IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`
`
`TRAXCELL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`Case No. 2:17-cv-00718-RWS-RSP
`
`
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
`
`
`
`v.
`
`AT&T, INC., ET AL.,
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`Before the Court is the opening claim construction brief of Traxcell Technologies, LLC
`
`(“Plaintiff”) (Dkt. No. 155, filed on February 13, 2019),1 the response of AT&T Corp., AT&T
`
`Mobility LLC, T-Mobile USA, Inc., Verizon Wireless Personal Communications LP, Sprint
`
`Communications Company, LP, Sprint Spectrum, LP, and Sprint Solutions, Inc. (collectively
`
`“Defendants”) (Dkt. No. 163, filed on March 12, 2019), and Plaintiff’s reply (Dkt. No. 164, filed
`
`on March 29, 2019). The Court held a hearing on the issue of claim construction on April 2, 2019.
`
`Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by the parties at the hearing and in their
`
`briefing, the Court issues this Order.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1 Citations to the parties’ filings are to the filing’s number in the docket (Dkt. No.) and pin cites
`are to the page numbers assigned through ECF.
`
`
`
`1
`
`

`

`Table of Contents
`
`B.
`C.
`D.
`
`I.
`II.
`
`V.
`
`BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................... 3
`LEGAL PRINCIPLES ..................................................................................................... 5
`A.
`Claim Construction ................................................................................................. 5
`B.
`Departing from the Ordinary Meaning of a Claim Term ........................................ 8
`C.
`Functional Claiming and 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 (pre-AIA) / § 112(f) (AIA) ........... 9
`D.
`Definiteness Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 (pre-AIA) / § 112(b) (AIA) ................. 11
`III. AGREED CONSTRUCTIONS ..................................................................................... 12
`IV. CONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED TERMS ............................................................... 14
`A.
`“first computer,” “computer,” “second computer,” and “a second
`computer” .............................................................................................................. 14
`“one of the radio-frequency transceivers” ............................................................ 18
`“performance issue” and “performance” .............................................................. 21
`“in order to restrict processing of radio frequency signals from at least one
`of said at least two wireless devices . . . in order to improve
`communication with at least one said wireless device” ........................................ 24
`“referencing performance,” “referencing the performance data,” and
`“references the performance data” ........................................................................ 27
`“means for . . . suggest corrective actions” and “means for . . . correcting
`radio frequency signals” ....................................................................................... 32
`’284 Patent Claim 12 ............................................................................................ 37
`“error code” ........................................................................................................... 42
`“access flag” and “no access flag” ........................................................................ 44
`“wherein the first computer provides access . . . if the no access flag is
`reset” and “providing access from the first computer . . . if the no access
`flag is reset” .......................................................................................................... 46
`“routinely”............................................................................................................. 49
`K.
`“a second processor” ............................................................................................. 51
`L.
`“preference flags” ................................................................................................. 53
`M.
`“the second radio-frequency transmitter” ............................................................. 55
`N.
`CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 57
`
`E.
`
`F.
`
`G.
`H.
`I.
`J.
`
`
`
`2
`
`

