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`Case 6:20-cv-01214-ADA Document 25 Filed 06/04/21 Page 1 of 14
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`WACO DIVISION
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`CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:20-cv-1214
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`OCEAN SEMICONDUCTOR LLC,
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`v.
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`SILICON LABORATORIES INC.
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`Plaintiff,
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`Defendant.
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`SILICON LABORATORIES INC.’S OPPOSITION TO
`PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRETRIAL CONSOLIDATION
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`IPR2021-01348
`Ocean Semiconductor Exhibit 2030
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`Case 6:20-cv-01214-ADA Document 25 Filed 06/04/21 Page 2 of 14
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1
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`II.
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`ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................................... 2
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`A. Ocean Fails to Meet Its Threshold Burden Showing Common Questions .......................... 2
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`B. The Relevant Factors Weigh Against Consolidation ........................................................... 5
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` Pretrial consolidation will lead to confusion ................................................................... 5
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` The Defendants will be prejudiced by consolidation ....................................................... 7
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` There is little or no risk of inconsistent adjudications of common factual or legal
`questions if the actions are not consolidated. .................................................................. 8
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` Consolidation will not significantly reduce the time/cost of these cases. ........................ 9
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` The remaining factors are neutral or weigh against consolidation ............................... 10
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`III. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 10
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`IPR2021-01348
`Ocean Semiconductor Exhibit 2030
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`Cases
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`Case 6:20-cv-01214-ADA Document 25 Filed 06/04/21 Page 3 of 14
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Page(s)
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`Arnold & Co., LLC v. David K. Young Consulting, LLC,
`No. No. SA-13-CV-00146-DAE, 2013 WL 1411773 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 2013) ..................2, 5
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`Cont’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Platzer,
`304 F. Supp. 228 (S.D. Tex. 1969) ............................................................................................2
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`DAC Surgical Partners P.A. v. United Healthcare Servs., Inc.,
`No. 4:11-cv-1355-MFH, 2013 WL 3229686 (S.D. Tex. June 24, 2013)...................................9
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`Dryshod Int’l, LLC v. Haas Outdoors, Inc.,
`No. 1:18-CV-596-RP, 2019 WL 5149860 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2019) ......................................8
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`Frazier v. Garrison ISD,
`980 F.2d 1514 (5th Cir. 1993) .................................................................................................. 8
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`Goodridge v. Hewlett-Packard,
`No. H-07-4162, 2008 WL 11389213 (S.D. Tex. June 25, 2008)...........................................3, 7
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`Neutron Depot, LLC v. Bankrate, Inc.,
`No. 2:14-cv-192, 2016 WL 3536721 (S.D. Tex. June 29, 2016).............................................10
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`PB&J Software v. Acronis, Inc.,
`No. 4:12-cv-690, 2012 WL 4815132, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 10, 2012) ..................................8, 9
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`Peters v. Woodbury County, Iowa,
`291 F.R.D. 316 (W.D. Iowa 2013) ....................................................................................6, 7, 8
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`Pfeffer v. HAS Retail, Inc
`No. SA-11-cv-959-XR, 2012 WL 394645, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2012) .....................5, 6, 8
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`Raymond v. Ivest Props.,
`No. SA-20-CV-00965-FB, 2021 WL 725819 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 17, 2021) ................................8
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`St. Bernard Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Hosp. Serv. Ass’n of New Orleans, Inc.,
`712 F.2d 978 (5th Cir. 1983) .....................................................................................................7
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`YETI Coolers, LLC v. RTIC Drinkware, LLC,
`No. 1:16-CV-909-RP, 2017 WL 5505325 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2017) ......................2, 3, 4, 8, 9
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`IPR2021-01348
`Ocean Semiconductor Exhibit 2030
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`Case 6:20-cv-01214-ADA Document 25 Filed 06/04/21 Page 4 of 14
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`Defendant Silicon Laboratories Inc. (“Silicon Labs” or “Defendant”) opposes Ocean
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`Semiconductor LLC’s (“Ocean” or “Plaintiff”) Motion for Pre-Trial Consolidation (“Ocean’s
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`Motion”) (Dkt. 21 (hereinafter, “Mot.”)) of seven cases (Case Nos. 6:20-1210, 6:20-1211, 6:20-
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`1212, 6:20-1213, 6:20-1214, 6:20-1215, and 6:20-1216) against disparate defendants (MediaTek
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`Inc., NVIDIA Corp., NXP USA,
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`Inc., Renasas Electronics Corp., Silicon Labs,
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`STMicroelectronics, Inc., and Western Digital Technologies, Inc., collectively “Defendants”).
