Case: 19-1147 Document: 123 Page: 1 Filed: 02/01/2019
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`2019-1147, -1148, -1323, -1324, -1325
`________________________________________________________________
`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
`
`2019-1147
`
`BTG INTERNATIONAL LIMITED, JANSSEN
`BIOTECH, INC., JANSSEN ONCOLOGY, INC.,
`JANSSEN RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT, LLC,
`Plaintiffs-Appellants
`
`v.
`
`AMNEAL PHARMACEUTICALS LLC, AMNEAL PHARMACEUTICALS OF
`NEW YORK, LLC, DR. REDDY’S LABORATORIES, INC., DR. REDDY’S
`LABORATORIES, LTD., WOCKHARDT BIO AG, WOCKHARDT USA LLC,
`WOCKHARDT LTD., MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS INC., MYLAN INC.,
`WEST-WARD PHARMACEUTICALS CORP., NKA HIKMA
`PHARMACEUTICALS USA INC., HIKMA PHARMACEUTICALS LLC,
`TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC.,
`Defendants-Appellees
`
`PAR PHARMACEUTICAL, INC., PAR PHARMACEUTICAL
`COMPANIES, INC., RISING PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.,
` Defendants
`
`Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey in
`Nos. 2:15-cv-05909-KM-JBC, 2:16-cv-02449-KM-JBC, and
`2:17-cv-06435-KM-JBC, Judge Kevin McNulty.
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`2019-1148
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`BTG INTERNATIONAL LIMITED, JANSSEN
`BIOTECH, INC., JANSSEN ONCOLOGY, INC.,
`JANSSEN RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT, LLC,
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` Plaintiffs-Appellants
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`v.
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`AMERIGEN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.,
`AMERIGEN PHARMACEUTICALS LIMITED,
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`Defendants-Appellees
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`Appellant
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`Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
`in No. 2:16-cv-02449-KM-JBC, Judge Kevin McNulty.
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`2019-1323
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`JANSSEN ONCOLOGY, INC.,
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`v.
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`AMERIGEN PHARMACEUTICALS LIMITED,
`ARGENTUM PHARMACEUTICALS LLC,
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`(Caption continued on next page)
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`Appellees
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`Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Trial
`and Appeal Board in Nos. IPR2016-00286 and IPR2016-01317.
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`2019-1324
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`JANSSEN ONCOLOGY, INC.,
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`Appellant
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`v.
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`MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS INC., AMNEAL
`PHARMACEUTICALS LLC, AMNEAL PHARMACEUTICALS
`OF NEW YORK, LLC, DR. REDDY’S LABORATORIES, INC.,
`DR. REDDY’S LABORATORIES, LTD., TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA,
`INC., WEST-WARD PHARMACEUTICAL CORPORATION, HIKMA
`PHARMACEUTICALS LLC,
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`Appellees
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`Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Trial and
`Appeal Board in Nos. IPR2016-01332 and IPR2017-00853.
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`2019-1325
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`JANSSEN ONCOLOGY, INC.,
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`Appellee
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`Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office,
`Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2016-01582.
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`INVITED BRIEF FOR THE DIRECTOR – U.S. PATENT AND
`TRADEMARK OFFICE AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF
`NEITHER PARTY
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`Appellant
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`v.
