Case 6:21-cv-00528-ADA Document 16 Filed 08/02/21 Page 1 of 17
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`WACO DIVISION
`
`BILLJCO, LLC,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`APPLE INC.,
`
`Defendant.
`
`Civil Action No. 6:21-cv-00528-ADA
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S
`CLAIMS OF WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT AS TO EACH PATENTS-IN-SUIT AND
`PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS OF INDIRECT INFRINGEMENT
`AS TO EACH PATENTS-IN-SUIT
`
`Exhibit 1018
`IPR2022-00426
`Page 1 of 17
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`

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`Case 6:21-cv-00528-ADA Document 16 Filed 08/02/21 Page 2 of 17
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I.
`II.
`III.
`
`IV.
`
`B.
`
`Introduction ..........................................................................................................................1
`Legal Standard .....................................................................................................................1
`Argument .............................................................................................................................2
`A.
`BillJCo’s Willful Infringement Claims Should Be Dismissed ................................2
`1.
`BillJCo’s Allegations of Pre-Suit Knowledge Are Insufficient ...................2
`2.
`No “Egregious” Conduct Is Alleged ............................................................4
`The Asserted Patents Indirect Infringement Claim Should Be Dismissed ..............5
`1.
`BillJCo’s Pre-Suit Knowledge Allegations Fail to Plausibly State a
`Claim of Indirect Infringement ....................................................................5
`BillJCo Also Fails to Plead Specific Intent to Cause Induced
`Infringement .................................................................................................6
`BillJCo’s Generic Allegations of Contributory Infringement are
`Deficient .......................................................................................................9
`Conclusion .........................................................................................................................10
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`i
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`Exhibit 1018
`IPR2022-00426
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`Case 6:21-cv-00528-ADA Document 16 Filed 08/02/21 Page 3 of 17
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`CASES
`
`Addiction and Detoxification Inst. L.L.C. v. Carpenter,
`620 F. App’x 934 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ........................................................................................6, 7
`
`Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. Toyota Motor N. Am.,
`No. W:13-cv-365, 2014 WL 2892285 (W.D. Tex. May 12, 2014) .......................................8, 9
`
`Artrip v. Ball Corp.,
`735 F. App’x 708 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ............................................................................................5
`
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
`556 U.S. 662 (2009) ...........................................................................................................1, 3, 9
`
`Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
`550 U.S. 544 (2007) ...............................................................................................................1, 5
`
`Blackberry Ltd. v. Nokia Corp.,
`No. 17-cv-155-RGA, 2018 WL 1401330 (D. Del. Mar. 20, 2018) .....................................9, 10
`
`Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,
`575 U.S. 632 (2015) ...............................................................................................................5, 6
`
`Dynamic Data Techs., LLC v. Amlogic Holdings Ltd.,
`No. 19-1239-CFC, 2020 WL 4365809 (D. Del. July 30, 2020) ................................................3
`
`Fluidigm Corp. v. IONpath, Inc.,
`No. C 19-05639 WHA, 2020 WL 408988 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2020)........................................4
`
`Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear Inc.,
`620 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010)..................................................................................................9
`
`Google LLC v. Princeps Interface Techs. LLC,
`No. 19-CV-06566-EMC, 2020 WL 1478352 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2020)..................................4
`
`Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc.,
`136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016) .......................................................................................................3, 4, 5
`
`Ikorongo Texas LLC v. LG Elecs. Inc. et al.,
`No. 6:20-cv-257-ADA (W.D. Tex.), Dkt. 78 (March 31, 2021) ...............................................8
`
`In re Bill of Lading Transmission and Processing Sys. Patent Litig.,
`681 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2012)................................................................................................10
`
`Iron Oak Techs., LLC v. Acer Am. Corp. et al.,
`6:17-cv-00143, Dkt. 18 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 2017) ..................................................................9
`
`ii
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`Exhibit 1018
`IPR2022-00426
`Page 3 of 17
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`Case 6:21-cv-00528-ADA Document 16 Filed 08/02/21 Page 4 of 17
`
`Iron Oak Techs., LLC v. Dell, Inc.,
`No. 1:17-CV-999-RP, 2018 WL 1631396 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 4, 2018) .......................................9
`
`Joao Control & Monitoring Sys., LLC v. Protect Am., Inc.,
