`
`DOCKET NO.: 337722-000230
`Filed on behalf of Apple Inc.
`By: Larissa S. Bifano, Reg. No. 59,051
`
`Joseph W. Wolfe, Reg. No. 73,173
`
`Zachary Conrad, Reg. No. 77,682
`
`
`
`
`
`
`DLA Piper LLP (US)
`33 Arch Street, 26th Floor
`Boston, Massachusetts 02110-1447
`Email: Larissa.Bifano@dlapiper.com
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`
`
`
`
`APPLE INC.,
`
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`BILLJCO LLC,
`
`Patent Owner
`
`IPR2022-00131
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`SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF THOMAS LA PORTA, PH.D.
`REGARDING CLAIMS 1, 5, 13, 20, 21, 29, 30, 34, 42, and 49
`OF U.S. PATENT NO. 8,639,267
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`APPLE
`EXHIBIT 1012 - PAGE 0001
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`IPR2022-00131
`Patent 8,639,267
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`I, Thomas La Porta, Ph.D., declare as follows:
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`1. My name is Thomas F. La Porta, and I have been retained by counsel
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`for Petitioner Apple Inc. (“Petitioner”) to analyze U.S. Patent No. 8,639,267 (“’267
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`patent”) and to provide my opinions regarding the patentability of claims 1, 5, 13,
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`20, 21, 29, 30, 34, 42, and 49 of the ’267 patent in light of Patent Owner’s
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`Response.
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`2.
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`I am being compensated at my normal consulting rate of $550 per
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`hour for my time. My compensation is not contingent on the outcome of this
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`proceeding, or of any proceedings relating to the ’267 patent.
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`II. BACKGROUND AND QUALIFICATIONS
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`3. My background and qualifications have previously been provided in
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`my Declaration filed with the Petition for Inter Partes Review. EX1002, Section
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`II.
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`III. MATERIALS CONSIDERED
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`4.
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`For purposes of forming my opinions as stated in this supplemental
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`declaration, I have reviewed the following documents in addition to the documents
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`I considered for forming my opinions in the original declaration (EX1002, Section
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`III):
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`1
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`APPLE
`EXHIBIT 1012 - PAGE 0002
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`Patent 8,639,267
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`Patent Owner’s Response.
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`Patent Owner’s Response.
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`Exhibits identified in the Table of Exhibits for Petition for Inter
`Partes Review of U.S. Patent 8,639,267.
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`5.
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`Petitioner’s counsel has asked me to consider whether certain
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`references disclose or suggest, alone or in combination, the features recited in
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`certain claims of the ’267 patent. I have also been asked to consider the plain and
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`ordinary meaning of terms in the Challenged Claims.
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`6. My opinions in this declaration are based on my review of the
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`documents above, my understanding as an expert in the relevant field, and my
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`education, training, research, knowledge, and personal and professional
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`experience.
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`7.
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`To my knowledge, I have no financial interest in Petitioner. Counsel
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`for Petitioner has informed me that BillJCo purports to own the ’267 patent. To the
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`best of my knowledge, I have no financial interest in BillJCo and, to my
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`recollection, have had no contact with BillJCo or the named inventors of the ’267
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`patent, William J. Johnson and Jason M. Johnson. To the best of my knowledge, I
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`do not have any financial interest in the ’267 patent.
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`2
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`APPLE
`EXHIBIT 1012 - PAGE 0003
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`8.
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`To the extent any mutual funds or other investments that I own have a
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`financial interest in the Petitioner, the Patent Owner, or the ’267 patent, I am not
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`aware of, and do not control, any financial interest that would affect or bias my
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`judgment.
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`IV. LEGAL STANDARDS
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`9.
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`The legal standards used for forming my opinions have previously
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`been provided in my Declaration filed with the Petition for Inter Partes Review.
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`EX1002, Section IV.