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`WOCKHARDT BIO AG,
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`JENNIFER L. UTRECHT
`SCOTT R. MCINTOSH
`MARK R. FREEMAN
`Of Counsel
`
`Attorneys, Appellate Staff
`Civil Division
`U.S. Department of Justice
`
`
`
`February 1, 2019
`
`THOMAS W. KRAUSE
`Solicitor
`
`FARHEENA Y. RASHEED
`Senior Counsel for Patent Law &
`Litigation
`
`
`FRANCES M. LYNCH
`ROBERT J. MCMANUS
`JOSEPH MATAL
`Associate Solicitors
`
`Attorneys for the Director of the
`U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`SUMMARY ............................................................................................................... 1
`DETAILED RESPONSE TO ORDER ...................................................................... 3
`(1) Whether a petitioner is estopped from challenging claims in
`district court under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) based on a ground
`that it brought in an inter partes review, which resulted in a
`final written decision holding the claims unpatentable but
`which has a pending request for rehearing. ................................ 3
`a. Section 315(e)(2) applies to both successful and
`unsuccessful petitioners .................................................... 3
`b. Section 315(e)(2) estoppel attaches once the PTAB has
`issued a “final written decision” even if a party seeks
`rehearing of that decision ................................................. 9
`(2) Whether a decision is a “final written decision” under
`35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) if the period for rehearing under
`37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) has not yet expired. .................................15
`(3) Whether a PTAB decision on the pending requests for
`rehearing could moot the estoppel issue. ..................................16
`(4) Whether a district court can stay a case pending the outcome
`of a request for rehearing of a final written decision and/or
`appeal from a final written decision. ........................................17
`CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 19
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
` Page(s)
`
`Cases
`Abbott Labs. v. Matrix Labs., Inc.,
`2009 WL 3719214 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 5, 2009) ........................................................18
`Apple Inc. v. Personalized Media Communications LLC,
`2018 WL 922376 (PTAB Feb. 15, 2018) ............................................................14
`Arista Networks, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,
`908 F.3d 792 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ................................................................................ 7
`Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino,
`501 U.S. 104 (1991) ............................................................................................... 8
`B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc.,
`___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015) .................................................................... 6
`Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. United States,
`148 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ..........................................................................5, 6
`Bettcher Indus. Inc. v. Bunzl U.S.A. Inc.,
`661 F.3d 629 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ..............................................................................11
`Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co.,
`331 U.S. 519 (1947) ............................................................................................... 6
`Certain Hybrid Electric Vehicles and Components Thereof,
`Inv. No. 337-TA-1042 (USITC Nov. 2, 2017) ...................................................... 8
`Clinton v. Jones,
`520 U.S. 681 (1997) .............................................................................................17
`Cypress Semiconductor Corp. v. GSI Tech., Inc.,
`Case No. 13-cv-02013-JST, 2014 WL 5021100 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2014) ..........13
`Depomed, Inc. v. Purdue Pharma L.P.,
`2016 WL 50505 (D.N.J. 2016) ..................................................................... 17, 18
`Eli Lilly & Co. v. Accord Healthcare Inc.,
`2015 WL 8675158 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 11, 2015) ......................................................18
`
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`Emerson Elec. Co. v. IP Co., LLC,
`2017 WL 2390705 (PTAB May 31, 2017) ................................................... 14, 15
`Facebook, Inc. v. Uniloc USA, Inc.,
`IPR2017-01427 (PTAB May 29, 2018) ...............................................................14
`FCC v. Schreiber,
`381 U.S. 279 (1965) ............................................................................................... 8
`Florida Dept. of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc.,
`554 U.S. 33 (2008) ................................................................................................. 6
`Fresenius USA., Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc.,
`721 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ............................................................................17
`ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers,
`482 U.S. 270 (1987) .............................................................................................10
`Johnson v. Whitehead,
`647 F.3d 120 (4th Cir. 2011).................................................................................. 8
`Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp. v. Hilti, Inc.,
`138 F. Supp. 3d. 1032 (E.D. Wisc. 2015) ............................................................13
`Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp. v. Snap-On, Inc.,
`271 F. Supp.3d 990 (E.D. Wis. 2017) .................................................................... 8
`NFC Tech. LLC v. HTC Am., Inc.,
`Case No. 2:13-CV-1058-WCB, 2015 WL 1069111 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2015) .13
`Oil-Dri Corp. v. Nestle Purina Petcare Co.,
`Case No. 15-cv-1067, 2015 WL 13650951 (N.D. Ill. May 5, 2015) ...................13
`Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey,
`524 U.S. 206 (1998) ............................................................................................... 6
`SiOnyx, LLC v. Hamamatsu Photonics K.K.,
`330 F.Supp.3d 574 (D. Mass. 2018) ........................................................... 8, 9, 15
`Stone v. INS,
`514 U.S. 386 (1995) ............................................................................................... 5
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`Valve Corp. v. Ironburg Inventions Ltd.,
`2018 WL 575390 (PTAB Jan. 25, 2018) .............................................................14
`Verinata Health, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc.,
`Case No. 12-cv-05501-SI, 2017 WL 235048 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2017) .............15
`Statutes
`35 U.S.C. § 315 ................................................................................................ passim
`35 U.S.C. § 315 (pre-AIA) (2011) .......................................................................5, 11
`35 U.S.C. § 316 ........................................................................................................12
`35 U.S.C. § 317 .......................................................................................................... 7
`35 U.S.C. § 318 ....................................................................................................8, 10
`Regulations
`37 C.F.R. § 42.71 .....................................................................................................16
`37 C.F.R. § 90.3 ................................................................................................ 10, 16
`Other Authorities
`157 Cong. Rec. S1376 (Mar. 8, 2011) .....................................................................12
`18 James Wm. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice
`§ 131.30[2][c][iv] (3d ed. 1998) ..........................................................................11
`Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48759 (Aug. 14, 2012) ................ 7
`Restatement (Second) of Judgments §27 (1980) ....................................................... 6
`S. Rep. No. 111-18 (2009) .......................................................................................12
`
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`STATEMENT OF INTEREST
`The Director respectfully submits this amicus brief pursuant to Fed. R. App.
