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`Filed: September 29, 2022
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`_________________
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`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`_________________
`
`
`GOOGLE LLC,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`SONOS, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`
`_________________
`
`Case No. IPR2021-01563
`U.S. Patent No. 9,967,615
`_________________
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`
`
`PETITIONER’S REPLY
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`
`
`

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`Petitioner’s Reply
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`PAGE
`Sonos’ Arguments Are Premised on Misinterpretations of Law .................... 1
`A.
`Sonos is wrong that an “added burden” applies when asserted
`references were cited during prosecution. ............................................. 1
`Sonos is wrong that general motivations to combine, when
`provided in addition to specific motivations, are insufficient. .............. 1
`Sonos is wrong that references “teach away” from combination
`if they cannot be physically combined with guaranteed success. ......... 3
`Claim 1 is Unpatentable .................................................................................. 5
`A. Al-Shaykh discloses limitations 1-c, 1-d, 1-e: the “transferring
`playback” limitations ............................................................................. 5
`B. Qureshey discloses limitation 1-f: causing one or more first
`cloud servers to add multimedia content to a local playback
`queue on the particular playback device, wherein adding the
`multimedia content to the local playback queue comprises the
`one or more first cloud servers adding, to the local playback
`queue, one or more resource locators corresponding to
`respective locations of the multimedia content at one or more
`second cloud servers of a streaming content service ............................ 7
`1.
`Qureshey discloses a “playback queue” under any
`construction ................................................................................. 8
`Qureshey’s intelligent device streams playlists from
`remote sources. .......................................................................... 10
`A POSA would have been motivated to combine Al-
`Shaykh and Qureshey ............................................................... 11
`a.
`Sonos’ “affirmative reasons” a POSA would not
`have combined the references are flawed. ...................... 11
`Sonos’ teaching away arguments are legally and
`factually insufficient. ...................................................... 13
`
`B.
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`C.
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`
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`I.
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`II.
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`
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`2.
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`3.
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`b.
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`i
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`

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`Petitioner’s Reply
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`C.
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`D.
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`Limitation 1-g: transferring playback … further comprises (b)
`causing playback at the control device to be stopped ......................... 15
`1.
`Al-Shaykh discloses limitation 1-g ........................................... 15
`2.
`Alternatively, a POSA would have been motivated to
`combine Al-Shaykh and Phillips to render obvious
`limitation 1-g ............................................................................. 18
`Limitation 1-i: causing the particular playback device to play
`back the multimedia content, wherein the particular playback
`device playing back the multimedia content comprises the
`particular playback device retrieving the multimedia content
`from one or more second cloud servers of a streaming content
`service and playing back the retrieved multimedia content ................ 19
`1.
`Al-Shaykh discloses limitation 1-i ............................................ 20
`2.
`Alternatively, Qureshey discloses limitation 1-i, and a
`POSA would specifically combine Al-Shaykh and
`Qureshey ................................................................................... 21
`III. Dependent Claims 6, 9, and 11 ...................................................................... 22
`A. Al-Shaykh discloses the only disputed element of claim 6,
`limitation [6-a]: detecting, via the control device, a set of inputs
`to transfer playback from the playback device back to the
`control device ...................................................................................... 22
`Claim 9: … sending a message to the streaming content service
`that causes the one or more first cloud servers to add the
`multimedia content to the local playback queue on the
`particular playback device .................................................................. 23
`Claim 11: … detecting an input that causes playback at the
`control device to be stopped ................................................................ 24
`IV. Dependent Claims 2 and 14 ........................................................................... 25
`A.
`Sonos’ arguments misread Al-Shaykh and Ramsay ........................... 25
`
`B.
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`C.
