DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT
`
`DRM
`
`— “digital rights” or “digital restrictions” management?
`
`Richard Leeming
`Red Bee Media
`
`If correctly applied, DRM can be likened to a motorway, providing a seamless high-
`speed route to content, enabling people to get the content they want, where they
`want it, quickly and easily. However, if badly applied, heavy handed and overly
`restrictive, DRM is more like a traffic jam – denying people access to the content they
`want and crucially denying rights-holders the revenue they want.
`This article looks at some of the proprietary DRM systems currently available and
`argues that we need to start thinking hard about when and how we apply DRM to our
`precious content.
`
`In 2006, music lovers worldwide have been celebrating the 250th anniversary of Mozart’s birth.
`Although he only lived for 35 years, Mozart composed more than 600 pieces of classical music –
`most of which are still hugely popular today.
`But it’s perhaps something of a surprise to discover that one of the key moments of Mozart’s early
`career would today count as piracy and be prevented by digital-rights technology.
`As a 14-year-old, Mozart travelled to the Vatican and heard Gregorio Allegri’s Miserere. This piece
`of music had long been closely guarded by the Vatican and it was forbidden to transcribe it: if you
`did, you would be excommunicated. Whether Mozart knew this is unknown but, having heard it
`once, he transcribed it from memory and it became published in London, thus breaking the Vatican’s
`ban.
`This is perhaps one of the earliest-known examples of content rights management being overturned.
`The Vatican may not have been too happy, but music lovers worldwide have benefited for more than
`two centuries now.
`There’s little doubt that issues around digital rights management (DRM) present one of the key
`areas of debate in the emerging digital content market.
`On the one hand you have rights creators; the record companies, Hollywood studios, TV production
`companies, broadcasters, and sports organizations who seek to get a financial return on their artistic
`creations. Then, on the other hand, you have the technology companies, be they distribution plat-
`forms or device manufacturers, who want to get the best content onto their platform and recognize
`the need to meet the requirements of content owners.
`And then there are the consumers, the people who actually watch and listen to this stuff, some of
`whom are paying for it, some of whom are getting it for free in ways they probably shouldn’t and
`most of whom are slightly baffled by the term digital rights management.
`
`EBU TECHNICAL REVIEW – January 2007
`R. Leeming
`
`1 / 10
`
`EX1052
`Roku V. Media Chain
`U.S. Patent No. 9,715,581
`
`

`

`DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT
`All of these parties have differing and conflicting interests, and it’s proving hard to reconcile their
`different needs.
`Even the term DRM itself is open to debate. While the simple definition that it is “any one of several
`technologies used by publishers or copyright holders to control access to or usage of digital data
`such as movies, music files or video clips” is relatively uncontroversial, a growing campaign against
`DRM suggest the term would better be defined as Digital Restrictions Management.
`Aside from the philosophical debate, there are:
`(cid:129) commercial concerns that DRM can be anti-competitive or off-putting to consumers;
`(cid:129) legal concerns that DRM over-rides long-standing legal precedents and consumer rights, and
`(cid:129) artistic concerns that DRM stifles creativity.
`One thing that does seem certain is that the market for DRM software
`is booming. According to market research company Jupiter
`Research, the market will grow to $274 million by 2008 from $36
`million in 2003.
`The driving forces behind DRM have been around for as long as it has
`been possible to copy content. British music fans who bought records in
`the 1980s will be familiar with the phrase “Home
`taping is killing music”. Around that time, the
`introduction of videotapes led to the 1984 US
`lawsuit Sony Corp. vs. Universal City Studios which even-
`tually led to the US Supreme Court setting an important legal precedent
`– that a technology cannot be illegal, but the use of it can.
`Clearly the advent of digital media makes the demand for DRM even
`greater as multiple copying of digital content not only becomes
`easier, quicker and cheaper, but also avoids the quality degradation
`that happened with analogue content.
`
`DRM technologies
`There are many different DRM technologies, so providing an accurate technical description of them
`is outside the scope of this article.
`However, to focus on the needs of the broadcast industry, an early distinction needs to be made
`between Conditional Access and DRM.
`
`Conditional access
`Conditional Access (CA) is the system that has traditionally been used to protect TV channels. The
`standards are tightly-defined and provide a method by which a digital television stream can be
`scrambled. The only people who can descramble, and thus watch, the picture are those with the
`right receiving box and valid keys. Clearly these are the people who have paid to receive the
`service.
`A good example of this in action in the UK is on Sky Sports on a Sunday afternoon. Watch the
`match at home, then go to the nearest pub that is showing the same game and you’ll see a simple
`difference. In the pub, the screen will have an icon depicting a half-empty pint glass in the bottom
`right hand corner of the picture. This denotes to any visiting spies from Sky Sports that the pub has
`paid for the premium rights to show the game to paying customers.
`Conditional Access works by a combination of scrambling and encryption.
`
`EBU TECHNICAL REVIEW – January 2007
`R. Leeming
`
`2 / 10
`
`

