Anderson as
`
`“computer art” does not advance CPC’s position, as Mathiassen is broadly directed
`
`to “computer art.” (Paper 17, 21). Mathiassen’s car locking system includes a
`
`“central car computer” that forms part of the biometric car locking system and
`
`employs processors and other computing elements for performing the biometric
`
`recognition. (Paper 1, 10; Ex. 1003, ¶¶ 84-85). Mathiassen’s car door locks in the
`
`central locking system are a controlled item, where access is controlled by the central
`
`car computer. (Paper 1, 10-11). Therefore, Mathiassen’s embodiment controlling
`
`access to the car door locks is, like McKeeth and Anderson, “computer art[.]” (Ex.
`
`12
`
`

`

`1090, ¶ 14). Mathiassen teaches other controlled items implementing the biometric
`
`secure access system, such as a computer, medicine cabinet, safe, and others. (Paper
`
`1, 9; Ex. 1004, [0054], [0100], [0119], [0122-0123]; Ex. 1003, ¶ 112). Regardless of
`
`the controlled item, the biometric secure access system still employs a computer.
`
`See, e.g., Ex. 1004, [0167]. The Board agreed Mathiassen teaches implementing the
`
`biometric access system for providing secure access to “computers[.]” (Paper 11, 15,
`
`34).
`
`Mathiassen’s central car computer for controlling access to the door locks is
`
`a “door locking mechanism on a secure door[.]” (Ex. 1001, 6:17-20). That
`
`Mathiassen uses fingerprint recognition to access a secure item (e.g., car door locks)
`
`and McKeeth and Anderson use fingerprint recognition to access another type of
`
`secure item (i.e., a computer) does not create a “major distinction between these
`
`references[,]” as CPC contends. (Ex. 1090, ¶ 15; Paper 17, 20-21; KSR Int’l Co. v.
`
`Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007) (obviousness does not require teachings
`
`come from the same field). This is especially true as CPC admits Mathiassen and
`
`McKeeth are in the same field of “fingerprint recognition[.]” (Paper 17, 24).
`
`Dr. Sears provided a detailed discussion of the incentives for modifying
`
`Mathiassen to include McKeeth’s duress and alert access and to include Anderson’s
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`durational variation. (Ex. 1003, ¶¶ 150-161, 220-223). Dr. Sears also opined each
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`reference is “directed to a biometric access system[,]” which leads a POSITA to
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`conclude the references would be “appropriate” for combination, “with a reasonable
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`expectation of success.” (Ex. 1003, ¶ 106). CPC does not rebut Dr. Sears’s opinions,
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`and CPC’s declarant merely repeats back the attorney argument in CPC’s Response
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`without any factual basis underlying his opinions. Compare Ex. 2013, ¶¶ 51, 60-61,
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`75-80, with Paper 17, 18-19, 24, 29-31. The Board should entitle “little weight” to
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`Dr. Easttom’s “verbatim” testimony. Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-
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`00624, Paper 9, 15 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (designated precedential).
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`Because Mathiassen, McKeeth, and Anderson is each directed to providing
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`secure access to a controlled item via a biometric security system, CPC’s
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`“automotive” versus “computer” art theory should be rejected.
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`C. CPC Resorts to Bodily Incorporation Arguments
`CPC argues the modification of Mathiassen with McKeeth and Anderson
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`would require incorporating McKeeth’s peripheral device and Anderson’s cursor
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`control stick. (Paper 17, 21, 31-32). CPC’s arguments are not responsive to the
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`Petition’s mapping, as the Petition does not propose incorporating McKeeth’s
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`peripheral device or Anderson’s cursor control stick in Mathiassen’s system.
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`Bodily incorporation of features from a secondary reference into a primary
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`reference is not required for determining obviousness. MCM Portfolio LLC v.
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`Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Home Depot U.S.A.,
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`Inc., v. Lynk Labs, Inc., IPR2021-01368, Paper 49, 16 (PTAB Jan. 27, 2023). Here,
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`the Board’s evaluation is simpler, as Apple is not proposing to modify Mathiassen
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`to include McKeeth’s or Anderson’s hardware. McKeeth is cited for outputting a
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`duress condition and an alert condition via user instruction. (Paper 1, 20-23).
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`Anderson is cited for pressure pulses of varying durations. (Paper 1, 34-36).