`No. 1:14-cv-134-LY, 2015 WL 3513151 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2015) ......................................6
`
`M&C Innovations, LLC v. Igloo Prods. Corp.,
`No. 4:17-cv-2372, 2018 WL 4620713 (S.D. Tex. July 31, 2018) .............................................5
`
`Med. Components, Inc. v. Osiris Med., Inc.,
`No. 15-cv-305, 2016 WL 7638155 (W.D. Tex. July 12, 2016) .................................................1
`
`Meetrix IP, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,
`No. 1:18-cv-309-LY, 2018 WL 8261315 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2018) ......................................5
`
`Memory Integrity, LLC v. Intel Corp.,
`144 F. Supp. 3d 1185 (D. Or. 2015) ..........................................................................................7
`
`Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,
`545 U.S. 913 (2005) ...................................................................................................................7
`
`Michigan Motor Techs. LLC v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft,
`472 F.Supp.3d 377 (E.D. Mich. 2020) ...............................................................................2, 4, 7
`
`MONEC Holding AG v. Motorola Mobility, Inc.,
`897 F. Supp. 2d 225 (D. Del. 2012) ...........................................................................................6
`
`Parity Networks, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,
`No. 6:19-CV-00207-ADA, 2019 WL 3940952 (W.D. Tex. July 26, 2019) ..............................2
`
`Ruby Sands LLC v. Am. Nat’l Bank of Tex.,
`No. 2:15-cv-1955, 2016 WL 3542430 (E.D. Tex. June 28, 2016) ............................................1
`
`State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp.,
`751 F.2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1985)..................................................................................................2
`
`Takeda Pharms. U.S.A., Inc. v. West-Ward Pharm. Corp.,
`785 F.3d 625 (Fed. Cir. 2015)................................................................................................8, 9
`
`U.S. Philips Corp. v. Iwasaki Elec. Co.,
`505 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007)..................................................................................................2
`
`Unwired Planet, LLC v. Apple Inc.,
`No. 13-cv-04134-VC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20935 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14,
`2017) ..........................................................................................................................................3
`
`STATUTES
`
`35 U.S.C. §271(b) ..........................................................................................................................10
`iii
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`Exhibit 1018
`IPR2022-00426
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`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`
`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 84 .................................................................................................1
`
`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 ...................................................................................................1
`
`iv
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`Exhibit 1018
`IPR2022-00426
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`Case 6:21-cv-00528-ADA Document 16 Filed 08/02/21 Page 6 of 17
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Plaintiff BillJCo, LLC’s (“BillJCo” or “Plaintiff”) Complaint fails to plead facts that
`
`plausibly allege willful infringement by Apple Inc. (“Apple” or “Defendant”) as to each asserted
`
`patent – U.S. Patent Nos. 8,566,839 (“’839 patent”); 8,639,267 (“’267 patent”); 8,761,804 (“’804
`
`patent”); 9,088,868 (“’868 patent”); 10,292,011 (“’011 patent”); and 10,477,994 (“’994 patent”)
`
`(collectively, “the asserted patents”). The Complaint offers only speculative and inaccurate
`
`allegations that Apple had knowledge of the asserted patents and makes no allegations that Apple’s
`
`conduct was egregious, as required by controlling precedent. Similarly, BillJCo’s allegations fail
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`to state a claim for both induced and contributory infringement of the asserted patents, offering
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`only conclusory and speculative indications of knowledge of the asserted patents and failing to
`
`allege anything other than insufficient, boilerplate recitations of the other elements of these indirect
`
`infringement claims. BillJCo’s claims should be dismissed.
`
`II.
`
`LEGAL STANDARD
`
`“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
`
`relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
`
`Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). To satisfy the plausibility standard, a plaintiff must
`
`plead facts that allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
`
`the misconduct alleged.” Id. In addition, courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion
`
`couched as a factual allegation.” Id. While Form 18 of Fed. R. Civ. P. 84 previously governed
`
`pleading requirements for allegations of direct infringement in patent cases, that rule was
`
`abrogated on December 1, 2015 “in favor of the more stringent pleading requirements of Federal
`
`Rule of Civil Procedure 8.” Med. Components, Inc. v. Osiris Med., Inc., No. 15-cv-305, 2016 WL
`
`7638155, at *3 (W.D. Tex. July 12, 2016). Accordingly, Twombly and Iqbal now apply to a
`
`plaintiff’s infringement claims. Ruby Sands LLC v. Am. Nat’l Bank of Tex., No. 2:15-cv-1955,
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`1
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`2016 WL 3542430, at *2-3 (E.D. Tex. June 28, 2016).