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`
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`ii
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`

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`B. Adding Ramsay to the Al-Shaykh-Qureshey system is not
`incompatible with Qureshey and does not fundamentally alter
`Al-Shaykh ............................................................................................ 26
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`Petitioner’s Reply
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`iii
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`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Petitioner’s Reply
`
` Page(s)
`
`Cases
`ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc.,
`694 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ............................................................................ 2
`Alcon Rsch., Ltd. v. Apotex Inc.,
`687 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ............................................................................ 3
`In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Pat. Litig.,
`639 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ........................................................................ 3, 4
`In re Keller,
`642 F.2d 413 (CCPA 1981) .................................................................................. 5
`Large Audience Display Sys., LLC v. Tennman Prods., LLC,
`660 F. App’x 966 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ....................................................................... 1
`Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Depomed, Inc.,
`643 F. App’x 960 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ....................................................................... 2
`Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu,
`912 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2019) .......................................................... 4, 11, 18, 28
`Shire LLC v. Amneal Pharms.,
`802 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ............................................................................ 1
`TQ Delta, LLC v. CISCO Sys., Inc.,
`942 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ............................................................................ 2
`UberTechs., Inc. v. X One, Inc.,
`957 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ............................................................................ 5
`Univ. of Strathclyde v. Clear-Vu Lighting LLC,
`17 F.4th 155 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ............................................................................... 5
`W. Digital Corp. v. Spex Techs., Inc.,
`No. IPR2018-00084, 2018 WL 1990268 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 25, 2018) .................... 9
`
`
`
`iv
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`Petitioner’s Reply
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`The Board should issue a Final Written Decision finding that claims 1-2, 6-
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`14, 18-25, and 27-29 of U.S. Patent No. 9,967,615 (“’615 patent”) unpatentable.
`
`I.
`
`Sonos’ Arguments Are Premised on Misinterpretations of Law
`The Response relies on three flawed legal positions contaminating all of
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`Sonos’ responsive arguments.
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`A.
`
`Sonos is wrong that an “added burden” applies when asserted
`references were cited during prosecution.
`Sonos incorrectly asserts that Google bears an “added burden” due to the
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`’615 patent citing Al-Shaykh, Qureshey, and Phillips. See POR, 1-2. Sonos’ only
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`support, Shire LLC v. Amneal Pharms., addresses invalidity in district court,
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`applying the presumption of validity and the clear and convincing evidence
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`standard. 802 F.3d 1301,1306-7 (Fed. Cir. 2015). But this is an IPR, where “no
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`presumption of validity attaches to [] claims” and validity “is not measured by the
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`clear and convincing evidence standard.” Large Audience Display Sys., LLC v.
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`Tennman Prods., LLC, 660 F. App’x 966, 971 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Therefore, Shire is
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`inapposite.
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`B.
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`Sonos is wrong that general motivations to combine, when
`provided in addition to specific motivations, are insufficient.
`Sonos does not dispute the general reasons Google provided to combine
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`references, but argues them as wholly irrelevant to the obviousness analysis. POR,
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`26-27, 29-30, 53, 64. Not so. Sonos confuses the distinction between legal
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`sufficiency and relevance.
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`1
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`Petitioner’s Reply
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`First, the cases Sonos cites address a scenario absent here—a complete lack
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`of a specific motivation to combine. Both Purdue Pharma and ActiveVideo held
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`that a lack of any specific motivation is insufficient to establish obviousness.
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`Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Depomed, Inc., 643 F. App’x 960, 966 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
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`ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, 1328 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2012). But neither case suggests that general motivations, presented in
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`addition to specific motivations (as Google provides), are wholly irrelevant. See
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`POR, 26-27, 53, 64; see also infra §§ II.B.3, II.C.2, II.D.2, IV.
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`Second, Sonos incorrectly claims that ActiveVideo prohibits using lower cost
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`as a motivation to combine. POR, 29-30. But this case merely criticizes generic
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`and aspirational expert testimony related to lower cost as a motivation. It does not
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`find all expert opinions explaining lower cost as a motivation or showing that
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`references addressing low cost goals are per se insufficient. Id; ActiveVideo, 694
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`F.3d at 1328. In fact, Purdue Pharma explicitly permits motivations based on
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`problems derived directly from the prior art, which is exactly the case here. POR,
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`31. Both Al-Shaykh and Qureshey specifically address the problem of requiring
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`multiple, expensive control devices to effectuate media playback systems and
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`disclose cheaper options with “low-cost [rendering] devices.” Pet., 16.
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`Sonos’ reliance on TQ Delta, LLC v. CISCO Sys., Inc. is equally misplaced.
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`This case warns against “conclusory and unsupported expert testimony” because it
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`2
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`

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`risks the challenged patent being used as a roadmap. 942 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed.
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`Petitioner’s Reply
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`Cir. 2019). But Sonos fails to identify any conclusory or unsupported testimony
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`from Google’s expert. Instead, as explained below, the motivations come from the
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`prior art.
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`C.
