`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`
`
`TRILLER, INC.,
`Petitioner
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`
`v.
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`TIKTOK PTE. LTD,
`Patent Owner
`
`
`
`U.S. Patent No. 9,648,132
`IPR2022-00179
`
`U.S. Patent No. 9,992,322
`IPR2022-0180
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`
`SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF MICHAEL SHAMOS, PH.D.
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`
`Supplemental Declaration of Michael Shamos. Ph.D.
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`TRILLER EXHIBIT 1031-001
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 1
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ........................................................................... 2
`A.
`“software application” .......................................................................... 2
`B.
`“track meta-data that is formed as a separate meta-data layer” ........... 6
`INHERENCY ................................................................................................. 7
`III.
`IV. MULTITASKING AND MULTITHREADING ......................................... 12
`V.
`SEPARATE META-DATA LAYER ........................................................... 27
`VI. CONCLUDING STATEMENT ................................................................... 32
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`I.
`II.
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`TRILLER EXHIBIT 1031-002
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`I, Michael Shamos, declare as follows:
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`Supplemental Declaration of Michael Shamos. Ph.D.
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
`I am over the age of eighteen (18) and otherwise competent to make
`1.
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`this Declaration.
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`2.
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`I have been retained by counsel for Petitioner as an independent
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`technical expert consultant in proceedings before the United States Patent and
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`Trademark Office challenging U.S. Patent 9,648,132 (IPR2022-0179) and U.S.
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`Patent 9,992,322 (IPR2022-0180) (“Challenged Patents”). I am being compensated
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`at my rate of $550 per hour for my services. No part of my compensation is
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`dependent on my opinions or on the outcome of this proceeding. I have no financial
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`interest in any of the parties to this proceeding.
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`3.
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`I previously submitted a declaration entitled “Declaration of Michael
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`Shamos, Ph.D.,” dated November 10, 2021 (“Shamos I”). Shamos I is Exhibit 1025
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`in both IPRs 2022-00179 and 2022-00180. A single declaration is appropriate here
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`for both IPRs because the Challenged Patents are intimately related, in that the ’322
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`Patent is a continuation of the ’132 Patent, and both are continuations of U.S. Patent
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`9,924,430. Further, the Patent’s Owner’s POPRs and the Board’s Institution
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`Decisions in both IPRs raised substantially the same issues.
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`4. My background and qualifications were given in ¶¶ 9-21 of Shamos I,
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`which I incorporate herein by reference.
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`1
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`TRILLER EXHIBIT 1031-003
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`Supplemental Declaration of Michael Shamos. Ph.D.
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`II. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`“software application”
`A.
`5.
`On pages 8-10 of the Institution Decision for IPR2022-00179 (“the
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`’179 Institution Decision”) and on pages 8-10 of the Institution Decision for
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`IPR2022-00180 (“the ’180 Institution Decision”), the Board found that the term
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`“software application,” which appears, expressly or by dependency, in all the
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`Challenged Claims, should be construed “[a]t this stage of the proceeding” according
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`to the gloss provided for the capitalized term “Software Application,” which appears
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`in a “Definitions” section of the specification:
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`Software Application: The Client software application which is to be
`delivered over-the-air to, or pre-installed on, the Wireless Computing
`Device.
` This ostensible definition raises more questions than it answers,
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`6.
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`however, and should not be applied to the claims in my opinion. First, the definition
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`applies to the capitalized term “Software Application.” The specification uses
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`capitalized terms rather than lower-case terms to refer to defined terms and uses the
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`capitalized “Software Application” and the lower-case term “software application”
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`in different contexts. See ’132 patent, 8:6-9:14, 8:65; ’322 patent, 8:8-9:15, 8:67.
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`The Challenged Claims use only the lower-case term.
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`7.
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`Second, the definition by its own literal terms uses the lower-case term
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`to define the upper-case term, that is, “Software Application” is recited to be a type
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`of “software application.” The lack of further explanation of the lower-case term
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`2
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`TRILLER EXHIBIT 1031-004
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`“software application” in the specification indicates that the lower-case term has its
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`Supplemental Declaration of Michael Shamos. Ph.D.
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`ordinary meaning in the art.
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`8.