`

`DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT
`Alongside the scrambled signal, secret keys are also transmitted. These keys enable the descram-
`bler to work at the receiving end but, to ensure that they are not compromised, they are also
`encrypted. As well as being scrambled, the keys are regularly changed.
`
`DRM
`The main difference between CA and DRM is that DRM is usually applied to a specific piece of
`content.
`The list of actions covered by DRM are growing even longer, but typically they cover such things as:
`(cid:129) when the content is available;
`(cid:129) how many devices it can be viewed on, or indeed if it can be passed between devices at all;
`(cid:129) how many times it can be viewed;
`(cid:129) how long it is available for ... and so on.
`A simple explanation of how DRM systems works is this. It depends on content being secured by an
`encryption key which is split into two halves, one of which is private and one which is public.
`When a person (e.g. Bob) opts to
`buy a piece of content – say a
`music track or a video clip – from
`an online store, it first passes
`over the public half of the content
`encryption key. This is then
`attached to the digital file by the
`DRM gateway. The digital file
`and the public key is then sent to
`Bob where it is unlocked by his
`private key ... and the usage
`rights he has acquired are
`attached to the content.
`This model, which allows people
`to buy content direct from the
`rights holder, can also be modi-
`fied to serve “super-distribution”
`which is where someone, having
`enjoyed a digital file, can forward
`it to a friend (e.g. Frank) who
`cannot access it until he has
`replaced the original public key
`with his own one. This will, of
`course, involve him in paying the
`price of the content to the online
`store.
`
`So far so good, but this is actually where the problems start.
`Currently DRM applications are very basic and only scratch the surface of the possibilities. The
`market for DRM technology is heavily constrained by the lack of an open, scalable and dynamically
`adaptable solution.
`If correctly applied, DRM can be likened to a motorway, providing a seamless high-speed route to
`content, enabling people to get the content they want, where they want it, quickly and easily.
`However, if badly applied, heavy handed and overly restrictive, DRM is more like a traffic jam –
`denying people access to the content they want and crucially denying rights-holders the revenue
`they want.
`
`EBU TECHNICAL REVIEW – January 2007
`R. Leeming
`
`3 / 10
`
`

