UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`__________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`__________________________________________________________________
`
`
`
`GOOGLE LLC,
`
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`VOCALIFE LLC,
`
`Patent Owner.
`
`Patent No. RE48,371
`Filing Date: August 2, 2018
`Issue Date: October 14, 2014
`Reissue Date: December 29, 2020
`
`Title: MICROPHONE ARRAY SYSTEM
`
`
`__________________________________________________________________
`
`PATENT OWNER’S RESPONSE
`
`Case No. IPR2022-00005
`__________________________________________________________________
`
`
`__________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`__________________________________________________________________
`
`
`
`GOOGLE LLC,
`
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`VOCALIFE LLC,
`
`Patent Owner.
`
`Patent No. RE48,371
`Filing Date: August 2, 2018
`Issue Date: October 14, 2014
`Reissue Date: December 29, 2020
`
`Title: MICROPHONE ARRAY SYSTEM
`
`
`__________________________________________________________________
`
`PATENT OWNER’S RESPONSE
`
`Case No. IPR2022-00005
`__________________________________________________________________
`
`
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`IPR2022-00005
`PATENT NO. RE48,371
`
`Page(s)
`
`
`I.
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1
`DR. QI “PETER” LI AND HIS COMPANIES............................................... 1
`II.
`III. LITIGATION HISTORY BETWEEN VOCALIFE AND GOOGLE ............ 2
`IV. THE DEPOSITION OF GOOGLE’S EXPERT, DR. JEFFREY
`VIPPERMAN .................................................................................................. 6
`THE LAW OF OBVIOUSNESS ................................................................... 10
`V.
`VI. THE PROPOSED MAO AND JEONG COMBINATIONS DO NOT
`DISCLOSE OR RENDER OBVIOUS THE DIGITAL SIGNAL
`PROCESSOR LIMITATIONS, INCLUDING THE FOUR
`RECITED UNITS INTEGRATED IN A SINGLE DIGITAL
`SIGNAL PROCESSOR ................................................................................. 12
`VII. MAO AND JEONG DO NOT MEET THE “DETERMINING A
`DELAY” LIMITATIONS ............................................................................. 18
`VIII. MAO AND JEONG DO NOT RENDER OBVIOUS THE
`“PLURALITY OF CONFIGURATIONS” LIMITATION .......................... 22
`IX. THE PROPOSED MAO AND JEONG COMBINATIONS DO NOT
`DISCLOSE OR RENDER OBVIOUS THE “WHEREIN SAID
`DELAY IS REPRESENTED IN TERMS OF NUMBER OF
`SAMPLES” LIMITATION ........................................................................... 28
`THE PROPOSED MAO AND JEONG COMBINATIONS DO NOT
`DISCLOSE OR RENDER OBVIOUS THE SOUND SOURCE
`LOCALIZATION UNIT TO ENABLE BEAMFORMING
`LIMITATIONS .............................................................................................. 31
`XI. THE PRIOR ART DOES NOT DISCLOSE OR RENDER
`OBVIOUS DEPENDENT CLAIMS 24-27 AND 32-35 .............................. 35
`XII. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 37
`
`
`X.
`
`i
`
`
`
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`IPR2022-00005
`PATENT NO. RE48,371
`
` Page(s)
`
`Cases
`Amazon.com, Inc. v. Vocalife, LLC,
`IPR2020-00864, Paper 22 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 28, 2020) ............................................ 4
`Amazon.com, Inc. v. Vocalife LLC,
`IPR2020-00864, Paper 26 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 22, 2021) ............................................ 3
`Apple, Inc. v. Contentguard Holdings, Inc.,
`IPR2015-00355, Paper 9 (P.T.A.B. June 26, 2015) ........................................... 12
`Broadcom Corp. v. Emulex Corp.,
`732 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2013) .......................................................................... 12
`Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City,
`383 U.S. 1 (1966) ................................................................................................ 11
`Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd.,
`821 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2016) .......................................................................... 11
`Los Angeles Biomedical Research Inst. At Harbor-UCLA Med. Ctr. v.
