`___________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`___________
`
`
`TRILLER, INC.
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`TIKTOK PTE. LTD.
`Patent Owner
`
`
`
`Case No. IPR2022-00179
`U.S. Patent No. 9,648,132
`Issue Date: May 9, 2017
`
`Title: Method Of Enabling Digital Music Content To Be Downloaded To And
`Used On a Portable Wireless Computing Device
`
`
`
`
`
`PETITIONER’S MOTION
`TO SUBMIT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................ i
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.
`
`INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 1
`
`ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................. 1
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`Legal Standards ............................................................................................... 1
`
`There Is Good Cause for the Board to Allow Submission of
`Paragraphs 5-19 of
`the Supplemental Declaration Testimony
`Addressing Category 1 .................................................................................... 4
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`The Board Should Allow the Testimony in Paragraphs 5-11 of
`the Supplemental Declaration ............................................................... 4
`
`The Board Should Allow the Testimony in Paragraphs 12-13 of
`the Supplemental Declaration ............................................................... 6
`
`The Board Should Allow the Testimony in Paragraphs 18-19 of
`the Supplemental Declaration ............................................................... 8
`
`III. There Is Good Cause for the Board to Allow Submission of
`Paragraphs 18-21 of the Supplemental Declaration Addressing
`Category 2 ........................................................................................................ 9
`
`IV. There Is Good Cause for the Board to Allow Submission of
`Paragraphs 14-16 and 26-75 of the Supplemental Declaration
`Testimony Addressing Category 3 ................................................................ 10
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`The Board Should Allow the Testimony in Paragraphs 26-60 of
`the Supplemental Declaration ............................................................. 11
`
`The Board Should Allow the Testimony in Paragraphs 14-16
`and 61-75 of the Supplemental Declaration ........................................ 13
`
`CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 15
`
`
`
`
`
`i
`
`
`
`
`
`Cases
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
` Page(s)
`
`Genzyme Therapeutic Products Ltd. Partnership v. Biomarin
`Pharmaceutical Inc.,
`825 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ............................................................................ 2
`
`Nix v. Whiteside,
`475 U.S. 157 (1986) .............................................................................................. 3
`
`Pacific Market Int’l LLC v. Ignite USA, LLC,
`IPR2014-00561, Paper No. 23 .....................................................................passim
`
`Redline Detection, LLC v. Star Envirotech, Inc.,
`811 F.3d 435 (Fed. Cir. 2015) .......................................................................... 3, 6
`
`Technology Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc.,
`545 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .................................................................... 12, 14
`
`TechSearch, LLC v. Intel Corp.,
`286 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ............................................................................ 3
`
`Other Authorities
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.123 ................................................................................................. 2, 3
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.123(a) ......................................................................................... 1, 2, 3
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.123(b) and § 42.123(c) ...................................................................... 3
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`ii
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`
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.123(a) and pursuant to authorization from the
`
`Board in its email dated June 24, 2022, Petitioner Triller, Inc. (“Petitioner”) hereby
`
`files this motion to submit supplemental information. Specifically, Petitioner seeks
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`to submit the Supplemental Declaration of Dr. Michael I. Shamos (provisionally
`
`filed as Ex. 1031) to provide testimony addressing three categories of issues:
`
`(1) issues unanticipated by Petitioner, raised by Patent Owner for the first time in
`
`the Patent Owner Preliminary Response, and addressed by the Board in the
`
`Institution Decision (“Category 1”), (2) issues of inherency which the Board
`
`addressed in the Institution Decision and requested the parties to further address
`
`during trial (“Category 2”), and (3) passages identified for the first time in the
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`Patent Owner Preliminary Response (and then addressed in the Institution
`
`Decision) alleged to disclose claimed subject matter in the May 2007 PCT
`
`application priority document (“Category 3”). For the reasons set forth below, the
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`motion to submit the Supplemental Declaration as supplemental information
`
`should be granted.
`
`I.
`
`Legal Standards
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.123(a), “a party may file a motion to submit
`
`supplemental information” if “(1) [a] request for the authorization to file a motion
`
`1
`
`
`
`
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`to submit supplemental information is made within one month of the date the trial
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`is instituted” and “(2) [t]he supplemental information [is] relevant to a claim for
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`which the trial has been instituted.” In this case, trial was instituted on May 16,
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`2022, and Petitioner requested authorization by email to file this motion on June
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`16, 2022, within one month thereafter. As set forth more fully below, the
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`Supplemental Declaration is also clearly relevant to the claims for which trial has
`
`been instituted.