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`III.
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`A.
`
`BillJCo’s Willful Infringement Claims Should Be Dismissed
`
`1.
`
`BillJCo’s Allegations of Pre-Suit Knowledge Are Insufficient
`
`“To state a claim for willful infringement, ‘a plaintiff must allege facts plausibly showing
`
`that as of the time of the claim’s filing, the accused infringer: (1) knew of the patent-in-suit; (2) after
`
`acquiring that knowledge, it infringed the patent; and (3) in doing so, it knew, or should have known,
`
`that its conduct amounted to infringement of the patent.’” Parity Networks, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,
`
`No. 6:19-CV-00207-ADA, 2019 WL 3940952, at *3 (W.D. Tex. July 26, 2019).
`
`BillJCo does not point to facts sufficient to allege pre-suit knowledge of the asserted
`
`patents, let alone that Apple knew that any of its conduct infringed (or could infringe) the asserted
`
`patents. Instead, BillJCo cobbles together random facts and makes vague accusations to form the
`
`basis of Apple’s alleged knowledge of the asserted patents. However, the speculation and vague
`
`accusations by BillJCo do not satisfy the burden to plead pre-suit knowledge sufficient for willful
`
`infringement. See Michigan Motor Techs. LLC v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 472 F.Supp.3d
`
`377, 384 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (dismissing willful infringement claim based on “purely conclusory”
`
`factual allegation “devoid of further factual enhancement”) (citations omitted); State Indus., Inc. v.
`
`A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“To willfully infringe a patent, the patent
`
`must exist and one must have knowledge of it.”).
`
`First, BillJCo alleges that Apple became aware of its asserted patents during Apple’s patent
`
`prosecution of its U.S. Patent Appl. No. 13/373,966 and therefore, “knew or should have known”
`
`that they were infringing the asserted patents. Compl., ¶ 39. However, a citation of patent in a
`
`patent application is an insufficient notice of infringement and would not allow Apple to have
`
`knowledge of a specific infringement claim. U.S. Philips Corp. v. Iwasaki Elec. Co., 505 F.3d
`
`2
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`Exhibit 1018
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`1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also Unwired Planet, LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 13-cv-04134-VC,
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`2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20935, at *4-6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2017) (stating that evidence of
`
`Defendant’s familiarity with the Plaintiffs patent portfolio and inclusion of the patent in
`
`Defendant’s patent application, “reveals, at best, an undifferentiated risk of future infringement
`
`allegations that Apple might have had reason to explore – perhaps enough to go to trial on a
`
`negligence standard, but plainly not enough for willful blindness.”).
`
`Second, BillJCo alleges that “Apple has been aware that it infringes the Patents-in-Suit
`
`since at least June 5, 2019 upon it receiving a letter from BillJCo regarding the Patents-in-Suit.”
`
`Compl., ¶ 38. However, BillJCo does not allege that it identified all asserted patents or informed
`
`Apple of its alleged infringement, and it does not attach a copy of the letter. Indeed, the allegation
`
`in paragraph 38 that BillJCo gave notice to Apple of all asserted patents in its June 5, 2019 letter
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`is implausible on its face because the ’994 patent did not issue until November 19, 2019, five
`
`months after BillJCo sent the alleged June 5 letter. Compare Compl., ¶ 27 with Compl., ¶ 38.