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`Sonos is wrong that references “teach away” from combination if
`they cannot be physically combined with guaranteed success.
`Sonos wrongly argues that asserted references teach away from combining
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`them with each other. POR, 27-29, 53-54, 64-66. But a reference only “teaches
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`away” if it includes disclosures that “lead [a POSA] down an errant path or
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`discourage using the combination.” See In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Pat.
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`Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1321-22 (Fed. Cir. 2011). A reference that does not
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`expressly discourage a combination does not teach away from it. Id. And
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`motivations to combine references may be the same as that recognized in the
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`challenged patent. See Alcon Rsch., Ltd. v. Apotex Inc., 687 F.3d 1362, 1368 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2012).
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`The portions of Al-Shaykh that Sonos alleges teach away from combining
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`them with the other references do not discourage the combination. POR, 27-29, 53-
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`54, 64-66. Al-Shaykh’s differentiation of “mobile-device-as-server,” “sharing
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`application,” hidden user controls, and media extensions do not discourage
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`combination with references using these elements, but merely differentiate them
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`3
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`

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`from Al-Shaykh’s invention. Under Katz, mere differentiation is not teaching
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`Petitioner’s Reply
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`away. 639 F.3d at 1321-22.
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`Google’s proposed combinations are derived from suggestions in Al-Shaykh
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`itself because it discloses certain functionality but lacks implementation details,
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`thus encouraging a POSA to search for additional teachings to implement Al-
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`Shaykh. For example, Al-Shaykh’s rendering devices directly retrieve media
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`content from a remote server for playback, and Qureshey teaches how to
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`implement this functionality. See infra § II.A-II.B. Similarly, Al-Shaykh’s mobile
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`device transfers playback to a rendering device and acts as an external control
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`point, but Al-Shaykh only describes what occurs on the mobile device after
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`transfer at a high level—Phillips discloses how to implement what Al-Shaykh
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`suggests. See infra § II.C.2. Lastly, Al-Shaykh considers transferring playback to
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`multiple rendering devices, which would direct a POSA to find other teachings on
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`implementing this functionality, as Ramsay discloses. See infra § IV. A POSA
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`would have understandably sought the “similar teachings” of Qureshey, Phillips,
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`and Ramsay to acquire implementation details and “better understand” Al-Shaykh.
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`See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
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`Despite Al-Shaykh’s encouragement to seek additional references, Sonos
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`argues that success is not guaranteed when combining Al-Shaykh and Ramsay.
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`POR, 65. However, “whether one prior art reference can be incorporated into
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`4
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`

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`another is ‘basically irrelevant.’” UberTechs., Inc. v. X One, Inc., 957 F.3d 1334,
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`Petitioner’s Reply
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`1341 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Id. Instead, a court considers “what the combined teachings
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`of the references would have suggested to [POSA].” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413,
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`425 (CCPA 1981). The correct standard is a “reasonable expectation of success” to
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`combine the references, so “‘absolute predictability’ or ‘guaranteed success’ is
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`[not] required.” Univ. of Strathclyde v. Clear-Vu Lighting LLC, 17 F.4th 155, 160
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`(Fed. Cir. 2021).
`
`II. Claim 1 is Unpatentable
`Sonos disputes that limitations 1-c, 1-d, 1-e, 1-f, 1-g, and 1-i of claim 1 are
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`taught by the prior art. But each limitation is taught by the combination of Al-
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`Shaykh and Qureshey (Ground 1). And Limitation 1-g is alternatively taught by
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`Phillips (Ground 2). As explained below, the prior art also provided sufficient
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`motivations supporting the proposed combinations.
`
`A. Al-Shaykh discloses limitations 1-c, 1-d, 1-e: the “transferring
`playback” limitations
`Sonos disputes that Al-Shaykh discloses “transfer[ring] playback” because it
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`
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`(i) discloses transferring media content, not playback, and (ii) teaches away from
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`transferring playback. POR, 32-34. But Sonos is wrong.
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`Al-Shaykh discloses “transferring playback” because it teaches “transferring
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`playback from the control device (i.e., the mobile device) to a rendering device.”
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`Pet., 22-27.