`

`I.
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`Plaintiff alleges infringement of four U.S. Patents: No. 8,977,284 (the “’284 Patent”), No.
`
`9,510,320 (the “’320 Patent”), No. 9,549,388 (the “’388 Patent”), and No. 9,642,024 (the “’024
`
`Patent”) (collectively, the “Asserted Patents”). The ’284 and ’320 Patents are each entitled
`
`Machine for Providing a Dynamic Data Base of Geographic Location Information for a Plurality
`
`of Wireless Devices and Process for Making Same. The ’388 Patent is entitled Mobile Wireless
`
`Device Providing Off-Line and On-Line Geographic Navigation Information. The ’024 Patent is
`
`entitled Mobile Wireless Communications System and Method with Corrective Action Responsive
`
`to Communications Fault Detection. The patents are related. They share a common priority claim
`
`to an application filed Oct. 4, 2001. And they are related through a chain of continuation
`
`applications and thus share a substantially common specification (outside of the claim sets).
`
`The Court previously construed terms of the ’284, ’320, and ’024 Patents in Traxcell Techs.,
`
`LLC v. Huawei Techs. USA, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-00042-RWS-RSP, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2130
`
`(E.D. Tex. Jan. 4, 2019) (“Huawei”). Several of the terms now before the Court were construed in
`
`Huawei.
`
` In general, the Asserted Patents are directed to technology for locating a wireless
`
`communications device and then using that location for other applications, such as for improving
`
`communications with the wireless device.
`
`The abstracts of the ’284 and ’320 Patents are identical and provide:
`
`For a wireless network, a tuning system in which mobile phones using the network
`are routinely located. With the location of the mobile phones identified, load
`adjustments for the system are easily accomplished so that the wireless network is
`not subject to an overload situation. Ideally the location of the mobile phones is
`accomplished whether the mobile phones are transmitting voice data or not.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`

`The abstract of the ’388 Patent provides:
`
`A mobile device, wireless network and their method of operation provide both on-
`line (connected) navigation operation, as well as off-line navigation from a local
`database within the mobile device. Routing according to the navigation system can
`be controlled by traffic congestion measurements made by the wireless network
`that allow the navigation system to select the optimum route based on expected trip
`duration.
`
`The abstract of the ’024 Patent provides:
`
`A mobile device, wireless network and their method of operation provide fault
`handling in response to detection of a communications fault between a connected
`mobile device and the communications network. The communications network
`tracks location of mobile devices and stores performance data of connections
`between the mobile devices and the network. The performance data is referenced
`to expected performance data to determine whether a fault exists and a corrective
`action is suggested when the fault exists.
`
`Claim 1 of the ’284 Patent, an exemplary apparatus claim, recites:
`
`1. A wireless network comprising:
`a) at least two wireless devices, each said wireless device communicating via
`radio frequency signals;
`b) a first computer programmed to perform the steps of:
`1) locating at least one said wireless device on said wireless network and
`referencing performance of said at least one wireless device with
`wireless network known parameters,
`2) routinely storing performance data and a corresponding location for
`said at least one wireless device in a memory;
`c) a radio tower adapted to receive radio frequency signals from, and transmit
`radio frequency signals to said at least one wireless device; wherein said first
`computer further includes means for receiving said performance data and
`suggest corrective actions obtained from a list of possible causes for said
`radio tower based upon the performance data and the corresponding location
`associated with said at least one wireless device;
`d) wherein said radio tower generates an error code based upon operation of
`said at least one wireless device; and
`e) wherein said first computer is further programmed to,
`1) receive said error code from said radio tower, and,
`2) selectively suggest a corrective action of said radio frequency signals
`of said radio tower in order to restrict processing of radio frequency
`signals from at least one of said at least two wireless devices based upon
`said error code, and, whereby said first computer suggests said
`corrective action in order to improve communication with at least one
`said wireless device.
`
`
`
`4
`
`

