Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
`
`Paper 11
`Entered: May 23, 2022
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. and
`DELL TECHNOLOGIES INC.,
`Petitioner,
`v.
`MYPAQ HOLDINGS LTD.,
`Patent Owner.
`
`IPR2022-00311
`Patent 8,477,514 B2
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Before KRISTINA M. KALAN, DANIEL J. GALLIGAN, and
`ELIZABETH M. ROESEL, Administrative Patent Judges.
`ROESEL, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`DECISION
`Granting Institution of Inter Partes Review
`35 U.S.C. § 314
`
`
`
`
`
`
`571-272-7822
`
`Paper 11
`Entered: May 23, 2022
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. and
`DELL TECHNOLOGIES INC.,
`Petitioner,
`v.
`MYPAQ HOLDINGS LTD.,
`Patent Owner.
`
`IPR2022-00311
`Patent 8,477,514 B2
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Before KRISTINA M. KALAN, DANIEL J. GALLIGAN, and
`ELIZABETH M. ROESEL, Administrative Patent Judges.
`ROESEL, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`DECISION
`Granting Institution of Inter Partes Review
`35 U.S.C. § 314
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2022-00311
`Patent 8,477,514 B2
`
`INTRODUCTION
`I.
`A. Background and Summary
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. and Dell Technologies Inc.
`(collectively, “Petitioner”) filed a Petition (Paper 3, “Pet.”) seeking an inter
`partes review of claims 1–20 (the “challenged claims”) of U.S. Patent
`No. 8,477,514 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’514 Patent”). MyPAQ Holdings Ltd.
`(“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 7 (“Prelim. Resp.”).
`With Board authorization, Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 9, “Pet. Reply”),
`and Patent Owner filed a Sur-reply (Paper 10, “PO Sur-reply”).
`We have authority to determine whether to institute an inter partes
`review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2021). An inter
`partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in
`the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable
`likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the
`claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). After applying this
`standard and declining Patent Owner’s invitation to exercise our discretion
`to deny institution, we grant institution of an inter partes review.
`Our findings and conclusions below are based on the record
`developed thus far. This is not a final decision as to the patentability of any
`challenged claim. Any final decision will be based on the full record
`developed during trial.
`
`B. Related Matters
`The parties identify the following district court actions as related
`matters involving the ’514 Patent: MyPAQ Holdings Ltd. v. Samsung
`Electronics Co., 6:21-CV-00398 (W.D. Tex.) and MyPAQ Holdings Ltd. v.
`Dell Technologies Inc., 6:21-CV-00933 (W.D. Tex.) (together, the “district
`
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`Patent 8,477,514 B2
`court litigation”). Pet. 1; Paper 8, 1 (Patent Owner’s updated mandatory
`notices).
`
`C. The ’514 Patent (Ex. 1001)
`The ’514 Patent discloses a power system having a power converter
`with an adaptive controller. Ex. 1001, code (57), 6:51–55. In one
`embodiment, a power converter is coupled to a load and includes: (a) “a
`power switch configured to conduct for a duty cycle to provide an output
`characteristic at an output thereof” and (b) “a power converter controller
`configured to receive a signal from the load indicating a system operational
`state of the load and enable a power converter topological state as a function
`of the signal.” Id. at code (57), 6:55–62, 7:41–43, Fig. 3 (circuit diagram of
`a power converter with controller 311); see also id. at 11:32–14:22
`(describing Figure 3 embodiment). “In another embodiment, a power
`system includes a power system controller configured to provide a signal
`characterizing a power requirement of a processor system and a power
`converter coupled to the processor system.” Id. at 6:63–66, 8:3–6, Fig. 11
`(block diagram of a power system coupled to loads and including power
`converters controlled by a power system controller); see also id.
`at 21:65–25:27 (describing Figure 11 embodiment).
`
`D. Illustrative Claims
`Petitioner challenges claims 1–20 (all claims) of the ’514 Patent.
`Pet. 8–9. Claims 1, 6, 11, and 13 are independent. Claims 1 and 6 are
`illustrative of the claimed subject matter and are reproduced below.
`1. A power converter coupled to a load, comprising:
`a power switch configured to conduct for a duty cycle to
`provide an output characteristic at an output thereof; and
`
`3
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`Patent 8,477,514 B2
`a power converter controller configured to receive a signal
`from said load indicating a system operational state of said load
`and control an internal operating characteristic of said power
`converter as a function of said signal.