`
`P. 29(a) and this Court’s Orders of November 20, 2018 (ECF No. 68),
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`December 12, 2018 (ECF No. 83), and December 20, 2018 (ECF No. 86).
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`The Director’s brief takes no position on the merits of this case.
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`SUMMARY
`
`The Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office submits this briefing
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`in response to the Court’s invitation dated November 20, 2018, ECF No. 68,
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`requesting amicus participation by the USPTO on the following questions:
`
`1. Whether a petitioner is estopped from challenging claims
`in district court under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) based on a ground that it
`brought in an inter partes review, which resulted in a final written
`decision holding the claims unpatentable but which has a pending
`request for rehearing.
`
`2. Whether a decision is a “final written decision” under 35
`U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) if the period for rehearing under 37 C.F.R. §
`42.71(d) has not yet expired.
`
`3. Whether a PTAB decision on the pending requests for
`rehearing could moot the estoppel issue.
`
`4. Whether a district court can stay a case pending the
`outcome of a request for rehearing of a final written decision and/or
`appeal from a final written decision.
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`The first question has two parts: (a) whether “estoppel” under § 315(e)(2)
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`attaches to a successful petitioner, and (b) whether the estoppel attaches (i) when
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`the final written decision issues or (ii) only after any rehearing request has been
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`addressed. The plain language of the statute answers both subparts, and its drafting
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`history quiets any doubt. As to the successful-petitioner question, the plain
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`language makes no distinction between successful and unsuccessful petitioners, in
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`stark contrast to the statute’s inter partes reexamination predecessor. Likewise, the
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`plain language requires estoppel to attach when the proceedings result in a final
`1
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`written decision, regardless of whether a rehearing request remains outstanding;
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`this is again in contrast to the inter partes reexamination predecessor statute, which
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`delays application of estoppel until all appeals have been exhausted. Moreover, the
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`answer to the second subpart flows logically from the answer to the first—if the
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`estoppel is not outcome dependent, then there is no need to wait beyond issuance
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`of a final written decision to attach it.
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`The answer to the second question is not implicated under the facts of this
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`case because BTG’s rehearing petitions were timely filed before the district court
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`trial on invalidity and were pending at the time of the district court’s decision. If
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`reached, the answer to the first question resolves this question as well: estoppel
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`attaches regardless of whether a rehearing request remains outstanding.
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`As to the third question, estoppel attaches under section 315(e)(2) as soon as
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`the proceedings result in a written decision as to the patentability of the challenged
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`claims. That remains true even if a party petitions for rehearing. Accordingly, the
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`Board’s decision to deny the petitions for rehearing here did not affect the
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`application of section 315(e)(2) to the district court proceedings.
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`As to question four, a district court has considerable discretion to stay
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`proceedings under established case law and nothing in § 315(e)(2) limits that
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`discretion.
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`DETAILED RESPONSE TO ORDER
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`As an initial matter, the USPTO notes that if the Court were to affirm the
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`PTAB’s findings of unpatentability in the proceedings below, it would not
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`necessarily have to fully resolve the questions posed in the Court’s order. See infra
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`p. 17 n.6. Subject to that caveat, the USPTO’s answers to the Court’s questions are
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`set forth below.
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`(1) Whether a petitioner is estopped from challenging claims in
`district court under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) based on a ground that
`it brought in an inter partes review, which resulted in a final
`written decision holding the claims unpatentable but which has a
`pending request for rehearing.