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`5
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`Petitioner’s Reply
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`Multi-Element Embodiment
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`Single Element Embodiment
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`
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`Al-Shaykh, Figures 2, 3, and 5 (annotated)
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`Sonos’ arguments to the contrary are wrong. First, Sonos picks on Al-
`
`Shaykh’s word choice—using the phrase “transferring media content,” instead of
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`“transferring playback” (see POR, 32-33). But Sonos defines “transferring
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`playback” as transferring the function of rendering multimedia content. Id., 32.
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`This is what Al-Shaykh does. Al-Shaykh’s “user 12 may play selected music
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`content and/or may control the rendering of the music content on the mobile device
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`11 using the music player controls 141.” Al-Shaykh, [0169]. As shown above,
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`selecting button 51 or 71 changes the “renderer” of the multimedia content to a
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`“new target rendering device.” Id., [0077]. And both “rendering devices” “play
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`media content.” Id., [0004].
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`Sonos’ interpretation of “transferring media content” as only a file transfer
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`from the mobile device to the new target rendering device is contradicted by Al-
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`6
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`Shaykh’s disclosure of the rendering device directly retrieving Internet media for
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`Petitioner’s Reply
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`playback. Pet., 43-44; Al-Shaykh, [0020], [0093-95]. This playback is facilitated
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`without the media content “originat[ing] from and/or flow[ing] through the mobile
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`device.” Id. Thus, the media content need “not [be] stored locally on the mobile
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`device.” Id. Accordingly, there is no file transfer in the direct retrieval disclosure
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`relied on in the Petition.
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`Second, Sonos asserts that the mobile device in Al-Shaykh is not (i) “in a
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`[play] playback state” before transferring playback because it requires the mobile
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`device to “not ‘be set to PLAY’” and (ii) capable of causing the rendering device
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`to playback content initially rendered at the mobile device. POR, 34-35. But none
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`of this is required by the claims, making it irrelevant. Even if these limitations
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`were added to the claims, Al-Shaykh discloses them because the music “played in
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`the music player application [of the mobile device] may transfer to the target
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`rendering device for rendering.” Al-Shaykh, [0092]. The media controls of the
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`application “control rendering of music files on [both] the mobile device” and the
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`“rendering device” once enabled. Id.
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`B. Qureshey discloses limitation 1-f: causing one or more first cloud
`servers to add multimedia content to a local playback queue on the
`particular playback device, wherein adding the multimedia content
`to the local playback queue comprises the one or more first cloud
`servers adding, to the local playback queue, one or more resource
`locators corresponding to respective locations of the multimedia
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`
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`7
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`

`

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`Petitioner’s Reply
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`content at one or more second cloud servers of a streaming content
`service
`Qureshey discloses limitation 1-f by describing a synchronization procedure
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`in which an IPAN cloud server adds a playlist of URLs and audio files to “storage
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`space 1512” of “audio device 1510” for facilitating playback. Pet., 28-33. The
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`URLs correspond to locations of media content at remote “audio sources 630-632.”
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`Sonos first disputes that Qureshey discloses limitation 1-f because (i) it does
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`not disclose a “playback queue” and (ii) Google relied on two incompatible
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`sections of Qureshey.1 But Qureshey discloses a “local playback queue,” even
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`under Sonos’ construction, and using the purportedly incompatible sections
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`together.
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`Sonos also disputes that motivation does not exist to combine Al-Shaykh
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`and Qureshey. But its arguments mischaracterize the references.
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`1. Qureshey discloses a “playback queue” under any
`construction
`Qureshey discloses a “playback queue” under all three constructions raised
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`in the Response.
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`1 Sonos argues that Qureshey fails to teach “transferring playback” but Google
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`does not map Qureshey to it.
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`8
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`Petitioner’s Reply
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`First, Google adopted Sonos’ construction applying the plain and ordinary
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`meaning to “playback queue”: “a data construct … that can contain one or more
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`resource locators (e.g., … URLs, etc.), where each resource locator facilitates a
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`computing device performing a task or function.” Pet., 12 (citing Ex. 1012 at 4),
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`Ex. 2025, ¶ 58; see also Ex. 1037 at 5-8. The Board permits petitioners to adopt a
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`patent owner’s construction for the purposes of an IPR. See W. Digital Corp. v.
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`Spex Techs., Inc., No. IPR2018-00084, 2018 WL 1990268, at *5 (P.T.A.B. Apr.
`
`25, 2018).
