IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`
`BILLJCO, LLC,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`CISCO SYSTEMS, INC.,
`
`Defendant.
`
`v.
`
`ENTERPRISE
`PACKARD
`HEWLETT
`COMPANY, ARUBA NETWORKS, LLC.,
`
`Defendants.
`
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`
`CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:21-CV-00181-JRG
`(LEAD CASE)
`
`CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:21-CV-00183-JRG
`(MEMBER CASE)
`
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
`
`In these consolidated patent cases, Plaintiff BillJCo, LLC, alleges infringement of claims
`
`from three patents—U.S. Patents 8,761,804, 10,292,011, and 10,477,994—by Defendants Cisco
`
`Systems, Inc., Hewlett Packard Enterprise Co., and Aruba Networks, LLC. Each patent relates to
`
`“location based exchanges of data between distributed mobile data processing systems for
`
`locational applications.” ’804 Patent at 1:22–24; see also ’011 Patent at 38–40; ’994 Patent at
`
`1:45–47.
`
`The parties dispute the scope of five terms across the three patents. For each term,
`
`Plaintiff argues for a construction of “plain and ordinary meaning,” whereas Defendants advance
`
`a specific construction. Having considered the parties’ briefing, along with arguments of counsel
`
`during a February 17, 2022 hearing, the Court resolves the parties’ disputes as follows.
`
`Petitioners' Ex. 1024, Page 1 of 18
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`I.
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`A.
`
`U.S. Patent 8,761,804
`
`The ’804 Patent relates to “location based exchanges of data between distributed mobile
`
`data processing systems for locational applications.” ’804 Patent at 1:22–24. “Location based
`
`exchange” (or LBX) is a coined term, which the patent distinguishes from the more familiar “lo-
`
`cation based services” (or LBS):
`
`LBX describes leveraging the distributed nature of connectivity between [mobile
`data processing systems (MSs)] in lieu of leveraging a common centralized ser-
`vice nature of connectivity between MSs. The line can become blurred between
`LBS and LBX since the same or similar features and functionality are provided,
`and in some cases strengths from both may be used. The underlying architectural
`shift differentiates LBX from LBS for depending less on centralized services, and
`more on distributed interactions between MSs. LBX provide server-free and serv-
`er-less location dependent features and functionality.
`
`Id. at 3:65–4:8; see also id. at 3:57–59 (“This disclosure introduces a new terminology, system,
`
`and method referred to as Location Based eXchanges (LBX).”). “Mobile data processing sys-
`
`tems” (or MSs) are simply mobile devices, such as laptops and smartphones. See id. at 3:7–17.
`
`In the Background, the ’804 Patent identifies several disadvantages of centralized web
`
`services—that is, web services that use an intermediary point between clients. For example, with
`
`centralized web services, “[r]egardless of the number of threads of processing spread out over
`
`hardware and processor platforms, the web service itself can become a bottleneck causing poor
`
`performance for timely response, and can cause a large amount of data that must be kept for all
`
`connected users and/or systems.” Id. at 2:1–6. Similarly, centralized web services can give rise to
`
`security concerns, given that such a service inherently holds large amounts of user information in
`
`a centralized database. Id. at 2:43–58.
`
`Petitioners' Ex. 1024, Page 2 of 18
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`One way to address these disadvantages is by shifting more of the processing to the mo-
`
`bile devices. As the patent explains:
`
`Mobile data processing systems can intelligently handle many of their own appli-
`cation requirements without depending on some remote service. Just as two peo-
`ple in a business organization should not need a manager to speak to each other,
`no two mobile data processing systems should require a service middleman for
`useful location dependent features and functionality. The knowing of its own loca-
`tion should not be the end of social interaction implementation local to the mobile
`data processing systems, but rather the starting place for a large number of useful
`distributed local applications that do not require a service.
`
`’804 Patent at 2:63–3:6.
`
`Problematically, however, many mobile devices cannot be automatically located. Id. at
`
`3:17–20. “Conventional methods use directly relative stationary references such as satellites, an-
`
`tennas, etc. to locate MSs. Stationary references are expensive to deploy, and risk obsolescence
`
`as new technologies are introduced to the marketplace. Stationary references have finite scope of
`
`support for locating MSs.” Id. at 3:20–25.