`
`This first question can be divided into two separate and distinct questions:
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`(a) whether section 315(e)(2) bars a successful inter partes review petitioner from
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`making the same arguments in district court that it prevailed on in the inter partes
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`review, and (b) whether the operation of the 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) estoppel is
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`affected by the pendency of an administrative rehearing request. The USPTO
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`addresses those questions in turn.
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`a. Section 315(e)(2) applies to both successful and unsuccessful
`petitioners
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`On its face, the text of § 315(e)(2) is unambiguous and draws no distinction
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`between successful and unsuccessful petitioners:
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`(e) Estoppel.–
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`(2) Civil actions and other proceedings.—The petitioner in an inter
`partes review of a claim in a patent under this chapter that results in a
`final written decision under section 318(a), or the real party in interest
`or privy of the petitioner, may not assert either in a civil action arising
`in whole or in part under section 1338 of title 28 or in a proceeding
`before the International Trade Commission under section 337 of the
`Tariff Act of 1930 that the claim is invalid on any ground that the
`petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during that inter
`partes review.
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`35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) (emphasis added). By its terms, the § 315(e)(2) bar extends
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`to any petitioner—successful or not—in an inter partes review “that results in a
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`final written decision under § 318(a).” If the petitioner has pursued an inter partes
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`review that resulted in a final written decision, the petitioner may not assert in
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`district court or in the ITC any invalidity ground that was or reasonably could have
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`been raised during the inter partes review, regardless of the actual outcome of that
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`decision.
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`
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`The USPTO acknowledges that the plain language, as explained above,
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`leads to the counterintuitive result that a district court would not be able to
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`consider invalidity arguments the Board found persuasive. But the drafting history
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`of this provision confirms the natural meaning of this text. Prior to the creation of
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`inter partes review in the America Invents Act (AIA) in 2011, Congress provided a
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`similar mechanism for administrative review of issued patents in the form of inter
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`partes reexaminations. Inter partes reexamination decisions, like IPR decisions,
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`were given preclusive effect in infringement litigation. But the preclusionary
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`provision for inter partes reexaminations, pre-AIA § 315(c), was expressly
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`confined to cases in which patent claims had been finally determined to be “valid
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`and patentable”:
`
`A third party requester whose request for an inter partes
`reexamination results in an order under section 313 [35 U.S.C. § 313]
`is estopped from asserting at a later time, in any civil action arising in
`whole or in part under section 1338 of title 28, the invalidity of any
`claim finally determined to be valid and patentable on any ground
`which the third party requester raised or could have raised during the
`inter partes reexamination proceedings.
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`35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (pre-AIA) (2011) (“Civil Action”) (emphasis added).
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`In other words, only unsuccessful inter partes reexamination requesters were
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`barred from bringing the previously addressed or addressable challenges in district
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`court. Congress did not carry forward the outcome-determinative “determined to
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`be valid and patentable” language when it wrote § 315(e)(2). Rather, Congress
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`replaced it with language that is indifferent to the outcome: that petitioner is
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`estopped when the inter partes review “results in a final written decision”—win or
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`lose. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2). In short, Congress deleted the precise words that the
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`defendants now seek to add back into the statute, but the best indication of
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`Congress’s intent is the change in the statutory text itself. Stone v. INS, 514 U.S.
`
`386, 397 (1995) (“When Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume it intends
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`its amendment to have real and substantial effect.”); Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v.
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`United States, 148 F.3d 1363, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“A change in the language of
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`a statute is generally construed to import a change in meaning….”) (citation
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`omitted).
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`Moreover, the heading of § 315(e), “Estoppel,” does not evidence legislative
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`intent to incorporate common law collateral estoppel principles (and thereby an
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`unspoken limitation to unsuccessful petitioners) into § 315(e)(2). That argument
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`places too much weight on what is, in the end, simply a broad subsection heading.
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`Though “statutory titles and section headings ‘are tools available for the resolution
`
`of a doubt about the meaning of a statute,’” the subchapter heading standing alone
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`“cannot substitute for the operative text of the statute” itself. Florida Dept. of
`
`Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 47 (2008) (citation omitted);
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`Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998) (“[T]he
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`title of a statute . . . cannot limit the plain meaning of the text.”) (citation omitted);
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`Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528 (1947)
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`(the headings of statutory provisions are “not meant to take the place of the
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`detailed provisions of the text”).1
`
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`Indeed, the text of § 315(e)(2) cannot be reconciled with common law
`1
`collateral estoppel because it estops petitioners on grounds that they raised or
`“reasonably could have raised”; collateral estoppel applies only to grounds that
`were “actually litigated and determined.” B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus.,
`Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1303 (2015), quoting Restatement (Second) of
`Judgments §27, p. 250 (1980).
