Case 6:21-cv-00579-ADA Document 57 Filed 02/11/22 Page 1 of 30
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`WACO DIVISION
`
`SCRAMOGE TECHNOLOGY LTD.,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.,
`AND SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS
`AMERICA, INC.,
`
`Defendants.
`
`SCRAMOGE TECHNOLOGY LTD.,
`
`v.
`
`APPLE INC.,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`Defendant.
`
`SCRAMOGE TECHNOLOGY LTD.,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`GOOGLE LLC,
`
`Defendant.
`
`§
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`
`Civil Action No. 6:21-cv-00454-ADA
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`Civil Action No. 6:21-cv-00579-ADA
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`Civil Action No. 6:21-cv-00616-ADA
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`DEFENDANTS’ JOINT REPLY CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`Scramoge Technology Ltd.
`Ex. 2014 - Page 1
`
`

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`Case 6:21-cv-00579-ADA Document 57 Filed 02/11/22 Page 2 of 30
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1
`
`I.
`
`DISPUTED TERMS .............................................................................................................. 1
`
`1.
`
`[“arranged/provided] on” ........................................................................................... 1
`
`’215 Patent, Claims 1, 9, 13 and 19 .................................................................................... 1
`
`ʼ370 Patent, Claims 1 and 9 ................................................................................................ 1
`
`2.
`
`“a [first/second] surface of the plurality of soft magnetic layers” ............................. 4
`
`’215 Patent, Claims 1 and 13 .............................................................................................. 4
`
`3.
`
`“the [first/second] polymeric material layer includes a [first/second] extending
`portion extending longer than the plurality of soft magnetic layer ............................ 7
`
`/ the [first/second] polymeric material layer comprises a [first/second] extending portion
`extending longer than the plurality of soft magnetic layers” ’215 Patent, Claims 1
`and 13 ......................................................................................................................... 7
`
`4.
`
`“a [first/second] magnetic sheet” ............................................................................. 12
`
`’962 Patent, Claims 1, 7, 9, and 18 ................................................................................... 12
`
`5.
`
`“wherein a height of a highest position of the second magnetic sheet from the
`substrate is higher than a height of a lowest position of the receiving coil from the
`substrate”.................................................................................................................. 14
`
`’962 Patent, Claims 1 and 18 ............................................................................................ 14
`
`6.
`
`“a second polymeric film provided on the plurality of soft magnetic layers” ......... 17
`
`’370 Patent, Claim 1 ......................................................................................................... 17
`
`7.
`
`8.
`
`9.
`
`“plurality of soft magnetic layers provided on the first adhesive layer” ’370 Patent,
`Claim 1 ..................................................................................................................... 17
`
`“the [first/second] polymer film includes a [first/second] extending portion that
`extends further than the plurality of soft magnetic layers” ’370 Patent, Claim 1 .... 17
`
`“a [first/second] extending adhesive portion that extends further outward than the
`side portion of the plurality of soft magnetic layers, and a portion of the
`[first/second] extending adhesive portion is provided in the connected area” ’370
`Patent, Claims 12 and 15 ......................................................................................... 18
`
`
`
`i
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`Scramoge Technology Ltd.
`Ex. 2014 - Page 2
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`

`

`C a s e 6 : 2 1 - c v - 0 0 5 7 9 - A D A
`
`
`
` D o c u m e n t
`
`
`
`10. “a predetermined intensity” ’941 Patent, Claim 1 ................................................... 19
`
`11. “receiving space” ’740 Patent, Claims 1-3, 6, 7, and 8 (Google), Claims 6, 7, and 16
`(Apple) ..................................................................................................................... 19
`
`CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 20
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`ii
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`Scramoge Technology Ltd.