`Ex. 1001, 28:2–8.
`6. A power system, comprising:
`a power system controller configured to provide a signal
`characterizing a power requirement of a processor system; and
`a power converter coupled to said processor system,
`comprising:
`a power switch configured to conduct for a duty cycle to
`provide an output characteristic at an output thereof, and
`a power converter controller configured to receive a signal
`from said power system controller to control an internal
`operating characteristic of said power converter as a function of
`said signal.
`Id. at 28:29–41.
`
`E. Asserted Grounds and Evidence
`Petitioner asserts the following grounds of unpatentability.
`
`Ground Claim(s) Challenged
`
`35 U.S.C. §1 Reference(s)/Basis
`
`1A
`
`1B
`
`2A
`
`1–12, 14–17, 19, 20
`
`102(a), (b)
`
`Chagny2
`
`1–20
`
`103(a)
`
`Chagny
`
`1–10, 16, 17, 19, 20
`
`102(a), (b)
`
`Hwang3
`
`
`1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29,
`125 Stat. 284, 287–88 (2011) amended 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103, effective
`March 16, 2013. Because the ’514 Patent was filed before this date, we refer
`to the pre-AIA versions of §§ 102 and 103. Ex. 1001, code (22).
`2 Ex. 1004, US 6,873,136 B2, issued March 29, 2005 (“Chagny”).
`3 Ex. 1006, US 2004/0174152 A1, published September 9, 2004 (“Hwang”).
`
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`IPR2022-00311
`Patent 8,477,514 B2
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`Ground Claim(s) Challenged
`
`35 U.S.C. §1 Reference(s)/Basis
`
`2B
`
`2C
`
`2D
`
`11, 12, 14–17, 19, 20
`
`18
`
`13, 18
`
`103(a)
`
`103(a)
`
`103(a)
`
`Hwang, Chagny
`
`Hwang
`
`Hwang, Chagny
`
`Pet. 8–9. Petitioner submits the Declaration of Dr. Sayfe Kiaei to support its
`challenges. Ex. 1002 (“Kiaei Declaration”).
`II. ANALYSIS
`A. Discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a)
`Patent Owner argues that the Board should exercise its discretion
`under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and deny institution in light of the district court
`litigation involving the ’514 Patent. Prelim. Resp. 13–21; PO Sur-reply.
`Petitioner argues the opposite. Pet. 9–12; Pet. Reply.
`In assessing whether to exercise such discretion, the Board weighs six
`non-exclusive factors, known as the Fintiv factors. Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc.,
`IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 6 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential)
`(“Fintiv I”). Recognizing that “there is some overlap among these factors”
`and that “[s]ome facts may be relevant to more than one factor,” the Board
`“takes a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are
`best served by denying or instituting review.” Id. We have considered
`Patent Owner’s arguments in light of the Fintiv factors, together with
`Petitioner’s opposition, and we decline to exercise our discretion to deny the
`Petition as explained further below.
`
`1. Factor 1: Whether a Stay Exists or Is Likely to Be Granted if a
`Proceeding Is Instituted
`The district court litigation has not been stayed. Petitioner argues that
`it intends to seek a stay should the Board institute inter partes review.
`
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`Patent 8,477,514 B2
`Pet. 10. Patent Owner argues that the district court is unlikely to grant a
`stay. Prelim. Resp. 13; PO Sur-reply 1–2.
`There is no evidence that a stay has been requested in the district court
`litigation. We decline to speculate on how the district court would rule on a
`stay, if one were requested. Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019,
`Paper 15 at 12 (PTAB May 13, 2020) (informative) (“Fintiv II”) (explaining
`that factor 1 generally “does not weigh for or against discretionary denial”
`when neither party has requested a stay). Accordingly, this factor is neutral.
`
`2. Factor 2: Proximity of the Court’s Trial Date to the Board’s
`Projected Statutory Deadline
`The projected statutory deadline for this proceeding would be in May
`2023. According to the parties, a jury trial in the district court litigation is
`scheduled to begin on May 3, 2023. Pet. 10; Prelim. Resp. 13; Ex. 1014
`(district court scheduling order). Petitioner argues that the district court
`litigation is likely to be transferred to a different division, and the current
`schedule is unlikely to be maintained in view of Patent Owner’s stated
`intention to pursue foreign discovery. Pet. Reply 2–3. Patent Owner argues
`that “Petitioners’ speculative arguments are contrary to the known facts” and
`the presiding judge intends to keep the district court case on track. PO Sur-
`reply 2–3.
