throbber
Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
`
`
`
`
`
` Paper 39
`Entered: November 21, 2022
`
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`TCL INDUSTRIES HOLDINGS CO., LTD. and LG ELECTRONICS INC.,
`Petitioners,1
`v.
`
`PARKERVISION, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`IPR2021-009902
`Patent 7,110,444 B1
`____________
`
`
`Before MICHAEL R. ZECHER, BART A. GERSTENBLITH, and
`IFTIKHAR AHMED, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`GERSTENBLITH, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`JUDGMENT
`Final Written Decision
`Determining All Challenged Claims Unpatentable
`35 U.S.C. § 318(a)
`
`
`
`
`1 The caption is updated to remove Petitioner Hisense Co., Ltd. (“Hisense”)
`because Hisense is no longer a party to this proceeding. See Paper 38
`(Termination due to Settlement After Institution of Trial Only as to Hisense
`Co., Ltd.). The parties shall use this caption (without this footnote) going
`forward.
`2 LG Electronics Inc., who filed a petition in IPR2022-00245, is joined as
`petitioner in this proceeding.
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR2021-00990
`Patent 7,110,444 B1
`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Background
`
`TCL Industries Holdings Co., Ltd. (“TCL”) and Hisense filed a
`Petition (Paper 1, “Pet.”) requesting institution of inter partes review
`(“IPR”) of claims 2–4 (“the Challenged Claims”) of U.S. Patent
`No. 7,110,444 B1 (Ex. 1001, “the ’444 patent”). ParkerVision, Inc. (“Patent
`Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response (Paper 8). Applying the standard set
`forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we instituted an inter partes review as to all
`claims and grounds set forth in the Petition. Paper 9 (“Inst. Dec.”).
`After institution, LG Electronics Inc. (“LG”) filed a petition in
`IPR2022-00245 (challenging the same claims of the ’444 patent on the same
`grounds), and a motion for joinder (seeking to join this proceeding as a
`petitioner). LG Elecs. Inc. v. ParkerVision, Inc., IPR2022-00245 (PTAB
`Dec. 12, 2021), Papers 3 (petition), 4 (motion for joinder). We granted
`institution in IPR2022-00245 and granted LG’s motion for joinder. Id. at
`Paper 9 (PTAB Apr. 12, 2022); IPR2021-00990, Paper 16. Recently,
`Hisense and Patent Owner reached a settlement and this proceeding was
`terminated only as to Hisense. Paper 38. Accordingly, we refer to TCL and
`LG, collectively, as “Petitioners.”
`Also following institution, Patent Owner filed a Patent Owner
`Response (Paper 12, “PO Resp.”), Petitioners filed a Reply to Patent
`Owner’s Response (Paper 20, “Pet. Reply”), and Patent Owner filed a
`Sur-reply (Paper 26, “PO Sur-reply”). Additionally, we granted Petitioners’
`Motion for Routine and/or Additional Discovery (Paper 13), ordering the
`production of Patent Owner’s Final Infringement Contentions. Paper 18
`(Order), 8. And, we denied Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike portions of
`
`2
`
`

`

`IPR2021-00990
`Patent 7,110,444 B1
`
`Petitioners’ Reply (Paper 21), finding that the “Reply does not raise new
`issues, is not accompanied by belatedly presented evidence, and does not
`otherwise exceed the proper scope of [a] reply brief as set forth in 37 C.F.R.
`§ 42.23(b).” Paper 25 (Order), 13. An oral hearing was held on
`September 8, 2022, and the transcript is of record. Paper 34 (“Tr.”).3
`We have jurisdiction pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 6. This Decision is a
`Final Written Decision under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73 as to
`the patentability of the Challenged Claims. Petitioners bear the burden of
`proving unpatentability of the Challenged Claims. Dynamic Drinkware,
`LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). To
`prevail, Petitioners must prove unpatentability by a preponderance of the
`evidence. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d) (2020).
`Having reviewed the arguments and the supporting evidence, we determine
`that Petitioners have shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
`claims 2–4 of the ’444 patent are unpatentable.
`
`Related Proceedings
`
`The parties identify the following as related matters: ParkerVision,
`Inc. v. Intel Corporation, 6:20-cv-00108 (W.D. Tex.); ParkerVision, Inc. v.
`TCL Industries Holdings Co., Ltd. et al., No. 6:20-cv-00945 (W.D. Tex.);
`ParkerVision, Inc. v. Hisense Co., Ltd. et al., No. 6:20-cv-00870 (W.D.
`Tex.); ParkerVision, Inc. v. ZyXEL Communications Corp., No. 6:20-cv-
`
`
`3 Because of a substantial overlap in issues presented, the transcript includes
`oral argument from related case IPR2021-00985, although this proceeding
`and IPR2021-00985 are not consolidated or joined.
`
`3
`
`