`

`Claim 6 of the ’024 Patent, an exemplary method claim, recites:
`
`6. A method of managing a wireless radio-frequency (RF) network, the method
`comprising:
`coupling in communication, one or more radio-frequency transceivers and an
`associated one or more antennas to which the radio-frequency transceiver is
`coupled to one or more mobile wireless communications devices;
`locating the one or more mobile wireless communications devices according
`to the radio-frequency communications and generating an indication of a
`location of the one or more mobile wireless communications devices;
`receiving and storing performance data of connections between the one or
`more mobile wireless communications devices and the radio-frequency
`transceiver along with the indication of location;
`referencing the performance data to expected performance data;
`determining at least one suggested corrective action in conformity with
`differences between the performance data and expected performance data in
`conjunction with the indication of location;
`receiving an error code from the radio-frequency transceiver;
`determining whether the error code indicates a performance issue with respect
`to the connection between the one or more mobile wireless communications
`devices and the radio-frequency transceiver; and
`determining the at least one suggested corrective action in response to the error
`code.
`
`II.
`
`LEGAL PRINCIPLES
`
`A.
`
`Claim Construction
`
`“It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention to
`
`which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Innova/Pure Water Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc.,
`
`381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). To determine the meaning of the claims, courts start by
`
`considering the intrinsic evidence. Id. at 1313; C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 388 F.3d
`
`858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns Group, Inc., 262 F.3d
`
`1258, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The intrinsic evidence includes the claims themselves, the
`
`specification, and the prosecution history. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314; C.R. Bard, Inc., 388 F.3d at
`
`861. The general rule—subject to certain specific exceptions discussed infra—is that each claim
`
`term is construed according to its ordinary and accustomed meaning as understood by one of
`
`
`
`5
`
`

`

`ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention in the context of the patent. Phillips, 415 F.3d
`
`at 1312–13; Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Azure
`
`Networks, LLC v. CSR PLC, 771 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“There is a heavy presumption
`
`that claim terms carry their accustomed meaning in the relevant community at the relevant time.”)
`
`(vacated on other grounds).
`
` “The claim construction inquiry . . . begins and ends in all cases with the actual words of the
`
`claim.” Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1998). “[I]n
`
`all aspects of claim construction, ‘the name of the game is the claim.’” Apple Inc. v. Motorola,
`
`Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting In re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 1998)). First, a term’s context in the asserted claim can be instructive. Phillips, 415 F.3d at
`
`1314. Other asserted or unasserted claims can also aid in determining the claim’s meaning, because
`
`claim terms are typically used consistently throughout the patent. Id. Differences among the claim
`
`terms can also assist in understanding a term’s meaning. Id. For example, when a dependent claim
`
`adds a limitation to an independent claim, it is presumed that the independent claim does not
`
`include the limitation. Id. at 1314–15.
`
`“[C]laims ‘must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.’” Id. (quoting
`
`Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)). “[T]he
`
`specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive;
`
`it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’” Id. (quoting Vitronics Corp. v.
`
`Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp.,
`
`299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002). But, “‘[a]lthough the specification may aid the court in
`
`interpreting the meaning of disputed claim language, particular embodiments and examples
`
`appearing in the specification will not generally be read into the claims.’” Comark Commc’ns, Inc.
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`

`v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting Constant v. Advanced Micro-
`
`Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); see also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. “[I]t is
`
`improper to read limitations from a preferred embodiment described in the specification—even if
`
`it is the only embodiment—into the claims absent a clear indication in the intrinsic record that the
`
`patentee intended the claims to be so limited.” Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d
`
`898, 913 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
`
`The prosecution history is another tool to supply the proper context for claim construction
`
`because, like the specification, the prosecution history provides evidence of how the U.S. Patent
`
`and Trademark Office (“PTO”) and the inventor understood the patent. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317.
`
`However, “because the prosecution history represents an ongoing negotiation between the PTO
`
`and the applicant, rather than the final product of that negotiation, it often lacks the clarity of the
`
`specification and thus is less useful for claim construction purposes.” Id. at 1318; see also Athletic
`
`Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., 73 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (ambiguous prosecution
`
`history may be “unhelpful as an interpretive resource”).
`
`Although extrinsic evidence can also be useful, it is “‘less significant than the intrinsic record
`
`in determining the legally operative meaning of claim language.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317
`
`(quoting C.R. Bard, Inc., 388 F.3d at 862). Technical dictionaries and treatises may help a court
`
`understand the underlying technology and the manner in which one skilled in the art might use
`
`claim terms, but technical dictionaries and treatises may provide definitions that are too broad or
`
`may not be indicative of how the term is used in the patent. Id. at 1318. Similarly, expert testimony
`
`may aid a court in understanding the underlying technology and determining the particular
`
`meaning of a term in the pertinent field, but an expert’s conclusory, unsupported assertions as to a
`
`term’s definition are not helpful to a court. Id. Extrinsic evidence is “less reliable than the patent
`
`
`
`7
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`