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`The operative statutory text here is “may not assert,” which makes no
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`distinction between successful and unsuccessful petitioners. The argument that
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`“may not assert” would not prevent a petitioner from “maintaining” a previously-
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`asserted defense proves too much—if “assert” could be read that way, then
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`unsuccessful petitioners would likewise not be estopped. Moreover, when
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`Congress sought to exclude a class of petitioners from the reach of § 315(e)(2), it
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`did so expressly. See 35 U.S.C. § 317(a) (providing exception for petitioners in
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`proceedings that were terminated prior to resulting in a final written decision). In
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`view of the plain language of the operative text, the existence of an exception that
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`does not aid successful petitioners, and the differences between § 315(e)(2) and its
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`inter partes reexamination predecessor (pre-AIA § 315(c)), the provision must be
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`read to apply to successful as well as unsuccessful petitioners. The bare use of the
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`word “estoppel” in the subsection heading cannot create a distinction that is not
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`supported by the statutory text, and ignores the intent reflected in § 317(a) and the
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`change from pre-AIA § 315(c). 2
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`The USPTO notes that the Board’s Trial Practice Guide does look to
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`collateral estoppel principles, but only for determinations of privity. See 77 Fed.
`Reg. 48759 (Aug. 14, 2012).
`2
`In the context of common law assignor estoppel, this Court has likewise
`made clear that common law notions of estoppel must give way to the plain
`language of the AIA. See Arista Networks, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 908 F.3d 792,
`803 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that the “plain language” of § 311(a) “delineates who
`may file an IPR petition” and that this plain language allows any “person who is
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`In any event, as the district court noted in SiOnyx, the application of
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`§ 315(e)(2) to successful petitioners, in many cases, has no “practical effect.”3
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`SiOnyx, LLC v. Hamamatsu Photonics K.K., 330 F.Supp.3d 574, 600 (D. Mass.
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`2018). If this Court affirms the Board’s unpatentability determination, the
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`challenged claims will be cancelled. 35 U.S.C. § 318(b). Those cancelled claims
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`could no longer be asserted against the successful petitioners or any other party.
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`Accordingly, any co-pending infringement proceeding would be resolved in the
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`petitioner’s favor. Conversely, if the court reverses the Board’s unpatentability
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`determination, defendants would then become “unsuccessful” petitioners and
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`indisputably subject to estoppel. SiOnyx, 330 F. Supp. 3d at 600.4 Under this
`
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`not the owner of a patent” to file an inter partes review petition, including “an
`assignor, who is no longer the owner of a patent.”); see also Johnson v. Whitehead,
`647 F.3d 120, 129 (4th Cir. 2011) (“While judicial preclusion rules ordinarily
`reflect the common law, agency preclusion rules are creatures of statute. Courts
`must thus refrain from imposing judge-made preclusion principles on agencies
`unless such a course is dictated by statute.”) (citing, inter alia, Astoria Fed. Sav. &
`Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991) and FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S.
`279, 290-91 (1965)).
`3
`An administrative law judge at the ITC also applied estoppel to a successful
`petitioner. Certain Hybrid Electric Vehicles and Components Thereof, Inv. No.
`337-TA-1042 (USITC Nov. 2, 2017). The case settled (2018 WL 3456237 (USITC
`Apr. 26, 2018)) after the Commission granted review of that decision. 2017 WL
`6350515 (USITC Dec. 8, 2017).
`4
`Although some district court cases have stated that § 315(e)(2) estoppel
`applies to unsuccessful petitioners, they have done so without any examination of
`whether it also applies to successful petitioners. See, e.g., Milwaukee Elec. Tool
`Corp. v. Snap-On, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 3d 990, 1027 (E.D. Wis. 2017). As such, they
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`reasoning, the SiOnyx district court estopped defendants from arguing the
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`invalidity of claims on grounds that defendants had prevailed on at the Board, but
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`before all appeals had been exhausted. Id.