`

`IPR2021-00990
`Patent 7,110,444 B1
`
`01010 (W.D. Tex. )4; ParkerVision, Inc. v. LG Electronics Inc., No. 6:21-cv-
`00520 (W.D. Tex.); and Intel Corporation v. ParkerVision, Inc., IPR2020-
`01265 (“the Intel IPR”). Pet. 4–5; Paper 5 (Petitioners’ Updated Mandatory
`Notice), 1; Paper 7 (Patent Owner’s Mandatory Notices), 1. Petitioners also
`identify ParkerVision, Inc. v. Buffalo Inc., No. 6:20-cv-01009 (W.D. Tex.),
`as a related matter involving the ’444 patent. Pet. 5. Additionally,
`Petitioners challenge several claims of U.S. Patent No. 7,292,835 B2 (“the
`’835 patent”), owned by Patent Owner, in IPR2021-00985. Pet. 5; Paper 7,
`1.5
`
`Real Parties in Interest
`
`Petitioners identify TCL; TCL Electronics Holdings Ltd.; Shenzhen
`TCL New Technology Co., Ltd.; TCL King Electrical Appliances (Huizhou)
`Co., Ltd.; TCL Moka Int’l Ltd.; TCL Moka Manufacturing S.A. DE C.V.;
`TCL Technology Group Corp.; TTE Technology, Inc.; LG; and LG
`Electronics U.S.A., Inc. as real parties in interest. Pet. 4; LG, IPR2022-
`00245, Paper 3 at 5. Patent Owner identifies ParkerVision, Inc. as the sole
`real party in interest. Paper 7, 1.
`
`
`4 After the parties’ briefing, the district court granted a joint motion to
`dismiss with prejudice and the case is now closed. See Ex. 3001 (Docket
`Entry 25, Order dated Sept. 27, 2001).
`5 Patent Owner identifies the instant proceeding—IPR2021-00990—as a
`related matter, but we understand Patent Owner to refer to IPR2021-00985.
`See Paper 7, 1.
`
`4
`
`

`

`IPR2021-00990
`Patent 7,110,444 B1
`
`
`
`
`The Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability and Declaration
`Evidence
`Petitioners challenge the patentability of claims 2–4 of the ’444 patent
`on the following grounds:
`Claim(s) Challenged
`2, 3
`2–4
`
`35 U.S.C. §6
`103(a)
`103(a)
`
`Reference(s)/Basis
`Tayloe,7 TI Datasheet8
`Lam,9 Enz,10 Tayloe
`
`Pet. 7.
`Additionally, Petitioners support their challenge with a Declaration of
`Matthew B. Shoemake, Ph.D. (Ex. 1002) and a Declaration of Maureen M.
`Honeycutt (Ex. 1009). Patent Owner supports its arguments with a
`Declaration of Dr. Michael Steer (Ex. 2038). Petitioners cross-examined
`Dr. Steer and a transcript of that deposition is of record. Ex. 1021.
`
`The ’444 Patent
`
`The ’444 patent is directed to “a wireless local area network (WLAN)
`that includes one or more WLAN devices (also called stations, terminals,
`access points, client devices, or infrastructure devices) for effecting wireless
`communications over the WLAN.” Ex. 1001, 2:10–14. The ’444 patent
`
`
`6 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”) included revisions to
`35 U.S.C. § 103 that became effective on March 16, 2013. Because the
`’444 patent has an effective filing date before March 16, 2013, we apply the
`pre-AIA version of the statutory basis for unpatentability.
`7 U.S. Patent No. 6,230,000 B1, issued May 8, 2001 (Ex. 1004, “Tayloe”).
`8 SN74CBT3253 Dual 1-of-4 FET Multiplexer/Demultiplexer (rev. ed.
`May 1998) (Ex. 1005, “TI Datasheet”).
`9 U.S. Patent No. 5,937,013, issued Aug. 10, 1999 (Ex. 1006, “Lam”).
`10 Circuit Techniques for Reducing the Effects of Op-Amp Imperfections:
`Autozeroing, Correlated Double Sampling, and Chopper Stabilization,
`Proceedings of the IEEE, Vol. 84, No. 11, Nov. 1996 (Ex. 1007, “Enz”).
`
`5
`
`