`Ex. 2014 - Page 3
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`

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`Case 6:21-cv-00579-ADA Document 57 Filed 02/11/22 Page 4 of 30
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`
`
`Cases
`
`Acacia Media Techs. Corp. v. New Destiny Internet Grp.,
`405 F. Supp. 2d 1127 (N.D. Cal. 2005) .................................................................................... 14
`
`Actavis Lab’ys UT, Inc. v. UCB, Inc.,
`No. 2:15-cv-1001-JRG-RSP, 2016 WL 3678987 (E.D. Tex. July 11, 2016) ........................... 11
`
`Advanced Steel Recovery, LLC v. X-Body Equip., Inc.,
`808 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2015) .................................................................................................. 2
`
`Allen Eng'g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc.,
`299 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ................................................................................................ 13
`
`Altair Eng’g, Inc. v. LEDdynamics, Inc.,
`413 F. App’x 251, 254 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ..................................................................................... 2
`
`Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc.,
`512 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .................................................................................................. 5
`
`Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Tyco Healthcare Grp., LP,
`616 F.3d 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ................................................................................................ 21
`
`Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co.,
`441 F.3d 945 (Fed. Cir. 2006) .................................................................................................. 22
`
`CAE Screenplates Inc. v. Heinrich Fiedler GmbH & Co. KG,
`224 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ................................................................................................ 20
`
`Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc. v. Int'l Sec. Exch., LLC,
`677 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2012) .......................................................................................... 20, 21
`
`CloudofChange, LLC v. NCR Corp.,
`No. 6-19-CV-00513-ADA, 2020 WL 4004810 (W.D. Tex. July 15, 2020) ............................... 9
`
`Cohesive Tech., Inc. v. Waters Corp.,
`543 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ................................................................................................ 22
`
`Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corp. v. Velan, Inc.,
`438 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2006) .................................................................................................. 3
`
`Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc.,
`501 F.3d 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ................................................................................................ 12
`
`
`
`iii
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`Scramoge Technology Ltd.
`Ex. 2014 - Page 4
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`

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`Case 6:21-cv-00579-ADA Document 57 Filed 02/11/22 Page 5 of 30
`
`
`
`Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Applera Corp.,
`599 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ................................................................................................ 10
`
`In re Collier,
`397 F.2d 1003 (C.C.P.A. 1968) ................................................................................................ 14
`
`In re Fought,
`941 F.3d 1175, 131 U.S.P.Q.2d 422062 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ........................................................ 11
`
`Luv N' Care, Ltd. v. Koninklijke Philips Elecs. N.V.,
`No. 2:11-CV-512-RSP, 2013 WL 3471269 (E.D. Tex. July 9, 2013),
`aff'd sub nom. Luv N' Care Ltd. v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 587 F. App’x 657 (Fed. Cir.
`2014); DSW, Inc. v. Shoe Pavilion, Inc., 537 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ....................... 9
`
`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
`572 U.S. 898 (2014) .................................................................................................................. 14
`
`Negotiated Data Sols., LLC v. Dell, Inc.,
`596 F. Supp. 2d 949 (E.D. Tex. 2009) ........................................................................................ 2
`
`O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co.,
`521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .......................................................................................... 7, 8, 9
`
`Pisony v. Commando Constr., Inc.,
`No. W-17-CV-00055-ADA, 2019 WL 928406 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2019) ............................. 22
`
`SightSound Technologies, LLC v. Apple Inc.,
`809 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ................................................................................................ 20
`
`Sonix Tech. Co. v. Pub’ns Int'l, Ltd.,
`844 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ................................................................................................ 10
`
`Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp.,
`814 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2016),
`overruled on other grounds by Aqua Prods., Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2017) .. 14
`
`Tandon Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm'n,
`831 F.2d 1017 (Fed. Cir. 1987) .................................................................................................. 2
`
`Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.,
`789 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ................................................................................................ 10
`
`Twist, Inc. v. B GSE Group, LLC,
`No. 3:19-cv-00583-MOC-DSC, 2021 WL 2210892 (W.D.N.C. June 1, 2021) ....................... 11
`
`Whirlpool Corp. v. Ozcan,
`Nos. 2:15-cv-2103-JRG, 2016 WL 7474517 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 29, 2016) ................................. 11
`
`
`
`iv
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`Scramoge Technology Ltd.