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`Third, the definition is itself ambiguous because the meaning of “pre-
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`installed” is unclear. The prefix “pre” means prior to some event, but that event is
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`not defined in the specification or the claims. “Pre-installed” could mean installed
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`prior to the sale of the device, prior to the first use of the device, or prior to the use
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`recited in the claims. My best interpretation, although I do not believe any is needed,
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`is that “pre-installed” means installed “before it reaches the end user.” This follows
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`from the specification at 57:52-54:
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`The preferred method for distributing the MusicStation application to
`a handset is to preload (preinstall) the application on the device before
`it reaches the end-user.
`Fourth, if applied to the claims, the definition creates a gaping logical
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`9.
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`hole. It is possible to have a software application that is not installed on the device
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`before it reaches the end user (not pre-installed), but is also not delivered over-the-
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`air. For example, the software application could be installed on the device by
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`inserting a SIM card with the software application into the device after reaching the
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`end user. In that instance, the “software application” would not be a “Software
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`Application” because it would not conform to the supposed definition. Yet there is
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`no suggestion in the specification that such a “software application” would not fall
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`within the scope of the claims. Surely a POSITA reading the claims would not view
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`TRILLER EXHIBIT 1031-005
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`a device using such a software application on a SIM card (or delivered other than
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`Supplemental Declaration of Michael Shamos. Ph.D.
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`over-the-air) as falling within a non-infringement loophole.
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`10.
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`It is therefore my opinion that “software application” should take its
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`plain and ordinary meaning.
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`11.
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`In any event, whether plain meaning or the proposed “Software
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`Application” definition is used does not matter in this proceeding, which is another
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`reason construction is unnecessary. Abrams’ disclosure of a Web browser executing
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`on user devices 106 and 108 so as to receive and render Web pages from a Web
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`server and Abrams’ disclosure that user devices 106 and 108 can be “cellular
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`telephones” means that it would have been well within the general knowledge of a
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`POSITA and obvious to a POSITA that the browser on a “cellular telephone” would
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`have been installed on the cellular telephone either before reaching the end user or
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`installed on the cellular telephone over the air, i.e., over a wireless connection using
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`the telephone’s “cellular” capabilities. As I pointed out in Shamos I, Exhibit 1019
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`shows that smartphones with browsers were well-known and commercially available
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`by at least 2006 and 2007. (Ex. 1025, p. 76.) A POSITA would have understood that
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`those smartphones had “pre-installed” browsers. (E.g., Ex. 1019, p. 16 (“by default,
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`it opens the Web browser”), p. 20 (“the WAP wireless 2.0 Web browser”), p. 22 (“its
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`WAP 2.0 wireless Web browser”).) It would thus have been well within the general
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`knowledge of a POSITA and obvious to a POSITA to implement Abrams’ system
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`TRILLER EXHIBIT 1031-006
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`using a “cellular telephone” that had a pre-installed browser because cellular
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`Supplemental Declaration of Michael Shamos. Ph.D.
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`telephones with pre-installed browsers were well-known and commercially
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`available at the time.
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`12. Further, the claimed “software application” can be a browser, provided
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`it meets all the limitations recited for the “software application.” Patent Owner
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`argues otherwise at pp. 3-11 of the ’179 POPR (and pages 3-11 of the ’180 POPR),
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`but the Institution Decisions have rightly rejected those arguments. (’179 Institution
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`Decision, pp. 10-12; ’180 Institution Decision, pp. 10-12.)
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`13. Even if the “software application” of the claims cannot be a browser, a
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`proposition I dispute, it would have been obvious to use a dedicated application on
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`Abrams’ cellular telephone instead. It would have been trivial, well within the
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`general knowledge of a POSITA, and obvious for a POSITA to use a dedicated
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`application on Abrams’ cellular telephone to perform the functions of Abrams’
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`browser. A POSITA would have understood that this would have simply required
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`implementing Abrams’ web page functions into code for the dedicated application.
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`It would have been advantageous to develop a dedicated application, as it would not
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`have to provide all of the functions of a browser and would therefore be more
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`compact. As explained in Shamos I, both Khedouri and Partovi describe the use of
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`a dedicated application. Ex. 1025, pp. 121, 46-51, 102, 40-46. It would have been
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`obvious and well within the level of skill for a POSITA to implement the
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`5
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`TRILLER EXHIBIT 1031-007
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`functionality of Abrams’ web pages in a dedicated application such as Khedouri’s
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`Supplemental Declaration of Michael Shamos. Ph.D.