`
`The provisions of 37 C.F.R. § 42.123 “contemplate scenarios in which, after
`
`institution of trial in an inter partes review, supplemental information may prove
`
`beneficial to the Board in reaching a decision with respect to the trial.” Pacific
`
`Market Int’l LLC v. Ignite USA, LLC, IPR2014-00561, Paper No. 23, p. 3 (PTAB
`
`Dec. 2, 2014) (available at 2014 WL 6772228) (granting motion to submit
`
`supplemental declaration as supplemental
`
`information under 37 C.F.R.
`
`§ 42.123(a)). Indeed, the Federal Circuit has explained that “the introduction of
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`new evidence in the course of the trial is to be expected in inter partes review trial
`
`proceedings,” that “[t]he development of evidence in the course of the trial is in
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`keeping with the oppositional nature of an inter partes review proceeding,” and
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`that “[t]he purpose of the trial in an inter partes review proceeding is to give the
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`parties an opportunity to build a record by introducing evidence—not simply to
`
`weigh evidence of which the Board is already aware.” Genzyme Therapeutic
`
`2
`
`
`
`
`
`Products Ltd. Partnership v. Biomarin Pharmaceutical Inc., 825 F.3d 1360, 1366-
`
`67 (Fed. Cir. 2016). This is because a trial is, first and foremost, a search for the
`
`truth. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 166 (1986); TechSearch, LLC v. Intel
`
`Corp., 286 F.3d 1360, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
`
`Requests under 37 C.F.R. § 42.123(b) and § 42.123(c) require a motion to
`
`“show why the supplemental information reasonably could not have been obtained
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`earlier, and that consideration of the supplemental information would be in the
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`interests-of-justice.” But the present request was made within one month after
`
`institution and thus falls under 37 C.F.R. § 42.123(a). There is no such requirement
`
`for requests under § 42.123(a). Pacific Market, Paper No. 23 at 3.
`
`At the same time, “the provision for submitting supplemental information is
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`not intended to offer a petitioner a routine avenue for bolstering deficiencies in a
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`petition raised by a patent owner in a Preliminary Response” and “a petitioner
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`should not expect § 42.123 to present a ‘wait-and-see’ opportunity to supplement a
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`petition after initial comments or arguments have been laid out by a patent owner.”
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`Pacific Market, Paper No. 23 at 3. Therefore, the Board properly considers a
`
`petitioner’s justifications for presenting supplemental information, including
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`reasons why a petitioner reasonably could not have been expected to submit the
`
`supplemental information with its petition. Redline Detection, LLC v. Star
`
`Envirotech, Inc., 811 F.3d 435, 443, 441-49 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
`
`3
`
`
`
`
`
`Here, there is good cause for the Board to allow the Supplemental
`
`Declaration and to do so at this time. Each of the three categories of testimony in
`
`the Supplemental Declaration will be addressed more specifically below.
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`II. There Is Good Cause for the Board to Allow Submission of Paragraphs
`5-19 of the Supplemental Declaration Testimony Addressing Category 1
`
`There is good cause for considering the testimony in Category 1 and to do so
`
`at this time. As explained above, the testimony in Category 1 is testimony
`
`addressing issues that were unanticipated by Petitioner, that were raised by Patent
`
`Owner for the first time in the Patent Owner Preliminary Response, and that were
`
`addressed by the Board in the Institution Decision. Petitioner could not have been
`
`expected to anticipate and address these issues in its petition.