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Ocean’s Motion ignores substantial prejudice to Silicon Labs that would result from
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`consolidation. Ocean’s Motion seeks to hinder Silicon Labs’ ability to present relevant defenses
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`by, for example, forcing Defendants to present joint defenses and arguments, limiting access to
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`relevant witnesses, and restricting the pages available for dispositive briefing. While Ocean
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`contends that it will be prejudiced absent consolidation, Ocean chose to pursue seven
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`considerably different actions, and Ocean should not now be heard to argue it is prejudiced
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`without consolidation. Ocean knew the burdens of initiating multiple suits, and Ocean—not
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`Silicon Labs—must properly bear any consequence of Ocean’s decision.
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`Consolidating these seven separate actions, even for pretrial purposes, is unnecessary and
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`impractical for several reasons. First, Ocean over-simplifies the details relevant to each action in
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`a failed effort to establish sufficient common questions of law and fact. The reality is that these
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`actions accuse seven different Defendants of infringing various combinations of ten different
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`patents through importation of hundreds of distinct products manufactured by, at least, three
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`foundry partners using multiple facilities with disparate tools. As such, the outcome of each case
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`will be determined by the unique facts specific to each Defendant and its products.
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`Second, even if some common questions exist, the Court should exercise its discretion
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`and deny Ocean’s Motion because, among other relevant factors, consolidation unnecessarily
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`IPR2021-01348
`Ocean Semiconductor Exhibit 2030
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`Case 6:20-cv-01214-ADA Document 25 Filed 06/04/21 Page 5 of 14
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`complicates discovery, causes confusion with witnesses and ultimately a jury, and prejudices the
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`Defendants. Given the stage and location of these cases, there is little risk of inconsistent results
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`and minimal, if any, efficiency to be realized from consolidation.
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`For these, and other factors described below, Ocean’s Motion should be denied.
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`II.
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`ARGUMENT
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`Ocean first fails to meet the “threshold requirement” showing that the seven cases
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`involve a “common question of law or fact” sufficient to necessitate consolidation. YETI
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`Coolers, LLC v. RTIC Drinkware, LLC, No. 1:16-CV-909-RP, 2017 WL 5505325, at *2 (W.D.
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`Tex. Jan. 18, 2017). Second, even where actions involve some overlap, “the mere presence of a
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`common question does not require consolidation” but must be balanced against “inconvenience,
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`delay and confusion that might result.” Cont’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Platzer, 304 F. Supp. 228,
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`229–30 (S.D. Tex. 1969). In balancing whether consolidation is warranted, “courts consider
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`factors such as whether the actions are pending before the same court; whether the actions
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`involve a common party; any risk of prejudice or confusion from consolidation; the risk of
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`inconsistent adjudications of common factual or legal questions if the matters are tried
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`separately; whether consolidation will reduce the time and cost of trying the cases separately;
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`and whether the cases are at the same stage of preparation for trial.” Arnold & Co., LLC v. David
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`K. Young Consulting, LLC, No. SA-13-CV-00146-DAE, 2013 WL 1411773, at *2 (W.D. Tex.
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`Apr. 8, 2013). Here, these factors weigh against consolidation. Ocean bears a threshold burden of
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`establishing common questions, and that consolidation is warranted; Ocean fails on both counts.
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`A.