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`Mathiassen’s secure access system already includes a fingerprint sensor and the
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`necessary software for recognizing fingerprint representations of finger movement
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`sequences on the fingerprint sensor and responsively outputting multiple commands
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`from various fingerprint movement inputs. (Paper 1, 23; Ex. 1003, ¶¶ 163-165; Ex.
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`1004, [0192]). There is no need to include McKeeth’s hardware, as CPC purports.
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`(Paper 1, 20-23). Similarly, Mathiassen’s remote biometric control already detects
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`a series of biometric signals (i.e., series of fingerprint representations) forming
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`fingerprint presses (e.g., touches/no-touches), requiring only simple programming
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`to “count the amount and the duration of touches in the touch/no-touch sequence.”
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`(Paper 1, 37; Ex. 1003, ¶¶ 224-225, pinpoint at ¶ 225).
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`Because McKeeth’s peripheral device and Anderson’s cursor control stick are
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`not required in the modification, and because CPC’s arguments amount to bodily
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`incorporation of unnecessary features from the secondary references, CPC’s
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`arguments should be rejected.
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`D. CPC’s Miscellaneous Issues Regarding the Proposed Ground
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`CPC presents several arguments regarding Ground 1 that amount to
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`procedural complaints of the Ground or the proffered motivation to combine without
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`any basis in the Board’s rules, the IPR statutes, or Federal Circuit law.
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`First, CPC argues that Apple is “tacit[ly]” admitting Mathiassen does not
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`teach the claimed “accessibility attribute” because Ground 1 also cites McKeeth as
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`teaching two other accessibility attributes. (Paper 17, 18). Apple disagrees with
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`CPC’s unsupported hypothesis.
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`As expressly mapped in the Petition, Mathiassen alone teaches the
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`“accessibility attribute,” including the “under which conditions” component. (Paper
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`1, 19-20; Ex. 1002, ¶¶ 140-142). McKeeth was cited for teaching two other
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`accessibility attributes (duress and alert) described in the ’705 Patent, further
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`evidencing the obviousness of the ’705 Patent’s purported invention of outputting
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`various types of accessibility attributes. (Paper 1, 20-22). Mathiassen does not need
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`to teach a duress command to meet the independent claims’ recited “accessibility
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`attribute.” For the Board’s reference, the independent claims do not require a
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`“duress” accessibility attribute or any particular accessibility attribute. Apple
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`proposed modifying Mathiassen with McKeeth’s duress and alert attributes to match
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`the ’705 Patent’s exemplary accessibility attributes. (Ex. 1001, 8:26-35; Ex. 1003,
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`¶¶ 145-148).
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`Simply because Apple chose to cite a combination of references that teaches
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`the same types of accessibility attributes described in the ’705 Patent—even though
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`the types of accessibility attributes are not recited in the independent claims—is not
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`a tacit admission. Rather, it shows the thorough obviousness of the ’705 Patent.
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`Additionally, in the related ’208 Patent, Claim 10 requires granting “more
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`than two types of access[,]” thus necessitating reliance on McKeeth’s duress and
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`alert access. (IPR2022-00601, Ex. 1001). For ease of review by the Board, the
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`related Petition for the ’208 Patent presents a substantially similar ground also
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`relying on McKeeth. Apple chose to present substantially similar grounds to the
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`Board to reduce administrative burden and ensure consistency of review. Regardless,
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`as noted by the Board, the combination with McKeeth provides a “more
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`comprehensive” mapping “than Mathiassen alone.” (Paper 11, 25-26).
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`CPC’s next issue is that a POSITA would not have been motivated to combine
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`McKeeth with Mathiassen because Dr. Sears testified Mathiassen “could” issue a
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`duress command. (Paper 17, 18-19). CPC mischaracterizes Dr. Sears’s testimony.
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`Dr. Sears answered a question regarding whether Mathiassen’s taught finger
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`movements would “be usable” to implement a duress signal. (Ex. 2012, 54:1-18).
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`Dr. Sears testified, and CPC does not rebut, that Mathiassen’s fingerprint
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`movements and commands could be used to send a duress signal. Id. A POSITA
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`would have been motivated to modify Mathiassen to include a duress command, per
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`McKeeth, because the references are not “merely redundant” with their teachings.
`
`Ingenico Inc. v. Ioengine LLC, IPR2019-00416, Pape