`
`A. The Board Should Allow the Testimony in Paragraphs 5-11 of the
`Supplemental Declaration
`
`Paragraphs 5-11 of the Supplemental Declaration address whether the
`
`specification’s definition for “Software Application” (upper case) is the proper
`
`definition for “software application” (lower case) in the claims, and if so, whether
`
`the claimed subject matter would still have been obvious. Petitioner did not
`
`anticipate and could not have been expected to anticipate that Patent Owner would
`
`argue that the specification’s definition for “Software Application” (upper case) is
`
`the proper definition for “software application” (lower case) used in the claims
`
`because the specification uses “Software Application” (upper case) and “software
`
`4
`
`
`
`
`
`application” (lower case) differently, with “Software Application” (upper case)
`
`having a narrower meaning than the ordinary meaning of “software application”
`
`(lower case). The Institution Decision concluded that “[a]t this stage of the
`
`proceeding, …the term ‘software application’ should be afforded the meaning
`
`provided by these definitions.” (Institution Decision, p. 9.) Paragraphs 5-11 of the
`
`Supplemental Declaration address why the Patent Owner’s argument (and the
`
`Institution Decision’s preliminary conclusion) is incorrect and why, even if it is
`
`correct, the claimed subject matter still would have been obvious based on the
`
`statutory grounds and evidence presented in the petition. As in Pacific Market,
`
`allowing this testimony does not change the statutory grounds presented in the
`
`petition. The petition argues that the instituted claims would have been obvious in
`
`light of specified prior art and the knowledge of a POSITA, and this testimony
`
`further establishes that the instituted claims would have been obvious in light of
`
`that prior art and the knowledge of a POSITA.
`
`Because Petitioner did not anticipate and could not have been expected to
`
`anticipate that Patent Owner would argue that the specification’s definition for
`
`“Software Application” (upper case) is the proper definition for “software
`
`application” (lower case) used in the claims when those terms are used differently
`
`in the specification, the Board should allow petitioner to submit paragraphs 5-11 of
`
`the Supplemental Declaration.
`
`5
`
`
`
`
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`Not only is there good cause for presenting this testimony after institution,
`
`but there is also good cause for allowing the Supplemental Declaration to be
`
`submitted now rather than in connection with Petitioner’s reply. As in Pacific
`
`Market, by allowing the Supplemental Declaration to be submitted now, Patent
`
`Owner will have “the opportunity to cross-examine [Dr. Shamos] in connection
`
`with his testimony provided as part of [Petitioner’s] Petition, and also, at the same
`
`time, would have the opportunity to cross-examine [Dr. Shamos] with respect to
`
`his supplemental testimony.” Pacific Market, Paper No. 23 at 4. In addition, Patent
`
`Owner will have “the opportunity to provide testimony from its own expert witness
`
`in response to [Dr. Shamos’s] testimony as part of its Patent Owner Response.” Id.
`
`Thus, “[m]aking the Supplemental Declaration of record now increases the
`
`likelihood that the record will be developed more fully with a minimum number of
`
`depositions and without additional motion practice.” Id.
`
`B.
`
`The Board Should Allow the Testimony in Paragraphs 12-13 of
`the Supplemental Declaration
`
`Paragraphs 12-13 of the Supplemental Declaration address whether the
`
`claimed “software application” can be a browser such as Abrams’ browser, and if
`
`not, whether the claimed subject matter still would have been obvious. Petitioner
`
`did not anticipate that Patent Owner would argue that the claimed “software
`
`application” could not be a browser and could not have been expected to do so
`
`since a browser is indisputably a type of “software application.” The Institution
`
`6
`
`
`
`
`
`Decision concluded that “at this stage of the proceeding” the Board would not
`
`adopt Patent Owner’s argument. (Institution Decision, pp. 10-12, 17-18.)
`
`Paragraphs 12-13 of the Supplemental Declaration further address why the Patent
`
`Owner’s argument is incorrect and why, even if it is correct, the claimed subject
`
`matter still would have been obvious based on the statutory grounds and evidence
`
`presented in the petition. As in Pacific Market, allowing this testimony does not
`
`change the statutory grounds presented in the petition. The petition argues that the
`
`instituted claims would have been obvious in light of specified prior art and the
`
`knowledge of a POSITA, and this testimony further establishes that those claims
`
`would have been obvious in light of that prior art and the knowledge of a POSITA.
`
`Because Petitioner did not anticipate and could not have been expected to
`
`anticipate that Patent Owner would argue that the claimed “software application”
`
`could not be a browser such as Abrams’ browser, the Board should allow petitioner
`
`to submit paragraphs 12-13 of the Supplemental Declaration. As in Pacific Market,
`
`this testimony should be allowed at this stage of the proceedings so that Patent
`
`Owner will have the opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Shamos on this issue, so that
`
`its own expert will be able to provide rebuttal testimony on this issue, and so that
`
`the trial record will be as fully developed as possible on this issue.