`We typically take a district court’s trial schedule at “face value.”
`Fintiv II at 13. Accordingly, we assume that trial will begin in the district
`court litigation on May 3, 2023.
`Given that trial is currently set to begin in the district court litigation
`around the same time as the projected statutory deadline for a final written
`decision, we determine that this factor is neutral.
`
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`Patent 8,477,514 B2
`3. Factor 3: Investment in the Parallel Proceeding by the Court and
`Parties
`In the district court litigation, we understand that a Markman hearing
`was held on May 4, 2022, and fact discovery began on May 5, 2022.
`Ex. 1014, 4; see also Pet. 10–11; Prelim. Resp. 14–18 (discussing status and
`schedule in district court litigation). The parties have exchanged preliminary
`infringement and invalidity contentions (see Prelim. Resp. 14), and final
`contentions are due June 29, 2022. Ex. 1014, 4. Fact discovery closes on
`November 30, 2022, and expert discovery closes on January 25, 2023. Id.
`Although Patent Owner asserts that by the time of the institution decision, “a
`substantial portion of discovery in the parallel litigations will also be
`complete” (Prelim. Resp. 15), Petitioner argues that “the parties still face all
`of the burden associated with fact and expert discovery related to a validity
`challenge in district court.” Pet. Reply 4.
`Although Patent Owner asserts that substantial discovery has taken
`place related to Petitioner’s suppliers and motions to transfer venue (Prelim.
`Resp. 15–17), we determine that work on such ancillary discovery matters
`does not show substantial district court investment in the validity issues. See
`Sand Revolution II, LLC v. Continental Intermodal Group-Trucking LLC,
`IPR2019-01393, Paper 24 at 10 (PTAB June 16, 2020) (informative) (“much
`of the district court’s investment relates to ancillary matters untethered to the
`validity issue itself”). We recognize that much work remains to be done in
`the district court litigation as it relates to invalidity: fact discovery is still
`ongoing, expert reports are not yet due, there have been no fact or expert
`depositions, and substantive motion practice is yet to come. See Ex. 1014.
`Thus, although the parties and the district court have invested effort in the
`
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`Patent 8,477,514 B2
`district court litigation, the bulk of the work to prepare the invalidity case for
`trial is yet to be done.
`We also acknowledge Petitioner’s diligence in filing the Petition
`“almost 5 months before” the Markman hearing and “prior to serving
`preliminary invalidity contentions.” Pet. 10.
`Under these circumstances, we determine that this factor weighs
`against exercising our discretion to deny institution.
`
`4. Factor 4: Overlap Between Issues Raised in the Petition and in
`the Parallel Proceeding
`Petitioner states that the “Petition challenges claims not asserted by
`the [Patent Owner] in district court.” Pet. 11. Petitioner also states:
`Petitioners hereby stipulate that, if the Board institutes inter
`partes review of this Petition, then Petitioners, and the Real
`Parties in Interest listed herein, will not assert in the [district
`court litigation] that any of claims 1–20 of the ’514 Patent is
`invalid on any ground involving the prior art relied upon in the
`grounds of invalidity herein.
`Id. at 11–12. Petitioner argues that this stipulation is broader than the
`stipulation in Sand Revolution. Pet. Reply 5. Patent Owner argues that
`Petitioner’s stipulation is narrower than the statutory estoppel that attaches
`after a final written decision and would have little, if any, impact on the
`district court litigation. Prelim. Resp. 19–21.