`

`IPR2021-00990
`Patent 7,110,444 B1
`
`explains that “[t]he WLAN device includes at least an antenna, a receiver,
`and a transmitter . . . . The WLAN receiver includes at least one universal
`frequency translation module that frequency down-converts a received
`electromagnetic (EM) signal.” Id. at 2:14–22.
`Figure 70A is reproduced below:
`
`
`Figure 70A of the ’444 patent “illustrates an IQ [in-phase quadrature]
`receiver having shunt UFT [universal frequency translation] modules.”
`Ex. 1001, 5:34–35. The ’444 patent explains that “I/Q modulation
`receiver 7000 receives, down converts, and demodulates a[n] I/Q modulated
`RF [radio frequency] input signal 7082 to an I baseband output signal 7084,
`and a Q baseband output signal 7086.” Id. at 35:51–54; see id. at 35:60–62
`(Antenna 7072 receives and outputs I/Q modulated RF input signal 7082.).
`
`6
`
`

`

`IPR2021-00990
`Patent 7,110,444 B1
`
`The ’444 patent states that, “[w]hen present, LNA 7018 amplifies I/Q
`modulated RF input signal 7082, and outputs amplified I/Q signal 7088.”
`Id. at 35:63–64. Thereafter, “[f]irst UFD [universal frequency down-
`conversion] module 7002 receives amplified I/Q signal 7088 . . . [,] down-
`converts the I-phase portion of the amplified input I/Q signal 7088 according
`to an I control signal 7090 . . . [, and] outputs an I output signal 7098.” Id. at
`35:65–36:2. Similarly, UFD module 7006 “receives amplified I/Q
`signal 7088[,]” “down-converts the inverted I-phase signal portion of
`amplified input I/Q signal 7088 according to an inverted I control
`signal 7092[,]” and “outputs an inverted I output signal 7001.” Id. at 36:33–
`37. Thereafter, “[f]irst differential amplifier 7020 receives filtered I output
`signal 7007 . . . subtracts filtered inverted I output signal 7007 from filtered I
`output signal 7001, amplifies the result, and outputs I baseband output
`signal 7084.” Id. at 37:3–8.
`The ’444 patent’s first and second UFD modules in Figure 70A
`include capacitors 7074 and 7076, respectively, and UFT modules 7026 and
`7038, respectively. Ex. 1001, 36:3–5 (first UFD module 7002 comprises
`first storage module 7024 and first UFT module 7026), 36:14–15 (first
`storage module 7024 comprises first capacitor 7074), 36:38–40 (second
`UFD module 7006 comprises second storage module 7036 and second UFT
`module 7038), 36:50–51 (second storage module 7036 comprises second
`capacitor 7076).
`
`7
`
`