`

`and its prosecution history in determining how to read claim terms.” Id. The Supreme Court has
`
`explained the role of extrinsic evidence in claim construction:
`
`In some cases, however, the district court will need to look beyond the patent’s
`intrinsic evidence and to consult extrinsic evidence in order to understand, for
`example, the background science or the meaning of a term in the relevant art during
`the relevant time period. See, e.g., Seymour v. Osborne, 11 Wall. 516, 546 (1871)
`(a patent may be “so interspersed with technical terms and terms of art that the
`testimony of scientific witnesses is indispensable to a correct understanding of its
`meaning”). In cases where those subsidiary facts are in dispute, courts will need to
`make subsidiary factual findings about that extrinsic evidence. These are the
`“evidentiary underpinnings” of claim construction that we discussed in Markman,
`and this subsidiary factfinding must be reviewed for clear error on appeal.
`
`Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015).
`
`B.
`
`Departing from the Ordinary Meaning of a Claim Term
`
`There are “only two exceptions to [the] general rule” that claim terms are construed according
`
`to their plain and ordinary meaning: “1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own
`
`lexicographer, or 2) when the patentee disavows the full scope of the claim term either in the
`
`specification or during prosecution.”2 Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Apple Inc., 758 F.3d 1362, 1365
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2012)); see also GE Lighting Solutions, LLC v. AgiLight, Inc., 750 F.3d 1304, 1309 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2014) (“[T]he specification and prosecution history only compel departure from the plain meaning
`
`in two instances: lexicography and disavowal.”). The standards for finding lexicography or
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`disavowal are “exacting.” GE Lighting Solutions, 750 F.3d at 1309.
`
`To act as his own lexicographer, the patentee must “clearly set forth a definition of the
`
`disputed claim term” and “clearly express an intent to define the term.” Id. (quoting Thorner, 669
`
`
`2 Some cases have characterized other principles of claim construction as “exceptions” to the
`general rule, such as the statutory requirement that a means-plus-function term is construed to
`cover the corresponding structure disclosed in the specification. See, e.g., CCS Fitness, Inc. v.
`Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
`8
`
`
`
`

`

`F.3d at 1365); see also Renishaw, 158 F.3d at 1249. The patentee’s lexicography must appear
`
`“with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision.” Renishaw, 158 F.3d at 1249.
`
`To disavow or disclaim the full scope of a claim term, the patentee’s statements in the
`
`specification or prosecution history must amount to a “clear and unmistakable” surrender. Cordis
`
`Corp. v. Boston Sci. Corp., 561 F.3d 1319, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also Thorner, 669 F.3d at
`
`1366 (“The patentee may demonstrate intent to deviate from the ordinary and accustomed meaning
`
`of a claim term by including in the specification expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction,
`
`representing a clear disavowal of claim scope.”). “Where an applicant’s statements are amenable
`
`to multiple reasonable interpretations, they cannot be deemed clear and unmistakable.” 3M
`
`Innovative Props. Co. v. Tredegar Corp., 725 F.3d 1315, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
`
`C.
`
`Functional Claiming and 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 (pre-AIA) / § 112(f) (AIA)3
`
`A patent claim may be expressed using functional language. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6;
`
`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1347–49 & n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in
`
`relevant portion). Section 112, Paragraph 6, provides that a structure may be claimed as a “means
`
`. . . for performing a specified function” and that an act may be claimed as a “step for performing
`
`a specified function.” Masco Corp. v. United States, 303 F.3d 1316, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
`
`But § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply to all functional claim language. There is a rebuttable
`
`presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 applies when the claim language includes “means” or “step for” terms,
`
`and that it does not apply in the absence of those terms. Masco Corp., 303 F.3d at 1326;
`
`Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1348. The presumption stands or falls according to whether one of
`
`ordinary skill in the art would understand the claim with the functional language, in the context of
`
`
`3 The Court refers to the pre-AIA version of § 112 but understands that there is no substantial
`difference between functional claiming under the pre-AIA version and under the AIA version of
`the statute.
`
`
`
`9
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`