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`Ocean Fails to Meet Its Threshold Burden Showing Common Questions
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`Ocean’s Motion does not directly address its threshold requirement to show that the
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`seven cases involve common questions of law or fact (YETI, 2017 WL 5505325, at *2), and
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`instead infers that common questions of law and fact exist based solely on superficial
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`IPR2021-01348
`Ocean Semiconductor Exhibit 2030
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`Case 6:20-cv-01214-ADA Document 25 Filed 06/04/21 Page 6 of 14
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`descriptions of the allegations in each case. Mot at 1–2. Ocean points only to surface
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`commonalities—one common foundry partner (of three named) using some common tools (four
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`among six named) infringe some common patents (seven of ten asserted)—and ignores the
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`distinct factual details in each case. For example, Ocean alleges that each Defendant’s accused
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`products were manufactured by a combination of foundry partners and certain Defendants’ own
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`fabrication facilities. Id. at 2. Ocean also alleges that the foundries use different accused tools to
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`manufacture the accused products—camLine’s LineWorks, Applied Materials’ SmartFactory, or
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`both. Id. at 1–2. While other tools are accused in each case, no two cases have complete overlap
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`between foundries and accused tools, as shown in the table below:
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`Foundry
`Accused Tool TSMC TSMC/Self TSMC/UMC TSMC/UMC/Self TSMC/Kioxa/Self
`STMicro
`SiLabs Renesas
`camLine
`NXP
`SmartFactory
`Both
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`MediaTek
`NVIDIA
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`Western Digital
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`Tool
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`As a matter of law, this is insufficient to meet the required threshold for consolidation.
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`See Goodridge v. Hewlett-Packard, Co., No. H-07-4162, 2008 WL 11389213, at *3 (S.D. Tex.
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`June 25, 2008) (acknowledging the actions arise out of the same context, but finding insufficient
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`common questions of fact to consolidate as each will involve a separate and distinct fact inquiry).
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`In YETI, the court denied a motion to consolidate even though the lawsuits were between
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`the same parties, asserted “similar sets of claims,” and were governed by the same law. YETI,
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`2017 WL 5505325, at *1. RTIC sought to consolidate several of the actions relating to coolers,
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`cups, and bottle products, arguing common questions of law existed because of the nearly
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`identical set of claims for the different products. Id. at *2. RTIC even identified a number of
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`factual inquiries it believed were common to all cases, including, for example, “the functional
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`and generic nature of the parties’ products.” Id. In denying, the YETI court reasoned that, even
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`though the cases shared common themes and context, and raised similar factual and legal issues,
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`IPR2021-01348
`Ocean Semiconductor Exhibit 2030
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`Case 6:20-cv-01214-ADA Document 25 Filed 06/04/21 Page 7 of 14
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`“the questions arising in each case are not the same and necessarily can be resolved differently
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`for each category of products.” Id. The court was “not persuaded that these cases entail common
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`issues simply because they involve the same types of claims and the products at issue happen to
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`be manufactured by the same companies.” Id. In other words, an analysis of the similar series of
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`claims had to be done product by product for each case. Thus, the court held that RTIC failed to
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`meet the threshold burden for consolidation. Id.
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`The reasoning in YETI applies with greater force in this case, which involves multiple
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`unrelated parties. Ocean’s Motion, like in YETI, merely identifies shared common themes and
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`context, such as similar conclusory allegations arising from some commonly asserted patents,
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`some commonly accused fabrication tools, and one common foundry partner. Mot. at 1–2. This
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`partial overlap is not sufficient to meet Ocean’s threshold burden of demonstrating common
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`questions of law and fact warranting consolidation. Just as in YETI, here Ocean’s separate
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`infringement allegations depend on material facts unique to each individually filed case. Ocean’s
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`Motion presupposes foundries use the same tools and facilities for all seven Defendants, but
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`there is no reason to believe that is true. For example, TSMC, which Ocean identified as a
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`foundry partner for each Defendant, is a massive corporation with numerous facilities worldwide
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`that operates 18 different fabrication facilities. Ex. 1. TSMC’s different facilities have differing
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`processing capabilities, use different tools and methods for fabricating products, and different
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`products are fabricated at different locations. See Dkt. 17 at 2, n.2. Given this, it is highly
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`unlikely that the TSMC-related facts will overlap for all Defendants, as Ocean alleges, and
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`Ocean has provided no reason why this must be so. As such, even for the common patents, a
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`finding of infringement related to one Defendant’s products will have little bearing on whether
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`any other Defendant’s products are manufactured in the same manner.