`

`IPR2021-00990
`Patent 7,110,444 B1
`
`
`Figure 1B is reproduced below:
`
`
`Figure 1B of the ’444 patent “is a more detailed diagram of a universal
`frequency translation (UFT) module.” Ex. 1001, 2:56–58. The ’444 patent
`explains that, “[g]enerally, the UFT module 103 includes a switch 106
`controlled by a control circuit 108.” Id. at 8:62–64 (noting that switch 106 is
`referred to as a controlled switch); see id. at 36:5–7 (first UFT module,
`shown in Figure 70A, contains a switch that opens and closes as a function
`of I control signal 7090), 36:40–42 (second UFT module, also shown in
`Figure 70A, contains a switch that opens and closes as a function of inverted
`I control signal 7092).
`
`8
`
`

`

`IPR2021-00990
`Patent 7,110,444 B1
`
`
`The ’444 patent includes two alternative configurations of switches
`and capacitors in UFD modules (Ex. 1001, 9:43–57), as shown in
`Figures 20A and 20A-1 reproduced below:
`
`
`
`Figures 20A and 20A-1 of the ’444 patent “are example aliasing modules.”
`Ex. 1001, 3:50–51. The ’444 patent explains that, in Figure 20A,
`switch 2008 is in series with input signal 2004 and capacitor 2010 is shunted
`to ground; in Figure 20A-1, however, capacitor 2010 is in series with input
`signal 2004 and switch 2008 is shunted to ground. Id. at 9:48–57 (also
`noting that “[t]he electronic alignment of the circuit components is
`flexible”).
`The ’444 patent states that “[t]he down-conversion of an EM signal by
`aliasing the EM signal at an aliasing rate is fully described in . . . U.S.
`Pat[ent] No. 6,061,551 [(‘the ’551 patent’)] . . . , the full disclosure of which
`is incorporated herein by reference.” Ex. 1001, 9:32–38; see id. at 34:54–58
`(“Down-conversion utilizing a UFD module (also called an aliasing module)
`is further described in . . . [the ’551 patent].”).11
`
`
`11 The ’551 patent is Exhibit 2029 in this proceeding.
`
`9
`
`

`

`IPR2021-00990
`Patent 7,110,444 B1
`
`
`Illustrative Claims
`
`Claims 2 and 3, the independent claims challenged in this proceeding,
`are illustrative of the claimed subject matter and are reproduced below with
`Petitioners’ bracketing added for reference:
`2.
`[2-pre] A wireless modem apparatus, comprising:
`[2A] a receiver for frequency down-converting an input
`signal including,
`[2B] a first frequency down-conversion module to
`down-convert the input signal, wherein said first
`frequency down-conversion module down-converts said
`input signal according to a first control signal and outputs
`a first down-converted signal;
`[2C] a second frequency down-conversion module
`to down-convert said input signal, wherein said second
`frequency down-conversion module down-converts said
`input signal according to a second control signal and
`outputs a second down-converted signal; and
`[2D] a subtractor module that subtracts said second
`down-converted signal from said first down-converted
`signal and outputs a down-converted signal;
`[2E] wherein said first frequency down-conversion
`module under-samples said input signal according to said first
`control signal, and [2F] said second frequency down-
`conversion module under-samples said input signal according
`to said second control signal.
`3.
`[3-pre] A wireless modem apparatus, comprising:
`[3A] a receiver for frequency down-converting an input
`signal including,
`[3b] a first frequency down-conversion module to
`down-convert the input signal, wherein said first
`frequency down-conversion module down-converts said
`input signal according to a first control signal and outputs
`a first down-converted signal;
`
`10
`
`