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`Under Sonos’ construction, Qureshey’s storage space 1512 constitutes a
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`playback queue because it contains a playlist with URLs and a certain list of media
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`(e.g., a list of songs for playback) and the audio device uses the URLs for retrieval
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`and playback of the list of media in a particular sequence. Pet., 31-33. Sonos does
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`not dispute this.
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`Second, Qureshey discloses a “local playback queue” under Sonos’ new
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`construction—“a ‘container’ that can hold multimedia … that a given device is set
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`to play.” POR, 23-25, 47-49. Qureshey’s playlists in storage space 1512 satisfies
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`Sonos’ construction because those playlists indicate audio content to playback by
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`the audio device. Pet., 31-32. Further, Qureshey discloses that the audio device is
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`“adapted to enable playback from [its] data storage device,” and thus the media is
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`9
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`“set to play” from storage space 1512. Qureshey, claim 4, claims 22 and 45, 4:4-
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`Petitioner’s Reply
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`35, 8:58-67, Fig. 2.
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`Third, Sonos raises (but does not advocate for) a third construction of
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`“playback queue” as “an ordered list of multimedia items that is selected by the
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`user for playback,” which Google proposed in district court. POR, 47-48. But the
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`Court did not adopt this exact construction, construing “playback queue” as “a list
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`of multimedia content selected for playback.” Ex. 1037 at 5. See Ex. 1037 at 5-8.
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`Regardless, Qureshey’s storage 1512 meets this limitation because it contains
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`“list[s] of audio files and associated URL[s],” “select[ed]” and “compose[d]” by
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`users which is an ordered list of multimedia items selected by a user for playback.
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`Pet., 31-32; Qureshey, Abstract.
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`2. Qureshey’s intelligent device streams playlists from remote
`sources.
`Sonos’ argument that Qureshey’s playlist and Web radio modes of operation
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`are incompatible (POR, 45-47) ignores Google’s mapping, which shows that
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`Qureshey’s intelligent audio device, when operating in playlist mode, retrieves
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`content from remote sources to stream. Pet., 32; Qureshey, 35:33-67, 1:53-64, 3:5-
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`12. These remote sources include web site audio sources 630-632, which are
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`remote computing systems. Pet., 28-29. Thus, Google’s mapping does not rely on
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`the Web radio mode.
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`10
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`Petitioner’s Reply
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`3.
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`A POSA would have been motivated to combine Al-Shaykh
`and Qureshey
`A POSA would have combined Al-Shaykh and Qureshey, as proposed,
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`because (i) both references are analogous art, deal with similar devices, and solve
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`problems with those devices (none of which Sonos disputes, see supra § I.B), (ii)
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`Al-Shaykh discloses rendering devices directly retrieving media content from a
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`remote server for playback (see supra § II.A) but omits the details on the back-end
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`functionality—details Qureshey provides (see Realtime Data, LLC, 912 F.3d at
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`1374), and (iii) the combination improves the robustness of playback at the
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`rendering device (which Sonos also does not dispute, see POR, 37, 40-41). See
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`Pet., 13-16, 33-34. Sonos’ counterarguments misinterpret Al-Shaykh’s disclosure
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`and rely on conclusory assertions that the proposed combination could not have
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`been physically implemented.
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`a.
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`Sonos’ “affirmative reasons” a POSA would not have
`combined the references are flawed.
`Sonos relies on three flawed “affirmative reasons” a POSA purportedly
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`would not have combined the references: (i) Al-Shaykh discloses three approaches
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`to playback content on the rendering device and would not seek a fourth; (ii) the
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`proposed combination fundamentally alters Al-Shaykh; and (iii) Google fails to
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`appreciate design tradeoffs resulting from the combined system. POR, 41-44.
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`11
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`Petitioner’s Reply
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`All three reasons fail because Al-Shaykh discloses rendering devices directly
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`obtaining content from the remote content service for playback, which is what the
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`Petition relied on, in addition to the “three approaches” Sonos identifies. See supra
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`§ II.A.