` Eli Lilly & Co., 849 F.3d 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ............................................... 11
`Pers. Web Techs., LLC v. Apple, Inc.,
`848 F.3d 987 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ............................................................................ 11
`Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp.,
`713 F.2d 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1983) .......................................................................... 11
`Vocalife LLC v. Bose Corporation,
`No. 2:21-cv-00128-JRG, Dkt. 38 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 2021) ............................... 2
`
`
`
`ii
`
`
`
`IPR2022-00005
`PATENT NO. RE48,371
`
`EXHIBITS
`
`Description of Document
`
`Decision Denying Institution in IPR2020-00864
`Claim Construction Order from Vocalife LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc.
`et al., USDC EDTX No. 2:19-CV-00123-JRG, Dkt. 83, dated April
`6, 2020.
`Joint Agreed Claim Construction Chart from Vocalife LLC v.
`Harman Becker International Industries, Inc., USDC EDTX No.
`2:21-CV-00123-JRG, Dkt. 70-1, dated Oct. 29, 2021.
`Transcript of the Deposition of Jeffrey S. Vipperman, Ph.D., taken
`July 12, 2022
`Declaration of Joseph C. McAlexander III
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Exhibit
`No.
`2001
`2002
`
`2003
`
`2004
`
`2005
`
`iii
`
`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`On April 15, 2022, the Board instituted a petition filed by Google LLC
`
`(“Petitioner” or “Google”) for inter partes review (“IPR”) of U.S. Patent No.
`
`RE48,371 (Ex. 1001, “the ’371 Patent”), authorizing review of Claims 22-41 (“the
`
`Challenged Claims”). Paper 10 at 2. Patent Owner Vocalife LLC (“Patent Owner”
`
`or “Vocalife”) files this response in opposition to the grounds set forth in the Petition
`
`as authorized for review by the Board.
`
`The Board made clear that its preliminary findings and conclusions were
`
`“based on the evidentiary record developed thus far” at the time of the Institution
`
`Decision and did not consider any testimony from Vocalife’s expert, Mr. Joseph
`
`McAlexander. Paper 10 at 2-3. The Board also did not consider the deposition
`
`testimony of Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Jeffrey Vipperman. Exhibit 2004.
`
`As set forth herein, in view of the evidence of record, Petitioner has not met
`
`its burden of providing any proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance of the
`
`evidence.
`
`II. DR. QI “PETER” LI AND HIS COMPANIES
`The ’371 Patent lists Dr. Qi “Peter” Li as one of two inventors. Dr. Li is also
`
`the owner of Vocalife and its sister company Li Creative Technologies.1 Dr. Li’s
`
`companies were started by former Bell Labs research scientists and have become
`
`
`1 See, e.g., https://licreative.com/ and https://crispmic.com/
`
`1
`
`
`
`
`recognized leaders in the technology fields of digital signal processing, speech
`
`IPR2022-00005
`PATENT NO. RE48,371
`
`recognition, natural language processing, far-field microphone array technology, 3D
`
`audio and music, among others. Dr. Li was the winner of the International CES
`
`Innovations Design and Engineering Award and has been awarded numerous federal
`
`grants for research and development, including for numerous DARPA projects.
`
`Dr. Li’s companies provide new products, designs, services, and solutions for
`
`government and commercial enterprises,
`
`including
`
`smartphones, video
`
`conferencing, home automation, music, banking, and transportation industries. As
`
`part of these advancements, the ’371 Patent claims an invention related to far-field
`
`microphone array technology.
`
`III. LITIGATION HISTORY BETWEEN VOCALIFE AND
`Vocalife and Google are parties to Vocalife LLC v. Google LLC, Case No.
`
`2:21-cv-00124-JRG (E.D. Tex. Apr. 2, 2021) (“District Court Case”). The case was
`
`consolidated with Vocalife LLC v. Harman Int’l Indus. Inc., Case No. 2:21-cv-
`
`00123-JRG (E.D. Tex.) as the lead case. Defendant Harman International Industries
`
`Inc. took a license to the Vocalife patents. See Vocalife LLC v. Harman Int’l Indus.
`
`Inc., Case No. 2:21-cv-00123-JRG, Dkt. 61 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2021).2
`
`
`2 Defendants Bose Corporation and Sonos, Inc. have each taken a license to the
`Vocalife patents. See Vocalife LLC v. Bose Corporation, No. 2:21-cv-00128-JRG,
`
`
`2
`
`
`
`Vocalife and Defendants Amazon.com, Inc. and Amazon.com, LLC were
`
`IPR2022-00005
`PATENT NO. RE48,371
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`
`
`parties to Vocalife LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., Case No. 2:19-cv-00123-JRG (E.D.
