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EXHIBIT 9
`EXHIBIT 9
`
`Data Co Exhibit 1020
`Data Co Exhibit 1020
`Data Co v. Bright Data
`Data Co v. Bright Data
`
`

`

`Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) R. Seggelmann
`Request for Comments: 6520 M. Tuexen
`Category: Standards Track Muenster Univ. of Appl. Sciences
`ISSN: 2070-1721 M. Williams
` GWhiz Arts & Sciences
` February 2012
`
` Transport Layer Security (TLS) and
` Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Heartbeat Extension
`
`Abstract
`
` This document describes the Heartbeat Extension for the Transport
` Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
` protocols.
`
` The Heartbeat Extension provides a new protocol for TLS/DTLS allowing
` the usage of keep-alive functionality without performing a
` renegotiation and a basis for path MTU (PMTU) discovery for DTLS.
`
`Status of This Memo
`
` This is an Internet Standards Track document.
`
` This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
` (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
` received public review and has been approved for publication by the
` Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
` Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
`
` Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
` and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
` http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6520.
`
`Seggelmann, et al. Standards Track [Page 1]
`
`

`

`RFC 6520 TLS/DTLS Heartbeat Extension February 2012
`
`Copyright Notice
`
` Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
` document authors. All rights reserved.
`
` This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust’s Legal
` Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
` (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
` publication of this document. Please review these documents
` carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
` to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
` include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
` the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
` described in the Simplified BSD License.
`
`Table of Contents
`
` 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
` 2. Heartbeat Hello Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
` 3. Heartbeat Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
` 4. Heartbeat Request and Response Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
` 5. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
` 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
` 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
` 8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
` 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
`
`1. Introduction
`
`1.1. Overview
`
` This document describes the Heartbeat Extension for the Transport
` Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
` protocols, as defined in [RFC5246] and [RFC6347] and their
` adaptations to specific transport protocols described in [RFC3436],
` [RFC5238], and [RFC6083].
`
` DTLS is designed to secure traffic running on top of unreliable
` transport protocols. Usually, such protocols have no session
` management. The only mechanism available at the DTLS layer to figure
` out if a peer is still alive is a costly renegotiation, particularly
` when the application uses unidirectional traffic. Furthermore, DTLS
` needs to perform path MTU (PMTU) discovery but has no specific
` message type to realize it without affecting the transfer of user
` messages.
`
`Seggelmann, et al. Standards Track [Page 2]
`
`

`

`RFC 6520 TLS/DTLS Heartbeat Extension February 2012
`
` TLS is based on reliable protocols, but there is not necessarily a
` feature available to keep the connection alive without continuous
` data transfer.
`
` The Heartbeat Extension as described in this document overcomes these
` limitations. The user can use the new HeartbeatRequest message,
` which has to be answered by the peer with a HeartbeartResponse
` immediately. To perform PMTU discovery, HeartbeatRequest messages
` containing padding can be used as probe packets, as described in
` [RFC4821].
`
`1.2. Conventions
`
` The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
` "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
` document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
`
`2. Heartbeat Hello Extension
`
` The support of Heartbeats is indicated with Hello Extensions. A peer
` cannot only indicate that its implementation supports Heartbeats, it
` can also choose whether it is willing to receive HeartbeatRequest
` messages and respond with HeartbeatResponse messages or only willing
` to send HeartbeatRequest messages. The former is indicated by using
` peer_allowed_to_send as the HeartbeatMode; the latter is indicated by
` using peer_not_allowed_to_send as the Heartbeat mode. This decision
` can be changed with every renegotiation. HeartbeatRequest messages
` MUST NOT be sent to a peer indicating peer_not_allowed_to_send. If
` an endpoint that has indicated peer_not_allowed_to_send receives a
` HeartbeatRequest message, the endpoint SHOULD drop the message
` silently and MAY send an unexpected_message Alert message.
`
` The format of the Heartbeat Hello Extension is defined by:
`
` enum {
` peer_allowed_to_send(1),
` peer_not_allowed_to_send(2),
` (255)
` } HeartbeatMode;
`
` struct {
` HeartbeatMode mode;
` } HeartbeatExtension;
`
` Upon reception of an unknown mode, an error Alert message using
` illegal_parameter as its AlertDescription MUST be sent in response.
`
`Seggelmann, et al. Standards Track [Page 3]
`
`