`Ex. 2014 - Page 5
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`

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`Case 6:21-cv-00579-ADA Document 57 Filed 02/11/22 Page 6 of 30
`
`WSOU Invs., LLC v. Microsoft Corp.,
`No. 6:20-cv-00454-ADA, Dkt. 62 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2021) ................................................ 10
`
`v
`
`Scramoge Technology Ltd.
`Ex. 2014 - Page 6
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`

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`Case 6:21-cv-00579-ADA Document 57 Filed 02/11/22 Page 7 of 30
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Defendants Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Samsung Electronics America, Inc.
`
`(“Samsung”), Apple Inc. (“Apple”), and Google LLC (“Google”) (collectively “Defendants”),
`
`hereby submit this Reply claim construction brief, pursuant to the parties’ Agreed Scheduling
`
`Orders (Dkts. 46, 33, and 28, respectively), to construe terms of U.S. Patent Nos. 9,843,215 (“the
`
`’215 Patent”); 9,997,962 (“the ’962 Patent”); 10,367,370 (“the ’370 Patent”); 10,424,941 (“the
`
`’941 Patent”); and 10,804,740 (“the ’740 Patent”).1
`
`I.
`
`DISPUTED TERMS
`
`1.
`
`[“arranged/provided] on”
`’215 Patent, Claims 1, 9, 13 and 19
`ʼ370 Patent, Claims 1 and 9
`
`Samsung, Apple, and Google’s Proposed
`Construction
`
`Scramoge’s Proposed Construction
`
`in contact with
`
`Plain and ordinary meaning
`
`Defendants’ proposed construction provides necessary clarity to this term which is absent
`
`in the specification.
`
`First, contrary to Scramoge’s assertion, Defendants’ proposed construction is not “unduly
`
`narrow” because “in contact with” allows for direct contact or indirect contact through an adhesive
`
`layer. Responsive Brief (“RB”) (Dkt. 47), 2. Defendants’ construction is rooted in the specification
`
`and provides clarity that will allow the jury to understand this term. See Opening Brief (“OB”)
`
`1 Defendants file this brief jointly. U.S. Patent Nos. 9,843,215 (“the ’215 Patent”); 9,997,962
`(“the ’962 Patent”); 10,367,370 (“the ’370 Patent”); and 10,804,740 (“the ’740 Patent”) are
`asserted in Scramoge Tech. Ltd. v. Google LLC, No. 6:21-cv-00616-ADA. The ’215 Patent, ’962
`Patent, and ’370 Patent are asserted in Scramoge Tech. Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., No.
`6:21-cv-00454-ADA. The ’740 Patent is not asserted against Samsung. The ’215 Patent, ’962
`Patent, and ’740 Patent are asserted in Scramoge Tech. Ltd. v. Apple Inc., No. 6:21-cv-00579-
`ADA. The ’370 Patent is not asserted against Apple. Google, Apple, and Samsung reserve all
`rights with respect to the patents not asserted by Scramoge at this time.
`
`1
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`Scramoge Technology Ltd.
`Ex. 2014 - Page 7
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`Case 6:21-cv-00579-ADA Document 57 Filed 02/11/22 Page 8 of 30
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`(Dkt. 44), 8. While the language in the specification does not describe what it means for one
`
`element to be “arranged on” or “provided on” another element, the drawings shed light on what
`
`these positioning terms require. Id. (citing Advanced Steel Recovery, LLC v. X-Body Equip., Inc.,
`
`808 F.3d 1313, 1317-18 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Altair Eng’g, Inc. v. LEDdynamics, Inc., 413 F. App’x
`
`251 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Negotiated Data Sols., LLC v. Dell, Inc., 596 F. Supp. 2d 949, 964 (E.D.