`
`Tex. Apr. 16, 2019) (“Vocalife I”) which progressed to a jury trial before the
`
`Honorable Rodney Gilstrap. Vocalife I resulted in a final judgment entering a jury
`
`verdict of infringement and validity of claims 1 and 8 of U.S. Patent RE47,049 (the
`
`’049 Patent”). See Exhibit 2001. The jury entered a $5,000,000 verdict to be paid by
`
`Amazon. Id.
`
`During Vocalife I, Amazon filed a concurrent petition in IPR2020-00864,
`
`which was denied institution. In its decision, the Board found “the merits are weak.”
`
`Amazon.com, Inc. v. Vocalife LLC, IPR2020-00864, Paper 26 at 3 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 22,
`
`2021).
`
`Many of the same limitations existing in both the ’049 Patent and ’371 Patent
`
`have already withstood the scrutiny of Amazon’s four trial law firms and have been
`
`found to be valid after a five-day trial on the merits, as well as the weak grounds in
`
`IPR2020-00864. The instant Petition simply re-packages many of the same old
`
`references that were previously relied on by Amazon in Vocalife I and subsequently
`
`dropped prior to trial.
`
`The Petition asserts TEN GROUNDS. Pet. at 3-4. All 10 Grounds are based
`
`
`Dkt. 38 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 2021); Vocalife LLC v. Bose Corporation, No. 2:21-cv-
`00128-JRG, Dkt. 93 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 2022).
`
`3
`
`
`
`
`on variations of the Mao and Jeong references with one or more of the Van Trees,
`
`IPR2022-00005
`PATENT NO. RE48,371
`
`Briere, Buck, and Yen references. The prior art references and obviousness grounds
`
`cannot render the Challenged Claims obvious because they fail to disclose all of the
`
`elements required by the Challenged Claims. For example, the prior art references
`
`do not disclose or render obvious the Challenged Claims, particularly with respect
`
`to the following limitations: (1) the claimed digital signal processor with the four
`
`recited units integrated in a signal DSP; (2) determining a delay; (3) plurality of
`
`configurations; (4) delay is represented in terms of number of samples; and (5) sound
`
`source localization unit enables beamforming.
`
`First, Mao and Jeong do not teach any “digital signal processor” or the four
`
`recited units integrated in one single DSP, as required by the Challenged Claims.
`
`Similar to the deficiency in IPR2020-00864, where the PTAB denied institution of
`
`a Petition challenging the ’049 Patent finding that Petitioner failed to sufficiently
`
`show that the three recited units are “integrated in a digital signal processor.”
`
`Amazon.com, Inc. v. Vocalife, LLC, IPR2020-00864, Paper 22 at 16 (P.T.A.B. Oct.
`
`28, 2020). Briere does not cure Jeong’s deficiencies because Briere expressly admits
`
`that it was “impossible to build the original system on the DSP” and speculates that
`
`it would need to “reduce” the localization system. Briere at 3. The Petition’s failure
`
`to address these concessions of impossibility and inoperability are fatal to institution
`
`because they are direct evidence of teaching away from the claimed invention and
`
`4
`
`
`
`
`direct evidence against any conclusory allegations of motivation to combine with
`
`IPR2022-00005
`PATENT NO. RE48,371
`
`Briere.
`
`Second, Mao and Jeong do not teach the “determination of a delay” limitation
`
`as required by the Challenged Claims. Petitioner inconsistently maps both the
`
`“delaying unit” and the disclosed TDOA to this claim limitation. Such inconsistent
`
`mapping is fatal to the Petition. In addition, Petitioner’s expert concedes that the
`
`equation of the “delaying unit” disclosed in Jeong does not teach how to compute
`
`the delay. Further, Jeong’s TDOA is a “sound source location search method” and
`
`the TDOA Petitioner relies upon is not the same TDOA disclosed in the Challenged
`
`Claims.