`
`Such conclusory and inaccurate allegations are insufficient to “state a claim to relief that is
`
`plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
`
`In addition, a second independent ground for dismissal is that BillJCo’s allegations also offer
`
`no support for any conclusion that Apple knew or should have known that any of its conduct
`
`amounted to infringement of the asserted patents. Absent knowledge of the alleged infringement,
`
`there can be no willful infringement. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1926
`
`(2016) (a plaintiff must allege infringement was “intentional or knowing” to adequately plead
`
`willful infringement); Dynamic Data Techs., LLC v. Amlogic Holdings Ltd., No. 19-1239-CFC,
`
`2020 WL 4365809, at *5 (D. Del. July 30, 2020) (“To state a claim for enhanced damages based
`
`on willful infringement, however, Dynamic Data must allege not only that Dynamic Data had
`
`3
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`knowledge of the asserted patents, but also that Amlogic had knowledge of its infringement of the
`
`asserted patents.”); Fluidigm Corp. v. IONpath, Inc., No. C 19-05639 WHA, 2020 WL 408988, at
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`*5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2020) (“Patent owners did allegedly notify defendant of the ’104 patent.
`
`But, notably, the complaint never alleges that the letter accused defendant of infringement, much
`
`less detailed how defendants allegedly infringed.”) (emphasis in original). Here, BillJCo alleges
`
`no sufficient facts showing that Apple had any knowledge of any alleged infringement. Again,
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`BillJCo does not allege in its Complaint that the alleged June 5, 2019 letter accused Apple of
`
`infringing the asserted patents. Compl., ¶ 38. Rather, BillJCo only offers the barest conclusory
`
`allegation in this regard, which is insufficient. Michigan Motor Techs., 472 F.Supp.3d at 384.
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`Accordingly, BillJCo’s allegations of Samsung’s pre-suit knowledge of (1) the asserted
`
`patents and (2) Samsung’s alleged infringement each fail to meet the plausibility standard.
`
`2.
`
`No “Egregious” Conduct Is Alleged
`
`A claim of willful infringement also requires that the plaintiff show that a defendant’s
`
`infringement is an “egregious case[ ] of culpable behavior,” conduct that has been described as
`
`“willful, wanton, malicious, bad-faith, deliberate, consciously wrongful, flagrant, or—indeed—
`
`characteristic of a pirate.” Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1932.
`
`BillJCo does not allege any egregious conduct. BillJCo’s willfulness claim is limited to its
`
`assertion that Apple knew of the asserted patents (discussed in Section III.A.1., above). See Compl.,
`
`¶ 44. Because BillJCo fails to allege any egregious conduct, this is precisely the situation where
`
`willful infringement should not be found. “Awards of enhanced damages under the Patent Act over
`
`the past 180 years establish that they are not to be meted out in a typical infringement case, but are
`
`instead designed as a ‘punitive’ or ‘vindictive’ sanction for egregious infringement behavior.”
`
`Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1932; see also Google LLC v. Princeps Interface Techs. LLC, No. 19-CV-
`
`06566-EMC, 2020 WL 1478352, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2020) (dismissing willful infringement
`4
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`Case 6:21-cv-00528-ADA Document 16 Filed 08/02/21 Page 10 of 17
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`claim where defendant “allege[d] no particular facts establishing egregious conduct”).
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`Accordingly, because BillJCo’s willfulness allegations are wholly inadequate, BillJCo has failed to
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`“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
`
`Moreover, when an accused infringer learns of the patent post-suit, and then merely
`
`continues to manufacture allegedly infringing products, that is “the kind of ‘garden-variety’ patent
`
`case that Halo affirms is ill-suited for a finding of willfulness.” M&C Innovations, LLC v. Igloo
`
`Prods. Corp., No. 4:17-cv-2372, 2018 WL 4620713, at *5 (S.D. Tex. July 31, 2018); Meetrix IP,
`
`LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. 1:18-cv-309-LY, 2018 WL 8261315, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2018)
`
`(dismissing willful infringement claim based on failure to articulate an allegation of egregiousness).
`
`This is precisely the situation here and BillJCo’s willful infringement claims should be dismissed.
`
`B.
`
`The Asserted Patents Indirect Infringement Claim Should Be Dismissed
`
`BillJCo’s indirect infringement claim against the asserted patents fails for reasons similar
`
`to those discussed above. BillJCo fails to sufficiently allege that Apple had pre-suit knowledge of
`
`either the asserted patents or the alleged infringement of the asserted patents. In addition, BillJCo
`
`fails to plead facts plausibly supporting a conclusion that Apple had the required “specific intent”
`
`to induce infringement or engaged in the additional required elements to allege contributory
`
`infringement. Thus, BillJCo’s indirect infringement allegations cannot stand.