`Concerns about the degree of overlap may be mitigated where a
`petitioner agrees not to pursue in the parallel district court litigation the
`grounds advanced in the petition. Sand Revolution, IPR2019-01393,
`Paper 24 at 11–12, 12 n.5. A petitioner stipulating not to pursue “any
`ground raised or that could have been reasonably raised” weighs strongly in
`favor of not exercising discretionary denial. Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo
`Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 at 18–19 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020)
`
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`Patent 8,477,514 B2
`(precedential as to § II.A) (“Sotera”)). Petitioner’s stipulation is not quite as
`broad as a Sotera-style stipulation, but it is more comprehensive than the
`stipulation in Sand. Specifically, whereas the petitioner in Sand agreed not
`to assert “the same grounds in the district court litigation” as asserted in the
`petition (Sand Revolution, IPR2019-01393, Paper 24 at 12), Petitioner here
`agrees that, if inter partes review is instituted, it will not assert in the district
`court litigation “any ground involving the prior art relied upon in the
`grounds of invalidity” in the Petition. Pet. 11–12. This stipulation mitigates
`to a large extent the concerns of inefficiency and the possibility of
`conflicting decisions with respect to the district court litigation. Thus, for all
`of the foregoing reasons, we determine that the fourth Fintiv factor weighs
`against discretionary denial of institution.
`
`5. Factor 5: Whether the Petitioner and the Defendant in the
`Parallel Proceeding Are the Same Party
`Under the circumstances here in which Petitioner is a defendant in the
`district court litigation and the trial in that case is currently set to occur
`around the same time as the issuance of a final written decision, this factor is
`neutral.
`
`6. Factor 6: Other Circumstances that Impact the Board’s Exercise
`of Discretion, Including the Merits
`Petitioner contends that “multiple prior art references anticipate the
`challenged claims,” and the Petition “provides good reasons for combining
`the routine teachings of the references.” Pet. 12; Pet. Reply 5. Patent
`Owner contends that the merits of Petitioner’s arguments are weak and this
`factor weighs in favor of discretionary denial. Prelim. Resp. 21.
`As the Board explained in Fintiv I, we consider this factor as “part of
`a balanced assessment of all the relevant circumstances in the case.” Fintiv I
`
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`IPR2022-00311
`Patent 8,477,514 B2
`at 14. The assessment requires consideration of the “strengths or
`weaknesses regarding the merits,” but this “is not to suggest that a full
`merits analysis is necessary to evaluate this factor.” Id. at 15–16.
`We discuss the merits of this case below, finding Petitioner’s evidence
`and arguments are sufficient to meet our standard for instituting inter partes
`review, and, thus, we determine that this factor is neutral.
`
`7. Balancing the Fintiv Factors
`We have considered the circumstances and facts before us in view of
`the Fintiv factors. We take “a holistic view of whether efficiency and
`integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.”
`Fintiv I at 6. Having evaluated all of the factors, we determine that the
`circumstances presented here do not warrant exercising our discretion under
`§ 314(a) to deny institution.
`
`B. Reasonable Likelihood under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a)
`1. Legal Standards
`“In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the
`onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is
`unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed.
`Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review
`petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the
`grounds for the challenge to each claim”)); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)
`(requiring a petition for inter partes review to identify how the challenged
`claim is to be construed and where each element of the claim is found in the
`prior art patents or printed publications relied upon).
`A claim is anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102 only if “each and every
`element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently
`
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`IPR2022-00311
`Patent 8,477,514 B2
`described, in a single prior art reference.” Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co.,
`814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
`A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 if the
`differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that
`the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the
`invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
`subject matter pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406
`(2007). The question of obviousness is resolved based on underlying factual
`determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any
`differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level
`of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) when presented, objective evidence of
`nonobviousness, i.e., secondary considerations. Graham v. John Deere Co.,
`383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).
`Additionally, the obviousness inquiry typically requires an analysis of
`“whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in
`the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (citing In
`re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (requiring “articulated
`reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of
`obviousness”)). Petitioner cannot satisfy its burden of proving obviousness
`by employing “mere conclusory statements,” but “must instead articulate
`specific reasoning, based on evidence of record, to support the legal
`conclusion of obviousness.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d
`1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
`
`2. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art
`Relying on the Kiaei Declaration, Petitioner contends that a person of
`ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have had “either (i) a Masters of
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`Patent 8,477,514 B2
`Science in Electrical Engineering, or an equivalent field, or (ii) a Bachelor of
`Science in Electrical Engineering or an equivalent field as well as at least
`two years of experience in the design of power electronics.” Pet. 9 (citing
`Ex. 1002 ¶ 35).
`Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA for
`purposes of the Preliminary Response. See Prelim. Resp. 11.