`
`To address that problem, the patent suggests “[a] method . . . for enabling users to get lo-
`
`cation dependent features and functionality through having their mobile locations known, regard-
`
`less of whether or not their MS is equipped for being located.” Id. at 3:44–49. The ’804 Patent
`
`summarizes the disclosure as:
`
`a distributed system and method for enabling new and useful location dependent
`features and functionality to mobile data processing systems. Mobile data pro-
`cessing systems interact with each other as peers in communications and interop-
`erability. A mobile data processing system may dynamically take on roles, de-
`pending on the environment and capabilities available at a particular time. Refer-
`ence whereabouts data is appropriately shared between mobile data processing
`systems to carry out automatic location techniques ensuring mobile data pro-
`cessing systems are kept up to date with their own whereabouts and whereabouts
`of others, regardless of the freely moving travels of any of the mobile data pro-
`
`Petitioners' Ex. 1024, Page 3 of 18
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`cessing systems involved, and the location technologies that may or may not be
`available when needed. . . .
`
`’804 Patent at [57].
`
`The parties dispute the scope of three terms from the ’804 Patent: (1) “application”
`
`(which is also at issue with respect to the ’994 Patent and ’011 Patent); (2) “an application in use
`
`at the sending data processing system”; and (3) “identity information for describing an originator
`
`identity.”
`
`The ’804 Patent issued from Application No. 14/033,540. ’804 Patent at [21]. The appli-
`
`cant filed the ’540 Application as a continuation of Application No. 12/077,041. Id. at [63].
`
`B.
`
`U.S. Patents 10,292,011 and 10,477,994
`
`The ’011 Patent and ’994 Patent are related and share the same disclosure. Like the ’804
`
`Patent, both patents claim priority to the ’041 Application. ’994 Patent at [63]. Moreover, both
`
`patents relate to “location based exchanges of data between distributed mobile data processing
`
`systems for locational applications.” ’011 Patent at 1:38–40; see also ’994 Patent at 1:45–47. Not
`
`surprisingly, the Background sections are the same as that of the ’804 Patent and describe the
`
`same problems. The specification, however, is considerably longer than the ’804 Patent (which
`
`itself is lengthy).
`
`The abstracts of the two patents are similar:
`
`Mobile data processing Systems (MSs) interact with systems in their vicinity, and
`with each other, in communications and interoperability. Information transmitted
`inbound to, transmitted outbound from, is in process at, or is application modified
`at a mobile data processing system triggers processing of actions in accordance
`with user configurations, for example to present content to a user. . . .
`
`’011 Patent at [57]; see also ’994 Patent at [57] (similar).
`
`The parties dispute the scope of three terms from these two patents: “a Bluetooth
`
`Petitioners' Ex. 1024, Page 4 of 18
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`communications interface,” which only appears in claims of the ’994 Patent; “application,”
`
`which appears in all three patents; and “application context identifier data,” which only appears
`
`in the ’011 Patent.
`
`II.
`
`LEGAL STANDARDS
`
`A.
`
`Generally
`
`“‘[T]he claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right
`
`to exclude.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting
`
`Innova/Pure-Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2004)). As such, if the parties dispute the scope of the claims, the court must determine their
`
`meaning. See, e.g., Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d 1295, 1317 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2007); see also Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996), aff’g, 52
`
`F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
`
`Claim construction, however, “is not an obligatory exercise in redundancy.” U.S. Surgical
`
`Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Rather, “[c]laim construction is a
`
`matter of [resolving] disputed meanings and technical scope, to clarify and when necessary to
`
`explain what the patentee covered by the claims . . . .” Id. A court need not “repeat or restate eve-
`
`ry claim term in order to comply with the ruling that claim construction is for the court.” Id.