`

`DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT
`A successful DRM system has to be transparent and flexible with the user unaware that DRM proc-
`esses are going on behind the scenes. However this demands a great deal of co-operation from
`many different partners, that are managing different aspects of the process, if this is to happen. For
`the simple purchase of an mp3 track via a mobile phone, this will involve record companies, mobile
`network operators, billing software providers, handset manufacturers, DRM vendors – all with
`different priorities, needs and agendas.
`An example of how difficult this is, in reality, is provided by the Open Mobile Alliance.
`
`Open Mobile Alliance
`The Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) was set up members from many different industries, including:
`(cid:129) Mobile phone manufacturers (e.g. Nokia, Motorola, Samsung, Sony-Ericsson, BenQ-Siemens);
`(cid:129) Mobile system manufacturers (e.g. Ericsson, Siemens, Openwave);
`(cid:129) Operators (e.g. Vodafone, O2, Cingular, Deutsche Telekom, Orange) and
`(cid:129) IT companies (e.g. Microsoft, IBM, SUN).
`The intention was to set DRM standards for mobile phones.
`
`OMA DRM v1.0
`The first implementation of OMA DRM, version 1.0, was approved in June 2004. It is a basic DRM
`standard which doesn’t offer strong protection to content owners. It has been implemented in 400
`phones, which may sound a lot until you realize that there have been thousands of different devices
`released.
`However it’s the best technology there is for mobile applications at present and many operators use
`OMA DRM for their content services.
`It specifies three main methods:
`
`Forward Lock
`Forward Lock prevents the unauthorized transfer of content from one device to another. The inten-
`tion is to prevent peer-to-peer distribution, or super-distribution, of content using Bluetooth or infra-
`red. The content is packaged inside a DRM message that is delivered to the terminal. The device
`can play, display, or execute the content, but it cannot forward it.
`
`Combined Delivery
`This builds upon the ability to stop super-distribution by allowing the content owners to set rules
`about how a person may use the content. When the content is delivered to the handset, it contains
`two objects: the content and a rights object.
`The rights object defines the usage rules for the content. This can support all kinds of functions,
`such as preview, or time- and usage-based constraints. For example, it allows a complimentary
`preview, such as using the content only for a specific number of days, or an annual subscription with
`non-interfering price models.
`If a content owner applies the Combined Delivery mechanism, this will ensure that neither the
`content nor the rights object can be forwarded from the target device.
`Thus, on Nokia Series 40 phones, an installed file with DRM will have its “Send” option greyed out in
`its options menu. If the user attempts to send this via MMS, a message “The file is copyright
`
`EBU TECHNICAL REVIEW – January 2007
`R. Leeming
`
`4 / 10
`
`

`

`CA
`CEK
`DRM
`DVB
`
`Conditional Access
`(OMA) Content Encryption Key
`Digital Rights Management
`Digital Video Broadcasting
`http://www.dvb.org/
`
`Abbreviations
`OMA
`
`PKI
`XCP
`
`Open Mobile Alliance
`http://www.openmobilealliance.org/
`Public Key Infrastructure
`(Sony) eXtended Copy Protection
`
`DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT
`
`protected” will appear. A Bluetooth file transfer will fail if the user tries to extract the file using Blue-
`tooth, yet the file will still appear as present and will still be deletable via Bluetooth.
`
`Separate Delivery
`The most sophisticated level of OMA DRM is called Separate Delivery. It provides better protection
`for high-value content by encrypting the content itself.
`Thus the content is useless without both a rights object and a Content Encryption Key (CEK), which
`are delivered separately from the content.
`The rules set by OMA insist that the CEK is delivered securely, via WAP push, directly to the author-
`ized mobile device. On the handset, the DRM User Agent uses it for content decryption.
`OMA DRM-compliant devices such as the Nokia 3200 or 6230, or the Siemens SX1 and C62, store
`the rights objects in a part of the handset’s memory where the user can’t see it. Only the handset’s
`media player can access both the encrypted content and the rights object, including the CEK, to
`enable the consumption of the content by displaying or playing it.
`Although people can download content and forward it to friends, they won’t be able to see it until
`they obtain their own CEK for content decryption.
`The OMA standards include a “rights refresh” mechanism, allowing people who have had content
`sent to them by their friends to contact the content owner directly to obtain rights to either preview or
`purchase the content they have received.
`OMA describes this super-distribution as a key benefit of Separate Delivery because it maximizes
`the number of potential customers through peer-to-peer recommendations while retaining control for
`the content provider through centralised rights acquisition, potentially triggering enormous revenue
`growth. It also avoids the distribution costs for rights holders.
`
`OMA DRM v2.0
`Having established OMA DRM v1.0, the organization set out to create v2.0 – an open standard for
`technology to handle the application of DRM to music, video, gaming and similar services delivered
`to wireless devices – which was approved in March 2006.
`OMA describe it as an enhancement on the earlier DRM specification as it is based on the concept
`of a “trusted terminal”, requiring that the handsets support Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI) authenti-
`cation, which ensures their identity.
`The standard includes several control mechanisms built into the handset, allowing for what OMA
`describe as “a more robust set of content control options”.
`These benefits include:
`(cid:129) content subscriptions;
`(cid:129) gifting – allowing users to pay for content and forward it to a friend;
`(cid:129) previewing – enabling users to watch a portion of the content before purchasing it, and
`
`EBU TECHNICAL REVIEW – January 2007
`R. Leeming
`
`5 / 10
`
`