`

`IPR2021-00990
`Patent 7,110,444 B1
`
`
`[3C] a second frequency down-conversion module
`to down-convert said input signal, wherein said second
`frequency down-conversion module down-converts said
`input signal according to a second control signal and
`outputs a second down-converted signal; and
`[3D] a subtractor module that subtracts said second
`down-converted signal from said first down-converted
`signal and outputs a down-converted signal;
`[3E] wherein said first and said second frequency down-
`conversion modules each comprise a switch and a storage
`element.
`Ex. 1001, 60:47–67, 61:1–18.
`
`Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art
`
`Petitioners, supported by Dr. Shoemake’s testimony, propose that a
`person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had
`“at least an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering or a related
`subject and two or more years of experience in the fields of communication
`systems, signal processing and/or RF circuit design.” Pet. 35 (citing
`Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 31–36). Petitioners explain that “[l]ess work experience may be
`compensated by a higher level of education, such as a master’s degree.” Id.
`(citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 31–36).
`In the Institution Decision, we noted that Patent Owner had not
`expressed a position on the level of ordinary skill in the art in the
`Preliminary Response, and, based on the preliminary record, we adopted
`Petitioners’ unopposed position, finding it consistent with the level of
`ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’444 patent and the prior art of
`record. Inst. Dec. 10 (citing Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355
`(Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In
`re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978)).
`
`11
`
`

`

`IPR2021-00990
`Patent 7,110,444 B1
`
`
`In the Patent Owner Response, Patent Owner, supported by
`Dr. Steer’s testimony, proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art at
`the time of the invention would have had
`(a) a Bachelor of Science degree in electrical or computer
`engineering (or a related academic field), and at least
`two (2) additional years of work experience in the design and
`development of radio frequency circuits and/or systems, or
`(b) at least five (5) years of work experience and training in the
`design and development of radio frequency circuits and/or
`systems.
`PO Resp. 4 (citing Ex. 2038 ¶ 24). Neither Patent Owner nor Dr. Steer
`explain why their proposal materially differs from that proposed by
`Petitioners.
`Patent Owner’s option (a) is substantially the same as Petitioners’
`proposal—both require a bachelor’s degree in the same or a related subject
`and two additional years of related work experience. Patent Owner’s
`option (b) adds an additional option based on work experience in lieu of a
`formal degree.
`Neither party contends that the difference in their proposals affects the
`outcome of this proceeding and we do not find that it does. Nonetheless, on
`the full record before us, we find that our identification of the level of
`ordinary skill in art in the Institution Decision as well as Patent Owner’s
`option (b) are supported by the prior art of record, the ’444 patent, and the
`opinion of Dr. Steer. Accordingly, we modify our preliminary finding to
`include option (b) from Patent Owner’s proposal. Thus, we find that one of
`ordinary skill in the art would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in
`electrical engineering or a related subject and two or more years of
`experience in the field of RF circuit design, or at least five years of work
`
`12
`
`

`

`IPR2021-00990
`Patent 7,110,444 B1
`
`experience and training in the design and development of RF circuits and/or
`systems. We also find that less work experience may be compensated by a
`higher level of education, such as a master’s degree.
`
`II. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`In this inter partes review, claims are construed using the same claim
`construction standard that would be used to construe the claims in a civil
`action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b). See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2020). The
`claim construction standard includes construing claims in accordance with
`the ordinary and customary meaning of such claims, as would have been
`understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.
`See id.; Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–14 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en
`banc). In construing claims in accordance with their ordinary and customary
`meaning, we take into account the specification and prosecution history.
`Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315–17.
`If the specification “reveal[s] a special definition given to a claim
`term by the patentee that differs from the meaning it would otherwise
`possess[,] . . . the inventor’s lexicography governs.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at
`1316 (citing CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366
`(Fed. Cir. 2002)). Another exception to the general rule that claims are
`given their ordinary and customary meaning is “when the patentee disavows
`the full scope of a claim term either in the specification or during
`prosecution.” Uship Intellectual Props., LLC v. United States, 714 F.3d
`1311, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am.,
`LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
`Additionally, only terms that are in controversy need to be construed,
`and these need be construed only to the extent necessary to resolve the
`
`13
`
`