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`or Partovi’s.
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`“track meta-data that is formed as a separate meta-data layer”
`B.
`14. This term is recited expressly in what I have referred to as the “Layer
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`Claims,” namely ’132 claim 6 and ’322 claim 35.
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`15.
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`I explained in Shamos I (¶¶ 66-75) that this term has no ascertainable
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`meaning, principally because there is no explanation in the specification of what it
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`means to be “formed as a separate meta-data layer.” The only use of the term “layer”
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`in the specification is in connection with a “transport layer” (Ex. 1001, ’132 Patent,
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`38:37-43; Ex. 1002, ’322 Patent, 38:63-39:2), but that disclosure has to do with the
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`use of HTTP and TCP/IP transport protocols, not track meta-data. The term “layer”
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`has no well-understood meaning in the art with respect to meta-data, and the
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`specification offers no explanation of what it is that the “meta-data layer” must be
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`separate from. Nothing in the Patent Owner’s POPRs or the Board’s Institution
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`Decisions has changed my opinion that “track meta-data that is formed as a separate
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`meta-data layer” does not have a reasonably ascertainable meaning.
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`16. Nevertheless, I provided opinions of obviousness based on Patent
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`Owner’s incorrect proposals in related litigation, namely that Patent Owner believes
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`that “track meta-data that is formed as a separate meta-data layer” means one or
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`more of (1) “track meta-data that exists separately from the music track” (although
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`TRILLER EXHIBIT 1031-008
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`it is not clear why that would in any way be a “layer”); or (2) “track meta-data that
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`Supplemental Declaration of Michael Shamos. Ph.D.
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`exists in any way from other forms of meta-data” (although it is not clear why that
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`would in any way be a “layer”); or (3) “track meta-data that is stored in a separate
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`database” (although it is not clear what the database has to be separate from and it is
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`also not clear why that would in any way be a “layer”). The Institution Decisions do
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`not appear to adopt any of these interpretations as the correct interpretation but
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`merely appear to assume, for purposes of analyzing priority and the prior art, that
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`they reflect Patent Owner’s interpretation. But Patent Owner’s POPR did not commit
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`to any interpretation either. The ’179 Institution Decision at fn. 15 (and the ’180
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`Institution Decision at fn. 18) says that Petitioner “sets forth the potential
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`interpretations for the phrase” “track meta-data that is formed as a separate meta-
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`data layer.” However, my understanding is that Petitioner merely tried to discern
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`the ways in which Patent Owner might be interpreting that term, and none of them
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`is correct.
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`III.
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`INHERENCY
`17. The ’179 Institution Decision at 23, 27 and the ’180 Institution Decision
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`at 24, 29 invite the parties to address inherency issues, namely (a) “whether ‘over a
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`wireless connection’ is necessarily present from Abrams’ disclosure of a cellular
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`device,” and (b) whether “(i) the browser would inherently be embodied on a non-
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`TRILLER EXHIBIT 1031-009
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`transitory storage medium in Abrams, (ii) Abrams’ cellular telephone would
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`Supplemental Declaration of Michael Shamos. Ph.D.
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`inherently be a smartphone, and (iii) the profiles would inherently be editable.”
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`18. As to (a), Patent Owner asserts in its POPR that when user devices 106
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`and 108 in Abrams are implemented as the disclosed “cellular telephones,” the
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`functions specified in the claims and disclosed in Abrams do not “inherently” occur
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`“over a wireless connection” because the “cellular telephones” might also have a
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`wired connection. (POPR, 13-24.) But regardless of whether the “cellular
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`telephones” disclosed in Abrams might also have wired connections, they clearly
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`have wireless connections. As I stated on page 63 of Shamos I, “[w]ireless
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`connections are disclosed in Abrams because the user device can be a wireless
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`‘cellular telephone’ or ‘personal digital assistant[].’” In other words, Abrams’
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`disclosure that user devices 106 and 108 can be implemented as “cellular
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`telephones” is a disclosure that user devices 106 and 108 can perform their functions
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`over a wireless connection, regardless of whether they could also perform those
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`functions over a wired connection. The purpose of disclosing the use of a “cellular
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`telephone” in Abrams would be to take advantage of its “cellular” capabilities, so
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`that disclosure of the use of a “cellular telephone” is a disclosure of the use of a
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`wireless connection. A POSITA would understand that Abrams would not disclose
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`the use of a “cellular telephone” as user devices 106 and 108 if he intended for some
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`of the functions disclosed in Abrams to be performed only via a wired connection.