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`IPR2021-01348
`Ocean Semiconductor Exhibit 2030
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`Case 6:20-cv-01214-ADA Document 25 Filed 06/04/21 Page 8 of 14
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`Further, merely asserting the same cause of action, i.e., infringement of some of the same
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`patents, is insufficient—otherwise, this Court would consolidate far more cases. In Pfeffer v.
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`HAS Retail, Inc., Pfeffer filed nine lawsuits against nine defendants alleging the same violation
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`of the Electronic Funds Transfer Act (“EFTA”) and then moved for consolidation of the nine
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`actions. No. SA-11-cv-959-XR, 2012 WL 394645, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2012). The court
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`denied consolidation “[b]ecause all nine cases involve different defendants and independent fact
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`scenarios, the risks of consolidation outweigh any potential benefits.” Id. The court elaborated
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`that, other than the same legal claim being alleged, the nine actions are unrelated because “each
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`case involves a different defendant, each of which is a different corporate entity,” and Pfeffer
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`“does not allege that any of the defendants acted in concert with one another or that any of the
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`defendants were even aware of one another’s activities.” Id. The court found the risk of
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`confusion and prejudice to be too high for consolidation. Id. at *2. Here, similar to Pfeffer, each
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`case involves a different Defendant and each case involves different fact scenarios—i.e.,
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`disparate products, fab facilities, and tools. For these reasons, Ocean’s Motion fails to
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`demonstrate sufficient common questions of law and fact, and it should be denied.
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`B.
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`The Relevant Factors Weigh Against Consolidation
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`Of course, as noted above, the mere presence of a common question of law or fact does
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`not require consolidation. Even if this threshold inquiry is met (which it is not), courts must
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`weigh additional factors when exercising discretion to consolidate. Arnold, 2013 WL 1411773,
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`at *2. Analysis of these additional factors confirms the cases at issue should not be consolidated.
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`Pretrial consolidation will lead to confusion
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`Consolidating these cases, even for pretrial purposes only, will likely result in significant
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`confusion for all involved. Ocean declares in a conclusory fashion that there will be no risk of
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`confusion because of “the substantial overlap between the asserted patents, accused foundry
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`Case 6:20-cv-01214-ADA Document 25 Filed 06/04/21 Page 9 of 14
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`partners, and accused manufacturing tools.” Mot. at 4. Ocean’s position either ignores or
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`significantly simplifies reality. In fact, even while presenting an overly simplified version of
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`seven unique cases, Ocean’s Motion seeks to leave the door open for adding non-accused
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`foundry partners and tools. Mot. at n.1 and n.2; see also Dkt. 14 at 9-12.
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`Consolidation will unnecessarily complicate discovery. For example, as discussed in
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`Section II.A above, TSMC alone operates numerous facilities that fabricate different ones of the
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`hundreds of accused products. Given the idiosyncrasies of each location, consolidation would
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`greatly complicate fact and expert witness deposition preparation and could potentially lead to
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`confused or muddled deposition testimony that would not assist a jury. For example, it may be
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`easy for a deponent to mistake one record related to one facility or Defendant for another. Rather
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`than unnecessarily complicating discovery in these ways, these cases should remain separate.
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`Courts have found the risk of confusion significant when denying consolidation in similar
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`situations. As discussed in Section II.A above, the Pfeffer court denied consolidation of nine
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`cases involving violations of the EFTA and elaborated that: “Since the cases consist of different
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`defendants and independent fact scenarios, the potential risks and burdens of consolidation
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`outweigh any potential benefits. The risk of prejudice to the defendants and juror confusion at
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`trial are sizeable.” Pfeffer, 2012 WL 394645, at *2. Similar to Pfeffer, each of the seven cases at
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`issue here involves a different defendant and independent fact scenarios. As such, the risk of
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`confusion for witnesses that translates into confusion for the jury is palpable, and the benefits of
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`consolidation are slim. See, e.g., Peters v. Woodbury County, Iowa, 291 F.R.D. 316, 320 (W.D.