`

`IPR2021-00990
`Patent 7,110,444 B1
`
`controversy. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795,
`803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that
`are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the
`controversy”); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co.,
`868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of
`an inter partes review).
`
`“storage element”
`
`In the Institution Decision, we did not construe any claim terms
`expressly because none of the terms were in dispute. Inst. Dec. 11. In the
`briefing following institution, Patent Owner proposed a construction for the
`term “storage element,” see, e.g., PO Resp. 36–38, and it became clear that
`the parties dispute the meaning of the term. Additionally, because many of
`Patent Owner’s arguments hinge on the meaning of this term, its proper
`construction is important to address the issues presented in this proceeding.
`Further, the parties’ arguments rely, almost exclusively, on disclosures in the
`’551 patent, incorporated by reference into the ’444 patent.
`In the final written decision in IPR2020-01265 (Ex. 2016), we
`construed the term “storage element,” relying on its use in the ’551 patent.
`In IPR2020-01265, after considering the parties’ extensive arguments as
`well as prior constructions in related district court litigation, we construed
`“storage element” to mean “an element of a system that stores non-
`negligible amounts of energy from an input EM signal.” Ex. 2016, 41.
`Critical to that determination was the finding that the patentees acted as their
`own lexicographers by defining the systems to which “storage modules”
`refer to. Specifically, we explained that the ’551 patent expressly states
`“[s]torage modules and storage capacitances, on the other hand, refer to
`
`14
`
`

`

`IPR2021-00990
`Patent 7,110,444 B1
`
`systems that store non-negligible amounts of energy from an input EM
`signal.”12 Id. at 36 (emphasis added) (citing ’551 patent,13 66:59–67).
`Additionally, we also explained that in a prior proceeding challenging claims
`of the ’551 patent before the Board—IPR2014-00948—Patent Owner
`represented that the ’551 patent “provides an explicit definition” and
`“explicitly defines a storage module.” Id. at 39 (citing Ex. 1032,14 21). We
`found that “Patent Owner’s acknowledgement that the ’551 patent provides
`an explicit definition of ‘storage module’ directly supports our determination
`that the patentees acted as lexicographers.” Id. at 40.
`In this proceeding, in addition to raising substantially the same
`arguments addressed in IPR2020-01265, Patent Owner submitted a Claim
`Construction Order and Memorandum in Support Thereof from
`ParkerVision, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., No. 6:21-cv-00520-ADA (W.D.
`Tex. June 21, 2022) (Doc. 55) (Ex. 2040), and a Special Master’s Report and
`Recommendation Regarding Claim Construction from ParkerVision, Inc. v.
`Hisense Co., No. 6:20-cv-00870-ADA (W.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2022) (Doc. 72)
`
`
`12 It is undisputed that “storage element” (recited in the ’444 patent) and
`“storage module” (recited in the ’551 patent) are synonymous. See PO
`Resp. 37–38 (referring to storage module); Pet. Reply 4 (consenting to the
`adoption of the Board’s construction of “storage element” from IPR2020-
`01265, which relied on the use of “storage module” in the ’551 patent).
`13 In IPR2020-01265, the ’551 patent was Exhibit 2007.
`14 Exhibit 1032 from IPR2020-01265 is Patent Owner’s Preliminary
`Response (Paper 7) from IPR2014-00948, which was not filed as an exhibit
`in this proceeding.
`
`15
`
`