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`TRILLER EXHIBIT 1031-0010
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`It is in this sense that “all interactions between the ‘server apparatus 110’ and user
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`Supplemental Declaration of Michael Shamos. Ph.D.
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`devices 106 and 108 are inherently via a ‘wireless connection’ when the user device
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`is a ‘cellular telephone.’” (Ex. 1025, Shamos I, pp. 63, 66, 68-69, 70.)
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`19. Even if Abrams’ disclosure of the use of a “cellular telephone” for user
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`devices 106 and 108 does not disclose the use of a wireless connection for the
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`functions specified in the claims and disclosed in Abrams, it would have been well
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`within the general knowledge of and obvious to a POSITA from the disclosure of
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`the use of “cellular telephones” for user devices 106 and 108 that a wireless
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`connection should be used for those functions because, once again, that would be
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`the purpose of using a “cellular telephone.” The POPR argues that “Triller has not
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`argued that it would have been obvious to modify Abrams such that all
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`communications for performing the functions of elements [1.4]-[1.8] would have
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`occurred wirelessly.” (POPR, p. 22.) But it is not a matter of whether it would have
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`been obvious to modify Abrams in this manner; if not disclosed in Abrams, this is
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`how it would have been obvious to implement Abrams in accordance with its
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`disclosure, i.e., no modification of Abrams is necessary.
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`20. As to (b)(i), the user interface devices 106 and 108 on which a “user
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`interface” is presented “may be any device capable of presenting data, including, but
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`not limited to, cellular telephones, television sets or hand-held ‘personal digital
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`assistants’.” Abrams at [0077] discloses:
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`Supplemental Declaration of Michael Shamos. Ph.D.
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`The Web application server 130 is a system that sends out Web pages
`in response to Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) requests from
`remote browsers (i.e. users of the apparatus 110). That is, the Web
`server 130 provides the GUI 102 & 104 to users of the system in the
`form of Web pages. These Web pages sent to the user’s device 106 &
`108 would result in GUI screens 102 & 104 being displayed.
`21. Abrams thus discloses that devices 106 and 108 are capable of running
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`browsers to display Web pages. This, in turn, means that the “cellular telephone” of
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`Abrams is a smartphone, as only smartphones had the capability of processing Web
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`pages. The question in (b)(i) is whether it would have been inherent for a
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`smartphone to store a browser on a non-transitory storage medium. It would be.
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`This follows from the fact that a browser not stored on a non-transitory medium
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`would perforce be transitory; that is, it would be erased from memory each time the
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`device is powered down. Not only would downloading a browser at each power-up
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`be an extreme inconvenience to the user, I have never heard of such a scenario, and
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`Patent Owner has been unable to point to any device having a browser in which the
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`browser was not stored on a non-transitory storage medium. Further, I note that
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`Petitioner and I do not rely solely on inherency for storage of the browser on a non-
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`transitory storage medium. On pp. 61-62 of Shamos I, I explained that it was either
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`inherent in Abrams or obvious in view of Abrams that the browser software would
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`have been stored on a non-transitory memory.
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`22. As to (b)(ii), I have already addressed the point in the paragraph above.
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`A cellphone that was not a smartphone had no capability of processing and
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`10
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`TRILLER EXHIBIT 1031-0012
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`displaying web pages sent to the cellphone “in response to Hypertext Transfer
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`Supplemental Declaration of Michael Shamos. Ph.D.
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`Protocol (HTTP) requests” generated by the cellphone as Abrams discloses.
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`(Abrams, ¶ 77.) Abrams at ¶ 74 discloses that interface devices 106 and 108 “may
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`be any device capable of presenting data, including, but not limited to, cellular
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`telephones, television sets or hand-held ‘personal digital assistants.’” Abrams at ¶
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`77 says that “Web pages to the user’s device 106 & 108 would result in GUI screens
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`102 & 104 being displayed.” Any cellphone capable of performing the functions
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`disclosed in Abrams (e.g., display of web pages), would necessarily have been a
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`smartphone.