`
`When construing claims, “[t]here is a heavy presumption that claim terms are to be given
`
`their ordinary and customary meaning.” Aventis Pharm. Inc. v. Amino Chems. Ltd., 715 F.3d
`
`1363, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13). Courts must therefore “look
`
`to the words of the claims themselves . . . to define the scope of the patented invention.” Id. (cita-
`
`tions omitted). “[T]he ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the
`
`term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention,
`
`Petitioners' Ex. 1024, Page 5 of 18
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`i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. This “per-
`
`son of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the par-
`
`ticular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including
`
`the specification.” Id.
`
`Intrinsic evidence is the primary resource for claim construction. See Power-One, Inc. v.
`
`Artesyn Techs., Inc., 599 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312). For
`
`certain claim terms, “the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood by a person of skill
`
`in the art may be readily apparent even to lay judges, and claim construction in such cases in-
`
`volves little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood
`
`words.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314; see also Medrad, Inc. v. MRI Devices Corp., 401 F.3d 1313,
`
`1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“We cannot look at the ordinary meaning of the term . . . in a vacuum. Ra-
`
`ther, we must look at the ordinary meaning in the context of the written description and the pros-
`
`ecution history.”). But for claim terms with less-apparent meanings, courts consider “‘those
`
`sources available to the public that show what a person of skill in the art would have understood
`
`disputed claim language to mean[,] [including] the words of the claims themselves, the remain-
`
`der of the specification, the prosecution history, and extrinsic evidence concerning relevant sci-
`
`entific principles, the meaning of technical terms, and the state of the art.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d at
`
`1314 (quoting Innova, 381 F.3d at 1116).
`
`III.
`
`THE LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART
`
`The level of ordinary skill in the art is the skill level of a hypothetical person who is pre-
`
`sumed to have known the relevant art at the time of the invention. In re GPAC, 57 F.3d 1573,
`
`1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In resolving the appropriate level of ordinary skill, courts consider the
`
`types of and solutions to problems encountered in the art, the speed of innovation, the sophistica-
`
`Petitioners' Ex. 1024, Page 6 of 18
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`tion of the technology, and the education of workers active in the field. Id. Importantly, “[a] per-
`
`son of ordinary skill in the art is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” KSR
`
`Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007).
`
`Here, the parties agree a skilled artisan would have had “at least a Bachelor’s degree in
`
`electrical engineering, computer science, or a related field, and one or two years of work experi-
`
`ence in wireless communications and mobile computing devices, or the equivalent.” Dkt. No. 65
`
`at 3; Dkt. No. 67 at 6 (agreeing that Plaintiff’s definition of the level of ordinary skill is appro-
`
`priate).
`
`IV.
`
`THE DISPUTED TERMS
`
`A.
`
`“a Bluetooth communications interface” (’994 Patent, Claims 1, 8, 14)
`
`Plaintiff’s Construction
`Plain and ordinary meaning.
`(“a means for transmitting information in
`the Bluetooth wave spectrum, i.e., 2.4
`GHz.” Dkt. No. 65 at 7.)
`
`Defendants’ Construction
`
`Bluetooth as defined in the Bluetooth Core Speci-
`fication as of the priority data of the asserted pa-
`tents
`
`Claim 1, which is representative of the other claims in which this term appears, recites:
`
`1. A beaconing data processing system, comprising:
`one or more processors;
`a Bluetooth communications interface; and
`a memory coupled to the one or more processors, wherein the
`one or more processors access the memory and control op-
`erations of the beaconing data processing system, the oper-
`ations comprising:
`periodically beaconing outbound a broadcast unidirectional
`wireless data record communicated through the Blue-
`tooth communications interface to serve as a physical
`location reference contributing to physical location de-
`termination processing of one or more user carried mo-
`
`Petitioners' Ex. 1024, Page 7 of 18
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`bile data processing systems in a Bluetooth wave spec-
`trum range vicinity of the beaconing data processing
`system, the beaconing data processing system:
`. . .
`not configured to process inbound communications re-
`sulting from the receipt of the broadcast unidirec-
`tional wireless data record in the one or more user
`carried mobile data processing systems, the broad-
`cast unidirectional wireless data record communi-
`cated through the Bluetooth communications inter-
`face to serve as the physical location reference . . . .
`
`’994 Patent at 448:28–62.