`
`Third, Mao, Jeong, and Van Trees do not render obvious the “plurality of
`
`configurations” limitation of the Challenged Claims where Petitioner concedes
`
`Jeong discloses a linear array configuration and Van Trees discloses a plurality of
`
`array configuration but fails to provide a motivation to combine these disclosures.
`
`Petitioner’s expert testified that each geometry would have its own specific delay
`
`and that each geometry would require different delays.
`
`Fourth, Mao or Jeong in view of Van Trees and Briere does not render obvious
`
`the “wherein said delay is represented in terms of number of samples” where Jeong
`
`discloses a time-based delay. There is no teaching in Jeong regarding delay
`
`represented in number of samples and Petitioner does not point to any disclosures of
`
`5
`
`
`
`
`Van Trees that disclose delay represented in samples. Briere’s “sample frames” do
`
`IPR2022-00005
`PATENT NO. RE48,371
`
`not meet this limitation where Petitioner cannot show the “sample frames” are
`
`representations for delay. Rather, Petitioner attempts to minimize the requirement of
`
`the Challenged Claims that the delay must be represented in number of samples.
`
`Lastly, Mao or Jeong do not disclose or render obvious the limitations
`
`regarding the sound source localization unit to enable beamforming, where
`
`Petitioner inconsistently maps two different paths disclosed in Briere to meet the
`
`claimed “sound source localization unit” limitation and the beamforming Petitioner
`
`points to is used to enable the finding of sources, the opposite of what the Challenged
`
`Claims require. Briere teaches a Sound Source Localization and Tracking system
`
`which uses a beamformer to find the position of a source and the tracking module to
`
`then follow the moving source. Briere further discloses that the sound source
`
`localization and tracking system is not used for speech recognition.
`
`IV. THE DEPOSITION OF GOOGLE’S EXPERT, DR. JEFFREY
`VIPPERMAN
`On July 12, 2022, Vocalife took the deposition of Google’s expert, Jeffrey S.
`
`Vipperman, Ph.D. See Ex. 2004. The deposition exposed numerous inconsistencies
`
`with certain positions set forth in the Petition. Such inconsistencies are identified in
`
`detail below.
`
`As a preliminary matter, Dr. Vipperman conceded that he did not look at the
`
`6
`
`
`
`
`Petition at all in submitting his declaration.
`
`IPR2022-00005
`PATENT NO. RE48,371
`
`
`Ex. 2004, Vipperman Dep. Tr. at 20:9-19. Dr. Vipperman acknowledges that it may
`
`have “ma[d]e sense to have reviewed it.” Id.
`
`Further, Dr. Vipperman testified that “determination of delay” requires that
`
`each configuration have its own set of delays and that determination of delay for one
`
`configuration would not enable beamforming for other configurations.
`
`7
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2022-00005
`PATENT NO. RE48,371
`
`
`Ex. 2004, Vipperman Dep. Tr. at 41:6-25. Dr. Vipperman confirmed that the prior
`
`art does not disclose determination of a delay for one configuration that would enable
`
`beamforming for a plurality of configurations.
`
`8
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2022-00005
`IPR2022-00005
`PATENT NO. RE48,371
`PATENT NO. RE48,371
`
`Q.
`
`And so looking at the prior art,
`
`Van Trees and Jeong, neither of those
`
`references disclose a determination of a
`
`delay for one geometry that enables
`
`beamforming for a different geometry.
`
`Right?
`
`MR. TUCKER: Objection to form.
`
`A.
`
`I think that's right.
`
`I mean,
`
`18
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`you could do this for any geometry,
`
`including the ones that -- the
`
`illustrative geometries that I pulled out
`
`of Van Trees in paragraphs 88 and 89 in my
`
`14
`
`declaration.
`
`Id., at 42:2-14.
`Id., at 42:2-14.
`
`
`
`9
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2022-00005
`PATENT NO. RE48,371
`
`
`Id., at 47:10-19. Thus, Dr. Vipperman acknowledges that his opinion is that a
`
`different delay would need to be determined for each configuration. This position is
`
`inconsistent with Dr. Vipperman’s declaration and the Petition which do not identify
`
`a “plurality of configurations,” each with their own respective delay determinations,
`
`as per the requirements set forth in Dr. Vipperman’s deposition testimony. See Pet.
`
`at 34-36; Ex. 1006, ¶¶ 88-89.