`We find that Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA is consistent with the
`scope and content of the ’514 Patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply
`Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision, with the exception of
`the open-ended phrase “at least” to avoid introducing vagueness as to the
`amount of experience.
`
`3. Claim Construction
`In an inter partes review, we apply the same claim construction
`standard as would be used by a district court to construe a claim in a civil
`action involving the validity or infringement of a patent. 37 C.F.R.
`§ 42.100(b). Under that standard, claim terms are given their ordinary and
`customary meaning, as would have been understood by a person of ordinary
`skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the
`claims, the specification, and the prosecution history of record. Id.; Phillips
`v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); Thorner
`v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365–66 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
`Neither party proposes an express construction for any claim term.
`See Pet. 9; Prelim. Resp. 11.
`In Section II.B.4.b below, we discuss the meaning of “power
`converter.” Except as discussed below, we determine that we do not need to
`resolve any claim construction issues for purposes of this Decision. See
`
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`Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The
`Board is required to construe ‘only those terms ... that are in controversy,
`and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid
`Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).
`
`4. Chagny Anticipation Ground
`Petitioner contends that claims 1–12, 14–17, 19, and 20 are
`anticipated by Chagny. Pet. 13–39. Patent Owner opposes. Prelim.
`Resp. 22–27. We provide an overview of Chagny before turning to the
`parties’ arguments and our analysis, which focuses on the disputed claim
`limitations.
`
`a) Chagny (Ex. 1005)
`Chagny discloses a voltage regulator module (“VRM”) that provides a
`regulated direct current (“DC”) voltage output to power a processor of an
`information handling system. Ex. 1004, code (57). An embodiment is
`shown in Figure 2A, which is reproduced below.
`
`
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`Patent 8,477,514 B2
`Chagny’s Figure 2A shows VRM 200, which receives a DC voltage
`input 205 and generates a regulated DC voltage output 295, which provides
`power to processor 292 included in information handling system device 290.
`Ex. 1004, 3:52–59. VRM 200 includes, among other things, controller
`module 210 operable to receive activity input 202 indicative of levels of
`activity of processor 292 and to select a switching frequency of VRM 200
`responsive to activity input 202, so that the switching frequency
`“dynamically matches the level of activity” of processor 292. Id. at 3:60–65,
`4:66–5:3, 5:9–12.
`
`b) “Power converter” and “coupled to a load”
`The preamble of independent claim 1 of the ’514 Patent recites “a
`power converter coupled to a load.” Ex. 1001, 28:2.4 Independent claims 6,
`11 and 16 each recite “a power converter” in the body of the claim. Id.
`at 28:33, 29:1, 30:8–9.
`Petitioner identifies Chagny’s VRM 200 as a “power converter.”
`Pet. 13, 26, 33. For claim 1, Petitioner contends that “VRM 200 is coupled
`to provide power to a load including processor 292 and software program
`296.” Pet. 13–14 (citing Ex. 1004, 3:56–60, Fig. 2A).
`Patent Owner argues that “Chagny’s VRM is not a power converter
`and is not coupled to a load.” Prelim. Resp. 22–24. According to Patent
`Owner, “VRM 200 is a voltage regulator, not a power converter” and
`“VRM 200 is not coupled to the load; instead it is a component within the
`information handling device (the load) that regulates DC voltages.” Id.
`at 23–24.
`
`
`4 Neither party addresses whether the claim preamble should be construed as
`limiting.
`
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`Patent 8,477,514 B2
`After considering the parties’ arguments, we determine that, for
`purposes of institution, Petitioner shows sufficiently that Chagny discloses a
`“power converter,” as recited in claims 1, 6, 11, and 16, and that the power
`converter is “coupled to a load,” as recited in claim 1.
`Even though Chagny uses different words than those of the claims,
`Chagny’s VRM 200 appears to teach the claimed “power converter.”
`Neither party proposes a construction for “power converter.” We find that
`the following passages from the ’514 Patent are instructive as to the meaning
`and scope of the term:
`A switch-mode power converter (also referred to as a
`“power converter”) is a power supply or power processing circuit
`that converts an input voltage waveform into a specified output
`voltage waveform.
`Ex. 1001, 2:42–45.