`

`the entire specification, to denote sufficiently definite structure or acts for performing the function.
`
`See Media Rights Techs., Inc. v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 800 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
`
`(§ 112, ¶ 6 does not apply when “the claim language, read in light of the specification, recites
`
`sufficiently definite structure” (quotation marks omitted) (citing Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349;
`
`Robert Bosch, LLC v. Snap-On Inc., 769 F.3d 1094, 1099 (Fed. Cir. 2014))); Williamson, 792 F.3d
`
`at 1349 (§ 112, ¶ 6 does not apply when “the words of the claim are understood by persons of
`
`ordinary skill in the art to have sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure”); Masco
`
`Corp., 303 F.3d at 1326 (§ 112, ¶ 6 does not apply when the claim includes an “act” corresponding
`
`to “how the function is performed”); Personalized Media Communications, L.L.C. v. International
`
`Trade Commission, 161 F.3d 696, 704 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (§ 112, ¶ 6 does not apply when the claim
`
`includes “sufficient structure, material, or acts within the claim itself to perform entirely the recited
`
`function . . . even if the claim uses the term ‘means.’” (quotation marks and citation omitted)).
`
`When it applies, § 112, ¶ 6 limits the scope of the functional term “to only the structure,
`
`materials, or acts described in the specification as corresponding to the claimed function and
`
`equivalents thereof.” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1347. Construing a means-plus-function limitation
`
`involves multiple steps. “The first step . . . is a determination of the function of the means-plus-
`
`function limitation.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 248 F.3d 1303, 1311
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2001). “[T]he next step is to determine the corresponding structure disclosed in the
`
`specification and equivalents thereof.” Id. A “structure disclosed in the specification is
`
`‘corresponding’ structure only if the specification or prosecution history clearly links or associates
`
`that structure to the function recited in the claim.” Id. The focus of the “corresponding structure”
`
`inquiry is not merely whether a structure is capable of performing the recited function, but rather
`
`whether the corresponding structure is “clearly linked or associated with the [recited] function.”
`
`
`
`10
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`

`

`Id. The corresponding structure “must include all structure that actually performs the recited
`
`function.” Default Proof Credit Card Sys. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 412 F.3d 1291, 1298 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2005). However, § 112 does not permit “incorporation of structure from the written
`
`description beyond that necessary to perform the claimed function.” Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great
`
`Plains Chem. Co., 194 F.3d 1250, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
`
`For § 112, ¶ 6 limitations implemented by a programmed general purpose computer or
`
`microprocessor, the corresponding structure described in the patent specification must include an
`
`algorithm for performing the function. WMS Gaming Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339,
`
`1349 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The corresponding structure is not a general purpose computer but rather
`
`the special purpose computer programmed to perform the disclosed algorithm. Aristocrat Techs.
`
`Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
`
`D.
`
`Definiteness Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 (pre-AIA) / § 112(b) (AIA)4
`
`Patent claims must particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter regarded as
`
`the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2. A claim, when viewed in light of the intrinsic evidence, must
`
`“inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.” Nautilus
`
`Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 910 (2014). If it does not, the claim fails § 112, ¶ 2
`
`and is therefore invalid as indefinite. Id. at 901. Whether a claim is indefinite is determined from
`
`the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art as of the time the application for the patent was
`
`filed. Id. at 911. As it is a challenge to the validity of a patent, the failure of any claim in suit to
`
`comply with § 112, ¶ 2 must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. BASF Corp. v. Johnson
`
`Matthey Inc., 875 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2017). “[I]ndefiniteness is a question of law and in
`
`
`4 The Court refers to the pre-AIA version of § 112 but understands that there is no substantial
`difference between definiteness under the pre-AIA version and under the AIA version of the
`statute.
`
`
`
`11
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`