`
`The parties dispute whether “a Bluetooth communications interface” should be limited to
`
`Bluetooth standards existing on or before the priority date of the ’994 Patent. Arguing the term
`
`should be limited in that way, Defendants cite several district court decisions that “found the
`
`plain and ordinary meaning is reflected in the issued standards that existed at the time of the in-
`
`vention.” Dkt. No. 67 at 7–8 (citing cases). Plaintiff, however, contends Defendants’ construction
`
`ignores the phrase “communications interface,” and focuses only on “Bluetooth.” Dkt. No. 65 at
`
`5. Further, Plaintiff urges the applicant use “Bluetooth” to refer only to a wave spectrum in the
`
`2.4 GHz range. Id. at 5–6; see also id. at 7 (“The plain and ordinary meaning for a ‘Bluetooth
`
`communication interface’—a means for transmitting information in the Bluetooth wave spec-
`
`trum, i.e., 2.4 GHz—should be adopted by this Court.”).
`
`The specification references “Bluetooth” three times. The first two occur in the same par-
`
`agraph:
`
`Locating functionality may incorporate triangulated locating of the MS, for ex-
`ample using a class of Radio Frequency (RF) wave spectrum (cellular, WiFi
`(some WiFi embodiments referred to as WiMax), bluetooth, etc), and may use
`measurements from different wave spectrums for a single location determination
`
`Petitioners' Ex. 1024, Page 8 of 18
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`(depends on communications interface(s) available). A MS may have its wherea-
`bouts determined using a plurality of wave spectrum classes available to it (cellu-
`lar, WiFi, bluetooth, etc).
`
`’994 Patent at 6:55–63 (emphasis added). The third reference relates to FIG. 24C:
`
`Presence of field 2490d indicates to send processing feeding from queue 24 to
`target the MS ID over the specified comm. interface (e.g. when MS has a plurality
`of comm. interfaces (e.g. cellular, WiFi, Bluetooth, etc; i.e. MS supports multiple
`classes of wave spectrum)).
`
`Id. at 121:11–15 (emphasis added).
`
`Plaintiff characterizes “Bluetooth” as “a brand name for a short-range wireless transmis-
`
`sion technology that transmits in a radio frequency (RF) wave spectrum,” Dkt. No. 65 at 5, but
`
`that characterization understates the implications of the term. The Bluetooth specification sub-
`
`mitted by Defendants not only details frequency bands (or the “wave spectrum”), Specification
`
`of the Bluetooth System (July 26, 2007), Dkt. No. 67-4 at 12, but message sequences, discovera-
`
`bility modes, data packet formats, signal packet formats, security, and more, see generally id. at
`
`9–21. The document is 900-plus pages of information. See id. at 21. That specification confirms
`
`a skilled artisan would not understand “Bluetooth” as only referring to transmitting and receiving
`
`in the 2.4 GHz frequency range.
`
`Concerning the claims, Plaintiff notes Claim 1 recites some of the functionality of the
`
`claimed “Bluetooth communications interface” and expressly specifies a “Bluetooth wave spec-
`
`trum.” Dkt. No. 65 at 6. While true, that is not inconsistent with Defendants’ position, as there is
`
`nothing surprising about a device that uses “a Bluetooth communications interface” operating in
`
`the frequency range required by the Bluetooth standard. Moreover, the applicant’s use of both
`
`“Bluetooth communications interface” and “Bluetooth wave spectrum” in Claim 1 supports this
`
`conclusion. See Innova, 381 F.3d at 1119 (“[W]hen an applicant uses different terms in a claim it
`
`Petitioners' Ex. 1024, Page 9 of 18
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`is permissible to infer that he intended his choice of different terms to reflect a differentiation in
`
`the meaning of those terms.”).
`
`With respect to the specification, Plaintiff correctly notes each use of “Bluetooth” ex-
`
`pressly references “a class of Radio Frequency (RF) wave spectrums.” Dkt. No. 65 at 6. The first
`
`two references specifically refer to wave spectrums, but the surrounding language notes the wave
`
`spectrum “depends on [the] communications interface(s) available.” ’994 Patent at 6:55–63. Like
`
`the claim language, the last reference explains, unsurprisingly, that when an MS has a plurality of
`
`wireless communication interfaces, it supports the frequency ranges associated with those inter-
`
`faces. See id. at 121:11–14. If anything, the specification supports the distinction urged by De-
`
`fendants—that a wave spectrum can be one characteristic of a communications interface, but that
`
`“wave spectrum” and “communications interface” are not the same thing.