`In an exemplary application, the power converters have the
`capability to convert an unregulated dc input voltage such as five
`volts to a lower, regulated, dc output voltage such as 2.5 volts to
`power a load. In another exemplary application, the power
`converters have the capability to convert an unregulated ac input
`voltage such as 120 volts to a regulated internal dc bus voltage,
`such as 300 volts dc, and to further convert the regulated internal
`dc bus voltage into a dc output voltage such as 2.5 volts to power
`a load.
`Id. at 2:67–3:9. The first passage appears to be definitional, as the term
`“power converter” appears in quotes followed by the transition “is.” On this
`record, the ’514 Patent’s definition appears to encompass Chagny’s
`description that VRM 200 is “operable to receive a direct current (DC)
`voltage input 205 and generate a regulated DC voltage output 295.” Pet. 13
`(quoting Ex. 1004, 3:54–56). Furthermore, the exemplary applications
`described in the ’514 Patent appear to align with Chagny’s description of
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`VRM 200. Compare, e.g., Ex. 1001, 2:67–3:4 (“In an exemplary
`application, the power converters have the capability to convert an
`unregulated dc input voltage such as five volts to a lower, regulated, dc
`output voltage such as 2.5 volts to power a load.”), with Ex. 1004, 3:54–56
`(“The VRM 200 is operable to receive a direct current (DC) voltage input
`205 and generate a regulated DC voltage output 295.”).
`Petitioner also shows sufficiently that Chagny’s VRM 200 is “coupled
`to a load,” as recited in the preamble of claim 1. Petitioner identifies the
`“load” as including Chagny’s “processor 292 and software program 296.”
`Pet. 13–14. Petitioner directs us to Chagny’s description of Figure 3 as
`showing that “the regulated DC voltage output 295 provides power to a
`processor 292 included in an information handling system device 290. The
`output 295 may also be used to power other components (not shown)
`included in the device 290.” Id. at 14 (quoting Ex. 1004, 3:56–60). We
`have considered Patent Owner’s argument that Chagny’s “VRM 200 is not
`coupled to a load; instead it is a component within the information handling
`device (the load).” Prelim. Resp. 23–24. For purposes of institution, we
`find adequate support for Petitioner’s assertion that Chagny’s processor 292
`and software program 296 correspond to a “load” as recited in claim 1. On
`this record, it appears that Chagny’s VRM 200 is coupled to and provides
`power to processor 292 in the same way that the power converter described
`in the ’514 Patent is coupled to and provides power to a microprocessor.
`Compare Ex. 1001, 10:12–15 (“The power converter . . . provides power to
`a system (not shown) such as a microprocessor coupled to an output
`thereof.”), with Ex. 1004, 3:54–58 (“The VRM 200 is operable to . . .
`generate a regulated DC voltage output 295 . . . [that] provides power to a
`processor 292.”).
`
`16
`
`
`
`IPR2022-00311
`Patent 8,477,514 B2
`c) “Power system controller”
`Claims 6 and 11 each recite a “power system, comprising a power
`system controller . . . and a power converter . . . comprising . . . a power
`converter controller.” Ex. 1001, 28:29–38, 28:62–29:2.
`Referring to Chagny Figure 2A, Petitioner contends that “Chagny’s
`software program 296, . . . either alone or collectively with I/O controller
`hub (ICH) 280, serves as the power system controller.” Pet. 26, 30 n.7.
`Patent Owner argues that Chagny does not teach or suggest both a
`“power system controller” and a “controller” within the power converter.
`Prelim. Resp. 24–27. Patent Owner argues that Chagny discloses only one
`controller—controller module 210. Id. at 25. According to Patent Owner,
`neither Chagny’s software program 296 nor I/O controller hub (ICH) 280 is
`a “power system controller” because neither “control[s] anything with
`respect to a power system.” Id. at 26–27.
`After considering the parties’ arguments, we determine that, for
`purposes of institution, Petitioner shows sufficiently that Chagny discloses a
`“power system controller,” as recited in claims 6 and 11.
`Claim 6 recites that the “power system controller” is “configured to
`provide a signal characterizing a power requirement of a processor system.”
`Ex. 1001, 28:30–32. Claim 11 recites that the “power system controller” is
`“configured to enable operation of components of a processor system to
`establish a state of power drain thereof, said power system controller
`configured to provide a signal to identify operation of said processor system
`in said state of power drain.” Id. at 28:62–67.