`

`effect part of claim construction.” ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 700 F.3d 509, 517 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2012).
`
`When a term of degree is used in a claim, “the court must determine whether the patent
`
`provides some standard for measuring that degree.” Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 783
`
`F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). Likewise, when a subjective term is
`
`used in a claim, “the court must determine whether the patent’s specification supplies some
`
`standard for measuring the scope of the [term].” Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417
`
`F.3d 1342, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The standard “must provide objective boundaries for those of
`
`skill in the art.” Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 766 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
`
`In the context of a claim governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, the claim is invalid as indefinite
`
`if the claim fails to disclose adequate corresponding structure to perform the claimed function.
`
`Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1351–52. The disclosure is inadequate when one of ordinary skill in the
`
`art “would be unable to recognize the structure in the specification and associate it with the
`
`corresponding function in the claim.” Id. at 1352.
`
`III. AGREED CONSTRUCTIONS
`
`The parties have agreed to the following constructions set forth in their Amended Joint Claim
`
`Construction Chart (Dkt. No. 166) or expressed at the hearing.
`
`Term5
`
`“radio tower”
`’284 Patent Claims 1 and 12
`•
`“location”
`’284 Patent Claims 1 and 12
`•
`’320 Patent Claim 8
`•
`
`Agreed Construction
`base station transceiver subsystem and
`associated antenna(s)
`
`location that is not merely a position in a grid
`pattern
`
`
`5 For all term charts in this order, the claims in which the term is found are listed with the term
`but: (1) only the highest-level claim in each dependency chain is listed, and (2) only asserted claims
`identified in the parties’ Amended Joint Claim Construction Chart (Dkt. No. 166) are listed.
`12
`
`
`
`

`

`Term5
`“indication of a location” / “indication of
`location”
`’320 Patent Claims 1 and 4
`•
`’024 Patent Claims 1, 6, 11, 17
`•
`“locate”
`’320 Patent Claim 1
`•
`’024 Patent Claim 1
`•
`“locating”
`’284 Patent Claim 1
`•
`’320 Patent Claim 4
`•
`’024 Patent Claims 6, 17
`•
`“corrective action”
`’284 Patent Claim 1
`•
`’320 Patent Claims 1, 4
`•
`’024 Patent Claims 1, 6, 11, 17
`•
`“corrective adjustment”
`’284 Patent Claim 2
`•
`’024 Patent Claim 8
`•
`“correction for adjusting”
`’284 Patent Claim 7
`•
`“correcting radio frequency signals”
`’284 Patent Claim 12
`•
`“corrects the radio frequency signals”
`’284 Patent Claim 12
`•
`“status request”
`’284 Patent Claims 9, 12
`•
`“performance data”
`’284 Patent Claims 1, 12
`•
`’320 Patent Claims 1, 4
`•
`’024 Patent Claims 1, 6, 11, 17
`•
`“faulty”
`’024 Patent Claim 11, 17
`•
`
`Agreed Construction
`
`location that is not merely a position in a grid
`pattern
`
`determine location that is not merely a
`position in a grid pattern
`
`determining location that is not merely a
`position in a grid pattern
`
`plain and ordinary meaning
`
`plain and ordinary meaning
`
`plain and ordinary meaning
`
`plain and ordinary meaning
`
`plain and ordinary meaning
`
`request for location of a wireless device
`
`performance data that is not determined by
`the wireless communications device
`
`plain and ordinary meaning
`
`Having reviewed the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence of record, the Court hereby adopts the
`
`parties’ agreed constructions.
`
`
`
`13
`
`

