Paper No. ___
`
`Filed on behalf of:
` IGT
`By: Matthew I. Kreeger
`
`Parisa Jorjani
`Morrison & Foerster LLP
`425 Market Street
`San Francisco, California 94105-2482
`Telephone: (415) 268-7000
`Facsimile: (415) 268-7522
`mkreeger@mofo.com
`pjorjani@mofo.com
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_______________________
`BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
`AND INTERFERENCES
`_______________________
`
`Zynga Inc.
`Junior Party
`(Application No. 10/658,836
`Inventors: Rolf E. Carlson and Michael W. Saunders),
`v.
`IGT
`Senior Party
`(Patent No. 7,168,089
`Inventors: Binh T. Nguyen, Michael M. Oberberger and
`Gregory Hopkins Parrott).
`_______________________
`Patent Interference No. 105,747 (RES)
`(Technology Center 2400)
`_______________________
`
`IGT’S OPPOSITION TO ZYNGA’S SUBSTANTIVE MOTION 3
`(For Judgment That IGT’s Involved Claims Are Unpatentable)
`
`sf-3313570
`
`Zynga Ex. 1006, p. 1
` Zynga v. IGT
` IPR2022-00199
`
`

`

`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`III. 
`IV. 
`
`V. 
`
`2. 
`
`D. 
`
`E. 
`
`F. 
`
`G. 
`
`Page
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... ii 
`I. 
`EVIDENCE IN OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION ........................................................... 1 
`II. 
`RESPONSE TO FACTS FROM MOTION AND STATEMENT OF
`MATERIAL FACTS IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION .................................................... 1 
`INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1 
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ................................................................................................ 2 
`A. 
`Legal Standards for Claim Construction................................................................. 2 
`B. 
`The IGT Patent ........................................................................................................ 2 
`C. 
`Meaning of the IGT Patent’s Claim Terms............................................................. 3 
`1. 
`“Software Authorization Agent” ................................................................. 3 
`2. 
`“Request for Transfer of Gaming Software” Limitation ............................ 6 
`THE IGT PATENT CLAIMS ARE NOT OBVIOUS ........................................................ 6 
`A. 
`The Law of Obviousness ........................................................................................ 7 
`B. 
`The ’834 patent ....................................................................................................... 8 
`C. 
`Differences between the Claims of the IGT Patent and the ’834
`Patent....................................................................................................................... 9 
`1. 
`The ’834 patent does not disclose a “software authorization
`agent.” ......................................................................................................... 9 
`The ’834 patent does not teach the “request for transfer of
`gaming software” limitation. .................................................................... 12 
`Additional Differences between Claim 1 of the IGT Patent and the
`’834 Patent ............................................................................................................ 14 
`Additional Differences between Claim 52 of the IGT Patent and
`the ’834 Patent ...................................................................................................... 16 
`Additional Differences between Claim 84 of the IGT Patent and
`the ’834 Patent ...................................................................................................... 18 
`The ’834 Patent Does Not Render the Claims of the IGT Patent
`Obvious ................................................................................................................. 20 
`1. 
`The IGT claims are not obvious. ............................................................... 20 
`2. 
`Independent Claim 1 and dependent Claims 2- 27 are not
`obvious. ..................................................................................................... 22 
`Independent Claim 52, and dependent Claims 53-84 are not
`obvious. ..................................................................................................... 23 
`Independent Claim 84, and dependent Claims 85-102, are
`not obvious. ............................................................................................... 23 
`ZYNGA’S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
`ITS MOTION .................................................................................................................... 24 
`VII.  CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 24 
`
`3. 
`
`4. 
`
`VI. 