`Petitioner contends that, in Chagny, the recited functions of the
`“power system controller” are performed by software program 296, alone or
`together with ICH 280. Pet. 24–26, 29–33. For example, Petitioner asserts
`
`17
`
`
`
`IPR2022-00311
`Patent 8,477,514 B2
`that Chagny’s software program 296 “‘monitors the processor 292 loading’”
`and “‘generates the activity input 202’ (i.e., a signal), which is ‘indicative of
`levels of activity of the processor 292.’” Pet. 24–25 (quoting Ex. 1004,
`4:35–37, 4:40–43).
`Patent Owner does not dispute that Chagny’s software program 296
`performs the functions of the “power system controller” recited in claims 6
`and 11. For example, Patent Owner agrees that Chagny’s software
`program 296 is “monitoring and reporting the system operational state of the
`load.” Prelim. Resp. 26. Although Patent Owner argues that software
`program 296 “does not control any aspect of a claimed power system,”
`Patent Owner does not identify any recited function for the “power system
`controller” that is not performed by Chagny’s software program 296. On
`this record, it appears that the “power system controller” exerts control over
`the power system by performing the functions recited in the claims. For
`example, both the claim language and the description of the ’514 Patent
`appear to show that the “power system controller” exerts control by
`providing a signal or command to a power converter controller, which
`controls an internal operating characteristic of the power converter in
`response to the signal or command. Ex. 1001, 6:63–7:16, 13:10–67,
`26:53–27:10, 28:29–41, 28:62–29:7. On this record, Chagny’s software
`program 296 appears to exert control in the same manner as claimed and in a
`manner similar to that described in the ’514 patent, namely, by providing
`activity input 202 to frequency selector module 215 of controller module
`210, which changes the switching frequency of VRM 200 in response to
`activity input 202. Ex. 1004, 4:35–37, 4:40–43, 4:62–63, 4:66–5:3, 5:9–12.
`
`18
`
`
`
`IPR2022-00311
`Patent 8,477,514 B2
`d) Remaining claim limitations
`Petitioner contends that all remaining limitations of claims 1–12,
`14–17, 19, and 20 are taught by Chagny. Pet. 13–39. Patent Owner does
`not specifically contest Petitioner’s contentions for the remaining claim
`limitations. We determine that Petitioner’s contentions for the remaining
`claim limitations are sufficient for purposes of institution.
`
`e) Conclusion for Chagny Anticipation Ground
`After considering the information presented in the Petition and the
`Preliminary Response, we determine that Petitioner establishes a reasonable
`likelihood of prevailing on its challenge to at least one of claims 1–12,
`14–17, 19, and 20 as anticipated by Chagny.
`
`5. Chagny Obviousness Ground
`Petitioner asserts that, to the extent Patent Owner argues various
`distinctions between Chagny and the claims challenged in its anticipation
`ground, then it would have been obvious to modify or supplement Chagny’s
`disclosure to address those distinctions. Pet. 40–43. In addition, Petitioner
`contends that the additional limitation of dependent claims 13 and 18 would
`have been obvious in view of Chagny. Pet. 43–44 (citing Ex. 1002
`¶¶ 138–140; Ex. 1004, 4:40–45; Ex. 1007, 3:57–64, 4:28–40, 4:50–58).
`Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s obviousness ground fails to
`address the functionality that Patent Owner asserts is missing from Chagny.
`Prelim. Resp. 27–28.
`Petitioner’s Chagny obviousness ground for claims 1–12, 14–17, 19,
`and 20 addresses arguments that Patent Owner does not make at this stage of
`the proceeding, and Petitioner’s Chagny obviousness ground for claims 13
`and 18 is uncontested by Patent Owner at this stage of the proceeding.
`
`19
`
`
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`IPR2022-00311
`Patent 8,477,514 B2
`Accordingly, there is no need to address Petitioner’s Chagny obviousness
`ground for purposes of this Decision.
`
`6. Hwang Anticipation Ground
`Petitioner contends that claims 1–10, 16, 17, 19, and 20 are
`anticipated by Hwang. Pet. 45–69. Patent Owner opposes. Prelim.
`Resp. 28–32. We provide an overview of Hwang before turning to the
`parties’ arguments and our analysis, which focuses on the disputed claim
`limitations
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