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`V. THE CHALLENGED CLAIMS ARE OBVIOUS
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`10. Based on my review of the POR, I maintain that claims 1, 5, 13, 20,
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`21, 29, 30, 34, 42, and 49 (the “Challenged Claims”) are obvious under three
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`grounds: (1) Haberman; (2) Haberman in view of Boger; and (3) Vanluijt. See
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`Institution Decision, 18-19, 23. Nothing in the Patent Owner Response (“POR")
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`changes this determination.
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`11.
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`In my opinion, Patent Owner (PO) fails to address the substantive
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`analysis of the petition and the institution decision in the Patent Owner. Instead,
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`PO relies on narrow constructions for “privilege” and “destination identity,” which
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`PO uses to justify their position of non-obviousness. As laid out below, I believe
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`these constructions are both unnecessary and incorrect. Nevertheless, even
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`3
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`APPLE
`EXHIBIT 1012 - PAGE 0004
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`construing these terms in the manner proposed by the PO, I believe the Petitioner’s
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`grounds still render the Challenged Claims obvious as discussed below.
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`12. Finally, it is my opinion that, by failing to address the substantive
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`analysis of the petition, PO concedes that the Petitioner’s arguments of
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`obviousness are correct should the Board reject PO’s constructions. Accordingly, I
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`maintain that the Challenged Claims are obvious under three distinct grounds. See
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`Petition, 7-64.
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`A. Claim Construction
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`1.
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`No construction is necessary
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`13. Rather than address the substantive analysis of the Petition or
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`Institution Decision, PO proposes constructions of “privilege” and “destination
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`identity” that go beyond their plain and ordinary meaning. As explained in the
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`Petition, I submit that the challenged claims should take their ordinary and
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`customary meaning under Phillips. I do not believe that any of PO’s proposed
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`constructions should be adopted in this proceeding for at least the reasons set forth
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`below.
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`2.
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`“Privilege”
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`14. PO alleges that “privilege” should be construed according to its plain
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`and ordinary meaning. PO then offers several different interpretations for what PO
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`4
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`APPLE
`EXHIBIT 1012 - PAGE 0005
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`considers the plain and ordinary meaning of “privilege.” It is my opinion that none
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`of PO’s proposed constructions for the plain and ordinary meaning of privilege
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`should be adopted.
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`15. As PO’s various proposals indicate, it is my opinion that the PO is
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`unable to consistently define what it refers to as a “privilege.” First, PO alleges
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`that a privilege “is a security related concept that delegates permissions to users,
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`programs, processes, or services to perform certain functions on a computer.”
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`POR 9. Second, PO alleges that a privilege is “a right granted to users, programs,
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`processes, or services to perform certain functions on a computer.” POR 12.
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`Third, PO alleges that a privilege is “a granted authorization to perform a
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`function.” Id. Fourth, PO alleges that a privilege is “a right given to a user,
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`application, system, etc. to perform certain functions on a computer.” POR 13.
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`Finally, PO alleges that “the interpretation for ‘privilege’ that should be utilized is
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`the common and ordinary meaning – a right granted to user, programs, processes,
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`or services to perform certain functions on a computer.” POR 14.
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`
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`16. Because PO has not proposed one construction for this term, I do not
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`believe that any of PO’s proposed constructions for “privilege” should be adopted.
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`17. Further, from my review, I believe that all of PO’s proposed
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`constructions are narrower than the intrinsic record. As indicated by the Board in
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`5
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`APPLE
`EXHIBIT 1012 - PAGE 0006
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`the Institution Decision, ’267 Patent defines privileged data as any right “granted
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`by one identity to another identity that can limit, enable, delegate or govern
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`actions, feature(s), functionality, behavior(s), or any subset(s) thereof.” EX1001,
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`124:15-24. PO’s various proposals are much narrower than their own
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`specification.
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`18. Accordingly, it is my opinion that the Board should interpret
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`“privilege” according to its plain and ordinary meaning.