`
`Tex. 2009)).
`
`Second, Scramoge incorrectly argues that “[t]he patentees’ choice of the different terms
`
`‘arranged’ and ‘contact’ in the claims confirms that they are not intended to have the same
`
`meaning.” RB, 2. The different terms confirm no such thing. Rather, the patentee used
`
`“arranged/provided on” for the polymeric layers and soft magnetic layers, and “contact each other”
`
`for the first and second extending portions. No matter whether the terms are construed as the same
`
`or different, no conflict is created within the claims. Tandon Corp. v. US Int’l Trade Comm'n, 831
`
`F.2d 1017, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“To the extent that the absence of such difference in meaning
`
`and scope would make a claim superfluous, the doctrine of claim differentiation states the
`
`presumption that the difference between claims is significant.”). Accordingly, there is no need to
`
`distinguish these terms from one another. Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corp. v. Velan, Inc., 438
`
`F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Different claims with different words can, of course, define
`
`different subject matter within the ambit of the invention. On the other hand, claim drafters can
`
`also use different terms to define the exact same subject matter.”).The figures of the ’215 and ’370
`
`Patents also confirm that Defendants’ proposed construction is correct. The figures show that the
`
`second polymeric material layer contacts the second surface of the plurality of soft magnetic layers
`
`(directly or indirectly through an adhesive layer) and the coil pattern contacts the second polymeric
`
`material layer. ’215 Patent, Figs. 1-5, 9-10. Moreover, claim 5 expressly allows for the first
`
`2
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`Ex. 2014 - Page 8
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`Case 6:21-cv-00579-ADA Document 57 Filed 02/11/22 Page 9 of 30
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`polymeric layer to be “arranged on” (i.e., in contact with) the plurality of soft magnetic layers
`
`through an adhesive layer. Compare ’215 Patent, Claim 5 (“The wireless charging and
`
`communication board of claim 1, further comprising an adhesive layer that adheres the first
`
`polymeric material layer and the second polymeric material layer to the plurality of soft magnetic
`
`layers.”), with id., Claim 1 (“a first polymeric material layer arranged on a first surface of the
`
`plurality of soft magnetic layers”). Defendants’ construction is thus supported by the specification,
`
`other claims, and each of the figures.
`
`Third, Defendants’ construction is not contradicted by Samsung and Google’s IPR petition.
`
`To the contrary, the petition is entirely consistent with Defendants’ proposed construction, with
`
`“arranged on” meaning to be in direct or indirect contact with the other parts in the embodiment.
`
`Scramoge concedes this point, acknowledging that Defendants’ proposed construction allows for
`
`“intervening adhesive layers” consistent with the ’215 Patent’s described embodiments. RB, 1
`
`(quoting Dkt. 35-2 (Samsung’s ’215 IPR petition) (“For example, the ’215 Patent describes
`
`embodiments where polymeric layers (310/312) are ‘arranged on’ soft magnetic layers (220/230)
`
`despite the presence of intervening adhesive layers 315.”)).
`
`Fourth, Defendants are not importing limitations from the figures. Defendants simply
`
`referred to exemplary embodiments, but the remaining figures also show that each of these
`
`elements that is “arranged on” or “provided on” another element must contact that element directly
`
`or through an adhesive layer. Figures 3 and 5, showing the second polymeric material layer
`
`contacts the second surface of the plurality of soft magnetic layers and the coil pattern contacts the
`
`second polymeric material layer, are merely exemplary. Figures 1, 2, 4, 9, and 10 also show that
`
`the polymeric layers are in direct contact, or indirect contact through an adhesive layer, with the
`
`soft magnetic layers.
`
`3
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`Scramoge Technology Ltd.