`
`7
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`C. The Board Should Allow the Testimony in Paragraphs 18-19 of
`the Supplemental Declaration
`
`Paragraphs 18-19 of the Supplemental Declaration address whether
`
`performing the claimed functions “over a wireless connection” is inherent in
`
`Abrams’ disclosure of the use of a “cellular telephone,” and, if not, whether the
`
`claimed subject matter still would have been obvious. Petitioner did not anticipate
`
`and could not have been expected to anticipate that Patent Owner would argue that
`
`performing the functions “over a wireless connection” is not inherent in Abrams’
`
`disclosure of the use of a “cellular telephone,” since the purpose of a telephone
`
`being “cellular” is to perform functions over a wireless connection. The Institution
`
`Decision concluded that “[a]t this stage of the proceeding,” the Board would credit
`
`Dr. Shamos’s testimony of inherency. (Institution Decision, pp. 20, 21-23.)
`
`Paragraphs 18-19 of the Supplemental Declaration further address why the Patent
`
`Owner’s argument is incorrect and why, even if it is correct, the claimed subject
`
`matter still would have been obvious based on the statutory grounds and evidence
`
`presented in the petition. As in Pacific Market, allowing this testimony does not
`
`change the statutory grounds presented in the petition. The petition argues that the
`
`instituted claims would have been obvious in light of specified prior art and the
`
`knowledge of a POSITA, and this testimony further establishes that those claims
`
`would have been obvious in light of that prior art and the knowledge of a POSITA.
`
`8
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`
`
`
`
`
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`Because Petitioner did not anticipate and could not have been expected to
`
`anticipate that Patent Owner would argue that performing the claimed functions
`
`“over a wireless connection” is not inherent in Abrams’ disclosure of the use of a
`
`“cellular telephone,” the Board should allow petitioner to submit paragraphs 18-19
`
`of the Supplemental Declaration. As in Pacific Market, this testimony should be
`
`allowed at this stage of the proceedings so that Patent Owner will have the
`
`opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Shamos on this issue, so that its own expert will
`
`be able to provide rebuttal testimony on this issue, and so that the trial record will
`
`be as fully developed as possible on this issue.
`
`III. There Is Good Cause for the Board to Allow Submission of Paragraphs
`18-21 of the Supplemental Declaration Addressing Category 2
`
`There is also good cause for considering the testimony in Category 2 and to
`
`do so at this time. As explained above, the testimony in Category 2 addresses
`
`issues of inherency which the Board identified in the Institution Decision and
`
`requested the parties to further address during trial. Thus, it is the Board’s request
`
`in its Institution Decision that justifies the testimony in Category 2. Specifically,
`
`paragraphs 18-19 of the Supplemental Declaration (which also fall within Category
`
`1) address whether performing the claimed functions “over a wireless connection”
`
`is inherent in Abrams’ disclosure of the use of a “cellular telephone.” Paragraphs
`
`20-21 address whether Abrams’ browser would inherently be embodied on a “non-
`
`transitory storage medium.” Each of these issues was addressed in the petition and
`
`9
`
`
`
`
`
`in Dr. Shamos’s original declaration, but the Institution Decision expressly stated
`
`that “[t]he parties should consider addressing this inherency issue for this
`
`obviousness ground during trial, in accordance with our Rules” and then stated, for
`
`both issues, that “[t]he parties should consider addressing these issues during trial,
`
`in accordance with our Rules.” (Institution Decision, pp. 23, 27.)
`
`
`
`Because the Board has asked the parties to further address these issues in its
`
`Institution Decision, the Board should allow petitioner to submit paragraphs 18-21
`
`of the Supplemental Declaration. As in Pacific Market, this testimony should be
`
`allowed at this stage of the proceedings so that Patent Owner will have the
`
`opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Shamos on these issues, so that its own expert
`
`will be able to provide rebuttal testimony on these issues, and so that the trial
`
`record will be as fully developed as possible on these issues. As in Pacific Market,
`
`allowing this testimony does not change the statutory grounds presented in the
`
`petition. This testimony merely provides additional evidence to confirm what was
`
`already argued in the petition.
`
`IV. There Is Good Cause for the Board to Allow Submission of Paragraphs
`14-16 and 26-75 of the Supplemental Declaration Testimony Addressing
`Category 3
`
`There is also good cause for considering the testimony in Category 3 and to
`
`do so at this time. As explained above, the testimony in Category 3 is testimony
`
`addressing passages of the May 2007 PCT application priority document that were
`
`10
`
`
`
`
`
`first identified in the Patent Owner Preliminary Response as allegedly disclosing
`
`the subject matter of claims 3, 6, and 27 of the ’132 patent and that were then
`
`addressed in the Institution Decision. Petitioner could not have been expected to
`
`have known which passages of the 244-page PCT application Patent Owner would
`
`point to in its Patent Owner Preliminary Response as allegedly disclosing the
`
`subject matter of the claims at issue. Indeed, as Petitioner pointed out in its
`
`petition, it is Patent Owner that has the burden of production on this point.