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`3.
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`“Destination Identity”
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`19. PO alleges that the “destination identity” should be construed
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`according to its plain and ordinary meaning, which PO alleges is the grantor in a
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`privilege conveyance between a grantor and a grantee. POR 15-17. I disagree.
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`20. From my understanding, “the ordinary and customary meaning of a
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`claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in
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`the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of
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`the patent application.” Phillips v. AWH Corp.,415 F.3d 1303,1313, 75 USPQ2d
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`1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). “The ordinary and customary meaning of a
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`term may be evidenced by a variety of sources, including the words of the claims
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`themselves, the specification, drawings, and prior art.” MPEP 2111.01(I).
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`However, “[t]hough understanding the claim language may be aided by
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`6
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`APPLE
`EXHIBIT 1012 - PAGE 0007
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`explanations contained in the written description, it is important not to import into
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`a claim limitations[sic] that are not part of the claim. For example, a particular
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`embodiment appearing in the written description may not be read into a claim
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`when the claim language is broader than the embodiment.” Superguide Corp. v.
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`DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875, 69 USPQ2d 1865, 1868 (Fed. Cir.
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`2004).
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`21.
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`It is my opinion that PO’s interpretation of “destination identity”
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`requires an importation of several limitations from the specification be read into
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`the claims and therefore cannot be adopted.
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`22. From my review of the ’267 patent, the ’267 specification never
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`discusses a destination or destination identity in the context of the grantor/grantee
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`relationship as alleged by the PO. Instead, “destination” is referenced in only two
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`contexts in the ’267 specification: as an MS destination and as a destination
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`identity field in a command operand. In the context of an MS destination, the ’267
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`specification mentions that the MS destination is the MS for which the data was
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`intended. In the context of a command operand, the destination identity is only
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`used in the context of a parameter field for a send command, a notify command, a
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`compose command, a connect command, a find command, an invoke command, a
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`copy command, a move command, a store command, and an administrate
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`7
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`APPLE
`EXHIBIT 1012 - PAGE 0008
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`command. From my review, at no point does the ’267 specification discuss
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`destination or destination identity in the context of a grantor/grantee relationship.
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`23. Further, there is evidence in the record that PO’s use of “originating
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`identity” and “destination identity” was a purposeful broadening of the claims.
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`During prosecution, PO purposely removed the grantor/grantee relationships from
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`the claims in favor of a broader limitation. EX1003, 87-96. In particular, PO
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`submitted the following amendment:
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`EX1003, 88.
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`24. Accordingly, I believe it would be improper to import the
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`grantor/grantee embodiment into the claims because the claim language – the
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`8
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`APPLE
`EXHIBIT 1012 - PAGE 0009
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`“destination identity” – is broader than the grantor/grantee embodiment described
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`in the specification.
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`25. Therefore, I disagree with PO’s construction of “destination identity”
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`cannot be adopted.
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`B. Haberman Renders Obvious the Challenged Claims of the ’267
`Patent
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`26. Based on my review of the POR, it is clear that PO’s rebuttal is
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`predicated on the Board adopting their constructions of “privilege” and
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`“destination identity.” POR, 19 and 24. While I believe that that these
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`constructions are both unnecessary and incorrect, even under PO’s proposed
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`constructions, it is my opinion that Haberman still renders the Challenged Claims
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`obvious.
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`1. Haberman’s Preferences are “Privileges”
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`27. PO collectively refers to “privilege data,” “matching privilege,” and
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`“privileged action” as “privilege-related claim limitations.” PO alleges that
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`Haberman fails to teach the “privilege-related claim limitations” because
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`Haberman’s preferences are not equivalent to a “privilege.” POR 19-23. With this
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`position, PO concedes that Haberman teaches all of the privilege-related claim
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`limitations if Haberman’s preferences are shown to be equivalent to a “privilege.”