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`Sonos’ second reason is legally flawed as relying on an improper
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`obviousness standard, as explained in Section I.C. Moreover, the purportedly
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`“complicated” modifications—incorporating (i) “cloud components,” (ii) a local
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`playback queue at the rendering device, (iii) communication channels between
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`cloud components and the rendering device, and (iv) the ability of the rendering
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`device to retrieve content—are not complex at all. Al-Shaykh discloses these
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`components and functionality, but lacks implementation details, which would have
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`motivated a POSA to look for and implement the teachings of Qureshey. Pet., 42-
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`44; Ex. 1003, ¶¶ 126-129. For example, Al-Shaykh’s system includes cloud
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`components, such as a “remote content provider” providing a “remote content
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`service” over the internet. Pet., 43; Al-Shaykh, [0082]. These cloud components
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`communicate with devices in the home network, including the mobile device and
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`numerous rendering devices. Id.; Al-Shaykh, Fig. 1. Further, a POSA would have
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`understood that the rendering devices would include storage, and the combination
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`merely requires storing specific information, e.g., URLs and audio content, in it.
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`12
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`Petitioner’s Reply
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`Sonos’ third reason alleges design issues with the combined system
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`including Internet disconnection causing system failure or increased network
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`latency—neither of which affects the claimed invention. POR, 43-44. Sonos
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`ignores the flexibility of Al-Shaykh’s system, which provides a variety of playback
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`modes and sources of media content to enrich the user’s playback experience. See
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`Al-Shaykh, [0094] (playback flowing through or not flowing through the mobile
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`device), [0093-6] (playback of “internet media content” and from a local server or
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`remote content service). In line with the goal of flexibility, the Al-Shaykh-
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`Qureshey combination allows playback of content from a remote internet source at
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`the rendering device without going through the mobile phone (see supra § II.A),
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`and a user may switch playback modes if faced with issues like internet disruptions
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`and network latency. For example, in the combined system, a user could playback
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`music at the rendering device from (i) a remote source, which would provide
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`access to a large variety of content, or (ii) a local server, which may not require an
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`internet connection and have improved network latency but provide access to
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`limited, stored content. Thus, the combined system allows users flexibility to
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`choose different modes based on environment characteristics.
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`b.
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`Sonos’ teaching away arguments are legally and
`factually insufficient.
`Sonos incorrectly alleges that Qureshey implements the “mobile-device-as-
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`server,” “sharing application,” and hidden user controls distinguished in Al-
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`Shaykh, which purportedly teaches away from combination. POR, 27-29.
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`Petitioner’s Reply
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`Qureshey does not teach away from Al-Shaykh as a matter of law because it does
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`not expressly discourage combination. See supra § I.C. Additionally, Sonos is also
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`incorrect because Qureshey does not implement these features at all.
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`First, Qureshey’s PC IPAN client is not a “mobile-device-as-server,” which
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`Al-Shaykh describes as a passive mobile device that merely acts as a source of
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`media content but is unable control playback through user inputs at the mobile
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`device. See POR, 28. Instead, Qureshey’s user can provide input to control
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`playback at the audio device, including a “play button 1712” to play a song, other
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`playback control inputs 1782-1796, or a “schedule button 1710” to “schedule
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`[playback of] playlists.” Qureshey, 23:28-26:19, Figs. 17A-17B and 17E, 2:1-12.
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`Second, Qureshey’s IPAN software cannot, on its own, disclose the “sharing
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`application” approach, as disclosed in Al-Shaykh. See POR, 28-29. This approach
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`“artificially separates the media experience on the mobile device” into two separate
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`applications—one that controls playback at the mobile device but is “unaware of
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`and cannot use rendering devices … in the home network” and another that enables
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`transferring playback to rendering device to play content stored on the mobile
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`device. Id. Sonos, however, only identifies Qureshey’s IPAN software and does
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`not explain what separate application Qureshey requires for the sharing application
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`approach.
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`Petitioner’s Reply
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`Third, Sonos argues that Qureshey adopts graphical user interfaces with
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`hidden controls not readily visible to a user. POR, 29. But Sonos ignores
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`Qureshey’s express disclosure of a synchronization button immediately visible and
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`capable of causing an IPAN cloud server to add an updated playlist to the space
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`1512 of an audio device. Pet., 30-31.
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`C. Limitation 1-g: transferring playback … further comprises (b)
`causing playback at the control device to be stopped
`Al-Shaykh discloses limitation 1-g
`1.
`Al-Shaykh discloses limitation 1-g, and Sonos’ arguments to the contrary
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`technically fail. Moreover, Sonos agrees that Al-Shaykh discloses functionality to
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`stop rendering at a device from which playback was transferred from, supporting
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`that limitation 1-g is at least rendered obvious solely by Al-Shaykh.