`Ex. 2014 - Page 9
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`Case 6:21-cv-00579-ADA Document 57 Filed 02/11/22 Page 10 of 30
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`
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`Last, Scramoge points to portions of the specification that mention the possibility of minor
`
`modifications to the figures, but these are boilerplate recitations in patent drafting. More
`
`importantly, as explained above, Defendants’ construction is not based on particular
`
`embodiments—instead it is grounded in the specification and claim language, and consistent with
`
`all of the disclosed embodiments.
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`Accordingly, Defendants request the Court adopt their proposed construction.
`
`2.
`
`“a [first/second] surface of the plurality of soft magnetic layers”
`’215 Patent, Claims 1 and 13
`
`Samsung, Apple, and Google’s Proposed
`Construction
`
`Scramoge’s Proposed Construction
`
`a [first/second] surface of more than one of
`the soft magnetic layers
`
`Defendants’ proposed construction reflects the proper scope of the claims, giving the term
`
`Plain and ordinary meaning
`
`“plurality” its accepted meaning and not excluding any embodiments. Scramoge, on the other
`
`hand, seeks to improperly broaden the scope of the claims by reading out the term “plurality” and
`
`asserting that the claims can be met when the [first/second] polymeric material layer only contacts
`
`one surface of one soft magnetic layer. Scramoge’s arguments are meritless for the reasons set
`
`forth below.
`
`First, Scramoge does not dispute that Defendants’ proposed construction merely affords
`
`the term “plurality” its recognized meaning of “more than one.” RB, 7. Although Scramoge
`
`dismisses the authority cited by Defendants as “irrelevant,” it is not, and it compels Defendants’
`
`proposed construction. Defendants seek a construction of “plurality” as “more than one of,” which
`
`gives proper effect to the claim language. The claims recite a “[first/second] surface of a plurality
`
`of soft magnetic layers” which requires that the “[first/second] surface” contain more than one soft
`
`magnetic layer. It is Scramoge that attempts to rely on inapposite case law to avoid this
`
`
`
`4
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`Scramoge Technology Ltd.
`Ex. 2014 - Page 10
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`Case 6:21-cv-00579-ADA Document 57 Filed 02/11/22 Page 11 of 30
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`
`
`construction. The case of Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc. does not address the meaning
`
`of “plurality.” 512 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
`
`Second, Defendants’ proposed construction that is supported by this authority is also
`
`entirely consistent with the claims, figures, written description, and prosecution history of the ’215
`
`Patent. Scramoge’s arguments to the contrary are incorrect.
`
`Defendants’ proposed construction would not “exclude from the scope of the claims” the
`
`embodiments shown in Figures 9 and 10. See RB. 5-7. While Defendants’ Opening Brief relied on
`
`Figure 2 as an example, the same concepts are also illustrated in Figures 9 and 10. These figures
`
`also show a surface comprising a “plurality” (i.e., “more than one”) of soft magnetic layers, as
`
`described in the specification. For example, as shown in annotated Figure 9 below, the first
`
`surface of the plurality of magnetic layers comprises more than one soft magnetic layer, e.g.,
`
`the first magnetic layer and third magnetic layer. The second surface of the plurality of
`
`magnetic layers also comprises more than one soft magnetic layer, e.g., the second magnetic
`
`layer and the fourth magnetic layer. Contrary to Scramoge’s assertion (RB, 7), the polymeric
`
`material layer (310, 312) is still adjacent to a plurality of soft magnetic layers.
`
`Defendants’ construction would also not exclude the embodiments recited in claims 6, 9,
`
`
`
`
`
`5
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`Scramoge Technology Ltd.
`Ex. 2014 - Page 11
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`Case 6:21-cv-00579-ADA Document 57 Filed 02/11/22 Page 12 of 30
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`and 19. See RB. 7-8. Defendants’ construction allows for a plurality of soft magnetic layers, where
`
`the soft magnetic layers are arranged on each other as exemplified above in Figure 9. The second
`
`soft magnetic layer is arranged on or provided on the first soft magnetic layer. And, with respect
`
`to claim 6, Defendants’ construction allows for an air gap between the plurality of soft magnetic
`
`layers, the first extending portion, and the second extending portion.