`
`(Petition, p. 41 (citing Technology Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d
`
`1316, 1326-29 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). Petitioner could not have been expected to have
`
`anticipated how Patent Owner would try to meet its burden of production.
`
`A. The Board Should Allow the Testimony in Paragraphs 26-60 of
`the Supplemental Declaration
`
`Paragraphs 26-60 of the Supplemental Declaration address whether the May
`
`2007 PCT application
`
`to which
`
`the patents claim priority discloses a
`
`multitasking/multithreading architecture to balance the computational demands of
`
`a DRM program, as required by claims 3 and 27 of the ’132 patent. Petitioner
`
`submitted testimony from Dr. Shamos that he had reviewed the May 2007 PCT
`
`application and could “find no disclosure in that application, either express or
`
`inherent, of using a multitasking or multithreaded architecture to balance the
`
`computational demands of a DRM program.” (Ex. 1025, ¶82, cited in Petition, p.
`
`39.) The Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response pointed to multiple passages that
`
`11
`
`
`
`
`
`allegedly disclose using a multitasking or multithreaded architecture to balance the
`
`computational demands of a DRM program. The Institution Decision addressed
`
`these passages and then noted that Petitioner had not addressed them. (Institution
`
`Decision, p. 30.) It also stated that it gave “little weight” to Dr. Shamos’s
`
`conclusion “because it is not sufficiently explained or substantiated” and
`
`preliminarily concluded
`
`that
`
`the PCT application discloses
`
`the claimed
`
`requirements. (Institution Decision, p. 30.)
`
`As noted above, it is Patent Owner that has the burden of production to point
`
`to disclosure in a priority document of claimed subject matter. Technology
`
`Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1326-29 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
`
`Petitioner could not have been expected to have anticipated how Patent Owner
`
`would try to meet its burden of production, i.e., to which passages of the May 2007
`
`PCT application it would point as disclosing the claimed requirements. And it was
`
`not feasible for Petitioner or Dr. Shamos to address every passage in the 244-page
`
`PCT application that mentioned multitasking or multithreading or a DRM program.
`
`
`
`Now that Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response (and the Institution
`
`Decision) has identified certain passages in the May 2007 PCT application as
`
`disclosing the subject matter of claims 3 and 27 of the ’132 patent, paragraphs 26-
`
`60 of the Supplemental Declaration can and do address why those passages do not
`
`disclose the claimed subject matter, as argued in the Petition.
`
`
`
`12
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Because Petitioner could not have been expected to address these passages
`
`of the May 2007 PCT application before now, the Board should allow petitioner to
`
`submit paragraphs 26-60 of the Supplemental Declaration. As in Pacific Market,
`
`this testimony should be allowed at this stage of the proceedings so that Patent
`
`Owner will have the opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Shamos on this issue, so that
`
`its own expert will be able to provide rebuttal testimony on this issue, and so that
`
`the trial record will be as fully developed as possible on this issue. As in Pacific
`
`Market, allowing this testimony does not change the statutory grounds presented in
`
`the petition. This testimony merely provides additional evidence to confirm what
`
`was already argued in the petition.
`
`B.
`
`The Board Should Allow the Testimony in Paragraphs 14-16 and
`61-75 of the Supplemental Declaration
`
`Paragraphs 14-16 and 61-75 of the Supplemental Declaration address
`
`whether the May 2007 PCT application to which the patents claim priority
`
`discloses “track meta-data that is formed as a separate meta-data layer,” as required
`
`by claim 6 of the ’132 patent. Petitioner submitted testimony from Dr. Shamos that
`
`he had reviewed the May 2007 PCT application and could “find no disclosure in
`
`that application, either express or inherent, of anything that could reasonably
`
`satisfy this claim language.” (Ex. 1025, ¶81, cited in Petition, p. 31.)