`
`sf-3313570
`
`i
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`Zynga Ex. 1006, p. 2
` Zynga v. IGT
` IPR2022-00199
`
`

`

`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`CASES
`
`Bruning v. Hirose,
`161 F.3d 681, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1934 (Fed. Cir. 1998) .................................................................7
`
`Graham v. John Deere Co.,
`383 U.S. 1, 148 U.S.P.Q. 459 (1966).........................................................................................7
`
`Hearing Components, Inc. v. Shure Inc.,
`600 F.3d 1357, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ...............................................................7
`
`Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc.,
`688 F.3d 1342, 104 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ...........................................................22
`
`Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co.,
`103 F.3d 1538, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1238 (Fed. Cir. 1997),
`abrogated on other grounds by
`Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc.,
`525 U.S. 55, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1641 (1998) ................................................................................22
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) ...............................................2
`
`Procter & Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharma.,
`566 F.3d 989, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2009) .................................................................7
`
`Spectralytics, Inc. v. Cordis Corp.,
`649 F.3d 1336, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d 1012 (Fed. Cir. 2011) .........................................................7, 19
`
`Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
`655 F.3d 1364, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d 1924 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ...........................................................7, 8
`
`Takeda Chem. Indus. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd..,
`492 F.3d 1350, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ...............................................................7
`
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`
`37 C.F.R. § 41.208(b) ......................................................................................................................7
`
`sf-3313570
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`ii
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`Zynga Ex. 1006, p. 3
` Zynga v. IGT
` IPR2022-00199
`
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`I.
`
`EVIDENCE IN OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION
`Pursuant to Standing Order ¶ 122.4.1, a list of the exhibits relied upon in support of this
`Opposition is attached as Appendix 1.
`
`II.
`
`RESPONSE TO FACTS FROM MOTION AND STATEMENT OF MATERIAL
`FACTS IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION
`
`As provided in the Standing Order ¶ 122.4.2.1, Appendix 2 of this opposition is a statement
`responding to each material fact alleged in Zynga’s motion, as well as additional material facts upon
`which this opposition relies.
`
`III.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`Zynga moves to invalidate all of the claims of International Gaming Technology’s (“IGT’s”)
`Patent No. 7,168,089 (“IGT patent”), asserting that IGT’s independent claims are obvious in light of
`Zynga’s Patent No. 7,260,834 (“’834 patent”) alone, or in combination with Patent No. 6,805,634
`(“Wells”). The ’834 patent is entitled “cryptography and certificate authorities in gaming machines,”
`and, as its name suggests, primarily is direct to encryption techniques, which ensure the secrecy of
`information transmitted in a gaming network, and the use of certificate authority servers and other
`techniques to verify the identity of users on the network (authentication). The patent does not
`concern the transfer of gaming software, and, therefore, does not address the fundamental problem
`solved by the invention of the IGT patent – how to authorize and monitor transfers of gaming
`software, so as to be able to download gaming software and comply with the regulatory framework
`associated with transfers of gaming software.
`As a result, the ’834 patent does not disclose or make obvious a limitation included in all of
`the IGT claims – the “software authorization agent.” The “software authorization agent” is a device
`that authorizes (that is approves or rejects) specific transfers of gaming software based on the
`applicable rules, and monitors (that is tracks) these transfers. The ‘834 patent also does not disclose a
`“request” for the transfer of specific gaming software, another limitation of all of IGT’s claims.
`Additionally, the ’834 patent does not teach other limitations included in independent Claims 1, 52
`and 84, which further distinguish these claims from the prior art. Finally, Wells, which Zynga only
`relies on for its teaching of the transfer of gaming software, does not remedy these deficiencies.
`
`sf-3313570
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`Zynga Ex. 1006, p. 4
` Zynga v. IGT
` IPR2022-00199
`
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`Therefore, one of ordinary skill would have understood that the ’834 patent does not render any of
`the IGT patent’s claims obvious, either alone or in combination with Wells.
`
`IV.
`
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`A.