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`Iowa 2013) (denying consolidation because it “would create complexities resulting in the
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`imposition of burdens on the court and the parties. For each exhibit offered, and each witness
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`examined, issues would arise as to whether the evidence applies to the Clay case, the Peters case
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`IPR2021-01348
`Ocean Semiconductor Exhibit 2030
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`Case 6:20-cv-01214-ADA Document 25 Filed 06/04/21 Page 10 of 14
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`or both”). For these reasons, the likelihood of confusion and error is simply too great to warrant
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`consolidation, even for pretrial purposes. As such, this factor weighs against consolidation.
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`The Defendants will be prejudiced by consolidation
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`Ocean declares in conclusory fashion that there “is no risk of prejudice or confusion if the
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`actions are consolidated.” Mot. at 1. As discussed above, consolidating even for pretrial purposes
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`would likely confuse witnesses, risking prejudice to the Defendants. See Peters, 291 F.R.D. at
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`320 (“The potential confusion creates a serious risk of prejudice to the defendants.”). And,
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`Silicon Labs will be prejudiced by limits on its ability to independently present its own defense.
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`For example, during the meet and confer process, Ocean contended that its Motion
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`contemplates combined summary judgment briefing at some page limit less than what would be
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`allowed in the seven individual cases it chose to file. Undoubtedly, such a limitation substantially
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`prejudices Defendants given their independent defenses and unique factual scenarios.
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`Further, Western Digital’s two IPRs are a concrete example of the Defendants’ divergent
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`interests that would lead to prejudice against Silicon Labs. In both IPR petitions, Western Digital
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`agrees that if the PTAB institutes its IPRs, Western Digital will not “pursue invalidity on the
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`same grounds in district court.” Ex. 2, IPR No. IPR2021-00864, Paper 1 at 6; Ex. 3, IPR No.
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`IPR2021-00929, Paper 1 at 7. But Silicon Labs—who has not filed IPRs and is not a real party in
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`interest to Western Digital’s IPRs—is not bound by that stipulation. Therefore, Silicon Labs can
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`raise those invalidity grounds regardless of whether the PTAB institutes. Forcing all Defendants
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`to pursue a common invalidity strategy is prejudicial.
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`It is well-settled that “[c]onsolidation is improper if it would prejudice the rights of the
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`parties.” St. Bernard Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Hosp. Serv. Ass’n of New Orleans, Inc., 712 F.2d 978,
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`989 (5th Cir. 1983); Goodridge, 2008 WL 11389213 at *1. Ocean is the party that filed seven
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`suits against different entities, each entitled to pursue its own independent defense. Ocean’s
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`IPR2021-01348
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`Case 6:20-cv-01214-ADA Document 25 Filed 06/04/21 Page 11 of 14
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`request for consolidation appears to be nothing more than an attempt to hamstring the
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`Defendants, forcing them to speak with one voice, even where the issues important to each
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`Defendant may differ substantially. Thus, this factor weighs strongly against consolidation.
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`There is little or no risk of inconsistent adjudications of common factual
`or legal questions if the actions are not consolidated.
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`Ocean alleges that separate actions pose “significant risks” of conflicting results, and
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`Ocean curiously suggests that filing Defendant-specific motions to dismiss using Defendant-
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`specific reasoning is an example that “could easily lead this Court to making inconsistent
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`decisions.” Mot. at 5–6. That position simply makes no sense, as the outcome of each action
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`must depend on the facts material to the specific case. See YETI, 2017 WL 5505325, at *3
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`(“[T]here is no reason why each case must reach the same conclusions.”); Peters, 291 F.R.D. at
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`321 (“[I]t is entirely possible that one plaintiff may prevail and the other may not . . . There
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`would be nothing inherently inconsistent in such an outcome.”).1
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`“A mere contention that failure to consolidate cases might lead to inconsistent decisions
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`is insufficient justification for a court to consolidate an action.” Pfeffer, 2012 WL 394645, at *1
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`(citing Frazier v. Garrison ISD, 980 F.2d 1514, 1532 (5th Cir. 1993)). Indeed, in PB&J
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`Software, LLC v. Acronis, Inc., the court denied consolidation where “three judges presiding over
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`the four cases may easily be made aware of relevant prior rulings, and they may choose to accept
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`or reject prior rulings as they see fit. The same is true for other motions, dispositive or
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`otherwise.” No. 4:12-cv-690, 2012 WL 4815132, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 10, 2012). The situation
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`1 Ocean’s reliance on Dryshod Int’l, LLC v. Haas Outdoors, Inc., is misplaced. Mot. at 5.