`
`1.
`
`BillJCo’s Pre-Suit Knowledge Allegations Fail to Plausibly State a
`Claim of Indirect Infringement
`
`Claims for contributory and induced infringement require “knowledge of the patent in suit
`
`and knowledge of patent infringement.” Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 575 U.S. 632, 639
`
`(2015). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff alleging contributory infringement must
`
`plausibly allege that the accused infringer knew of the asserted patents.” Artrip v. Ball Corp., 735
`
`F. App’x 708, 713 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing Commil, 135 S. Ct. at 1926). Similarly, “[t]o state a
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`5
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`Case 6:21-cv-00528-ADA Document 16 Filed 08/02/21 Page 11 of 17
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`claim for induced infringement, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant knew of the patent and
`
`that the induced acts constitute patent infringement.” Addiction and Detoxification Inst. L.L.C. v.
`
`Carpenter, 620 F. App’x 934, 938 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Commil, 135 S. Ct. at 1926).
`
`As described above, Plaintiff’s basis for alleging Defendant’s knowledge of the asserted
`
`patents or knowledge of any purported infringement of the asserted patents is based on Apple’s
`
`(1) alleged knowledge of the asserted patents through the prosecution of Apple’s own patents and
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`(2) a vague reference to an alleged letter BillJCo sent to Apple that BillJCo does not even identify
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`all of the asserted patents or allege infringement thereof. But these two alleged facts are
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`insufficient to constitute the required pre-suit knowledge of either the asserted patents or the
`
`alleged infringement of the asserted patents. In this regard, actual knowledge—not constructive
`
`knowledge—is required to state a plausible claim of indirect infringement. See MONEC Holding
`
`AG v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 2d 225, 232 n.6 (D. Del. 2012) (“[A]ctual (not
`
`constructive) knowledge of the patent-in-suit is necessary to state a claim for indirect infringement
`
`under the Supreme Court’s decision in Global–Tech, unless the patentee is claiming willful
`
`blindness.”) (citation omitted). Here, at best, BillJCo pleads actual knowledge in conclusory
`
`fashion, which does not support a plausible indirect infringement claim.
`
`2.
`
`BillJCo Also Fails to Plead Specific Intent to Cause Induced
`Infringement
`
`“To properly state a claim for induced infringement, a complaint must plead facts that
`
`plausibly show that the defendant has specific intent to cause another party’s direct infringement
`
`and knew that the other party’s acts constituted infringement.” Joao Control & Monitoring Sys.,
`
`LLC v. Protect Am., Inc., No. 1:14-cv-134-LY, 2015 WL 3513151, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2015).
`
`“[S]imply recit[ing] the legal conclusion that Defendants acted with specific intent” fails to plead
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`“facts that would allow a court to reasonably infer that Defendants had the specific intent to induce
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`infringement.” Addiction and Detoxification Inst., 620 F. App’x at 938.
`
`The Complaint repeats the accused functionality of Apple’s products based solely on
`
`citation to Apple developer documents without reciting any specific facts that can plausibly show
`
`the required specific intent to cause infringement:
`
`Apple takes specific steps to actively induce others—such as, for example
`customers, application developers, and third-party manufacturers—to access, use,
`and develop programs and applications for the Accused Instrumentalities and
`intentionally instructs infringing use through training videos, demonstrations,
`brochures,
`installation and user guides,
`such as
`those
`located at:
`https://developer.apple.com/ibeacon/;
`https://developer.apple.com/ibeacon/Getting-Started-with-iBeacon.pdf[;]
`https://developer.apple.com/hardwaredrivers/BluetoothDesignGuidelines.pdf;
`https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/UserExperience/Conce
`ptual/LocationAwarenessPG/RegionalMonitoring/RegionalMonitoring.html.