`

`DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT
`(cid:129) sharing – the sale of licences that permit the use of content among a set group of wireless
`devices, and saving the content to memory cards or other compliant devices, among many
`other new benefits.
`
`Patenting issues
`While the first handsets with OMA DRM 2.0 – the Nokia N91 and Sony Ericsson W850i – were put
`on the market in early 2006, the standard was in the middle of a huge financial row.
`The patents necessary to develop the software based on OMA v2.0 are held by MPEG LA. They
`initially proposed to sell licences at $1 per handset and 1% of every transaction. Obviously this was
`unacceptable to content owners as it presented them with potentially open-ended bills for DRM fees.
`MPEG LA eventually now plans to charge $0.65 per handset and $0.25 per mobile phone subscriber
`per year, still a significant amount, but no longer tied to the number of times the DRM is used. The
`price cut came after mobile network operators threatened to develop alternative DRM technology,
`which would have led to a fragmented DRM situation with incompatible files and no clear benefits to
`anyone.
`
`Apple FairPlay
`While the delays and financial arguments over OMA DRM are typical of when several
`players are involved, when just one organization is dominant it allows a more seam-
`less approach, as is the case with Apple’s FairPlay system used on its iTunes
`store and implemented on its iTunes software and iPod digital music players.
`FairPlay allows a track bought from the iTunes store to be used in the following
`ways:
`(cid:129) The protected track may be copied to any number of iPod portable music
`players;
`(cid:129) The protected track may be played on up to five (originally three) authorized computers simulta-
`neously;
`(cid:129) The protected track may be copied to a standard Audio CD any number of times. While the
`resulting CD has no DRM and may be ripped, encoded and distributed like any other CD
`because it has been compressed, to re-rip it will significantly degrade the sound quality;
`(cid:129) A particular playlist within iTunes containing a protected track can be copied to a CD only up to
`seven times (originally ten times) before the playlist must be changed.
`FairPlay does not affect the ability of the file itself to be copied. It only manages the decryption of
`the audio content.
`
`Sony rootkit
`Some unified vendors unfortunately got their approach to DRM expensively and badly wrong:
`
`“Most people, I think, don't even know what a rootkit is, so why should they care
`about it?”
`
`This is a quote that Thomas Hesse, the head of Sony BMG's global digital business, might now
`regret as, thanks to Sony BMG, many millions of people now know what a rootkit is, and have shown
`they care quite deeply about it. Furthermore, this approach to DRM has just cost Sony BMG several
`million dollars to settle class action lawsuits brought by more than 40 US states. The company also
`faces the prospect of paying up to $175 to many thousands of individual customers under the terms
`of the legal settlement.
`
`EBU TECHNICAL REVIEW – January 2007
`R. Leeming
`
`6 / 10
`
`