`
`In short, the Court agrees with Defendants. In the claims, “a Bluetooth communications
`
`interface” means “a communications interface using Bluetooth standards that existed at the time
`
`of the claimed invention.” This is consistent with how this Court and other courts have construed
`
`similar terms involving industry specifications. See ACQIS LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 2:20-
`
`cv-00295-JRG (E.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2021)), Dkt. No. 67-2 at 32–33 (stating “the term ‘Universal
`
`Serial Bus (USB) protocol’ must be interpreted as of the priority date”); Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Ap-
`
`ple, Inc., No. 19-cv-1692, 2021 WL 432183, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2021) (holding “Bluetooth
`
`messaging” and “Bluetooth protocols” should be limited to functionality described in the Blue-
`
`tooth specification “as it existed at the time of the claimed invention”); Fundamental Innovation
`
`Sys. Int’l LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 2:17-cv-145-JRG-RSP, 2018 WL 647734, at *11 (E.D.
`
`Tex. Jan. 31, 2018) (citation omitted) (“The term ‘USB’ in the patents-in-suit should be limited
`
`to the Universal Serial Bus standards that existed at the time of the claimed invention.”); see also
`
`Petitioners' Ex. 1024, Page 10 of 18
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`Kopykake Enters., Inc. v. Lucks Co., 264 F.3d 1377, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[W]hen a claim term
`
`understood to have a narrow meaning when the application is filed later acquires a broader defi-
`
`nition, the literal scope of the term is limited to what it was understood to mean at the time of
`
`filing.” (citation omitted)). Further, the Court specifically rejects that the term refers only to
`
`hardware for operating in the 2.4 GHz frequency range.
`
`B.
`
`“application” (’011 Patent, Claims 1, 11, 20; ’994 Patent, Claims 1–3, 8–10,
`14–16; ’804 Patent, Claims 1, 11)
`
`Plaintiff’s Construction
`
`Plain and ordinary meaning.
`(“a computer software program for perform-
`ing a function.” Dkt. No. 65 at 9.)
`
`Defendants’ Construction
`An entity of processing which can be started, ter-
`minated, and have processing results. Applica-
`tions (i.e., executables) can be started as a contex-
`tual launch, custom launch through an API or
`command line, or other launch method of an exe-
`cutable for processing.
`
`The parties’ dispute centers on whether this term requires an executable file and the ex-
`
`tent of necessary user interaction. Plaintiff contends the plain and ordinary meaning of this term
`
`is simply “a computer software program for performing a function.” Dkt. No. 65 at 9. Defend-
`
`ants contend the applicant defined “application” in both the ’011 Patent and the ’994 Patent, Dkt.
`
`No. 67 at 10–11, and that Plaintiff’s expert supports Defendants’ construction by explaining an
`
`“application” is “an executable that runs.” Dkt. No. 67 at 11. According to Defendants, Plaintiff
`
`attempts to encompass “both executable and non-executable programs.” Id. In its reply, Plaintiff
`
`criticizes Defendants’ construction as using language from one group of embodiments related to
`
`“atomic commands.” Dkt. No. 68 at 5–6.
`
`Although this term appears in claims of all three patents, Defendants rely on a passage
`
`that only appears in the ’011 Patent and ’994 Patent:
`
`Petitioners' Ex. 1024, Page 11 of 18
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`[T]he terminology ‘application’ and ‘executable’ are used interchangeably to rep-
`resent an entity of processing which can be started, terminated, and have pro-
`cessing results. Applications (i.e. executables) can be started as a contextual
`launch, custom launch through an API or command line, or other launch method
`of an executable for processing.
`
`’011 Patent at 269:53–59; see also ’994 Patent at 269:66–270:5.