`
`The Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response pointed to multiple passages that
`
`allegedly disclose “track meta-data that is formed as a separate meta-data layer”
`
`13
`
`
`
`
`
`but without offering an interpretation of that phrase. The Institution Decision did
`
`not decide on an interpretation of that phrase either, only using Petitioner’s
`
`assumptions of how Patent Owner might interpret the phrase. (Institution Decision,
`
`p. 32 & n.15.) With those assumed interpretations in place, the Institution Decision
`
`addressed the passages of the May 2007 PCT application to which Patent Owner
`
`had pointed and then noted that Petitioner had not addressed them. (Institution
`
`Decision, pp. 31-34.) The Board also stated that it gave “little weight” to Dr.
`
`Shamos’s conclusion because his testimony did “not provide any analysis or
`
`evidence to explain his conclusion” and preliminarily concluded that the PCT
`
`application discloses
`
`the claimed requirements under
`
`its assumed claim
`
`interpretations. (Institution Decision, p. 34.)
`
`As noted above, it is Patent Owner that has the burden of production to point
`
`to disclosure in a priority document of claimed subject matter. Technology
`
`Licensing, 545 F.3d at 1326-29. Petitioner could not have been expected to have
`
`anticipated how Patent Owner would try to meet its burden, i.e., to which passages
`
`of the May 2007 PCT application it would point as disclosing the claimed
`
`requirements. And it was not feasible for Petitioner or Dr. Shamos to address every
`
`passage in the 244-page application that had something to do with metadata.
`
`
`
`Now that Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response (and the Institution
`
`Decision) has identified certain passages in the May 2007 PCT application as
`
`14
`
`
`
`
`
`disclosing the subject matter of claim 6 of the ’132 patent, paragraphs 14-16 and
`
`61-75 of the Supplemental Declaration can and do address why those passages do
`
`not disclose the claimed subject matter, as argued in the Petition.
`
`
`
`Because Petitioner could not have been expected to address these passages
`
`of the May 2007 PCT application before now, the Board should allow petitioner to
`
`submit paragraphs 14-16 and 61-75 of the Supplemental Declaration. As in Pacific
`
`Market, this testimony should be allowed at this stage of the proceedings so that
`
`Patent Owner will have the opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Shamos on this issue,
`
`so that its own expert will be able to provide rebuttal testimony on this issue, and
`
`so that the trial record will be as fully developed as possible on this issue. As in
`
`Pacific Market, allowing this testimony does not change the statutory grounds
`
`presented in the petition. This testimony merely provides additional evidence to
`
`confirm what was already argued in the petition.
`
`CONCLUSION
`
`
`
`For the foregoing reasons, the Board should allow the Supplemental
`
`Declaration to be submitted as supplemental information under 37 C.F.R.
`
`§ 42.123(a). In the alternative, if the Board concludes that portions of the
`
`Supplemental Declaration are objectionable, the Board should allow submission of
`
`those portions that the Board concludes are not objectionable.
`
`
`
`15
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`
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`Dated: July 1, 2022
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted.
`
`By /Chad E. Nydegger/
` Chad E. Nydegger, Reg. No. 61,020
` Brian N. Platt, Reg. No. 62,249
` David R. Todd, Reg. No. 41,348
` WORKMAN NYDEGGER
`60 East South Temple, Suite 1000
`Salt Lake City, UT 84111
`Telephone: 801-533-9800
`Facsimile: 801-328-1707
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`Attorneys for Petitioner Triller, Inc.
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.6, I hereby certify that on this 1st day of July,
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`2022, I caused the foregoing Petitioner’s Motion to Submit Supplemental
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`Information to be served by electronic mail on the following counsel of record for
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`Patent Owner:
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`W. Karl Renner, Reg. No. 41,265 (email: renner@fr.com)
`Dan Smith, Reg. No. 71,278 (email: dsmith@fr.com)
`Patrick J. Bisenius, Reg. No. 63,893 (email: bisenius@fr.com)
`Craig A. Deutsch, Reg. No. 69,264 (email: deutsch@fr.com)
`Kim H. Leung, Reg. No. 64,399 (email: leung@fr.com)
`FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.
`3200 RBC Plaza
`60 South Sixth Street
`Minneapolis, MN 55402
`Tel: 202-783-5070
`Fax: 877-769-7945
`Additional Email Addresses: IPR50048-00015IP1@fr.com
`PTABInbound@fr.com
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`/Chad E. Nydegger/
`Chad E. Nydegger, Reg. No. 61,020
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