`
`V. THE LAW OF OBVIOUSNESS
`The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual
`
`determinations, including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) any
`
`10
`
`
`
`
`differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art, (3) the level of skill
`
`IPR2022-00005
`PATENT NO. RE48,371
`
`in the art, and (4) where in evidence, so called secondary considerations. Graham v.
`
`John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, at 17–18 (1966). The question is not
`
`whether the differences themselves would have been obvious, but whether the
`
`claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious. Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip
`
`Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
`
`In arriving at an obviousness determination, the Board must sufficiently
`
`explain and support the conclusions that the prior art references disclose all the
`
`elements recited in the Challenged Claims and a relevant skilled artisan not only
`
`could have made but would have been motivated to combine all the prior art
`
`references in the way the patent claims and reasonably expected success. Pers. Web
`
`Techs., LLC v. Apple, Inc., 848 F.3d 987, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2017). That is, even if all
`
`the claim elements are found across a number of references, an obviousness
`
`determination must consider whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would have
`
`the motivation to combine those references. Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina
`
`Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Los Angeles Biomedical
`
`Research Inst. At Harbor-UCLA Med. Ctr. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 849 F.3d 1049, 1067
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2017) (vacating and remanding an obviousness determination, in part,
`
`because the Board did not make factual findings as to whether there was an apparent
`
`reason to combine all three prior art references to achieve the claimed invention and
`
`11
`
`
`
`
`whether a person of skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of
`
`IPR2022-00005
`PATENT NO. RE48,371
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`success from such a combination.) This combinability determination, as supported
`
`by an articulated motivation to combine, requires a plausible rationale as to why
`
`those prior art references would have worked together. Broadcom Corp. v. Emulex
`
`Corp., 732 F.3d 1325, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
`
`The Board has held that a failure to identify the differences between the
`
`claimed subject matter and the prior art is fatal to an obviousness challenge. See
`
`Apple, Inc. v. Contentguard Holdings, Inc., IPR2015-00355, Paper 9 at 9-10
`
`(P.T.A.B. June 26, 2015) (denying institution for failure to identify the differences
`
`between the claimed subject matter and the prior art).
`
`VI. THE PROPOSED MAO AND JEONG COMBINATIONS DO
`NOT DISCLOSE OR RENDER OBVIOUS THE DIGITAL
`SIGNAL PROCESSOR LIMITATIONS, INCLUDING THE
`FOUR RECITED UNITS INTEGRATED IN A SINGLE
`DIGITAL SIGNAL PROCESSOR
`Claim 22 requires “wherein said sound source localization unit, said adaptive
`
`beamforming unit, said noise reduction unit, and echo cancellation unit are
`
`integrated in a digital signal processor.” Ex. 1001, claim 22. There is no dispute that
`
`the claimed single digital signal processor must contain at least all four units as
`
`claimed. Ex. 2005, ¶ 29.
`
`First, Jeong fails to disclose or even suggest the claimed sound source
`
`localization unit, adaptive beamforming unit, noise reduction unit, and echo
`
`12
`
`
`
`
`cancellation unit integrated in a digital signal processor. Ex. 2005, ¶ 30. Jeong does
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`IPR2022-00005
`PATENT NO. RE48,371
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`not recite the words “processor,” “microprocessor,” or “CPU” anywhere in its
`
`disclosure. Id. Accordingly, Petitioner’s expert states that Jeong discloses a
`
`“continuous process” to conclude, without support, that the signal processing units
`
`in Jeong are integrated in a DSP. Ex. 1006, ¶ 70 (“This is because Jeong’s apparatus
`
`obtains input mixed sound signals from the environment and outputs a target sound
`
`signal from which a noise is removed, which means that the signal processing
`
`between the input and the output must be continuous. Indeed, Jeong describes the
`
`signal processing between the sound source searching unit (223), the emphasized
`
`signal beam-former (221), the suppressed beam-former (222), and the signal
`
`extracting unit (230), as a continuous process.”); Ex. 2005, ¶ 31. However, that
`
`Jeong purportedly discloses a “continuous process” does not support his conclusion
`
`that Jeong discloses integration of all four claimed units in a single digital signal
`
`processor. Id.