`
`The Court disagrees this passage is definitional. For one, it appears in only two of the
`
`three patents, and then only with respect to FIGS. 63–74. See ’011 Patent at 269:41–59 (includ-
`
`ing the passage on which Defendant relies as a description of the “#A figures” in FIGS. 63–74).
`
`Defendant does not contest this, but responds by claiming Plaintiff “fails to identify a single em-
`
`bodiment, in over 400 columns of the specification, that is somehow excluded” from Defendant’s
`
`construction. Dkt. No. 67 at 12. But finding lexicography does not turn on whether a patent’s use
`
`of a term is internally consistent with a party’s proposed construction. Rather, the question is
`
`whether the applicant “‘clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term’ other than its
`
`plain and ordinary meaning.” See Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362,
`
`1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2002)) (“It is not enough for a patentee to . . . use a word in the same manner in all embodi-
`
`ments, the patentee must ‘clearly express an intent’ to redefine the term.”).
`
`The applicant did not do so here. Not only is the passage limited to certain figures of the
`
`disclosure, it focuses more on what applications and executables can do rather than what they
`
`are. Accordingly, the Court rejects Defendants’ lexicography argument and will give this term its
`
`plain and ordinary meaning.1
`
`1 Defendants frame the issue as “[w]hether a software program [that] performs without a need for
`user execution . . . can be considered an ‘application.’” H’rg Slides, Dkt. No. 85-1 at 37. Defend-
`
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`C.
`
`“application context identifier data” (’011 Patent, Claims 1, 11, 20)
`
`Plaintiff’s Construction
`
`Plain and ordinary meaning.
`
`Defendants’ Construction
`“data identifying a context in which the applica-
`tion was presented to a user via a user interface”
`
`These claims recite processors that send “a broadcast unidirectional wireless data record.”
`
`’011 Patent at 448:11–28. That record includes “application context identifier data identifying
`
`location based content for presenting by a location based application of the receiving [system].”
`
`Id. 448:14–38 (emphasis added). The location based content is presented to a user interface of
`
`the receiving system, id., and may be, for example, news, traffic, real estate, a job opportunity, a
`
`religious interest, and the like. Id. at 449:24–32.
`
`Effectively, the parties dispute whether “application context” requires the application to
`
`be (or have been) presented to a user via a user interface. Plaintiff contends the application need
`
`not be presented to the user and instead could run in the background. Dkt. No. 65 at 14 (citing
`
`Sharony Decl., Dkt. No. 65-18 ¶ 37). Defendants, however, urge “a given application context is
`
`based on the context in which the application was ‘focused,’ i.e., presented to the user via a user
`
`interface.” Dkt. No. 67 at 13. In particular, Defendants reference text describing FIG. 76A:
`
`If block 7624 determines an image lies in the focused object, then processing con-
`tinues to block 7626A. Block 7624 accesses appropriate status or data processing
`indication for knowing an image (frame) is in the user interface context. There are
`a variety of MS applications where an image is detected for being present in the
`focused user interface. These applications include:
`MS camera mode after just taking a snapshot of an image (a frame);
`MS browse of a snapshot image previously taken;
`MS camcorder/video while in standby or record mode;
`
`ants, however, did not address this issue directly, instead relying only on its “lexicography” ar-
`gument.
`
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`MS browse/review of a previously recorded video image stream (a plurality of
`frames);
`MS edit of a snapshot image;
`MS edit of an image stream; or
`Any other application context where some image is currently presented to the
`MS user interface.
`
`Id. at 309:20–33 (emphasis added).
`
`Defendants’ construction is too narrow. For one, the specification distinguishes between
`
`an application context and a user-interface context. See, e.g., ’011 Patent at 318:57–62 (“In some
`
`embodiments, the user interface context is determined by access to a user interface object han-
`
`dle . . . In another embodiment, the user action itself . . . uniquely identifies the application con-
`
`text desired by the user (e.g. distinct keystroke(s)) regardless of what user interface is currently
`
`in focus, so that block 7662 accesses the command (user action) for specific information of the
`
`requested context.” (emphasis added)). This distinction aligns with the claim language, which
`
`explains the location based content is “for presenting . . . to a user interface” of the receiving sys-
`
`tem.” Id. at 448:34–35. Thus, if presenting requires a user interface, from which a user interface
`
`context can be derived, application context logically means something else.