`
`Scramoge’s argument that Defendants’ construction would mean that claim 6 “would not
`
`include any of the Figures illustrated in the patent because the air gap . . . is not adjacent to both
`
`the first soft magnetic layer 220 and the second soft magnetic layer 230” is incorrect. Defendants’
`
`construction allows for this arrangement—and the claims do not require the air gap to be adjacent
`
`to the first magnetic layer and soft magnetic layer. Claim 6 requires that an air gap is “formed
`
`between the plurality of soft magnetic layers, the first extending portion, and the second extending
`
`portion.” Scramoge improperly seeks to limit the claims to require that the air gap is adjacent to
`
`the first and second soft magnetic layer. See O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co.,
`
`521 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
`
`Defendants’ construction is consistent with the prosecution history. See RB. 8-9. As
`
`explained above, Defendants’ construction does not exclude the second embodiment. Indeed, if
`
`any interpretation is limiting, it is Scramoge’s because it excludes the first embodiment by
`
`requiring that the plurality of magnetic layers are arranged in a vertical fashion while Defendants’
`
`construction allows for both embodiments.
`
`Finally, Defendants’ construction is not contradicted by Apple’s IPR petition for the ’215
`
`Patent. See RB. 9-10. Apple relied on art in which a magnetic sheet is encapsulated in a polymer
`
`resin such that the polymer is on a top surface of the magnetic sheet, a bottom surface of the
`
`magnetic sheet, and sides of the magnetic sheet, which consist of more than one magnetic plate.
`
`6
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`Scramoge Technology Ltd.
`Ex. 2014 - Page 12
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`Case 6:21-cv-00579-ADA Document 57 Filed 02/11/22 Page 13 of 30
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`See Dkt. 35-7 at 34, 39:
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`Scramoge’s attempt to offer an implicit construction for this term that is inconsistent with
`
`the intrinsic record should be rejected. As Defendants have shown, there is a dispute with regard
`
`to the ordinary meaning of this term, and thus a construction is needed. See O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v.
`
`Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008). As only Defendants have
`
`offered a construction—and as explained herein, it is the correct construction—Scramoge’s
`
`proposal should be rejected and Defendants’ construction adopted.
`
`Accordingly, Defendants request the Court adopt their proposed construction.
`
`3.
`
`“the [first/second] polymeric material layer includes a [first/second]
`extending portion extending longer than the plurality of soft magnetic layer
`/ the [first/second] polymeric material layer comprises a [first/second]
`extending portion extending longer than the plurality of soft magnetic
`layers” ’215 Patent, Claims 1 and 13
`
`Google’s Proposed Construction
`
`Scramoge’s Proposed Construction
`
`Indefinite
`
`Plain and ordinary meaning
`
`The issue concerns a contradiction between the claim language and the specification. The
`
`claims recite “extending portion[s] extending longer than the plurality of soft magnetic layers,”
`
`whereas the patent only describes and illustrates the opposite—extending portions shorter than the
`
`7
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`Scramoge Technology Ltd.
`Ex. 2014 - Page 13
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`

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`Case 6:21-cv-00579-ADA Document 57 Filed 02/11/22 Page 14 of 30
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`
`
`magnetic layers. OB, 14, 15.
`
`Scramoge embraces this contradiction, yet asserts that the term should be given a plain and
`
`ordinary meaning whereby extending portions are shorter than the soft magnetic layers. RB, 12,
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`13. Scramoge fails to address why its proposed plain and ordinary meaning is the opposite of the
`
`plain language of the claim, and Google requests that the Court resolve the difference. See
`
`CloudofChange, LLC v. NCR Corp., No. 6-19-CV-00513-ADA, 2020 WL 4004810, at *3 (W.D.