`
`Compl., ¶ 42. None of these assertions suggests that Apple specifically intended to cause a third
`
`party to infringe the asserted patents. Rather, these unsupported, limited assertions are the very type
`
`of general boilerplate statements courts have found insufficient to plead the specific intent required
`
`for inducing infringement. “Where defendants have not touted the benefits of the accused products
`
`in ways that track the asserted patents, courts generally do not infer specific intent.” Memory
`
`Integrity, LLC v. Intel Corp., 144 F. Supp. 3d 1185, 1195 (D. Or. 2015). In this regard, the law
`
`against induced infringement is not intended to prohibit “ordinary acts incident to product
`
`distribution, such as offering customers technical support or product updates.” Metro-Goldwyn-
`
`Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 937 (2005); see also Michigan Motor Techs.
`
`LLC, 472 F.Supp.3d at 385-86. Accordingly, BillJCo’s induced infringement claim must be
`
`dismissed because it fails to identify any post-knowledge actions that demonstrate specific intent
`
`to induce infringement.
`
`BillJCo also fails to plead facts that evidence specific intent. Rather, the Complaint
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`includes a conclusory statement that “Apple actively induces infringement of at least one claim of
`
`the [asserted patents] by selling the Accused Infringing Instrumentalities with instructions as to
`
`how to use the Accused Infringing Instrumentalities in a system or method such as recited in the
`
`[asserted patents]. Apple aids, instructs, or otherwise acts with the intent to cause an end user to
`
`use the Accused Infringing Instrumentalities.” Compl., ¶¶ 49, 58, 67, 76, 85, 94. The Complaint
`
`does not identify any purported manuals or instruction materials that allegedly encourage
`
`infringement and instead references citations to manuals and online instruction materials
`
`purportedly available on Apple’s website. Such a conclusory, generalized allegation is
`
`insufficient. Ikorongo Texas LLC v. LG Elecs. Inc. et al., No. 6:20-cv-257-ADA (W.D. Tex.),
`
`Dkt. 78 (March 31, 2021) (dismissing indirect infringement claims when plaintiff alleged
`
`“[defendant] provid[es] instructions on how to use its products and/or services in a manner or
`
`configuration that infringes one or more claims of the Asserted Patents, including those found at
`
`www.LG.com and in product literature.”); Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. Toyota Motor N. Am.,
`
`No. W:13-cv-365, 2014 WL 2892285, at *7 (W.D. Tex. May 12, 2014) (“Plaintiff[’]s generalized
`
`allegation that Toyota induced others to infringe the Asserted Patents through its marketing and
`
`sales tactics are likewise insufficient.”).
`
`Further, the Complaint does not identify how those manuals and instructions allegedly
`
`encourage infringement. To find inducement based on “advertising an infringing use or instructing
`
`how to engage in an infringing use, . . . [those] instructions need to evidence intent to encourage
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`infringement. The question is not just whether instructions describ[e] the infringing mode, but
`
`whether the instructions teach an infringing use of the device such that we are willing to infer from
`
`those instructions an affirmative intent to infringe the patent.” Takeda Pharms. U.S.A., Inc. v.
`
`West-Ward Pharm. Corp., 785 F.3d 625, 630–31 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (internal citations and quotation
`
`8
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`IPR2022-00426
`Page 13 of 17
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`Case 6:21-cv-00528-ADA Document 16 Filed 08/02/21 Page 14 of 17
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`marks omitted). “Merely describ[ing] an infringing mode is not the same as recommend[ing],
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`encourag[ing], or promot[ing] an infringing use.” Id.
`
`The Complaint does nothing more than cite to Apple developer website documents and
`
`does not describe how the content of the alleged “user manuals and online instruction materials on
`
`their website” affirmatively recommend, encourage, or promote infringing use of the asserted
`
`claims. Instead, the inducement allegations are conclusory. Conclusory statements, absent factual
`
`support, are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Iron Oak Techs., LLC v. Acer Am. Corp.
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`et al., 6:17-cv-00143, Dkt. 18 at 11 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 2017) (granting motion to dismiss claims
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`of induced infringement where “[t]he claims are more akin to ‘naked assertions devoid of further
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`factual enhancement’ because Iron Oak does not explain in its Complaint how the Warranty
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`contains specific facts regarding Acer’s intent to induce infringement.”). As such, Plaintiff’s
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`induced infringement claims should be dismissed.
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`3.