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`23. Further, I note that Petitioner and I do not rely solely on inherency for
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`establishing Abrams’ cellular telephone as a smartphone. On pp. 75-76 of Shamos
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`I, I explained that it was either inherent in Abrams or obvious in view of Abrams
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`that Abrams’ cellular telephone would have been implemented as a smartphone.
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`24. As to (b)(iii), the question is whether the profiles of Abrams would
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`inherently have been editable. I note, however, that Petitioner and I did not rely
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`solely on inherency for the ’322 claim 30 limitation, “wherein the profiles are
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`editable.” On pp. 76-77 of Shamos I, I explained that it was either inherent in
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`Abrams or obvious in view of Abrams that the profiles would have been editable.
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`25. Nevertheless, it would have been inherent that the profiles of Abrams
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`would be editable. Paragraph [0091] of Abrams contains a long list of “Profile Data”
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`11
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`TRILLER EXHIBIT 1031-0013
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`elements. Among these are “Interests,” which change over time. Four of the data
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`Supplemental Declaration of Michael Shamos. Ph.D.
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`elements are “Favorites” of various kinds, which also change over time. Another
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`element is “Income,” which also changes over time. A major purpose of Abrams is
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`“[i]ncreasing the ease of determining mutual interest among parties” [0037]. This
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`cannot be done if profiles are immutable and cannot be edited to contain correct and
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`up-to-date information. Asserting that profiles once entered cannot be changed
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`would frustrate this purpose of Abrams.
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`IV. MULTITASKING AND MULTITHREADING
`26. Pages 30-31 of the ’179 Institution Decision and pages 32-33 of the
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`’180 Institution Decision raise the issue whether the PCT application (Exhibit 1008)
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`to which the Patents claim priority contains support for these limitations:
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`“uses[/using] the multitasking architecture to balance the computational
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`demands of one or both of: a DRM program; media operations” (’132 claim
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`3, ’322 claim 32)
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`“uses[/using] a multithreaded architecture to balance the computational
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`demands of network access; and the computational demands of one or more
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`of: a user interface of the software application; a DRM program; media
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`operations.” (’132 claim 27, ’322 claim 56).
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`27. The Board wrote, in the ’179 Institution Decision at 30-31 (and in the
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`’180 Institution Decision at 32):
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`Petitioner relies on Dr. Shamos, who testifies that “[he] can see no
`disclosure of multithreading or multitasking
`to balance
`the
`computational demands of a DRM program” in the PCT application.
`Ex. 1025 ¶ 82. However, we assign little weight to that conclusion
`because it is not sufficiently explained or substantiated… For example,
`Dr. Shamos agrees that the PCT application describes a multithreaded
`architecture and identifies DRM as one of the processes performed by
`that architecture, but fails to explain why this discussion is insufficient
`to disclose the limitation [multithreading or multitasking to balance the
`computational demands of a DRM program]. See Ex. 1025 ¶ 82.
`28. Multitasking is a very old idea dating back to timesharing systems of
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`the 1960s. The concept is to apportion processor cycles among a plurality of
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`applications/tasks so
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`that
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`the applications/tasks appear
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`to be progressing
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`simultaneously. This enables a plurality of users to execute multiple programs on
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`the same processors. Consider, for example, two programs, A and B, each of which
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`requires half an hour of computer time. If the user of program B is forced to wait
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`for program A to finish, then program B will not even start for half an hour.
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`However, if every second of processor time is parceled out half a second to A and
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`half a second to B, then both programs A and B will begin at nearly the same time
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`(within half a second). There being no free lunch, each program will then take an
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`hour to complete because the processor only executes a given number of instructions
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`per second.
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`29. A very common use of multitasking was to avoid the effects of
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`“blocking.” Suppose, for example, that program A has a user interface that is
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`regularly asking the user to fill in data. While it is waiting for the user to type input,
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`A cannot proceed with any other calculations. Essentially the processor is in a state
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`Supplemental Declaration of Michael Shamos. Ph.D.
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`of suspense, not able to perform useful work. A multitasking system would see that
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`A is in a wait state (waiting for input), and would turn to executing a different
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`program B so that the processor cycles would not be wasted.