`

`DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT
`
`Sony BMG’s botched foray into DRM started when they included
`“eXtended Copy Protection” (XCP) software on music CDs.
`When a consumer tried to play a CD with XCP on their computer,
`they were prompted to install a CD player bundled with the music
`tracks.
`The software on the CD not only prevented the computer’s native
`media player from playing the CD, it also restricted the number of
`times the CD could be burned and prevented the CD being ripped
`to the iPod.
`These restrictions may have been onerous enough for consumers to object to, but it didn’t take long
`for software engineer Mark Russinovich to realize that this was the tip of an iceberg.
`He discovered that Sony BMG’s software was fundamentally similar to a rootkit, a programme used
`by hackers to conceal unauthorised activity on computer systems, often described as Spyware or
`Malware. Thus, without the consumers’ explicit knowledge or permission, Sony BMG had installed
`software on their computers that interfered with the normal way in which Microsoft Windows or Mac
`OS X operating systems play CDs and it opened security holes that allowed viruses to break in.
`Furthermore the software caused programmes to freeze up and applications to slow down: a series
`of hidden files that were the source of the problem proved to be nearly impossible to uninstall.
`Russinovich published his findings on his blog and the story was quickly picked up by the main-
`stream media, leading to several class-action lawsuits against Sony BMG, and even criticism from
`some Sony artists that their work had been protected by methods they didn’t approve of.
`Although Sony BMG quickly released an uninstaller, this too was fundamentally compromised. Not
`only did users have to provide their e-mail address, which Sony BMG reserved the right to use in
`future marketing activities, the procedure for obtaining the uninstaller was complicated and time-
`consuming and would only work on one computer each time. If a user had played the CD on several
`computers they had to go through the process several times.
`The uninstaller also used Microsoft’s ActiveX controls which many security experts recommend that
`people de-activate, as it may allow malicious attackers to take over control of people’s computers.
`Sony BMG’s final indignity came when they were criticised by the US Department of Homeland
`Security:
`
`“It's very important to remember that it's your intellectual property — it's not your
`computer’s”, Stewart Baker, the assistant secretary for policy, told the Washington Post.
`“And in the pursuit of protection of intellectual property, it's important not to defeat or under-
`mine the security measures that people need to adopt in these days.”
`Sony BMG eventually recalled all unsold CDs with XCP and offered to exchange CDs that people
`had bought for ones without the software. In December 2006, Sony BMG agreed to pay damages
`and fines to settle lawsuits brought by more than 40 US states. The company will pay Texas and
`California $750,000 in civil penalties and costs, and $4.25m to a consortium of other states as well
`as reimbursing consumers up to $175 each if their computers were damaged while trying to uninstall
`the XCP software.
`
`A growing movement against DRM
`Sony BMG’s sorry tale is perhaps the most extreme, but is by no means the only example of major
`criticisms being levelled at DRM.
`There’s a growing movement against DRM. While Defective by Design’s Day Against DRM on
`3 October 2006 hardly made the mainstream news agenda, perhaps a more significant announce-
`
`EBU TECHNICAL REVIEW – January 2007
`R. Leeming
`
`7 / 10
`
`