`Legal Standards for Claim Construction
`Claim construction requires the Board to determine the meaning of disputed claim terms “to a
`person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing
`date of the patent application.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-13, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321,
`1326 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Here, the relevant date is April 3, 2002, the filing date of the
`application that issued as the IGT patent. (Ex. 1001; see also Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 4-6 (describing level of
`skill at that time).) Claim construction begins with an examination of the language of the asserted
`claims. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1325. Where the meaning of a claim term
`as understood by persons of skill in the art is not immediately apparent, the Board looks to publicly
`available sources, such as “‘the words of the claims themselves, the remainder of the specification,
`the prosecution history, and extrinsic evidence concerning relevant scientific principles.’” Id. at
`1314, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1327 (citations omitted). The specification “is the single best guide to the
`meaning of a disputed term,” and “[u]sually, it is dispositive.” Id. at 1315, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1327
`(citations omitted).
`
`The IGT Patent
`B.
`The IGT patent concerns gaming systems in which gaming software and gaming information
`may be securely transmitted over “a public network such as the Internet.” (Ex. 1001 at 4:28-30.) In
`particular, the IGT patent teaches methods and systems that allow gaming software to be downloaded
`electronically from one device to another in a manner that permits compliance with regulations
`governing the highly regulated gaming industry. A device called the “software authorization agent”
`authorizes and monitors the transfers of gaming software, allowing the gaming software to be
`downloaded electronically by the individual player terminals or gaming machines. (Id. at 4:37-40;
`24:38-43.) The invention of the IGT patent represents a considerable advance over the prior art
`because it enables the electronic installation of gaming software, and avoids the need for manually
`checking the software before installation. (Id. at 24:56–25:5; Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 19-20.)
`
`sf-3313570
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`Zynga Ex. 1006, p. 5
` Zynga v. IGT
` IPR2022-00199
`
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`C.
`
`Meaning of the IGT Patent’s Claim Terms
`1.
`“Software Authorization Agent”
`Each of the independent claims of the IGT patent includes the term “software authorization
`agent.” (Ex. 1001 at Claims 1, 28, 52, 65, 84, 103, and 123; Ex. 1021 ¶ 21.) As Zynga’s expert
`concedes, the term lacks a clear ordinary and customary meaning. (Ex. 2001 ¶ 23; Ex. 1021 ¶ 22.)
`When “software authorization agent” is construed light of the IGT patent specification and claims, it
`would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art to mean “a device that authorizes (that is
`approves or rejects) specific transfers of gaming software based on the applicable rules, and monitors
`(that is tracks) these transfers,” as explained by Dr. William K. Bertram, an expert with more than
`three decades of experience in the gaming industries. (Ex. 1016 ¶¶ 1-7; Ex. 1021 ¶ 21.)
`The IGT specification compels this construction. It states, “For regulatory and tracking
`purposes, the transfer of gaming software between the two gaming devices may be authorized and
`monitored by a software authorization agent.” (Ex. 1001 at 4:37-40; Abstract (emphasis added).)
`The specification further describes the functions of the software authorization agent: “In general, the
`gaming software authorization agent 50 approves all gaming software transactions between two
`gaming device in the gaming software distribution network and stores a record of the gaming
`software transactions.” (Id. at 24:38-43 (emphasis added); Ex. 1021 ¶ 22.)
`The importance of the software authorization agent performing the dual functions of
`authorizing and monitoring transfers of gaming software results from the regulatory environment
`surrounding gaming software and its transfer. (Ex. 1021 ¶ 23.) The IGT specification explains this
`point. It notes that “gaming software that is used to play a game of chance on a gaming machine is
`typically highly regulated to ensure fair play and prevent cheating.” (Ex. 1001 at 24:50-53.)