`
`BillJCo’s Generic Allegations of Contributory Infringement are
`Deficient
`
`Claims of contributory infringement must be “more than boilerplate recitations of the
`
`elements of . . . contributory infringement.” Blackberry Ltd. v. Nokia Corp., No. 17-cv-155-RGA,
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`2018 WL 1401330, at *4 (D. Del. Mar. 20, 2018) (dismissing contributory infringement claims).
`
`A plaintiff must provide factual allegations that the accused product or component “has no
`
`substantial noninfringing uses.” Affinity Labs, 2014 WL 2892285, at *8 (quoting Fujitsu Ltd. v.
`
`Netgear Inc., 620 F.3d 1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). A “conclusory allegation” that “components
`
`provided by” the accused infringer “are not staple articles of commerce suitable for substantial
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`non-[in]fringing use” is “no more than a ‘threadbare recital’ of one of the elements.” Iron Oak
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`Techs., LLC v. Dell, Inc., No. 1:17-CV-999-RP, 2018 WL 1631396, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 4, 2018)
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`(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (dismissing contributory infringement claims). To plead
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`9
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`Page 14 of 17
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`Case 6:21-cv-00528-ADA Document 16 Filed 08/02/21 Page 15 of 17
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`contributory infringement, it is insufficient for Plaintiff to assert “nothing more than ‘if you use
`
`this device to perform the patented method, the device will infringe and has no noninfringing
`
`uses.’” In re Bill of Lading Transmission and Processing Sys. Patent Litig., 681 F.3d 1323, 1338
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2012) (affirming dismissal of contributory infringement claims).
`
`Plaintiff’s contributory infringement claim is merely a threadbare recital of elements:
`
`Apple is also liable for contributory infringement of at least one claim of the
`[asserted patents] by providing, and by having knowingly provided, a material part
`of the instrumentalities, namely the Accused Infringing Instrumentalities, used to
`infringe at least one claim of the [asserted patents]. The Accused Infringing
`Instrumentalities have no substantial non-infringing uses. Apple knew that the
`Accused Infringing Instrumentalities were especially made for use in an infringing
`manner prior to the filing of this lawsuit. For at least the reasons set forth above,
`Apple contributes to the infringement of the [asserted patents] pursuant to 35 U.S.C.
`§271(b).
`
`Compl., ¶¶ 50, 59, 68, 77, 86, 95 (emphasis added). This assertion simply states the legal standard
`
`for contributory infringement and plainly fails Iqbal’s factual pleading standard. It resembles the
`
`hypothetical contributory infringement claim explicitly rejected in In re Bill of Lading. Compare
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`id. (Apple’s products “have no substantial noninfringing uses”), with 681 F.3d at 1338 (“if you
`
`use this device to perform the patented method, the device will infringe and has no noninfringing
`
`uses”). Like the “boilerplate” contributory infringement claims in Blackberry, BillJCo’s
`
`boilerplate contributory infringement claims should be dismissed. 2018 WL 1401330, at *4.
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`IV.
`
`CONCLUSION
`
`For the foregoing reasons, BillJCo’s claims of willful and indirect infringement as to the
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`asserted patents should be dismissed.
`
`Dated: August 2, 2021
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`Respectfully submitted,
`
`/s/ John M. Guaragna
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`10
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`Case 6:21-cv-00528-ADA Document 16 Filed 08/02/21 Page 16 of 17
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`John M. Guaragna
`Texas Bar No 24043308
`DLA PIPER LLP (US)
`401 Congress Avenue, Suite 2500
`Austin, TX 78701-3799
`Tel: 512.457.7125
`Fax: 512.457.7001
`john.guaragna@dlapiper.com
`
`ATTORNEY FOR APPLE INC.
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`11
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`IPR2022-00426
`Page 16 of 17
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`Case 6:21-cv-00528-ADA Document 16 Filed 08/02/21 Page 17 of 17
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`The undersigned certifies that on this 2nd day of August 2021, all counsel of record who
`
`are deemed to have consented to electronic service are being served with a copy of this document
`
`through the Court’s CM/ECF system under Local Rule CV-5(b)(1). Any other counsel of record
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`will be served by a facsimile transmission and/or first class mail.
`
`/s/ John M. Guaragna
`John M. Guaragna
`
`12
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`Exhibit 1018
`IPR2022-00426
`Page 17 of 17
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`