`
`Further, Dr. Vipperman concludes that because a DSP is required to execute
`
`signal processing algorithms, “one skilled in the art would have understood that
`
`Jeong’s processing units are incorporated in a signal DSP.” Ex. 1006, ¶ 71. Again,
`
`Jeong does not disclose the integration of all four units in a single digital signal
`
`processor. Ex. 2005, ¶ 32. Further, there is no evidence of record to suggest that
`
`this critical feature of implementing or integrating the four claimed units in a single
`
`13
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`
`
`
`DSP is inherent or necessarily required by the mere presence of any feature(s) of
`
`IPR2022-00005
`PATENT NO. RE48,371
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`Jeong. Id., ¶ 33. For example, as explained by Mr. McAlexander, a person of
`
`ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that the prior art systems at the time
`
`of the invention used multiple, separate circuits or processors to implement each
`
`unit. Ex. 2005, ¶ 33.
`
`Recognizing that Jeong fails to disclose this limitation, Dr. Vipperman
`
`contends one skilled in the art would have found it obvious to integrate the signal
`
`processing units of Jeong in a DSP. Ex. 1006, ¶ 72; Ex. 2005, ¶ 34. However, Dr.
`
`Vipperman cites to no disclosures of Jeong nor a motivation to combine to reach this
`
`conclusion. Ex. 2005, ¶ 34. Like IPR2020-00864, the primary reference does not
`
`show a single digital signal processor integrating all three (or four) recited units, and
`
`Petitioner does not make any attempt to explain how the units were integrated into a
`
`single DSP. Id.
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`Similarly, Mao fails to disclose this limitation where the Mao reference does
`
`not recite any instances of a “digital signal processor.” Ex. 2005, ¶ 35. Rather,
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`Petitioner alleges this limitation is met because Mao identifies a “module.” Pet. at
`
`21; Ex. 1008, ¶ 41. However, Mao does not teach that this “module” as a digital
`
`signal processor, or any type of processor. Pet. at 21; Ex. 2005, ¶ 35. It is undisputed
`
`that Mao does not show a single digital signal processor integrating or implementing
`
`all four recited units. Ex. 2005, ¶ 35.
`
`14
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`
`
`Petitioner admits that Mao does not disclose this limitation and thus submits
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`IPR2022-00005
`PATENT NO. RE48,371
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`
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`that it would have been obvious to integrate the units in a DSP. Pet. at 22; Ex. 2005,
`
`¶ 36. However, Petitioner offers no explanation other than identifying that “power
`
`consumption and processing efficiency are key design concerns.” Pet. at 23; Ex.
`
`2005, ¶ 36.
`
`Alternatively, Petitioner relies on Briere to meet this limitation. See id. ¶ 73.
`
`Like Jeong and Mao, Briere does not disclose all four recited units integrated into a
`
`digital signal processor. Ex. 2005, ¶ 37. In addition, Briere does not cure the
`
`deficiencies of Jeong and Mao where Briere teaches away from using a DSP. Id. In
`
`addition, Petitioner fails to articulate a motivation to combine Mao and Briere other
`
`than Mao’s identification of requiring “real-time” processing. Id.
`
`Briere expressly states that “[i]t appears evident now that it will be impossible
`
`to build the original system on the DSP with the exact same parameters.” Ex. 1010
`
`at 2; Ex. 2005, ¶ 37. Briere speculates as to what steps it could “probably” take to
`
`build the system on to a DSP, which involves “reducing” the localization system.
`
`Ex. 1010 at 3; Ex. 2005, ¶ 37. Briere discloses that in 2006, it was undesirable to use
`
`a DSP in the manner set forth in the claimed invention and expressly taught away
`
`from use of DSP. Id. Petitioner’s proposal relies on the addition of algorithms that
`
`it contends make up the four recited units. Id. However, Petitioner’s proposal that a
`
`person of ordinary skill in the art would have been capable of adding certain
`
`15
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`
`
`algorithms to a digital signal processor is insufficient to render obvious the claimed
`
`IPR2022-00005
`PATENT NO. RE48,371
`
`invention, particularly where the mere capability or possibility is not enough to
`
`establish prima facie obviousness. Id. Further, the reference’s admissions of
`
`impossibility and inoperability that it would have required “reducing” the recited
`
`units is both evidence of teaching away from the claimed invention and evidence
`
`against making the proposed modification. Id.