`Therefore, “at any given time, it is important for a gaming regulatory entity to know what gaming
`software is installed on a gaming machine at any particular time.” (Id. at 24:54-56.) At the time the
`IGT patent was filed, regulatory bodies would manually check the gaming software before it was
`installed in the gaming machine. (Id. at 24:56-62.) The software authorization agent allows the
`software to be installed without this time consuming process. (Id. at 24:62–25:4.) In particular,
`“[t]he gaming software authorization agent 50 meets this need by allowing gaming software to be
`
`sf-3313570
`
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`Zynga Ex. 1006, p. 6
` Zynga v. IGT
` IPR2022-00199
`
`

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`electronically transferred between gaming devices, such as game servers and gaming machines, in a
`manner that may be easily monitored and regulated.” (Id. at 25:1-4 (emphasis added); Ex. 2012
`¶ 23.)
`“Monitor” is used in the IGT specification consistently with its ordinary meaning of “to keep
`track of.” (Ex. 1017; Ex. 1021 ¶ 24.) The authorization agent performs this function by “stor[ing] a
`record of the gaming software transactions.” (Ex. 1001 at 24:41-42; see also id. at Figure 8 & 24:32-
`36) In this manner, “given an initial distribution of gaming software in the gaming software
`distribution network 90 for each gaming device, the gaming software authorization records may be
`used to track the gaming software distribution for gaming devices in the gaming distribution network
`as a function [sic] time.” (Id. at 27:63-28:3; Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 24-25.)
`The other function performed by the software authorization agent, “authorizing” the transfer
`of gaming software, refers to approving or rejecting a specific transfer of gaming software based on
`the applicable rules. (Ex. 1021 ¶ 26.) The IGT specification describes “sending the gaming software
`transaction request to a gaming software authorization agent that approves or rejects the transfer of
`gaming software from the second gaming device.” (Ex. 1001 at 8:11-14; 9:12-14) (emphasis added).
`It further discloses that “[t]he software authorization agent may be generally characterized as
`comprising: . . . 2) a processor configured or designed to . . . (ii) approve or reject the gaming
`software transaction request. . . .” (Id. at 9:53-62 (emphasis added); see also id. at 29:33-36; Ex.
`1021 ¶ 26.) The IGT specification also teaches various rules or criteria the software authorization
`agent may employ to determine whether to approve a specific transfer of gaming software. For
`example, the software authorization agent may consult a database containing information identifying
`gaming devices that are allowed to receive gaming software downloads, or may only permit the
`downloading if software identification information in the request matches the identification
`information in the authorization agent’s database. (Ex. 1001 at 33:35-43-48; Ex. 1021 ¶ 27.)
`The IGT patent’s claims similarly demonstrate that the software authorization agent approves
`or rejects specific transfers of gaming software based on the applicable rules. Independent Claim
`103, for example, provides that the software authorization agent comprises a processor to “approve
`or reject the gaming software transaction request,” and Claim 65 recites “sending the gaming
`
`sf-3313570
`
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`Zynga Ex. 1006, p. 7
` Zynga v. IGT
` IPR2022-00199
`
`

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`software transaction request to a gaming software authorization agent that approves or rejects the
`transfer of gaming software from the second gaming device.” (Id. at Claims 65 & 103 (emphasis
`added); Ex. 1021 ¶ 28.) Although the independent claims do not expressly state the bases on which
`the software authorization agent decides to approve or reject specific transfers, the dependent claims
`underscore that a rule-based method is used, and provide examples of applicable rules to be used to
`make this determination. In Claim 8, for example, authorization is denied when the access
`information in the gaming software transaction request does not match access information stored in a
`database, and in Claim 10, authorization is denied when the gaming software identification in the
`gaming software transaction request does not match the software identification information stored in
`a database. (Ex. 1001 at Claims 8 & 10; Ex. 1021 ¶ 29.)
`Additionally, the way the term “authorize” or “authorization” generally is used in the area of
`computer security also supports interpreting “authorizing the transfer of gaming software,” as used in
`the IGT specification, to mean approving or rejecting a specific transfer of software based on the
`applicable rules. (Ex. 1016 ¶ 36.) In this context, “authorization establishes what a user is allowed to
`do.” (Id.; Ex. 1018 at 16.) It “determine[s] his or her access privileges.” (Ex. 1018 at 16.)