`

`DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT
`ment the same week came from UK nightclub group, The Ministry of Sound (MoS). In an article in
`The Times on 2 October 2006, they announced that they were starting an online music store with
`60,000 tracks which would be DRM-free.
`Lohan Presencer, managing director of the MoS Group, was quoted as saying: “DRM is a nonsense.
`It only succeeds in limiting choice and people still steal music regardless.”
`As The Ministry of Sound is the UK’s largest independent record company, selling about 2 million
`compilation dance CDs a year, and operates an international chain of “super-clubs”, they are one of
`the most significant companies so far to reject DRM.
`eMusic is another music download site which does not feature DRM and has a 13% market share in
`the USA. It recently launched in Europe with a catalogue of 1.7 million tracks from 8,500 inde-
`pendent labels.
`The major advantage touted by both these services is that because they sell mp3s without DRM,
`their tracks can be played on any digital music player, computer or HiFi system.
`iTunes may have the dominant share of paid-for music downloads worldwide, but an intentional limi-
`tation of it’s DRM system, FairPlay, is that it prevents iTunes’ customers from using the purchased
`music on any portable digital music player other than the iPod. This is one of the major criticisms of
`proprietary DRM systems that, instead of protecting intellectual property, they are in fact locking
`consumers into a single technology platform.
`And further problems are becoming evident in the growing VoD. market. Apple users are currently
`locked out of many new services such as the one just launched by Channel 4 in the UK
`That's because Apple has chosen not to licence FairPlay to other companies, hoping that content
`owners will instead use their iTunes platform to distribute their content. However this presents a
`problem for content owners such as C4, whose brand is big enough to justify building their own D2C
`portal. If they see iTunes as a rival and are reluctant to use it to distribute their programmes, their
`only option if they want to protect their content is to use Windows Media DRM which only works on
`PCs. Is the solution here for Microsoft to develop Windows DRM that works on Macs?
`
`Technical innovation and artistic creativity
`The debate is only going to get more intense as the US content industries make a second attempt
`the get the Broadcast Flag technology through Congress. This will insert a digital “watermark” into
`a broadcast stream which will control whether or not it can be recorded, or impose restrictions on
`what can be done with the recording. Ultimately this will restrict viewing of “flagged” content to
`devices which are compliant, forcing consumers to upgrade their technology to compliant devices, or
`miss out.
`A similar debate is happening in Europe where the DVB
`Project is attempting to get its Copy Protection and
`Content Management (CPCM) standard included in the
`next EU Copyright Directive. This is actually regarded as a
`more onerous series of restrictions than the US broadcast
`flag and will finely control which devices can be used to
`view programmes. As it contains a “robustness require-
`ment” that prevents the end user from modifying the
`receiving device, it will be impossible to use open-source
`software such as Linux to create receiving devices.
`This will have a profound effect on the European set-top
`box market as most manufacturers use Linux as their oper-
`ating system.
`This illustrates one of the unintended side-effects of DRM, that it restricts technical innovation.
`
`EBU TECHNICAL REVIEW – January 2007
`R. Leeming
`
`8 / 10
`
`

`

`DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT
`Opponents of DRM argue that the iPod would never have been invented if DRM had been present
`on audio CDs. It’s likely that one of the restrictions that would have been in place would have been
`to only allow audio output to a “trusted” pair of loudspeakers. Thus when CD drives started
`appearing in computers, users would not have been allowed to extract the digital data, i.e. rip them
`to mp3s, unless the content industry had given permission, which seems unlikely. So people would
`not have started storing their music collection as mp3s, there would have been no need to develop
`portable mp3 players and a whole industry would never have arisen.
`
`While some copyright owners might not regard this as a bad thing, acts like the Arctic Monkeys and
`Gnarls Barkley that have grown through file sharing and file downloading would most likely disagree.
`
`It’s not just technical creativity that is compromised, artistic creativity is also hindered. The restric-
`tions imposed by FairPlay mean that a track bought from the iTunes record store cannot be imported
`into any digital editing systems. So if someone editing together their holiday video and wanting to
`run a track bought from iTunes under some of their shots will find they’re unable to.
`
`And while this may be a minor irritation to home video enthusiasts, there are potentially wider
`cultural implications. Throughout history, artists and composers have developed through being
`influenced by or even copying other artists. This article started with the example of Mozart copying
`Allegri’s Miserere, but Bach is also widely credited as an important influence on Mozart, just as
`Mozart himself went on to influence dozens of other composers.
`
`The process continues in the digital age. Over the last few years, artists such as The Kleptones
`have created albums by remixing, or mashing-up, tracks from dozens of artists along with clips from
`films and TV programmes, creating a new art-form in the process.
`
`The restriction on importing tracks bought from iTunes into video-editing software could also contra-
`vene a consumer’s long-held rights. In many countries, copyright includes the principle of fair use.
`While this does not allow wholesale copying of a copyrighted work without the owner’s consent, it
`does allow limited quoting. So inserting a clip from a song into a documentary about music, or into
`an individual’s holiday video would usually be considered as fair use.
`
`Also compromised by DRM is the doctrine of first sale. This means that if you have purchased a
`licence to a copyrighted work, you have the right to sell that licence to someone else. But a digital
`file with DRM applied prevents this, so if I buy an album from iTunes and I don’t like it, I can’t then
`sell it on eBay as I would if I bought a CD I didn’t like.
`
`Battery consumption
`
`A further objection to DRM, especially where handheld devices are concerned, is over the extra
`power consumed by the software.
`
`The website MP3.com tested the battery life of mp3 players, intending to discover how close their
`actual battery life came to the manufacturers’ specs. They were also looking to find out what sort of
`things drained the power more quickly. They weren’t surprised to find that attaching a chunky “DJ-
`look” pair of headphones, or watching videos, quickly drained the batteries but they also discovered
`that restricting songs with DRM can significantly reduce the battery life.
`
`The batteries in a Creative Zen Vision:M lasted for 16 hours when playing mp3s, but when used to
`play WMA subscription tracks, they only lasted just over 12 hours, a drop of 25%. It was the same
`with other PlaysForSure players such as the Archos Gmini 402 Camcorder which lasted 11 hours,
`with mp3s but only 9 hours with DRM tracks.
`
`Considering that one of the biggest complaints about handheld media players is the battery life,
`which is only going to get more acute as new wireless technologies are added and more rich-media
`content is used, something that reduces the effective battery by 25% is a huge issue.
`
`EBU TECHNICAL REVIEW – January 2007
`R. Leeming
`
`9 / 10
`
`