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`As outlined below, I respectfully submit that Haberman’s preferences are indeed
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`9
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`APPLE
`EXHIBIT 1012 - PAGE 0010
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`equivalent to a “privilege,” and that therefore Haberman teaches all of the
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`“privilege-related claim limitations.”
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`28.
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`It is my opinion that the record includes substantial evidence to
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`support the position that Haberman’s preferences read on the claimed “privileges.”
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`Haberman describes that a user can store a “preferences profile” that “represents
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`the types of informational content with which the person using the mobile device
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`desires to be presented.” EX1004 [0025]. “[T]he stored preferences profile
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`indicates types of informational content with which the person using the mobile
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`device desires to be presented, i.e., that which is preferred.” EX1004, [0176],
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`[0181]. As described in further detail below, these preferences are not optional.
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`For example, Haberman teaches that “informational content of a broadcast is not
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`presented for which the informational content is determined not to be preferred
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`informational content.” EX1004, [0179].
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`29. Upon receiving an incoming transmission, mobile device 108 searches
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`the preferences profile to determine if there is a preference to present content in the
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`transmission. For example, Haberman teaches that the mobile device scans each
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`respective broadcast “to determine if the informational content thereof matches
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`informational content identified as being preferred in step 902.” EX1004, [0168].
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`10
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`APPLE
`EXHIBIT 1012 - PAGE 0011
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`a. Haberman’s Preferences are not Optional
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`30.
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`It is my opinion that the preferences do not merely indicate that the
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`user prefers to view certain content over other content (e.g., content A over content
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`B); instead, I believe that Haberman’s preferences dictate whether the mobile
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`device is permitted to present that type of content; or, put another way,
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`Haberman’s preferences dictate whether the sending device is permitted to have
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`their content presented to the user on the mobile device. For example, Haberman
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`teaches “informational content of a broadcast is not presented for which the
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`informational content is determined not to be preferred informational content.”
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`EX1004, [0179]. In other words, Haberman’s explicitly provides that if a user
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`defines a preference for presenting content A, and only content type A, the mobile
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`device is not permitted to present content type B.
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`31. Haberman also provides that the reverse is true, i.e., the preferences
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`profile can indicate which types of content the mobile device is not permitted to
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`present. For example, Haberman teaches that “the preferences profile indicates
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`types of informational content with which the person using the mobile device does
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`not desire to be presented.” EX1004, [0035]. Similarly, the negative preferences
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`must be followed and are not merely an indication that the user would prefer other
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`types of content. In fact, Haberman equates such negative preferences to a blocked
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`11
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`APPLE
`EXHIBIT 1012 - PAGE 0012
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`sender list. EX2005, [0176]. Accordingly, continuing with the above example, if
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`the user defines a preference that indicates that they do not wish to be presented
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`with content type B, and only content type B, the mobile device cannot present
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`content type B because the mobile device is not permitted to do so.
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`32. Accordingly, it is my opinion that Haberman clearly indicates that the
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`preferences dictate whether the mobile device is permitted to present the user with
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`certain content or, taken another way, whether the sending device is permitted to
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`have their content presented on the mobile device.
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`33. Thus, for this reason alone, I believe that Haberman’s preferences are
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`privileges.
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`b. Haberman’s Privileges Satisfy PO’s Construction
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`34. Even under PO’s several proposed constructions of privileges, I
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`believe that Haberman’s preferences are clearly the same as a “privilege.” Based
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`on the record, I believe that Haberman’s preferences: (1) delegates a permission to
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`the user device that allows the user device to present information received from a
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`transmitting device if information in the wireless data record satisfies a preference;
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`(2) is a right granted to the transmitting party that grants the transmitting party the
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`ability to present their information to the user on their mobile device; (3) is a
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`granted authorization to the mobile device to perform the function of presenting
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`12
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`APPLE
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`information in a received message; and (4) is a right given to the transmitting party
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`to have their information presented on the mobile device.
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`35.
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`In other words, from my review of the record, it is my opinion that the
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`record establishes that Haberman’s preferences are rights granted by the user to the
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`mobile device that permits the mobile device to perform an action or, taken another
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`way, is a right granted by the user to the transmitting device that permits the
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`transmitting device to present their content on the mobile device.
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`36. Therefore, I respectfully submit that Haberman’s preferences are
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`equivalent to a privilege, even under PO’s narrow construction.
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`
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`2. Haberman discloses “destination identity”
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`37. As provided in the Petition, Haberman discloses a “destination
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`identity.” See Petition, 21-25. Based on my review of the POR, I believe that PO
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`has failed to rebut this position and only relies on their narrow construction that the
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`destination identity must be the grantor of a privilege to an originating identity
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`(i.e., the grantee). Even under this narrow construction, it is my opinion that the
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`record clearly indicates that Haberman teaches such functionality.
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`a. Haberman’s Destination Grants the Originator a
`Privilege
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`38. Haberman describes that a user can store a “preferences profile” (i.e.,
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`privilege data) that “represents the types of informational content with which the
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`13
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`person using the mobile device desires to be presented.” EX1004 [0025]. “[T]he
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`stored preferences profile indicates types of informational content with which the
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`person using the mobile device desires to be presented, i.e., that which is
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`preferred.” EX1004, [0176], [0181]; EX1002, ¶70.
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`39. The types of informational content with which the person using the
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`mobile device desires to be presented can be content based or party based. For
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`example, Haberman teaches that the “preferences profile may include a broadcaster
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`identification by which broadcasts are screened or a transmitting party
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`identification by which broadcasts are screened.” EX1004, [0026]. The
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`broadcaster identification “represents the author of the informational content of a
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`broadcast.” EX1004, [0027]. The transmitting party identification “represents the
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`party of the transmitter by which the broadcast is transmitted in the transmission.”
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`Id.
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`40. By indicating in their preferences profile that a broadcaster
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`identification or a transmitting party identification is preferred, it is my opinion
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`that the user is granting the sending device (e.g., the broadcaster identification or
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`the transmitting party identification) the right to present their information on the
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`user’s device. For example, Haberman provides “for each respective broadcast
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`that is received, screening broadcaster identifications and broadcast identifications
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`14
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`against the received preferences profile to determine whether informational content
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`of a respective broadcast is to be stored within the mobile device.” Id.
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`41. Accordingly, even under PO’s narrow construction, I believe that
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`Haberman still discloses that claimed destination identity.
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`VI. THE COMBINATION OF HABERMAN AND BOGER RENDERS
`OBVIOUS THE CHALLENGED CLAIMS
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`42. Based on my review of the POR, I believe that PO has failed to rebut
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`the Petitioner’s position that the combination of Haberman and Boger renders the
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`challenged claims obvious. PO only provides that the combination of Haberman
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`and Boger fails to render the challenged claims obvious because Haberman’s
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`preferences are not equivalent to privileges. As provided above, this position is
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`incorrect. See supra, Section V.B.
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`43. Accordingly, I respectfully submit that the combination of Haberman
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`and Boger renders obvious the challenged claims.
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`A. Vanluijt Renders Obvious the Challenged Claims
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`44. Based on my review of the POR, PO’s rebuttal is similarly predicated
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`on the Board adopting their constructions of “privilege” and “destination identity.”
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`POR, 26, 29. While I believe that these constructions are both unnecessary and
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`15
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`incorrect, even under PO’s proposed constructions, it is my opinion that Vanluijt
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`still renders the Challenged Claims obvious.
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`1.
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`Vanluijt’s Preferences are Equivalent to “Privileges”
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`45. PO collectively refers to “privilege data,” “matching privilege,” and
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`“privileged action” as “privilege-related claim limitations.” PO alleges that
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`Vanluijt fails to teach the “privilege-related claim limitations” because Vanluijt’s
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`preferences are not equivalent to a “privilege.” POR 26-29. With this position, PO
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`concedes that Vanluijt teaches all of the privilege-related claim limitations if
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`Vanluijt’s preferences are shown to be equivalent to a “privilege.” As outlined
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`below, I believe that Vanluijt’s preferences are indeed equivalent to a “privilege,”
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`and therefore it is my opinion that Vanluijt teaches all of the “privilege-related
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`claim limitations.”
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`46. Vanluijt describes an arrangement that includes a plurality of beacons
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`120, 121, 122 configured to provide an information service to mobile device 130
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`EX1006, Abstract, [0001], [0036], FIG. 1. The arrangement in Vanluijt allows for
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`organizations to provide users within a location to receive information relevant to
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`those organizations. For example, “[t]here are many application scenarios where
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`the typical information request will be highly dependent on the location and likely
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`to be identical or similar for many requesters at that location. For example, a
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`restaurant may want to announce its daily menu to every passer-by.” EX1006,
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`[0004], [0036]. “The arrangement 100 may be used to provide location-specific
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`information such as local maps, information on nearby shops and restaurants and
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`so on, with the beacon 120, 121, 122 downloading information to the mobile
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`device 130, preferably in the form of information keys.” Id.
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`47. The user of mobile device 130 can dictate the information processed
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`or received from beacons 120, 121, 122 by allowing the user to set preferences. For
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`example, “[w]here the message is carrying data from one or other of the beacons
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`120, 121, 122 the mobile device 130 preferably has the ability to filter the
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`information received according to pre-stored user preferences.” EX1006, [0058].
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`48. Vanluijt’s pre-stored preferences do not merely indicate that the user
`
`prefers to view certain content over other content (e.g., content A over content B);
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`instead, Vanluijt’s preferences dictate whether the mobile device is permitted to
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`present that type of content. For example, Vanluijt teaches that “the user is only
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`alerted (i.e. the information will only be retained in the buffer and/or presented on
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`the screen 334) if comparison of stored preference data and subject matter
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`indicators in the message indicate that an item of data of particular interest has
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`been received.” EX1006, [0058]. In other words, the preferences go far beyond
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`whether the user prefers to view certain content; instead, the preferences dictate
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`whether the mobile device is permitted to present certain content.
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`49. Accordingly, I believe that Vanluijt clearly indicates that the
`
`preferences dictate whether the mobile device is permitted to present the user with
`
`certain content or, taken another way, whether the sending device is permitted to
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`have their content presented on the mobile device.
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`50.
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`In this manner, it is my opinion that Vanluijt’s preferences meet PO’s
`
`proposed construction of “privilege.” In particular, the record that Vanluijt’s
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`preferences: (1) delegates a permission to the user device that allows the user
`
`device to present information received from a transmitting device; (2) is a right
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`granted to the transmitting party that grants the transmitting party the ability to
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`present their information to the user on their mobile device; (3) is a granted
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`authorization to the mobile device to perform the function of presenting
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`information in a received message; and (4) is a right given to the transmitting party
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`to have their information presented on the mobile device.
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`51. Therefore, I respectfully submit that Vanluijt’s preferences are
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`equivalent to a privilege, even under PO’s narrower construction.
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`18
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`2.
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`Vanluijt Teaches “Searching the Privilege Data”
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`52. PO alleges that Vanluijt does not teach “searching the privilege data . .
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`. for a matching privilege upon the receiving” because “the disclosed filtering of
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`Vanluijt . . . could not be both the searching for a matching privilege and the
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`privileged action because the matching privilege must first be found before the
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`privilege is triggered.” POR 28. PO is incorrect.
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`53.
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`I did not rely on Vanluijt’s filtering for both the searching of the
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`privileged data and the privileged action. Instead, I opined that Vanluijt’s teaches
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`searching the privilege data when the mobile device filters information according
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`to pre-stored user preferences. See Petition, 53-55. I also independently opined
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`that Vanluijt teaches performing the privileged action when the mobile device
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`presents information that matches a preference. See Petition, 56-57.
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`54. For this reason alone, I believe PO’s position is incorrect.
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`55. Further, it is my opinion that PO’s incorrect position is rooted in a
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`mischaracterization of my testimony. For supporting this incorrect position, PO
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`alleges that I “also relied on the same filtering as the ‘privileged action.’” POR 28
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`(citing EX2009, 104:10-19). But this is false.
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`56. When asked by PO “[a]re you saying in paragraph 163 that the
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`filtering of the data is the performance of the privileged action,” I answered “the
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`presenting is the privileged action.” EX2009, 104:10-15. When PO asked me
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`again “[n]ot the filtering of it?”, I answered “[t]he presenting is the privileged
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`action, I would say.” EX2009, 104:17-19. Accordingly, my testimony makes
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`clear that I did not rely on the same filtering operation as the privileged action.
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`Clearly, PO’s characterization of my testimony is a complete fabrication that is
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`exactly opposed to my actual testimony.
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`57. Accordingly, I believe that Vanluijt teaches both the searching of a
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`matching privilege and the performing of a privileged action.
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`3.
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`Vanluijt Teaches “Destination Identity”
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`58.
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`In their proposed construction, PO alleges that the destination identity
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`must be the grantor of a privilege to an originating identity (i.e., the grantee).
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`Based on my review of the record, the record clearly indicates that Vanluijt teaches
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`such functionality.
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`59. Vanluijt discloses that the user of mobile device 130 can dictate the
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`information processed or received from beacons 120, 121, 122 by allowing the
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`user to set preferences. For example, “[w]here the message is carrying data from
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`one or other of the beacons 120, 121, 122 the mobile device 130 preferably has the
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`ability to filter the information received according to pre-stored user preferences
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`and the user is only alerted (i.e. the information will only be retained in the buffer
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`20
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`EXHIBIT 1012 - PAGE 0021
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`and/or presented on the screen 334) if comparison of stored preference data and
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`subject matter indicators in the message indicate that an item of data of particular
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`interest has been received.” EX1006, [0058]. Accordingly, Vanluijt teaches that
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`the user’s device is equipped “to filter the information received according to pre-
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`stored user preferences and the user is only alerted if an item of data of particular
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`interest has been received.” EX1006, [0002].
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`60. Vanluijt further provides that the beacons 120, 121, 122 may be
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`associated with “a store that wants to reach passers-by outside.” EX1006, [0038].
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`Taking the foregoing passages of Vanluijt together, it is clear that a preference can
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`indicate whether the user will be alerted to information pertaining to the store. In
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`this manner, Vanluijt’s preferences are rights granted by the user’s mobile device
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`(e.g., destination identity) to the beacons (e.g., originating identity).
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`61. Accordingly, even under PO’s narrow construction, I believe that
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`Vanluijt still discloses the claimed destination identity.
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`21
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`EXHIBIT 1012 - PAGE 0022
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`VII. CONCLUSION
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`62.
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`In my opinion, and for the reasons provided above, claims 1, 5, 13,
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`20, 21, 29, 30, 34, 42, and 49 are obvious over one or more of the Haberman,
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`Boger, and Vanluijt references.
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`63.
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`I declare that all statements made in this declaration regarding my
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`personal knowledge are true and accurate, and that all statements made on
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`information and belief are believed to be true. Further, I understand that these
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`statements were made with the knowledge that willful false statements and the like
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`are punishable by fine, imprisonment, or both, under Section 1001 of Title 18 of
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`the United States Code.
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`
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`___________________________
`Thomas La Porta
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`
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`Executed on ___________________ at _______________________________
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`
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`22
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`EXHIBIT 1012 - PAGE 0023
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