`
`Tex. July 15, 2020) (“As both parties disagree about the scope of the term, the term requires
`
`construction by the Court.” (quoting O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1362 (“When the parties present
`
`fundamental disputes regarding the scope of a claim term, it is the court's duty to resolve it.”))).
`
`To accept Scramoge’s proposal would improperly substitute in new language that directly
`
`contradicts the claim. Luv N’ Care, Ltd. v. Koninklijke Philips Elecs. N.V., No. 2:11-CV-512-RSP,
`
`2013 WL 3471269, at *27 (E.D. Tex. July 9, 2013) (rejecting plaintiff’s plain and ordinary
`
`proposal that substituted words in place of claim terms), aff’d sub nom. Luv N' Care Ltd. v. Philips
`
`Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 587 F. App'x 657 (Fed. Cir. 2014); DSW, Inc. v. Shoe Pavilion, Inc., 537 F.3d
`
`1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[A]bsent contravening evidence . . . plain and unambiguous claim
`
`language controls the construction analysis.”). Scramoge fails to address why it proposes that the
`
`plain and ordinary meaning is the opposite of the claim language. Further, rather than address why
`
`the Court should correct a clear error, Scramoge advances five, unpersuasive arguments attacking
`
`Google’s arguments.
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`First, Scramoge’s argument that this Court cannot find indefiniteness absent expert
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`testimony is legally flawed. RB, 10, 11. This Court has and is fully capable of resolving
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`indefiniteness without extrinsic expert testimony. See, e.g., WSOU Invs., LLC v. Microsoft Corp.,
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`No. 6:20-cv-00454-ADA, Dkt. 62 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2021) (holding six terms indefinite despite
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`8
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`Scramoge Technology Ltd.
`Ex. 2014 - Page 14
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`Case 6:21-cv-00579-ADA Document 57 Filed 02/11/22 Page 15 of 30
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`Plaintiff’s insistence that expert testimony was required). There is no expert testimony requirement
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`to find a claim indefinite. See Sonix Tech. Co. v. Pub’ns Int’l., 844 F.3d 1370, 1376 (Fed. Cir.
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`2017) (“[A] party cannot transform into a factual matter the internal coherence and context
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`assessment of the patent simply by having an expert offer an opinion on it. The internal coherence
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`and context assessment of the patent, and whether it conveys claim meaning with reasonable
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`certainty, are questions of law.” (quoting Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 789 F.3d 1335,
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`1342 (Fed. Cir. 2015))); see also Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Applera Corp., 599 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2010).
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`Scramoge’s cases do not support its position. In Twist, Inc. v. B GSE Grp., LLC¸ the Court
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`determined that the terms at issue were ordinary and easily understood by a layperson, such that
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`without expert testimony their common meaning should not be disturbed. No. 3:19-cv-00583-
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`MOC-DSC, 2021 WL 2210892, *8 (W.D.N.C. June 1, 2021). In Whirlpool Corp. v. Ozcan, the
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`Court did not reject Defendant’s arguments for failing to submit an expert declaration, but rather
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`because the Court found Defendant’s argument based on the intrinsic evidence to be unpersuasive.
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`Nos. 2:15-cv-2103-JRG, 2016 WL 7474517, *3 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 29, 2016).
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`Second, Scramoge incorrectly argues that the Court cannot determine indefiniteness
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`without Google proposing a level of skill for a POSITA. RB, 10, 11. The claims are ambiguous on
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`their face, and a determination of the level of skill of a POSITA is inconsequential to
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`indefiniteness. Actavis Lab’ys UT, Inc. v. UCB, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1001-JRG-RSP, 2016 WL
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`3678987, at *6-7 (E.D. Tex. July 11, 2016); see also In re Fought, 941 F.3d 1175, 1179, 131
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`U.S.P.Q.2d 422062, at *3-4 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (instructing that the PTO need not make a finding as
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`to the level of ordinary skill in the art unless the applicant “places the level of ordinary skill in the
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`art in dispute and explains with particularity how the dispute would alter the outcome”).