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`30. Multitasking can be used to balance computational demands (and that
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`is one of its ordinary and conventional purposes), but it is not always employed that
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`way. For example, suppose A would take 9 minutes if run alone, while B would
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`take 1 minute if run alone. The computational demands of A and B could be
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`“balanced” by apportioning 90% of the processor cycles to A and 10% to B instead
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`of asking the user of B to wait 9 minutes just to get started. In contrast, using
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`multitasking to avoid the effects of “blocking” is not using multitasking to balance
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`computational demands, as no “balancing” occurs.
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`31. Multithreading is essentially multitasking within a single executable
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`program. All of the examples above involving separate programs A and B could be
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`implemented in a single program C on a multithreaded architecture. C would be
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`considered to have two execution threads, A and B, but they would both be
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`controlled by the same program. Multithreading, like multitasking, can be used to
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`balance computational demands (and that is one of its ordinary and conventional
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`purposes), but it does not have to be used that way.
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`32.
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`I stated in Shamos I that the PCT application discloses a multitasking
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`architecture and a multithreaded architecture. However, the asserted claims require
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`more. For example, ’132 claim 3 recites, “wherein the software application uses the
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`multitasking architecture to balance the computational demands of one or both
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`of: a DRM program; media operations.” (Similarly in ’322 claim 32.) It does not
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`merely recite “the software application using a multitasking architecture.” That is,
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`a
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`specific purpose of
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`the multitasking architecture
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`is claimed
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`(“to
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`balance…computation demands”), and there is no disclosure of that purpose in the
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`entire PCT application.
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`33. The same is true of the other multitasking/multithreading claims. Claim
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`27 of the ’132 Patent recites, “wherein the software application uses a multithreaded
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`architecture to balance the computational demands of network access; and the
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`computational demands of one or more of: a user interface of the software
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`application; a DRM program; media operations.” (Similarly in ’322 claim 56.) It
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`does not merely recite “the software application uses a multithreaded architecture.”
`
`Rather, a specific purpose of the multithreaded architecture is claimed (“to
`
`balance…computational demands”), and there is no disclosure of that purpose in the
`
`entire PCT application.
`
`34.
`
`It is difficult to prove the non-existence of something by quoting
`
`material that itself does not exist. And it was not feasible for me to address in
`
`
`
`
`15
`
`TRILLER EXHIBIT 1031-0017
`
`
`
`
`Shamos I every passage in the 244-page PCT application that mentions
`
`Supplemental Declaration of Michael Shamos. Ph.D.
`
`multithreading or multitasking or DRM. Now that certain passages have been
`
`asserted to be relevant, I can address them below.
`
`35.
`
`I note first that the PCT application does not mention multitasking or
`
`multithreading in any claim.
`
`36. None of the passages of the PCT application cited in the Institution
`
`Decision (or cited in the POPR) discloses a software application that uses a
`
`multithreaded architecture (or a multitasking architecture) to “balance the
`
`computational demands of a DRM program.” There is no disclosure of a DRM
`
`program as being any thread or task of the multithreaded/multitasking architecture,
`
`and there is no disclosure anywhere of using that architecture to “balance the
`
`computational demands” of a DRM program.
`
`37. The ’179 Institution Decision at 29-30 and the ’180 Institution Decision
`
`at 32-33 cite numerous passages of Exhibit 1008 (cited in the POPR) that allegedly
`
`support the limitations. I will deal with each of them in turn in paragraphs 36-54
`
`below. It is important first to understand what the claimed “DRM program” does.
`
`This is not perfectly clear, as the PCT application does not use the term “DRM
`
`program” at all, and the Patents use it only in the claims. I do not argue that the term
`
`is indefinite, as a POSITA would take its ordinary meaning to be a “program that
`
`
`
`
`16
`
`TRILLER EXHIBIT 1031-0018
`
`
`
`
`performs digital rights management (DRM) functions.” Such a program is disclosed
`
`Supplemental Declaration of Michael Shamos. Ph.D.
`
`in the PCT application.