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`Contrary to the district court’s suggestion in this case, the USPTO’s reading
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`of § 315(e)(2) does not require a party “to stand mute” in an infringement
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`proceeding simply because it prevailed before the Board. As explained infra,
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`successful petitioners may ask the district court to stay infringement litigation until
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`the Board rehearing and appeals process has been completed and the patent itself
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`has been cancelled. Although a stay of proceedings cannot be guaranteed,
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`successful petitioners have strong arguments that a stay would be appropriate.
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`These arguments include the fact that a final adjudication of the IPR could obviate
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`the need for a trial, as well as (potentially) a post-trial amendment or judgment to
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`account for cancellation of the patent.
`
`b. Section 315(e)(2) estoppel attaches once the PTAB has issued a
`“final written decision” even if a party seeks rehearing of that
`decision
`
`The second part of the Court’s first amicus question is whether the filing of a
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`rehearing request delays the onset of the § 315(e)(2) bar until a decision is made on
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`the rehearing request. As a preliminary matter, the USPTO’s answer to the first
`
`
`are not persuasive authority as to whether § 315(e)(2) applies to successful
`petitioners.
`
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`half of the question points to the correct answer for the second half. Thus, if
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`§ 315(e)(2) applies only to unsuccessful petitioners, it might make sense to have it
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`apply only after the agency has rendered a truly final decision—that is, disposed of
`
`any rehearing request. But because, as the USPTO has argued above, § 315(e)(2)
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`does not distinguish between successful and unsuccessful petitioners, there is no
`
`reason to delay estoppel application until the rehearing request has been resolved.
`
`Even if the Board decides on a petitioner’s rehearing request that it erred and the
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`petitioner’s invalidity arguments are in fact meritorious, the petitioner will still be
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`precluded from contesting validity in district court on those grounds, so there is
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`nothing to be gained from waiting to see whether the Board changes its decision.
`
`More fundamentally, as a strictly textual matter, § 315(e)(2) applies to
`
`prevent petitioners from litigating in district court any invalidity claim raised in an
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`inter partes review once that proceeding has “result[ed] in a final written decision
`
`under section 318(a).” In other words, up until the point at which the Board has
`
`rendered a decision on the patentability of any challenged patent claim, which it is
`
`required to do at the conclusion of trial, 35 U.S.C. § 318(a), petitioners may
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`continue to assert invalidity defenses in co-pending litigation. But the estoppel
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`provisions under section 315(e)(2) attach once the IPR proceedings have
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`“result[ed]” in a written decision by the Board.
`
`This is true even though a rehearing request might be filed from a “final
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`written decision.” While the filing of a rehearing request renders a “final written
`
`decision” non-final and, therefore, unappealable, see ICC v. Brotherhood of
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`Locomotive Engineers, 482 U.S. 270, 284-85 (1987); 37 C.F.R. § 90.3(b), the
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`statute nonetheless attaches estoppel as soon as the inter partes review has
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`“result[ed] in” a decision. Thus, the question is not whether a “final written
`
`decision” is “final” for purposes of appellate review; the question is only whether,
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`pursuant to § 318(a), a “final written decision” has issued. As with district court
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`litigation, the initial judgment retains its preclusive effect even if additional filings
`
`render the decision non-appealable. See, e.g., 18 James Wm. Moore, Moore’s
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`Federal Practice § 131.30[2][c][iv], at 131-101 (3d ed. 1998).
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`Congress could have, but did not, use clear language to provide that the
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`§ 315(e)(2) bar applies only after final agency action, including resolution of any
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`rehearing requests. For example, prior to the AIA, estoppel in inter partes
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`reexamination attached only after the challenged claims had been “finally
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`determined to be valid and patentable” after the conclusion of all judicial appeals.
`
`See 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (2011); Bettcher Indus. Inc. v. Bunzl U.S.A. Inc., 661 F.3d
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`629, 642-43 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Congress chose not to carry forward that aspect of
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`the inter partes reexamination statute, and instead, elected to have estoppel attach
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`as soon as the inter partes review “results in a final written decision.” This change
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`illustrates that Congress intended estoppel to attach regardless whether the Board’s
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`decision would ultimately be subject to further review. Thus, especially when one
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`considers that Congress made § 315(e)(2)’s bar indifferent to outcome, it can
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`reasonably be inferred that Congress was more concerned with accelerating the
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`effect of the bar