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`In Al-Shaykh, after transfer is invoked (i.e., the media transfer control 51 or
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`control/indication element 71), playback transfers to the rendering device from the
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`mobile device, which acts as an “external control point” to “start and stop external
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`rendering of [] media content.” Pet., 35; POR, 56 (Sonos admitting Al-Shaykh’s
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`mobile device “control[s] playback at a rendering device”). To act as an external
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`control point, playback at the mobile device must stop. Pet., 35.
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`Sonos argues that (i) the mobile phone acting as an external control point to
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`control external rendering is “irrelevant,” and (ii) Google’s mapping points to user
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`input after the input that “transfers playback” that cannot meet limitation 1-g.
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`POR, 51. Regarding (i), Sonos relies on conclusory expert testimony without any
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`Petitioner’s Reply
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`further support and never explains how a control device acting as an external
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`control point would not require it to stop rendering content. Id. Regarding (ii),
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`Sonos misstates Google’s mapping—the user input to transfer playback (i.e., the
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`media transfer control 51 or control/indication element 71) is the same input that
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`stops playback at the mobile device so it can act as an external control point,
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`including by using media controls 42 to control playback at the rendering device.
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`Pet., 35; Al-Shaykh, [0092], [0118].
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`Sonos’ additional arguments misinterpret Al-Shaykh. POR, 50-51. First,
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`Sonos restates its argument that Al-Shaykh does not disclose transferring playback,
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`which is addressed in Section II.A. Id., 50. Sonos next argues that, when Al-
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`Shaykh’s transfer from the mobile device to the rendering device is initiated,
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`playback at the mobile device begins, opposite of limitation 1-g. Id., 50-51. This
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`misinterprets Al-Shaykh, as explained in § II.A. Finally, Sonos points to a non-
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`binding and preliminary European Patent Office Decision finding Al-Shaykh
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`disclosed simultaneous playback—but Sonos itself does not attempt to assert such
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`an argument, which is understandable given its lack of support in Al-Shaykh. Id.,
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`50; Ex. 2026 at 5 (“Preliminary opinions of the Opposition Division are not
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`final.”). In fact, Al-Shaykh never discusses or discloses simultaneous playback at
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`the mobile device and rendering device, and Sonos cites to no such disclosure. See
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`POR, 50, 57. This matches Al-Shaykh’s purpose, which aims to improve systems
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`Petitioner’s Reply
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`to allow playback on high-quality rendering devices instead of lower-quality
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`mobile devices—not simultaneous streaming. Al-Shaykh, [0005]. Regardless, even
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`assuming Al-Shaykh’s system is capable of simultaneous playback, it is also
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`capable of using the mobile device as an external control point to control external
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`rendering on the rendering device, requiring playback at the mobile device to
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`cease.
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`Lastly, Sonos never disputes that Al-Shaykh discloses stopping playback at
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`devices upon transfer. See POR, 52-53 (agreeing that Al-Shaykh discloses (i)
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`disabling transfer to the rendering device that causes playback at the rendering
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`device to stop and (ii) initiating transfer from one rendering device to another
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`causes playback at the first rendering device to stop). Instead, Sonos (incorrectly)
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`asserts these disclosures are irrelevant. But, as Google explained (and Sonos did
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`not dispute), a POSA would find that Al-Shaykh’s disclosure of these
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`functionalities render limitation 1-g obvious. See Pet., 35-36; Ex. 1003, ¶¶ 105-
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`106.
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`Petitioner’s Reply
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`2.
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`Alternatively, a POSA would have been motivated to
`combine Al-Shaykh and Phillips to render obvious
`limitation 1-g
`Sonos never disputes that Al-Shaykh and Phillips collectively teach
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`limitation 1-g, and only argues a lack of motivation to combine these references.
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`But Sonos’ arguments are legally flawed.
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`First, a POSA would have been motivated to combine Al-Shaykh and
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`Phillips because (i) both references are analogous art in the same field of endeavor,
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`deal with similar devices, and target solving the same problems in those devices
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`(none of which Sonos disputes, see supra § I.B), (ii) Al-Shaykh lacks detail
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`regarding what occurs at the mobile device when playback is transferred to a
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`rendering device—details Phillips provides (see Realtime Data, LLC, 912 F.3d at
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`1374), and (iii) the combination improves the system by allowing users to perform
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`other tasks on their mobile phone while playback continues on th