`
`38. For example, Ex. 1008 contains various DRM disclosures, including
`
`the DRM disclosures cited in the Institution Decisions:
`
`Industry standard music file protection by DRM. The DRM also enables
`the purchase of a music track such that the track can still be played if
`the subscription service is terminated. Ex. 1008, 8:3-4
`
`Digital Rights Management (DRM) provides a method to control and
`facilitate the legitimate distribution and use of digital media. Ex. 1008,
`104:18-19
`
`MusicStation's DRM is an implementation of the Open Mobile Alliance
`(OMA) DRM v2 specification. This specification has been widely
`adopted by both the mobile & music industries as their preferred
`method of protecting content for mobile devices. . . . Ex. 1008, 104:25-
`27
`
`6.3. Using MusicStation For The First Time
`Before a MusicStation application can be used by its owner it must first
`connect to the MusicStation Server so that it can be registered with the
`appropriate MusicStation Service and issued with a Client Certificate
`(and an associated Client Private Key) so that it may access the DRM
`protected music content which it downloads. In order to be issued with
`Rights Objects (containing the access rules and the keys to access the
`DRM protected content) the MusicStation application must also
`register with the Rights Issuer, this two-step registration process is
`described in this chapter.
`
`6.3.1. MusicStation Service Registration The first time MusicStation
`starts it knows that it needs to connect to the MusicStation Server in
`order to register with a Service and be equipped with a Client
`Certificate and the Client Private Key so that it may access DRM
`protected content. Ex. 1008, 110:9-20
`
`
`
`
`
`17
`
`TRILLER EXHIBIT 1031-0019
`
`
`
`
`
`Supplemental Declaration of Michael Shamos. Ph.D.
`
`6.3.1.3.3. MusicStation & Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) After a
`MusicStation Service Registration is successfully completed the Device
`will need to register with the Rights Issuer so that it may request Rights
`Objects and in turn access DRM content. Ex. 1008, 112:2-5
`
`6.4. Listening to Music In order to listen to music a MusicStation
`Device needs both the music file, stored as DRM protected content in
`the DRM Content Format (DCF), and the RO containing the Content
`Encryption Key (CEK) to unlock the DRM. Ex. 1008, 116:1-4
`
`6.4.3.1. Evaluating the Rights Expression Language (REL) Once a
`request is made to play a track, for which the relevant RO & DCF exist
`on the phone, the Rights Expression Language contained in the RO is
`parsed by the MusicStation DRM Agent. The REL defines the ways in
`which the content in the DCF associated with this RO can be consumed
`and used by the user. Ex. 1008, 118:12-16
`
`6.4.3.2. Decrypting the Content If the DRM Agent determines from the
`REL that the user is able to play the music then the 128-bit AES REK is
`used to gain access to the encrypted CEK for the associated DCF. Ex.
`1008, 118:25-27
`39. There is also a discussion at 105:1-106:16, which, together with the
`
`citations above, make clear that the DRM software has to validate the user’s
`
`credentials to verify that the user is authorized to receive the content. If so, the DRM
`
`software decrypts the content so it can be displayed to the user. Decryption must
`
`occur in real-time; otherwise, the user would see interruptions in the content stream.
`
`The PCT application does not disclose any need for multitasking or multithreading
`
`for balancing computational demands.
`
`40. The only express mention of “multitasking” in the PCT application is
`
`as follows:
`
`
`
`
`18
`
`TRILLER EXHIBIT 1031-0020
`
`
`
`
`
`Supplemental Declaration of Michael Shamos. Ph.D.
`
`the application is controlled using a multi-tasking context sensitive
`joystick. Ex. 1008, 10:9
`
`
`26. The method of any preceding Claim in which the application is
`controlled using a multi-tasking context sensitive joystick. Ex. 1008,
`165:24-25
`41. Now to multithreading. Claim 27 of the ’132 Patent recites, “wherein
`
`the software application uses a multithreaded architecture to balance the
`
`computational demands of network access; and the computational demands of
`
`one or more of: a user interface of the software application; a DRM program;
`
`media operations.” (Similarly in ’322 claim 56.)
`
`42. The
`
`first
`
`passage
`
`cited
`
`by
`
`the
`
`Board
`
`regarding
`
`multitasking/multithreading is Ex. 1008, 18:1-15. It reads:
`
`1.1. Multi-threading
`A key aspect of the player is that it performs multiple threads
`simultaneously. There are 3 main threads:
`
`
`• User Interface (UI) thread
`• Animation thread
`• Scheduler thread
`
`
`There is also an HTTP connection thread which actually downloads
`data and loads it into a buffer while the Scheduler thread reads from
`this so as not to be blocked by the connection.
`43. There is no expres
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