`

`IV. CONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED TERMS
`
`A.
`
`“first computer,” “computer,” “second computer,” and “a second computer”
`
`Disputed Term
`
`“first computer”
`’284 Patent Claims 1, 12
`•
`’320 Patent Claims 1, 4
`•
`“computer”
`’024 Patent Claims 1, 7–8, 11, 17
`•
`“second computer” / “a second
`computer”
`’284 Patent Claims 6, 9, 12
`•
`’320 Patent Claims 1, 4
`•
`
`Plaintiff’s Proposed
`Construction
`
`Defendants’ Proposed
`Construction
`
`plain and ordinary
`meaning
`
`plain and ordinary
`meaning
`
`plain and ordinary
`meaning
`
`first single computer
`
`single computer
`
`second single computer
`
`Because the parties’ arguments and proposed constructions with respect to these terms are
`
`related, the Court addresses the terms together.
`
`The Parties’ Positions
`
`Plaintiff submits: The patentee’s arguments during prosecution of the ’284 Patent do not limit
`
`“first computer” or “computer” or “second computer” to a single computer. Rather, the patentee
`
`distinguished the invention of the patent from the prior art by noting the first computer of the patent
`
`“does not require extra hardware and software and antenna equipment” in the wireless device. The
`
`distinguished prior-art reference (Andersson) requires a computer in the wireless device. The
`
`invention of the ’284 Patent does not require a computer in the wireless device because it “monitors
`
`performance from the base station, not the mobile device.” Even if “first computer” is limited to a
`
`single computer through statements made during prosecution of the ’284 Patent, this limitation
`
`does not apply to the later-filed ’320 Patent because any disclaimer of claim scope was revoked
`
`during prosecution of the ’320 Patent. Nor would a single-computer limitation be applied to
`
`
`
`14
`
`

`

`“second computer” in any patent since the prosecution statements referred only to “first computer.”
`
`Dkt. No. 155 at 8–14.
`
`In addition to the claims themselves, Plaintiff cites the following intrinsic evidence to support
`
`its position: ’284 Patent File Wrapper September 28, 2012 Amendment and Response (Plaintiff’s
`
`Ex. B, Dkt. No. 155-3); ’320 Patent File Wrapper November 9, 2015 Preliminary Amendment
`
`(Plaintiff’s Ex. A, Dkt. No. 155-2).
`
`Defendants respond: During prosecution of the ’284 Patent, the patentee distinguished the
`
`invention of the patent from the prior art by noting that the invention of the patent utilizes a single
`
`computer to both locate the wireless device and reference its performance. Notably, the then-
`
`pending claims, which were the subject of the prosecution statements, were agnostic regarding
`
`whether the “first computer” was in the mobile device. With respect to the ’320 Patent, the vague
`
`statements made during prosecution of that patent are not sufficient to rescind the disclaimer made
`
`in prosecuting the ’284 Patent. Finally, the patentee’s prosecution statements made clear that
`
`“computer” is used in the patents to refer to a single computer, thus the “first computer” and the
`
`“second computer” are each a single computer. Dkt. No. 163 at 6–7, 28.
`
`In addition to the claims themselves, Defendants cite the following intrinsic evidence to
`
`support their position: ’284 Patent File Wrapper September 28, 2012 Amendment and Response
`
`Plaintiff’s Ex. B, Dkt. No. 155-3).
`
`Plaintiff replies: The “first computer” at issue during prosecution of the ’284 Patent expressly
`
`performed functions other than locating the wireless device and referencing its performance. Thus,
`
`any prosecution statement regarding a single computer performing the locating and referencing
`
`functions does not mean that the “first computer” is necessarily a single computer. Dkt. No. 164
`
`at 2–3.
`
`
`
`15
`
`

`

`Analysis
`
`The issue in dispute is whether the “first computer,” “computer,” and “second computer” of
`
`the claims may each be a system of multiple computers. They may not. The terms each refer to a
`
`single computer.
`
`The “f