`

`IPR2021-00990
`Patent 7,110,444 B1
`
`(Ex. 2043).15 Each of these claim construction decisions construes “storage
`module” to mean “a module of an energy transfer system that stores
`non-negligible amounts of energy from an input electromagnetic signal.”
`Ex. 2043, 33; see Ex. 2040, 16 (district court declining to modify its
`previous construction of “storage module,” which was limited to an “energy
`transfer system”). In so determining, each of the district court’s decisions
`finds that the patentees did not act as their own lexicographers. See
`Ex. 2040, 19; Ex. 2043, 32. Patent Owner advocates that we adopt the same
`construction here. PO Resp. 36–38.
`Petitioners assert that “[u]nder any reasonable construction, a
`capacitor constitutes a ‘storage element.’” Pet. Reply 2 (citing Pet. 59;
`Ex. 1002 ¶ 169). Petitioners rely on the ’441 patent’s statement that a
`storage module is a capacitor. Id. at 2–3 (citing Pet. 59; Ex. 1002 ¶ 169;
`Ex. 1001, 34:22–23 (“The storage module 6704A is a capacitor 6706A.”),
`36:14–15 (“In an embodiment, first storage module 7024 comprises a first
`capacitor 7404.”)). Petitioners contend that “[t]his is consistent with [Patent
`Owner’s] position on infringement, where [Patent Owner] alleges repeatedly
`across multiple related patents that a ‘storage element’ in the accused
`products is simply ‘one or more capacitors.’” Id. at 3 (citing Ex. 1022
`¶¶ 127–131, 138–140, 150; Ex. 1023 ¶¶ 75, 92, 98). Nonetheless,
`“Petitioners do not object to adoption of the Board’s construction for
`‘storage element’ from IPR2020-01265.” Id. at 4.
`
`
`15 Patent Owner also submitted the same Special Master’s Report and
`Recommendation Regarding Claim Construction from ParkerVision, Inc. v.
`TCL Industries Holdings Co., No. 6:20-cv-00945-ADA (W.D. Tex. Aug. 29,
`2022) (Doc. 68) (Ex. 2042).
`
`16
`
`

`

`IPR2021-00990
`Patent 7,110,444 B1
`
`
`We have reviewed and considered the district court’s construction
`(which limits “storage element” to an “energy transfer system”), but we are
`not persuaded that our construction from IPR2020-01265 should be altered.
`We expressly adopt and incorporate by reference our analysis from
`IPR2020-01265 and do not repeat it in full here. We do, however, take this
`opportunity to provide additional reasoning in support of our prior
`determination based on the arguments and evidence presented in this
`proceeding.
`The ’551 patent provides the following, which formed the focal point
`of Patent Owner’s argument in IPR2014-00948 and which we found
`provides a lexicographic definition of “storage module”/”storage element” in
`IPR2020-01265:
`The terms storage module and storage capacitance, as used
`herein, are distinguishable from the terms holding module and
`holding capacitance, respectively. Holding modules and
`holding capacitances, as used above, identify systems that store
`negligible amounts of energy from an under-sampled input EM
`signal with the intent of “holding” a voltage value. Storage
`modules and storage capacitances, on the other hand, refer to
`systems that store non-negligible amounts of energy from an
`input EM signal.
`Ex. 2029, 66:59–67 (emphases added); see Ex. 2016, 39–40 (discussing
`Patent Owner’s prior arguments to construe “storage module” in IPR2014-
`00948). When defining certain terms in a section titled “General
`Terminology,” the ’551 patent repeatedly uses the phrase “when used
`herein” in combination with the phrase “refer(s) to.” See, e.g., Ex. 2029,
`13:56–15:27 (mentioning a term followed by “when used herein,” followed
`by “refers to,” followed by a definition). For example, the ’551 patent
`states, “[t]he term digital signal, when used herein, refers to a signal that
`
`17
`
`

`

`IPR2021-00990
`Patent 7,110,444 B1
`
`changes between discrete states, as contrasted to a signal that is continuous.”
`Id. at 15:7–9. As shown, the ’551 patent defines “digital signal” by stating
`“when used herein” followed by “refers to.” And, the same sentence also
`provides a comparison between “digital signal” and a signal that is
`continuous. Even though the passage describing “storage module” is not
`listed under the “General Terminology” section of the ’551 patent, the
`passage provides the same indications that the patentees clearly and
`unambiguously intended to define the term “storage module” by stating “as
`used herein” and “refer to”—hallmarks that the patentees were providing a
`lexicographic definition of the term. Vasudevan Software, Inc. v.
`MicroStrategy, Inc., 782 F.3d 671, 679 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“An applicant’s use
`of the phrase ‘refers to’ generally indicates an intention to define a term.”)
`(citing In re Imes, 778 F.3d 1250, 1252–53 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Microsoft
`Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 731 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Linear
`Tech. Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 566 F.3d 1049, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
`Additionally, as with the term “digital signal,” the above-passage provides a
`comparison between “storage module” and “holding module” and uses the
`definitions of the terms to compare and contrast them.
`“To act as its own lexicographer, a patentee must ‘clearly set forth a
`definition of the disputed claim term’ other than its plain and ordinary
`meaning.” Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1366 (citing CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at
`1366). “It is not enough for a patentee to simply disclose a single
`embodiment or use a word in the same manner in all embodiments, the
`patentee must ‘clearly express an intent’ to redefine the term.” Id. (citing
`Helmsderfer v. Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc., 527 F.3d 1379, 1381 (Fed.
`Cir. 2008); Kara Tech. Inc. v. Stamps.com, 582 F.3d 1341, 1347–48 (Fed.
`
`18
`
`