`Finally, as its name suggests, the “software authorization agent” authorizes and monitors the
`transfer of “gaming software” only, and not the transfer of other information. (Ex. 1021 ¶ 31.) In
`sum, as properly construed, “software authorization agent” means “a device that authorizes (that is
`approves or rejects) specific transfers of gaming software based on the applicable rules, and monitors
`(that is tracks) these transfers.” (Id. ¶ 32.)
`Zynga’s proposed construction of “software authorization agent,” “a computer or processor
`responsible for authorizing the transfer of gaming software in a game play system,” (Mot. at 5), is
`incomplete. (Ex. 1021 ¶ 33.) First, Zynga ignores the monitoring function of the software
`authorization agent described in the IGT specification and claims. (Id.) Indeed, Zynga selectively
`quotes from the specification in the sentence it relies on as support for its definition, deleting the end
`of the quoted sentence, which states “and stores a record of the gaming software transactions.” (Mot.
`at 5; Ex. 1001 at 24:42-43.) Second, Zynga fails to define the term “authorizing,” as used in its
`proposed construction. However, based on its quotation from Claim 1, Zynga appears to agree that
`
`sf-3313570
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`5
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`Zynga Ex. 1006, p. 8
` Zynga v. IGT
` IPR2022-00199
`
`

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`“authorizing” means “approving or rejecting.” (See Mot. at 5.) IGT believes that it is important to
`include in the definition that the approving or rejecting is of specific transfers of gaming software
`(based on the applicable rules), to make clear that in performing its authorizing function, the
`“software authorization agent” evaluates whether to approve a request to transfer a specific software
`program (see, e.g., Ex. 1001 at 8:11-14; 9:12-14), as opposed to authorizing transfers of gaming
`software in general. (Ex. 1021 ¶ 33.) The software authorization agent would not serve its purpose
`of regulating transfers of gaming software to facilitate compliance with applicable regulations, if its
`authorization of software transfers were not directed to specific transfers. (Id.)
`
`“Request for Transfer of Gaming Software” Limitation
`2.
`Most of the IGT patent’s claims require a “request” for the transfer of gaming software.
`(Ex. 1001 at Claims 1, 28, 65, 84, 103, 123; Ex. 1021 ¶ 34.) (Claim 52 is the only independent
`claims that does not include this requirement.) This limitation is expressed in different ways, such as
`“a gaming software transaction request,” “gaming software transaction requests,” “a request for the
`transfer of gaming software,” and “a gaming software download request message.” (Ex. 1001 at
`Claims 1, 28, 65, 84, 103, 123; Ex. 1021 ¶ 35.) Although the exact words used to describe this
`limitation are slightly different in the various claims, they all describe the same concept: that the
`request is for the transfer of certain gaming software. (Ex. 1021 ¶ 36.) Moreover, the IGT claims
`and specification, make clear that the transfer of gaming software is between two devices, the “first
`gaming device” and the “second gaming device,” that are separate from the software authorization
`agent. (Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 37-41.) Thus, independent Claims 1, 28, 65, 84, 103, and 123 require a request
`for the transfer of certain gaming software, where the transfer of gaming software is between two
`devices that are separate from the software authorization agent (the “request for transfer of gaming
`software” limitation). (Id. ¶ 42.)
`
`V.
`
`THE IGT PATENT CLAIMS ARE NOT OBVIOUS
`Zynga contends that each of IGT’s independent claims is obvious in light of the ’834 patent
`alone or in combination with Wells. Zynga is incorrect. First, the ’834 patent does not disclose two
`of the limitations included in all of IGT’s claims – the “software authorization agent” and the
`“request for transfer of gaming software” limitations. Second, Claims 1, 52 and 84 include additional
`
`sf-3313570
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`6
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`Zynga Ex. 1006, p. 9
` Zynga v. IGT
` IPR2022-00199
`
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`limitations that also are not taught by the ’834 patent. Finally, Wells, which Zynga only relies on for
`its teaching of the transfer of gaming software, does not remedy these deficiencies. Therefore,
`the ’834 patent does not render obvious any of the IGT patent’s claims obvious, either alone or in
`combination with Wells. (Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 43-44.)