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`Petitioner, nor its expert, Dr. Vipperman, does not address Briere’s admission
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`of impossibility and interoperability, which is fatal to Petitioner’s conclusory
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`obviousness arguments. Accordingly, Petitioner’s contention that the four recited
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`units integrated in a digital signal processor is disclosed by Jeong, Mao, and Briere
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`is incorrect.
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`Second, a person of ordinary skill in the art would not be motivated to
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`combine Jeong and Mao with Briere. Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, (1) Briere
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`teaches away from use of a digital signal processor, (2) any alleged prior art teaching
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`of all claimed units on a single digital signal processor is not enabled by the prior
`
`art; and (3) the Briere reference is express evidence against any reason or motivation
`
`to combine because a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that
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`Briere’s digital signal processor was inoperative and that such a combination would
`
`have been “impossible.” See Ex. 2005, ¶ 39; Ex. 1010. As confirmed by Petitioner’s
`
`expert, Briere contemplates different aspects of the invention being carried out by
`
`16
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`
`
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`different computing components and was unable to optimize the system for sound
`
`IPR2022-00005
`PATENT NO. RE48,371
`
`source localization, tracking, and separation on a single digital signal processor. Ex.
`
`2004, Vipperman Dep. Tr. at 64:8-66:18 (“You are right, they didn’t get it to
`
`work.”); Ex. 2005, ¶ 40. The solutions offered by Briere include “reducing sampling
`
`size, reducing resolution of the localization system, reducing maximum number of
`
`simultaneous sources.” Ex. 2004 at 66:19-67:11; Ex. 2005, ¶ 40. Briere also does
`
`not contemplate a different DSP. Ex. 2004 at 67:23-25; Ex. 2005, ¶ 40. Dr.
`
`Vipperman provides no evidence to the contrary. Ex. 2005, ¶ 40.
`
`The remainder of Petitioner’s reasons to combine Jeong, Mao, and Briere fail
`
`for the same reasons and because they are based on mischaracterizations. As shown
`
`above, there is not one instance of “digital signal processor,” “processor,”
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`“microprocessor,” or “CPU” in the Jeong or Mao references. Ex. 2005, ¶¶ 30, 35.
`
`Jeong and Mao make no reference to sound source localization. Id., ¶ 41. With
`
`respect to Mao, Petitioner recognizes that Mao fails to disclose a sound source
`
`localization unit and relies on the adaptive beamformer for sound source
`
`localization. Pet. at 17; Ex. 2005, ¶ 42. Accordingly, Mao purportedly only discloses
`
`three of the four units. Ex. 1008 ¶ 41 (“Module 124 includes acoustic echo
`
`cancellation module, adaptive beam-former module, and adaptive noise cancellation
`
`module.”); Ex. 2005, ¶ 42. In addition, Mao discloses that “in an environment with
`
`complicated reverberation noise, e.g., a videogame environment, it is practically
`
`17
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`
`
`
`infeasible to build a general sound location tracking system without integrating the
`
`IPR2022-00005
`PATENT NO. RE48,371
`
`environmental specific parameters.” Ex. 1008 ¶ 44; Ex. 2005, ¶ 42. Petitioner
`
`proposes combining Mao with Briere to meet the sound source localization unit
`
`limitation. Pet. at 17-18; Ex. 2005, ¶ 43. However, Petitioner fails to explain why
`
`one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine two systems
`
`where one system discloses a beamformer and the other, a “localization module.”
`
`Pet. at 17-18; Ex. 2005, ¶ 43.
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`Petitioner offers no explanation for its motivation to combine Jeong and Mao,
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`which does not disclose a DSP, with Briere, which teaches away from a single DSP.
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`Petitioner’s misleading characterizations are not supported in fact. Accordingly,
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`there is no motivation to combine Jeong, Mao, and Briere to arrive at the claimed
`
`invention without impermissible hindsight, and there is no expectation of success.
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`Ex. 2005, ¶ 44.