`

`DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT
`
`Richard Leeming has been working on interactive broadcast content for nearly 10
`years. After being one of the BBC’s first interactive content producers, he joined Red
`Bee Media in 2002 to help set up the Content Factory, running a team which man-
`ages, creates and publishes content for 3, the UK 3G network. In his current position
`as Business Development Manager – Interactive Content, he is responsible for work-
`ing with Red Bee Media’s clients to help them understand how to develop products
`and services for the Mobile Content Market.
`Mr Leeming’s understanding of interactive content draws on his career as a broad-
`cast journalist for the BBC, working for programmes like the Today programme on
`Radio 4, Breakfast and Drivetime on Radio 5 and Newsbeat on Radio 1.
`
`So it would seem sensible then for all players in the digital media market to start moving towards
`some kind of consensus on DRM. Some hard questions need to be asked, and some difficult
`answers arrived at.
`
`Conclusions
`Is it really sound business practice to treat your consumers like thieves? Or to install spyware on
`their computer without them realizing it?
`In an era where, in politics, choice is everything and we go to war over freedom, is it beneficial to the
`bottom-line for the digital media industry to be so actively seeking to restrict people’s choice and
`freedoms over what they watch and listen to?
`We need to start thinking hard about when and how we apply DRM. At IBC’s Multimedia on the
`Move Tutorial in September 2006, Martin Coggin of BT Movio insisted that, because their Virgin
`Lobster DMB receiver had a hard disc, could function as a PVR and could sync to a PC, then DRM
`was absolutely necessary. I found myself wondering – given the quality of the pictures, the size of
`the screen and the inherent usability issues of a mobile phone – how many people were going to go
`to the trouble of pirating content from the BT Movio service? This shouldn’t in any way be regarded
`as a criticism of the BT Movio service, just a recognition that there are some services where DRM
`gets in the way.
`If we regard mobile TV as a promotional service to drive consumers to higher-value broadcast serv-
`ices where the returns are greater, then surely allowing people to distribute the service virally
`increases the uptake and reduces the distribution costs.
`Clearly this doesn’t hold for all content. High-value, short-form content such as music videos or
`sports clips have much greater attraction for pirates and so DRM is vital, but maybe the digital
`content industry could consider the “Economics of Trust”?
`In North London there is a restaurant called “Just Around The Corner”. There are no prices on the
`menu, people pay what they think is fair. In fact, if they pay less than what the owner thinks is fair,
`then he thanks them politely and returns their money. The restaurant has been running for 17 years
`so surely illustrates that if you play to individual people’s better nature, then you will be rewarded.
`
`EBU TECHNICAL REVIEW – January 2007
`R. Leeming
`
`10 / 10
`
`