`

`RFC 6520 TLS/DTLS Heartbeat Extension February 2012
`
`3. Heartbeat Protocol
`
` The Heartbeat protocol is a new protocol running on top of the Record
` Layer. The protocol itself consists of two message types:
` HeartbeatRequest and HeartbeatResponse.
`
` enum {
` heartbeat_request(1),
` heartbeat_response(2),
` (255)
` } HeartbeatMessageType;
`
` A HeartbeatRequest message can arrive almost at any time during the
` lifetime of a connection. Whenever a HeartbeatRequest message is
` received, it SHOULD be answered with a corresponding
` HeartbeatResponse message.
`
` However, a HeartbeatRequest message SHOULD NOT be sent during
` handshakes. If a handshake is initiated while a HeartbeatRequest is
` still in flight, the sending peer MUST stop the DTLS retransmission
` timer for it. The receiving peer SHOULD discard the message
` silently, if it arrives during the handshake. In case of DTLS,
` HeartbeatRequest messages from older epochs SHOULD be discarded.
`
` There MUST NOT be more than one HeartbeatRequest message in flight at
` a time. A HeartbeatRequest message is considered to be in flight
` until the corresponding HeartbeatResponse message is received, or
` until the retransmit timer expires.
`
` When using an unreliable transport protocol like the Datagram
` Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP) or UDP, HeartbeatRequest messages
` MUST be retransmitted using the simple timeout and retransmission
` scheme DTLS uses for flights as described in Section 4.2.4 of
` [RFC6347]. In particular, after a number of retransmissions without
` receiving a corresponding HeartbeatResponse message having the
` expected payload, the DTLS connection SHOULD be terminated. The
` threshold used for this SHOULD be the same as for DTLS handshake
` messages. Please note that after the timer supervising a
` HeartbeatRequest messages expires, this message is no longer
` considered in flight. Therefore, the HeartbeatRequest message is
` eligible for retransmission. The retransmission scheme, in
` combination with the restriction that only one HeartbeatRequest is
` allowed to be in flight, ensures that congestion control is handled
` appropriately in case of the transport protocol not providing one,
` like in the case of DTLS over UDP.
`
`Seggelmann, et al. Standards Track [Page 4]
`
`

`

`RFC 6520 TLS/DTLS Heartbeat Extension February 2012
`
` When using a reliable transport protocol like the Stream Control
` Transmission Protocol (SCTP) or TCP, HeartbeatRequest messages only
` need to be sent once. The transport layer will handle
` retransmissions. If no corresponding HeartbeatResponse message has
` been received after some amount of time, the DTLS/TLS connection MAY
` be terminated by the application that initiated the sending of the
` HeartbeatRequest message.
`
`4. Heartbeat Request and Response Messages
`
` The Heartbeat protocol messages consist of their type and an
` arbitrary payload and padding.
`
` struct {
` HeartbeatMessageType type;
` uint16 payload_length;
` opaque payload[HeartbeatMessage.payload_length];
` opaque padding[padding_length];
` } HeartbeatMessage;
`
` The total length of a HeartbeatMessage MUST NOT exceed 2^14 or
` max_fragment_length when negotiated as defined in [RFC6066].
`
` type: The message type, either heartbeat_request or
` heartbeat_response.
`
` payload_length: The length of the payload.
`
` payload: The payload consists of arbitrary content.
`
` padding: The padding is random content that MUST be ignored by the
` receiver. The length of a HeartbeatMessage is TLSPlaintext.length
` for TLS and DTLSPlaintext.length for DTLS. Furthermore, the
` length of the type field is 1 byte, and the length of the
` payload_length is 2. Therefore, the padding_length is
` TLSPlaintext.length - payload_length - 3 for TLS and
` DTLSPlaintext.length - payload_length - 3 for DTLS. The
` padding_length MUST be at least 16.
`
` The sender of a HeartbeatMessage MUST use a random padding of at
` least 16 bytes. The padding of a received HeartbeatMessage message
` MUST be ignored.
`
` If the payload_length of a received HeartbeatMessage is too large,
` the received HeartbeatMessage MUST be discarded silently.
`
`Seggelmann, et al. Standards Track [Page 5]
`
`

`

`RFC 6520 TLS/DTLS Heartbeat Extension February 2012
`
` When a HeartbeatRequest message is received and sending a
` HeartbeatResponse is not prohibited as described elsewhere in this
` document, the receiver MUST send a corresponding HeartbeatResponse
` message carrying an exact copy of the payload of the received
` HeartbeatRequest.
`
` If a received HeartbeatResponse message does not contain the expected
` payload, the message MUST be discarded silently. If it does contain
` the expected payload, the retransmission timer MUST be stopped.
`
`5. Use Cases
`
` Each endpoint sends HeartbeatRequest messages at a rate and with the
` padding required for the particular use case. The endpoint should
` not expect its peer to send HeartbeatRequests. The directions are
` independent.
`
`5.1. Path MTU Discovery
`
` DTLS performs path MTU discovery as described in Section 4.1.1.1 of
` [RFC6347]. A detailed description of how to perform path MTU
` discovery is given in [RFC4821]. The necessary probe packets are the
` HeartbeatRequest messages.
`
` This method of using HeartbeatRequest messages for DTLS is similar to
` the one for the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) using the
` padding chunk (PAD-chunk) defined in [RFC4820].
`
`5.2. Liveliness Check
`
` Sending HeartbeatRequest messages allows the sender to make sure that
` it can reach the peer and the peer is alive. Even in the case of
` TLS/TCP, this allows a check at a much higher rate than the TCP keep-
` alive feature would allow.
`
` Besides making sure that the peer is still reachable, sending
` HeartbeatRequest messages refreshes the NAT state of all involved
` NATs.
`
` HeartbeatRequest messages SHOULD only be sent after an idle period
` that is at least multiple round-trip times long. This idle period
` SHOULD be configurable up to a period of multiple minutes and down to
` a period of one second. A default value for the idle period SHOULD
` be configurable, but it SHOULD also be tunable on a per-peer basis.
`
`Seggelmann, et al. Standards Track [Page 6]
`
`