`
`VII. MAO AND JEONG DO NOT MEET THE “DETERMINING A
`DELAY” LIMITATIONS
`Claim 22 of the ’371 Patent recites “determining a delay between each of said
`
`sound sensors and an origin of said array of said sound sensors as a function of
`
`distance between each of said sound sensors and said origin, a predefined angle
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`between each of said sound sensors and a reference axis, and an azimuth angle
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`between said reference axis and said target sound signal, when said target sound
`
`18
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`
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`source that emits said target sound signal is in a two dimensional plane, wherein said
`
`IPR2022-00005
`PATENT NO. RE48,371
`
`delay is represented in terms of number of samples, and wherein said determination
`
`of said delay enables beamforming for said array of sound sensors in a plurality of
`
`configurations.” Jeong and Mao fail to disclose or suggest the “determining a delay”
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`limitation. Ex. 2005, ¶ 45.
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`Jeong discloses multiple delays and Dr. Vipperman’s mapping of this claim
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`term is inconsistent. Ex. 2005, ¶¶ 46-47. During his deposition, Dr. Vipperman
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`stated that he has mapped both the “delaying unit” and the disclosed TDOA to this
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`claim limitation. Ex. 2004, Vipperman Dep. Tr. at 72:10-18 (“Q. So it’s your opinion
`
`that the delay claimed in the ’049 and ’371 Patents is taught specifically by the
`
`TDOA method disclosed by Jeong? Is that fair? A. that’s correct.”); 75:18-25 (“Q.
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`So if you look at paragraph 35—I am just trying to understand how this maps to the
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`claims in your opinion. It says Figure 3B, the delaying unit 330 determines the delay
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`term. That is what you are saying is the determination of the delay in the challenged
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`claims. Right? A. That’s right.”); Ex. 2005, ¶ 47. Dr. Vipperman’s inconsistent
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`positions with respect to Jeong and the delay limitation is fatal to the Petition.
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`Similarly, Mao does not meet this limitation. Ex. 2005, ¶ 48. While Petitioner
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`alleges that “[b]oth Mao and Van Trees disclose obtaining sound signals using
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`sensory arrays and determining a position of a target sound source using TDOA,”
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`Mao does not disclose TDOA. See generally Ex. 1008; Ex. 2005, ¶ 48. Rather, Mao
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`19
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`
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`refers to a “second order of statistic” or an “auto correlation or cross correlation
`
`IPR2022-00005
`PATENT NO. RE48,371
`
`scheme.” Ex. 1008, ¶ 47; Ex. 2005, ¶ 48. Accordingly, a person of ordinary skill in
`
`the art would not be motivated to combine the Mao and Van Trees references. Ex.
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`2005, ¶ 48.
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`Jeong and Van Trees do not disclose or suggest each and every claim
`
`limitation related to the “determination of delay” and there is no motivation to
`
`combine Jeong with Van Trees to arrive at the claimed invention without
`
`impermissible hindsight, and there is no reasonable expectation of success. Ex.
`
`2005, ¶ 49.
`
`The ”delaying unit” of Jeong is not the claimed invention, the TDOA
`
`disclosed in Jeong is not the same TDOA, and it is not used to arrive at the claimed
`
`invention. Ex. 2005, ¶ 50. Dr. Vipperman and Petitioner attempt to import the
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`“delaying unit” into the TDOA, but they are unrelated teachings. Id.
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`First, Dr. Vipperman contends that Jeong teaches delay where it discloses the
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`TDOA method, “[a]ccording to the time of delay arrival method, first, with respect
`
`to a mixed signal input from a plurality of sound sources to the microphone array
`
`(21), two microphones constituting the array are paired, the time delay between the
`
`microphones is measured, and the direction of the sound source is estimated based
`
`on the measured time delay.” Ex. 2004, Vipperman Dep. Tr. at 71:23-72:21; Ex.
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`2005, ¶ 51. However, the TDOA disclosed in Jeong is a “sound source location
`
`20
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`
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`search method.” Ex. 1008, ¶ 113 (“[V]arious sound source location search methods
`
`IPR2022-00005
`PATENT NO. RE48,371
`
`have been widely introduced, such as a time delay of arrival (TDOA) method, a
`
`beam-forming method, and a high-resolution spectral analysis method.”); Ex. 2005,
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`¶ 51. The TDOA method of Jeong discloses “two microphones constituting the array
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`are paired, the time delay between the microphones is measured, and the direction
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`of t
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