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`9
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`Scramoge Technology Ltd.
`Ex. 2014 - Page 15
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`Case 6:21-cv-00579-ADA Document 57 Filed 02/11/22 Page 16 of 30
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`Accordingly, Google is not required to identify, much less prove, a level of ordinary skill – that
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`determination, if necessary, is at the Court’s discretion. Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc.,
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`501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (discussing non-exhaustive factors the Court may use in
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`determine an ordinary level of skill).
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`Third, Scramoge points to the figures, specification, and claims to dispute Google’s
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`construction. Scramoge argues, without explanation, that the claim language provides context for
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`the disputed terms. Id. at 12. Connecting the first and second extending portions does not address
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`the lengths of extending portions relative to the soft magnetic layers. Scramoge also insists that
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`“Figures 1-5, 9, and 10 all illustrate the various embodiments of the [disputed terms]” and “a
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`POSITA would not have any problem understanding the scope of the claims.” RB, 12. Again,
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`Scramoge fails to explain, and unhelpfully alleges that “Google’s annotated Figure 2 identified the
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`‘extending portions’ (highlighted red) consistent with the claim language.” Id. at 12, 13. The
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`identity of the “extending portions” is not the issue. It’s whether the extending portions “extend[]
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`longer” than the soft magnetic layers. They do not, and Scramoge not explained why a POSITA
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`would understand otherwise.
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`Further, Scramoge cites the specification highlighting the contradiction described above.
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`RB, 12, 13. The specification and figures have the polymeric material layers extending longer
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`than the magnetic layers. ’215 Patent, Figs. 1-5, 9, 10; 3:39-43, 4:26-31, 5:26-30 (“a polymeric
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`material layer . . . extending longer than . . . the soft magnetic layer 220”); 6:34-35. There are no
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`extending portions extending longer than the magnetic layers. All are shorter.
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`In the same section, Scramoge emphasizes the length “l,” as shown in the annotated figure
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`above, as somehow resolving this fundamental contradiction. Again, Scramoge does not explain
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`how this is helpful, and it is not. The specification defines l=Axh, where “A” is a constant and “h”
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`10
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`Scramoge Technology Ltd.
`Ex. 2014 - Page 16
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`Case 6:21-cv-00579-ADA Document 57 Filed 02/11/22 Page 17 of 30
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`is the soft magnetic layer thickness. Id. at 4:39-50. The length of the extending portion has no
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`relationship to the length of the magnetic layers. The specification does not resolve the
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`fundamental contradiction.
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`Last, Google nowhere recommended rewriting the claims as Scramoge contends. RB,
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`14-15. That would be legally improper. Scramoge cannot have the Court fix a fundamental error
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`in claim drafting through claim construction. Id. (citing Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc.,
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`299 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“It is not [the Court’s] function to rewrite claims to
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`preserve their validity.”).
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`Fourth, Scramoge implicitly agrees that the claims do not provide a direction or orientation
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`of the extending portions. Scramoge alleges that “the . . . extending portion[s] are connected to
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`each other” means that the extending portions “cannot simply project in any direction without
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`constraint.” RB, 14. Again, Scramoge does not explain how this claim language defines the
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`direction or orientation of the extending portions, and it does not.
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`Further, Scramoge argues direction and orientation concern claim breadth, and “breadth is
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`not indefiniteness.” RB, 14. While the latter is true, Scramoge’s emphasis on breadth detracts from
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`the indefiniteness standard: whether the “claims, read in light of the specification . . . and the
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`prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, [a POSITA] about the scope of the
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`invention.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 901 (2014) (emphasis added).
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`The claims recite direction and orientation of all claim elements, except the extending portions.
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`Failing to claim th