`

`RFC 6520 TLS/DTLS Heartbeat Extension February 2012
`
`6. IANA Considerations
`
` IANA has assigned the heartbeat content type (24) from the "TLS
` ContentType Registry" as specified in [RFC5246]. The reference is to
` RFC 6520.
`
` IANA has created and now maintains a new registry for Heartbeat
` Message Types. The message types are numbers in the range from 0 to
` 255 (decimal). IANA has assigned the heartbeat_request (1) and the
` heartbeat_response (2) message types. The values 0 and 255 should be
` reserved. This registry uses the Expert Review policy as described
` in [RFC5226]. The reference is to RFC 6520.
`
` IANA has assigned the heartbeat extension type (15) from the TLS
` "ExtensionType Values" registry as specified in [RFC5246]. The
` reference is to RFC 6520.
`
` IANA has created and now maintains a new registry for Heartbeat
` Modes. The modes are numbers in the range from 0 to 255 (decimal).
` IANA has assigned the peer_allowed_to_send (1) and the
` peer_not_allowed_to_send (2) modes. The values 0 and 255 should be
` reserved. This registry uses the Expert Review policy as described
` in [RFC5226]. The reference is to RFC 6520.
`
`7. Security Considerations
`
` The security considerations of [RFC5246] and [RFC6347] apply to this
` document. This document does not introduce any new security
` considerations.
`
`8. Acknowledgments
`
` The authors wish to thank Pasi Eronen, Adrian Farrel, Stephen
` Farrell, Adam Langley, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos, Tom Petch, Eric
` Rescorla, Peter Saint-Andre, and Juho Vaehae-Herttua for their
` invaluable comments.
`
`9. References
`
`9.1. Normative References
`
` [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
` Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
`
` [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
` IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
` May 2008.
`
`Seggelmann, et al. Standards Track [Page 7]
`
`

`

`RFC 6520 TLS/DTLS Heartbeat Extension February 2012
`
` [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
` (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
`
` [RFC6066] Eastlake, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions:
` Extension Definitions", RFC 6066, January 2011.
`
` [RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
` Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, January 2012.
`
`9.2. Informative References
`
` [RFC3436] Jungmaier, A., Rescorla, E., and M. Tuexen, "Transport
` Layer Security over Stream Control Transmission Protocol",
` RFC 3436, December 2002.
`
` [RFC4820] Tuexen, M., Stewart, R., and P. Lei, "Padding Chunk and
` Parameter for the Stream Control Transmission Protocol
` (SCTP)", RFC 4820, March 2007.
`
` [RFC4821] Mathis, M. and J. Heffner, "Packetization Layer Path MTU
` Discovery", RFC 4821, March 2007.
`
` [RFC5238] Phelan, T., "Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) over
` the Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP)",
` RFC 5238, May 2008.
`
` [RFC6083] Tuexen, M., Seggelmann, R., and E. Rescorla, "Datagram
` Transport Layer Security (DTLS) for Stream Control
` Transmission Protocol (SCTP)", RFC 6083, January 2011.
`
`Seggelmann, et al. Standards Track [Page 8]
`
`

`

`RFC 6520 TLS/DTLS Heartbeat Extension February 2012
`
`Authors’ Addresses
`
` Robin Seggelmann
` Muenster University of Applied Sciences
` Stegerwaldstr. 39
` 48565 Steinfurt
` DE
`
` EMail: seggelmann@fh-muenster.de
`
` Michael Tuexen
` Muenster University of Applied Sciences
` Stegerwaldstr. 39
` 48565 Steinfurt
` DE
`
` EMail: tuexen@fh-muenster.de
`
` Michael Glenn Williams
` GWhiz Arts & Sciences
` 2885 Denise Court
` Newbury Park, CA, 91320
` USA
`
` EMail: michael.glenn.williams@gmail.com
`
`Seggelmann, et al. Standards Track [Page 9]
`
`

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