`
`The Law of Obviousness
`A.
`As the moving party, Zynga bears the burden of proving obviousness by a preponderance of
`the evidence. 37 C.F.R. § 41.208(b); Bruning v. Hirose, 161 F.3d 681, 686, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1934,
`1939 (Fed. Cir. 1998). A claim is obvious if “the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious
`at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
`matter pertains.” Procter & Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharma., 566 F.3d 989, 994, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d 1947,
`1949 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The obviousness determination, a question of law, turns on underlying factual
`inquiries involving: (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) differences between the claims at
`issue and the prior art, (3) the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art, and (4) where presented,
`evidence of secondary factors. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17, 148 U.S.P.Q. 459, 476
`(1966).
`A factor to be considered in determining obviousness is whether a prior art reference “teaches
`away” from the claimed invention. A reference teaches away when, upon reading the reference, a
`person of ordinary skill in the art would be “led away from the direction taken by the patentee.”
`Spectralytics, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 649 F.3d 1336, 1343, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d 1012, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
`“‘Teaching away’ does not require that the prior art foresaw the specific invention that was later
`made, and warned against taking that path.” Id.
`When relying on a combination of prior art references to prove obviousness, it is important to
`identify “a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to
`combine the elements in the way the claimed new invention does.” Takeda Chem. Indus. v.
`Alphapharm Pty., Ltd.., 492 F.3d 1350, 1356-57, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 1169, 1174 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting
`KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 1396 (2007)); accord Hearing
`Components, Inc. v. Shure Inc., 600 F.3d 1357, 1374, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 1397 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see
`also Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 655 F.3d 1364, 1374-75, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d 1924,
`
`sf-3313570
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`Zynga Ex. 1006, p. 10
` Zynga v. IGT
` IPR2022-00199
`
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`1931 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (a fact finder must determine “whether there is a motivation to combine
`teachings from separate references”). “Importantly, the great challenge of the obviousness judgment
`is proceeding without any hint of hindsight.” Star Scientific, 655 F.3d at 1375, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d at
`1932.
`
`The ’834 patent
`B.
`According to the ’834 patent, the patent’s invention “provides a method and apparatus that
`allows secure communication in a casino between networked gaming machines and a gaming server.
`With the present invention, privacy is ensured; communication is authenticated, and messages cannot
`be repudiated.” (Ex. 2005 at 2:41-45; see Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 46-47.) Privacy (also called confidentiality),
`authentication, and non-repudiation are three aspects of network security. (Ex. 1021 ¶ 48.)
`“Authentication provides assurance for the claimed identity of a user – it verifies that you are who
`you claim you are.” (Ex. 1018 at 10.) “Confidentiality, also known as secrecy, ensures that data is
`not revealed or disclosed to unauthorized people.” (Id. at 16.) “Encryption is a common mechanism
`to implement the confidentiality service.” (Id. at 17.) “Nonrepudiation services prevent a party
`involved in a communication from later falsely denying having participated in all or part of the
`communication.” (Id.) The ’834 patent explains at length how to ensure privacy through encryption
`of the information transmitted. (Ex. 2005 at Col. 4:48-9:19) It also discloses how a communication
`may be authenticated, for example, by the use of a certificate authority server (id. at 10:11-28), and
`notes that the system can implement non-repudiation through “[c]ryptographic services” (id. at 1:44-
`48; Ex. 1021 ¶ 49).