`

`IPR2021-00990
`Patent 7,110,444 B1
`
`Cir. 2009)). That is precisely what the patentees did in the above-passage.
`Specifically, we find that they clearly set forth a definition that is different
`than the plain and ordinary meaning and, in so doing, clearly expressed an
`intent to redefine the term. That the patentees intended to redefine the term
`“storage module” is clearly expressed by the use of “as used herein”16 and
`“refers to” in the above-passage and is consistent with the patentees’ use of
`these same phrases when defining other terminology in the ’551 patent, as
`discussed above.
`We also do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument that this passage
`in the ’551 patent does not provide a lexicographic definition for at least two
`reasons. First, in related case IPR2021-00985, Patent Owner argues that the
`patent-at-issue in that proceeding (the ’835 patent) provides a definition of
`the term “cable modem” and points to the following from the ’835 patent
`specification: “Cable Modems refer to modems that communicate across
`ordinary cable TV [television] network cables” (IPR2021-00985, Ex. 1001,
`36:19–20 (emphasis added)). During the oral argument, Patent Owner stated
`that “we just used the same definition that was in the spec. . . . We just took
`the same exact definition from the spec” (Tr. 83:16–20 (emphases added)).
`In other words, Patent Owner’s acknowledgement that the ’835 patent
`provides a definition of the term “cable modem” undermines Patent Owner’s
`argument that the patentees did not define “storage module” even though the
`patentees used the same phrase “refer(s) to.”
`Second, Patent Owner has absolutely no (even remotely) colorable
`explanation as to why it repeatedly argued, in IPR2014-00948, that the
`
`
`16 There is no substantive difference between the phrase “when used herein”
`and “as used herein.”
`
`19
`
`

`

`IPR2021-00990
`Patent 7,110,444 B1
`
`’551 patent “provides an explicit definition” and “explicitly defines a storage
`module.” See Ex. 2016, 39–40 (discussing Patent Owner’s prior arguments
`to construe “storage module” in IPR2014-00948). The only plausible
`explanation is that Patent Owner has simply changed positions to suit its
`current litigation strategy. But that is not how claim construction works.
`There either is a lexicographic definition or there is not, regardless of the
`claim construction standard applied (i.e., broadest reasonable interpretation
`v. the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the
`claims in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)). In IPR2014-00948,
`Patent Owner argued that there was a lexicographic definition and
`emphasized the same exact statements in the above-passage from the
`’551 patent. That passage has not changed and provides definitive
`confirmation of the patentees’ intent to provide a lexicographic definition of
`“storage module” for the reasons discussed above.17
`In its Sur-reply, Patent Owner argues that the above-passage from the
`’551 patent “is comparative, not definitional.” PO Sur-reply 4. We agree
`that it is comparative, but it is also definitional. These are not mutually
`exclusive concepts. And, the above-discussion reflects that the ’551 patent
`defines other terms by providing a definition and comparing that definition
`to definitions of other terms.
`Accordingly, for the reasons explained in detail in the Board’s final
`written decision in IPR2020-01265 and as further explained above, we find
`that the patentees clearly and unmistakably set forth a definition of “storage
`
`
`17 None of the district court claim construction decisions address Patent
`Owner’s representations, in IPR2014-00948, that the ’551 patent explicitly
`defines “storage module.”

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket