throbber
Trials@uspto.gov
`571.272.7822
`
`
`Paper 37
`Date: May 18, 2023
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`APPLE INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`BILLJCO LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`IPR2022-00131
`Patent 8,639,267 B2
`___________
`
`
`Before LYNNE H. BROWNE, STACEY G. WHITE, and GARTH D.
`BAER, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`BAER, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`JUDGMENT
`Final Written Decision
`Determining All Challenged Claims Unpatentable
`35 U.S.C. § 318(a)
`Denying as Moot Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude
`37 C.F.R. § 42.64
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR2022-00131
`Patent 8,639,267 B2
`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`A. BACKGROUND
`Apple Inc. (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition (Paper 2, “Pet.”) requesting
`
`an inter partes review of claims 1, 5, 13, 20, 21, 29, 30, 34, 42, and 49
`(“the challenged claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 8,639,267 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the
`’267 patent”). BillJCo, LLC (“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response
`(Paper 5, “Prelim. Resp.”) to the Petition. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, we
`instituted this inter partes review as to all challenged claims and all grounds
`raised in the Petition. Paper 7 (“Institution Dec.”).
`
`Following institution, Patent Owner filed a Response. Paper 13 (“PO
`Resp.”). Subsequently, Petitioner filed a Reply to Patent Owner’s Response
`(Paper 23, “Pet. Reply”), and Patent Owner filed a Sur-reply (Paper 26, “PO
`Sur-reply”). Patent Owner also filed a Motion to Strike (Paper 27), which
`Petitioner opposes (Paper 32). On February 23, 2023, we held an oral
`hearing. A transcript of the hearing is included in the record. Paper 36.
`
`We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6. This decision is a Final
`Written Decision issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a). For the reasons we
`discuss below, we determine that Petitioner has proven by a preponderance of
`the evidence that claims 1, 5, 13, 20, 21, 29, 30, 34, 42, and 49 are
`unpatentable.
`
`B. RELATED PROCEEDINGS
`The parties indicate that the ’267 patent is the subject of the following
`district court cases: 1) BillJCo, LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 6:21-cv-00528 (W.D.
`Tex.) (“District Court Litigation”); 2) BillJCo, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc.,
`No. 2:21-cv-00181 (E.D. Tex.); and 3) BillJCo, LLC v. Hewlett Packard
`Enterprise Co., No. 2:21-cv-00183 (E.D. Tex.). Pet. 1; Paper 4, 2.
`
`2
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`

`IPR2022-00131
`Patent 8,639,267 B2
`
`
`C. REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST
`The parties identify themselves as the only real parties in interest.
`Pet. 1; Paper 4, 2.
`
`D. THE ’267 PATENT
`The ’267 patent relates to “location based exchanges of data between
`distributed mobile data processing systems for locational applications.”
`Ex. 1001, 1:19–23. The ’267 patent states that the “[a]dvantages of having a
`service as the intermediary point between clients, users, and systems, and
`their associated services, include[] centralized processing, centralized
`maintaining of data, . . . [and] having a supervisory point of control.” Id. at
`1:38–45. But “[w]hile a centralized service has its advantages, there are also
`disadvantages.” Id. at 1:65–66. For example, according to the ’267 patent, a
`centralized service may “suffer from performance and maintenance
`overhead” and presents concerns about the “privacy” of users’ “personal
`information.” Id. at 2:5–6, 2:42–52. To address these alleged disadvantages,
`the ’267 patent states that “[a] reasonable requirement is to push intelligence
`out to the mobile data processing systems themselves, for example, in
`knowing their own locations and perhaps the locations of other nearby
`mobile data processing systems.” Id. at 2:58–61. Specifically, the ’267
`patent describes “a new terminology, system, and method referred to as
`Location Based eXchanges (LBX).” Id. at 3:56–58. It is a “foundation
`requirement” of LBX “for each participating [mobile data processing system]
`to know, at some point, their own whereabouts.” Id. at 4:8–10. “When two
`or more [mobile data processing systems] know their own whereabouts, LBX
`enables distributed locational applications whereby a server is not required to
`
`3
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`

`IPR2022-00131
`Patent 8,639,267 B2
`
`middleman social interactions between the [mobile data processing
`systems].” Id. at 4:13–16.
`E. CHALLENGED CLAIMS
`Of the challenged claims, claims 1 and 29 are independent. Claim 1 is
`reproduced below:
`
`1. A method for automatic location based exchange
`processing by a mobile data processing system, the method
`comprising:
`presenting a user interface to a user of the mobile data
`processing system, the user interface for configuring privilege
`data relating the mobile data processing system with a remote data
`processing system, the privilege data stored local to the mobile
`data processing system and searched upon receipt of whereabouts
`data received for processing by the mobile data processing
`system;
`receiving, for processing by the mobile data processing
`system, the whereabouts data including an originating identity of
`the whereabouts data;
`searching, by the mobile data processing system, the
`privilege data stored local to the mobile data processing system
`for a matching privilege upon the receiving, for processing by the
`mobile data processing system, the whereabouts data, wherein the
`matching privilege is configured for relating the originating
`identity of the whereabouts data with a destination identity of the
`whereabouts data to permit trigger of a privileged action for the
`receipt of whereabouts data received for processing by the mobile
`data processing system; and
`performing the privileged action at the mobile data
`processing system upon finding the matching privilege, after the
`searching, by the mobile data processing system, the privilege
`data stored local to the mobile data processing system.
`Ex. 1001, 284:14–41.
`
`
`
`
`4
`
`

`

`IPR2022-00131
`Patent 8,639,267 B2
`
`
`F. ASSERTED GROUNDS OF UNPATENTABILITY
`Petitioner asserts the following grounds of unpatentability. Pet. 4.
`
`
`
`35 U.S.C. §1 Reference(s)/Basis
`
`103
`
`103
`
`Haberman2
`
`Haberman, Boger3
`
`Claims
`Challenged
`1, 5, 13, 20,
`21, 29, 30,
`34, 42, 49
`1, 5, 13, 20,
`21, 29, 30,
`34, 42, 49
`1, 5, 13, 20,
`21, 29, 30,
`34, 42, 49
`Petitioner also relies on a declaration from Dr. Thomas La Porta (Ex. 1002).
`
`103
`
`Vanluijt4
`
`PRELIMINARY MATTERS
`II.
`A. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL
`Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had
`“a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or an
`equivalent, and two years of experience relating to wireless
`communications.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 42–43). Patent Owner does not
`dispute Petitioner’s formulation. PO Resp. 6. We adopt Petitioner’s
`description as it is consistent with the prior art and patent specification before
`us and supported by credible expert testimony. See Okajima v. Bourdeau,
`
`
`1 Because the parties agree that the challenged claims have an effective filing
`date before March 16, 2013, we apply the pre-AIA (“America Invents Act”)
`version of § 103. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No.
`112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 285–88 (2011).
`2 US 2005/0096044 A1, published May 5, 2005 (Ex. 1004, “Haberman”).
`3 US 2002/0159401 A1, published Oct. 31, 2002 (Ex. 1005, “Boger”).
`4 US 2002/0132614 A1, published Sept. 19, 2002 (Ex. 1006, “Vanluijt”).
`5
`
`

`

`IPR2022-00131
`Patent 8,639,267 B2
`
`261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (prior art itself may reflect an
`appropriate level of skill).
`B. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`In an inter partes review proceeding, a claim of a patent is construed
`using the same standard used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b),
`including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and
`customary meaning of the claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the
`art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. 37 C.F.R.
`§ 42.100(b).
`1. privilege
`Patent Owner proposes construing the term “privilege” in claims 1 and
`29 to exclude preferences. PO Resp. 13. According to Patent Owner,
`preferences merely “indicate a desire for certain information over other
`information” while privileges are “a right or authorization granted to permit
`the performance of certain computer functions.” See PO Sur-reply 5. We do
`not adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction. Patent Owner’s argument
`appears to be that anything labeled as a “preference” in a data processing
`system cannot be a “privilege,” even if the preference is enforced so as to
`actually limit or govern the system’s functionality. See PO Resp. 12–14, 20,
`22, 23. The ’267 patent indicates that privileges include “[a]ny configurable
`privilege granted by one identity to another identity that can limit, enable,
`disable, delegate, or govern actions, feature(s), functionality, behavior(s), or
`any subset(s) thereof.” Ex. 1001, 124:15–24. Patent Owner does not explain
`sufficiently how this description of privileges excludes anything labeled as a
`preference. Thus, we are not persuaded to construe the term “privilege” to
`exclude preferences. No further construction of the term “privilege” is
`
`6
`
`

`

`IPR2022-00131
`Patent 8,639,267 B2
`
`necessary to resolve the parties’ disputes. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci.
`& Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need
`be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to
`resolve the controversy.”).
`2. “destination identity”
`Patent Owner proposes construing the phrase “destination identity” in
`claims 1 and 29 as “relat[ing] to privilege data configuration” and
`“pertain[ing] to the matching privilege configuration.” PO Resp. 15; See PO
`Sur-reply 9, 10. We do not see how Patent Owner’s proposed construction
`impacts any disputed issue in this case. We, therefore, decline to adopt
`Patent Owner’s construction of “destination identity” and decline to further
`construe the term, because doing so is not necessary to resolving the parties’
`dispute. See Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803.
`
`35 U.S.C. § 325(d)
`III.
`Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s patentability challenges fail
`because the asserted prior art is cumulative or less relevant than the prior art
`considered during prosecution. PO Resp. 17–18 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 325(d)).
`We disagree with Patent Owner’s argument. Under § 325(d), whether the
`same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were
`presented to the Office may impact a decision “whether to institute” inter
`partes review. We decline to extend § 325(d) to this already-instituted inter
`partes review, as Patent Owner suggests.
`
`7
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`

`

`IPR2022-00131
`Patent 8,639,267 B2
`
`
`IV. UNPATENTABILITY ANALYSIS
`A. SUMMARY ASSERTED PRIOR ART
`Haberman is titled “Transmitter at Specific Address Transmitting
`Address-Specific Informational Content.” Ex. 1004, code (54). Haberman
`teaches “[a] method for presenting to a person using a mobile device
`informational content pertaining to a specific address when the mobile device
`is within proximity to the specific address.” Id. at code (57).
`B. OBVIOUSNESS OF CLAIM 1 BASED ON HABERMAN
`Petitioner argues that claim 1 would have been obvious over
`Haberman. Pet. 7–26. For the reasons explained below, we find Petitioner
`has shown by a preponderance of evidence that claim 1 would have been
`obvious over Haberman.
`1. “privilege data”
`Claim 1 recites “presenting a user interface to a user of the mobile data
`processing system, the user interface for configuring privilege data relating
`the mobile data processing system with a remote data processing system, the
`privilege data stored local to the mobile data processing system and searched
`upon receipt of whereabouts data received for processing by the mobile data
`processing system.” Ex. 1001, 284:17–23. Petitioner presents evidence that
`Haberman teaches providing an interface that allows a user to select the types
`of informational content that are preferred. Pet. 14–15 (citing Ex. 1004
`¶¶ 25, 121, 164, 176, 181). Petitioner also presents evidence that Haberman
`teaches storing the user’s preferences in a preference profile on the mobile
`device. Id. at 15–16 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 165–166). Further, Petitioner
`presents evidence that Haberman teaches receiving a broadcast including
`informational content pertaining to a particular location and searching the
`
`8
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`

`IPR2022-00131
`Patent 8,639,267 B2
`
`user’s preference profile to determine if the broadcast’s identifying
`information matches the user’s preferences. Id. at 16–18 (citing Ex. 1004
`¶¶ 13, 18, 31, 33, 70, 118, 122, 129, 168). With this analysis, we agree with
`Petitioner that Haberman teaches claim 1’s user-interface and privilege-data
`limitation.
`Patent Owner’s only argument related to this limitation is that
`Haberman does not teach privilege data because Haberman’s preferences are
`not privileges. PO Resp. 20–23. We disagree with Patent Owner’s argument
`because it relies on Patent Owner’s proposed construction of the term
`“privilege data,” which we do not adopt. As discussed above, we disagree
`with Patent Owner that the term “privilege” should exclude anything labeled
`as a preference. As Petitioner explains, Haberman’s preferences are
`privileges because they are enforced to determine what content is actually
`presented. PO Reply 7–8 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 179).
`2. “destination identity”
`Claim 1 recites “wherein the matching privilege is configured for
`relating the originating identity of the whereabouts data with a destination
`identity of the whereabouts data to permit trigger of a privileged action for
`the receipt of whereabouts data received for processing by the mobile data
`processing system.” Ex. 1001, 284:31–36. Petitioner presents evidence that
`Haberman teaches matching a broadcast’s identifying information (i.e., the
`originating identity) with the user’s preferences profile on the mobile device
`(i.e., a destination identity). Pet. 23–25 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 26–27, 130, 176,
`181). Petitioner also presents evidence that Haberman teaches presenting the
`broadcast’s informational content to the user when there is a match between
`the broadcast’s identifying information and the user’s preferences profile. Id.
`
`9
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`

`IPR2022-00131
`Patent 8,639,267 B2
`
`at 25 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 168). Given this analysis, we agree with Petitioner
`that Haberman teaches “wherein the matching privilege is configured for
`relating the originating identity of the whereabouts data with a destination
`identity of the whereabouts data to permit trigger of a privileged action for
`the receipt of whereabouts data received for processing by the mobile data
`processing system.”
`Although Patent Owner’s Response includes a separate section
`challenging Haberman’s disclosure of the claimed “destination identity,” the
`section’s substance is not sufficiently clear why Haberman is lacking, beyond
`reiterating Patent Owner’s preferences-are-not-privileges argument. See PO
`Resp. 24–25. At oral argument, Patent Owner’s counsel explained that
`Patent Owner’s destination-identity argument is the same as its privilege
`argument. See Paper 36, 44:21–46:2. For the reasons explained above, we
`disagree with Patent Owner that Haberman’s privileges are not preferences,
`as claim 1 requires. Further, we agree with Petitioner that Haberman teaches
`the claimed destination identity.
`3. Additional Undisputed Elements in Claim 1
`Petitioner asserts that Haberman teaches the additional undisputed
`elements in claim 1. Specifically, Petitioner presents evidence that
`Haberman teaches providing informational content pertaining to a particular
`location to a mobile device, and thus teaches “[a] method for automatic
`location based exchange processing by a mobile data processing system,” as
`claim 1 requires.5 Pet. 10–12 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 8, 16, 66, 118, 120, 129).
`
`
`5 Because Petitioner presents evidence that the prior art teaches the recitations
`in the preamble of claim 1, we need not decide whether the preamble is
`limiting.
`
`10
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`

`IPR2022-00131
`Patent 8,639,267 B2
`
`
`Claim 1 further recites “receiving, for processing by the mobile data
`processing system, the whereabouts data including an originating identity of
`the whereabouts data.” Ex. 1001, 284:24–26. Petitioner presents evidence
`that Haberman teaches receiving a broadcast including informational content
`pertaining to a particular location (i.e., whereabouts data), as well as a
`transmitting party identification and broadcast identifying information (i.e.,
`an originating identity). Pet. 18–21 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 18, 27, 31, 33, 66–67,
`118, 122, 129).
`Claim 1 further recites “searching, by the mobile data processing
`system, the privilege data stored local to the mobile data processing system
`for a matching privilege upon the receiving, for processing by the mobile
`data processing system, the whereabouts data.” Ex. 1001, 284:27–31.
`Petitioner presents evidence that Haberman teaches searching the user’s
`preference profile on the mobile phone to determine if a broadcast includes
`identifying information that matches the user’s preferences. Pet. 22–23
`(citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 70, 130, 168).
`Claim 1 further recites “performing the privileged action at the mobile
`data processing system upon finding the matching privilege, after the
`searching, by the mobile data processing system, the privilege data stored
`local to the mobile data processing system.” Ex. 1001, 284:37–41. Petitioner
`presents evidence that Haberman teaches presenting the broadcast’s
`informational content to the user when there is a match between the
`broadcast’s identifying information and the user’s preferences profile.
`Pet. 26 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 168, 173).
`
`11
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`

`IPR2022-00131
`Patent 8,639,267 B2
`
`
`4. Objective Indicia of Nonobviousness
`Patent Owner asserts that objective evidence of nonobviousness
`demonstrates that the challenged claims were not obvious. See PO Resp. 30–
`38. We address Patent Owner’s arguments below.
`a. Copying
`Patent Owner suggests that evidence of copying supports that the
`challenged claims are not obvious. PO Resp. 31–36. According to Patent
`Owner, we should infer copying based on Petitioner’s access to the ’267
`patent and Petitioner’s release of products that embody the challenged
`claims. Id. (citing Liqwd, Inc. v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 941 F.3d 1133, 1138
`(Fed. Cir. 2019). As the court in Liqwd recognized, access to a patent
`coupled with circumstantial evidence showing changes to a competitor’s
`design can be sufficient to support copying. Liqwd, Inc. v. L’Oreal USA,
`Inc., 941 F.3d 1133, 1138 (Fed. Cir. 2019). This may happen when, for
`example, “the defendant’s engineering design team had settled on one design
`and ‘suddenly changed direction’ to adopt a feature disclosed in the patent as
`soon as it issued.” Id. (quoting DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor
`Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
`Here, we find the circumstantial evidence is not sufficient to suggest
`that Petitioner copied the patented technology. As Petitioner notes, the only
`alleged access involves unsolicited communications between 2010 and 2014
`sent to Petitioner’s agent seeking to monetize Patent Owner’s then-pending
`patent applications. See Pet. Reply 19–20; PO Resp. 32–33. Patent Owner
`further alleges that “[i]n or around June 2013,” Petitioner “publicly
`announced its rollout of iOS7,” which Patent Owner alleges embodies the
`challenged claims. PO Resp. 33. These general allegations are not sufficient
`
`12
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`

`IPR2022-00131
`Patent 8,639,267 B2
`
`to infer that Petitioner changed its design to incorporate the patented features
`based on its access to Patent Owner’s technology. See Liqwd, 941 F.3d at
`1138 (noting the “primary concern . . . to avoid treating mere infringement as
`copying simply because the claims of a patent arguably read on a competitor
`product”).
`
`b. Commercial Success
`Patent Owner suggests that evidence of commercial success further
`supports that the challenged claims are not obvious. Specifically, according
`to Patent Owner, the claimed features were commercially successful because
`“Petitioner touted the claimed features of the invention in connection with
`products using the iBeacon technology covered by the ’267 patent.” PO
`Resp. 36. In addition, Patent Owner asserts that several companies “have
`[licensed] the patented technology covered by the ’267 patent.” Id. at 37.
`We find Patent Owner’s evidence unconvincing for several reasons.
`First, the alleged touting relates to the products’ functionality, not their
`commercial success. See PO Resp. 36–37. In addition, Patent Owner’s
`licensing is unconvincing because, as Petitioner notes, the asserted licenses
`address some 30+ patents, only one of which is the ’267 patent, and Patent
`Owner “failed to provide any evidence regarding the weight or importance of
`the ’267 Patent to these agreements.” Pet. Reply 21.
`In sum, we have reviewed Patent Owner’s arguments and evidence
`regarding objective evidence of non-obviousness and, for the reasons
`outlined above, do not find them persuasive enough to outweigh Petitioner’s
`evidence that the challenged claims would have been obvious.
`
`13
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`

`IPR2022-00131
`Patent 8,639,267 B2
`
`
`5. Claim 1 Conclusion
`Other than the arguments addressed above, Patent Owner does not
`additionally challenge Petitioner’s showing. We have reviewed Petitioner’s
`arguments and evidence and, based on Petitioner’s analysis outlined above,
`we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that
`claim 1 would have been obvious over Haberman.
`C. OBVIOUSNESS OF CLAIMS 5, 13, 20, 21, 29, 30, 34, 42, AND 49 BASED ON
`HABERMAN
`Independent claim 29 recites limitations similar to those discussed
`above for claim 1. Dependent claims 5, 13, 20, 21, 30, 34, 42, and 49 depend
`from claims 1 or 29. Petitioner presents evidence that Haberman teaches the
`limitations of claims 5, 13, 20, 21, 29, 30, 34, 42, and 49. Pet. 10–32. Other
`than the arguments discussed above for claim 1, Patent Owner does not
`additionally challenge Petitioner’s obviousness showing. Having reviewed
`the arguments and weighed the evidence, we find that Petitioner has shown
`by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 5, 13, 20, 21, 30, 34, 42, and
`49 would have been obvious over Haberman.
`D. ADDITIONAL OBVIOUSNESS GROUNDS
`Petitioner argues that claims 1, 5, 13, 20, 21, 29, 30, 34, 42, and 49
`also would have been obvious over Haberman and Boger (Pet. 33–42) and
`over Vanluijt (Pet. 42–64). Because Petitioner has shown these same claims
`would have been obvious over Haberman, we do not address these alternative
`grounds.
`
`PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE
`V.
`Patent Owner filed a Motion (Paper 27) seeking to exclude Dr. La
`Porta’s supplemental declaration (Ex. 1012) and “all argument’s in
`
`14
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`IPR2022-00131
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`
`Petitioner’s Reply based on the Supplemental Declaration.” Paper 27, 2.
`Because this decision does not rely on the supplemental declaration or
`arguments based on the declaration in question, we deny Patent Owner’s
`motion as moot.
`
`VI. CONCLUSION
`For the foregoing reasons, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated
`
`by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1, 5, 13, 20, 21, 29, 30, 34,
`42, and 49 of the ’267 patent are unpatentable.6 Our conclusions are
`summarized in the following table.
`
`
`
`
`6 Should Patent Owner wish to pursue amendment of the challenged claims in
`a reissue or reexamination proceeding subsequent to the issuance of this
`decision, we draw Patent Owner’s attention to the April 2019 Notice
`Regarding Options for Amendments by Patent Owner Through Reissue or
`Reexamination During a Pending AIA Trial Proceeding. See 84 Fed. Reg.
`16,654 (Apr. 22, 2019). If Patent Owner chooses to file a reissue application
`or a request for reexamination of the challenged patent, we remind Patent
`Owner of its continuing obligation to notify the Board of any such related
`matters in updated mandatory notices. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(a)(3), (b)(2).
`15
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`IPR2022-00131
`Patent 8,639,267 B2
`
`
`Claim(s)
`
`
`1, 5, 13,
`20, 21,
`29, 30,
`34, 42,
`49
`1, 5, 13,
`20, 21,
`29, 30,
`34, 42,
`49
`1, 5, 13,
`20, 21,
`29, 30,
`34, 42,
`49
`Overall
`Outcome
`
`35
`U.S.C.

`103
`
`Reference(s)/Basis
`
`Haberman
`
`Claims
`Not shown
`Unpatentable
`
`
`Claims
`Shown
`Unpatentable
`1, 5, 13, 20,
`21, 29, 30, 34,
`42, 49
`
`103
`
`Haberman, Boger7
`
`103
`
`Vanluijt8
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1, 5, 13, 20,
`21, 29, 30, 34,
`42, 49
`
`VII. ORDER
`In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby:
`
`ORDERED that claims 1, 5, 13, 20, 21, 29, 30, 34, 42, and 49 of the
`
`’267 patent are unpatentable; and
`
`FURTHER ORDERED that, because this is a Final Written Decision,
`parties to the proceeding seeking judicial review of the decision must comply
`with the notice and service requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 90.2;
`
`
`7 We do not reach this ground because it would not change the outcome of
`this case.
`8 We do not reach this ground because it would not change the outcome of
`this case.
`
`16
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`

`IPR2022-00131
`Patent 8,639,267 B2
`
`and
`FURTHER ORDERED that Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike
`
`(Paper 27) is DENIED as moot.
`
`
`
`
`
`17
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`

`IPR2022-00131
`Patent 8,639,267 B2
`
`PETITIONER:
`
`Larissa S. Bifano
`Joseph Wolfe
`Jonathan Hicks
`DLA PIPER LLP (US)
`larissa.bifano@dlapiper.com
`joseph.wolfe@us.dlapiper.com
`jonathan.hicks@dlapiper.com
`
`
`PATENT OWNER:
`
`Brian R. Michalek
`Joseph M. Kuo
`Brian R. Landry
`SAUL EWING ARNSTEIN & LEHR LLP
`brian.michalek@saul.com
`joseph.kuo@saul.com
`brian.landry@saul.com
`
`
`18
`
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