`
`The description of FIG. 76A further supports the distinction between “application con-
`
`text” and “user interface context,” as each of the exemplary applications are described as cur-
`
`rently presented to the user interface. For example, the listed applications suggest current user
`
`interaction: (1) “camera mode after just taking a snapshot”; (2) the user browsing or reviewing a
`
`previously recorded video image stream; or (3) the current edit of an image stream. Indeed, the
`
`specification suggests “[t]here are a variety of MS applications where an image is detected for
`
`being present in the focused user interface,” including “[a]ny other application context where
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`Petitioners' Ex. 1024, Page 14 of 18
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`some image is currently presented to the MS user interface.” If all application contexts were,
`
`without more, “where some image is currently presented to the MS user interface,” this distin-
`
`guishing language would be unnecessary.
`
`Ultimately, the Court concludes “application context” does not inherently require presen-
`
`tation to the user by the sending system. This would necessarily require that an “application”
`
`must at some point present something to the user, but Defendants have not persuaded the Court
`
`that requirement is inherent the term’s meaning. The Court therefore rejects that aspect of De-
`
`fendant’s construction and will give this term its plain and ordinary meaning.
`
`D.
`
`“an application in use at the sending data processing system (’804 Patent,
`Claim 1)
`
`Plaintiff’s Construction
`
`Plain and ordinary meaning.
`
`Defendants’ Construction
`“an application running on the sending data processing
`system”
`
`The claim recites the step of “accessing, by the sending data processing system, applica-
`
`tion information for an application in use at the sending data processing system.” ’804 Patent at
`
`117:65–67 (emphasis added). The method then prepares “a broadcast unidirectional wireless data
`
`record” that includes the application information, and ultimately transmits that wireless data rec-
`
`ord “for receipt by a plurality of receiving mobile data processing systems.” Id. at 118:13–14.
`
`The parties dispute the meaning of “in use.” Plaintiff contends a skilled artisan would
`
`recognize that “in use” does not necessarily mean an application is actively engaged by the user.
`
`Plaintiff suggests “in use” includes an application running in the background, or in a low-power
`
`or sleep mode. Dkt. No. 65 at 16. Defendants characterize Plaintiff’s position as contemplating
`
`“the mere fact that an application is loaded onto a device means that it is ‘in use,’ because the
`
`application may have run in the past or may run in the future.” Dkt. No. 67 at 17. Defendants
`
`Petitioners' Ex. 1024, Page 15 of 18
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`contend “in use” means the application is presently “running.”
`
`The Court agrees with Plaintiff that “in use” does not require active engagement by the
`
`user and that an application operating in low-power mode can be, but isn’t necessarily, “in use.”
`
`With respect to a “sleep” mode, Defendants have not sufficiently shown the specific technical
`
`meaning and impact of “sleep” mode as understood by a skilled artisan, and have failed to show
`
`that an application cannot be “in use” even in sleep mode, depending on what the characteristics
`
`of that mode are. The Court, however, agrees with Defendants that “the mere fact that an applica-
`
`tion is loaded onto a device” does not mean that it is “in use” as required by the claims.
`
`Here, Defendants’ construction simply substitutes “running” for “in use” without explain-
`
`ing how a skilled artisan would understand the term’s scope. Rather than painting all “applica-
`
`tions” with a broad brush, the answers to these questions depend on the specific implementation
`
`of a particular application (e.g., how it is coded and its intended use), which neither party pre-
`
`sented to the Court for resolution. The Court will therefore give this term its plain and ordinary
`
`meaning.
`
`E.
`
`“identity information for describing an originator identity” (’804 Patent,
`Claim 1)
`
`Plaintiff’s Construction
`
`Plain and ordinary meaning.
`
`Defendants’ Construction
`“an identifier that uniquely identifies the origina-
`tor device”
`
`Claim 1 of the ’804 Patent recites “accessing, by the sending data processing system,
`
`identity information for describing an originator identity associated with the sending data pro-
`
`cessing syst