`The ’834 patent, however, does not describe the performance of the authorization aspect of
`security taught in the IGT patent. (Ex. 1021 ¶ 50.) That is, it does not disclose approving or rejecting
`specific transfers of gaming software (or indeed any information) based on the relevant rules. This
`may be because the ’834 patent does not concern the transfer of gaming software, and the procedures
`disclosed in the IGT patent to facilitate compliance with regulations relating to transfers of gaming
`software are not needed for transfers of gaming information. (Ex. 1021 ¶ 51.) Instead of authorizing
`specific transfers of gaming information, in the embodiments of the gaming systems of the ’834
`patent, after the relevant devices or users are authenticated, and a secure communication channel has
`
`sf-3313570
`
`8
`
`Zynga Ex. 1006, p. 11
` Zynga v. IGT
` IPR2022-00199
`
`

`

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`been established by the transfer of the appropriate encryption key(s), all information may be
`transferred. (See, e.g., 1005 at 11:61-67; Ex. 1021 ¶ 50.) As explained in more detail below, the
`systems taught in the ’834 patent do not include a device that evaluates whether any given transfer of
`information should or should not be allowed. (Ex. 1021 ¶ 50.)
`
`C.
`
`Differences between the Claims of the IGT Patent and the ’834 Patent
`1.
`The ’834 patent does not disclose a “software authorization agent.”
`A “software authorization agent” is “a device that authorizes (that is approves or rejects)
`specific transfers of gaming software based on the applicable rules, and monitors (that is tracks) these
`transfers.” The ’834 patent does not teach a “software authorization agent,” which is a limitation of
`each of the claims of the IGT patent. (Id. ¶ 52.)
`First, the term “software authorization agent” does not appear anywhere in Zynga’s ’834
`patent. (Id. ¶ 53.) Moreover, as explained above, nowhere does the ’834 patent disclose a device that
`authorizes (that is, approves or rejects) specific transfers of any information based on applicable
`rules, whether that is “gaming information,” “gaming software,” or anything else. It, therefore, does
`not teach a device that also monitors (that is tracks) the authorized transfers. (Id.) Finally, the ’834
`patent does not describe, or even contemplate, any transfer of gaming software, and, thus, does not
`authorize or monitor specific transfers of gaming software. (Id.)
`On page 2, lines 2-3, Zynga argues that the gaming server 110 described in the ’834 patent is
`an example of the “authorization agent” of the IGT patent’s claims. (Ex. 2015 ¶ 182; Mot. at 2). In
`describing his basis for characterizing the gaming server as an “authorization agent,” Zynga’s expert
`asserts that the gaming server receives a request from the remote computer 150 for authorization to
`transfer data to the gaming machine 120, and responds with a message authorizing the transfer. (Ex.
`2015 ¶ 184.) IGT’s response is that Zynga’s expert does not accurately describe the operation of the
`gaming server, and when its operation is properly analyzed, it is clear that the gaming server is not an
`“authorization agent.”
`The gaming server does not approve or deny requests from the remote computer to transfer
`specific information to another device. (Ex. 1021 ¶ 54.) Rather, the gaming server approves or
`denies requests for access to the gaming machine by a remote player using a remote computer. (Id.
`
`sf-3313570
`
`9
`
`Zynga Ex. 1006, p. 12
` Zynga v. IGT
` IPR2022-00199
`
`

`

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`¶ 55.) The remote player makes a request for access to the gaming server, by “entering identification
`information that uniquely identifies the remote player of the remote computer,” such as a password or
`credit card information. (Ex. 2005 at 11:27-33.) The gaming server compares the identification
`information with the entries in a database, and, if there is a match, allows the remote computer to
`connect to the gaming machine. (Id. at 11:33-40.) The gaming server thus performs a classic
`authentication function, not an authorization function. (Ex. 1021 ¶ 55.)
`Authentication and authorization are two security functions that are sometimes confused,
`although they serve very different purpos