`Dryshod is not analogous to the present facts as it involved two mirror-image trademark and
`copyright infringement/non-infringement suits with identical parties. No. 1:18-CV-596-RP, 2019
`WL 5149860, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2019). Similarly, Ocean’s reliance on Raymond v. Ivest
`Props., is not helpful. Mot. at 6. In Raymond, the second case was intended to be filed as an
`amended complaint in the first, and thus consolidation was appropriate. No. SA-20-CV-00965-
`FB, 2021 WL 725819, at *2–3 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 17, 2021).
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`Case 6:20-cv-01214-ADA Document 25 Filed 06/04/21 Page 12 of 14
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`here is simpler than in PB&J Software: the Court will be aware of its prior rulings in the related
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`causes of action. As such, the risk of inconsistent results is nonexistent and this factor does not
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`weigh in favor of consolidation.
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`Consolidation will not significantly reduce the time/cost of these cases.
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`Ocean contends that consolidation will promote judicial efficiency through consolidated
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`discovery (Mot. at 6–7), but ignores the impact of consolidation on other aspects of the case. For
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`example, any time savings by a single deposition to cover a witness’ background information
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`only once is far outweighed by the likely confusion and inadvertent mistakes that would be made
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`by the witness and the attorneys during a marathon deposition discussing the manufacturing
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`processes involved for hundreds of different products for seven separate Defendants. And, while
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`some witnesses may overlap, there is no question that many witnesses are unique to each action,
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`such as staff and employees of both Defendants and individual foundry locations with their
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`particular knowledge regarding the manufacturing processes and tools used at separate facilities.
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`Ocean, in support of its position, relies on DAC Surgical Partners P.A. v. United
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`Healthcare Servs., Inc., in which the defendants, common to two cases, sought consolidation
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`when the plaintiffs asserted “virtually identical allegations and causes of action . . . the only
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`meaningful difference is the names of the plaintiffs.” No. 4:11-cv-1355-MFH, 2013 WL
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`3229686 (S.D. Tex. June 24, 2013). As discussed above, the accusations in the current cases are
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`not so straightforward. Here, Ocean proposes consolidating seven individual actions that include
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`unique parties, only one common foundry partner, and only some common patents and tools.
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`Consolidation will not significantly reduce the time and cost necessary to complete
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`discovery or try these cases. Rather, consolidating these cases is likely to make them more
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`complex. In denying consolidation in YETI, the court explained that consolidation “would lead to
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`one significantly more complex case, rather than three relatively simple ones.” 2017 WL
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`Case 6:20-cv-01214-ADA Document 25 Filed 06/04/21 Page 13 of 14
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`5505325, at *3. That is precisely the scenario Ocean is advocating here, which will make the
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`current proceedings more complex and potentially unmanageable.
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`Finally, consolidation is not the only avenue available to the parties to avoid duplicative
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`discovery and reduce pretrial costs where appropriate. Ocean’s analysis ignores this Court’s
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`usual practice of coordinating related cases—i.e., setting them on the same schedule and for a
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`single Markman hearing, which Silicon Labs would not oppose. This practice results in much of
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`the streamlining and efficiencies that Ocean incorrectly contends requires formal consolidation.
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`Additionally, where appropriate, Silicon Labs would consider sharing documents across cases,
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`making appropriate stipulations, abiding by common protective orders, and other reasonable
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`accommodations to avoid the unnecessary expenditure of resources responding to redundant
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`discovery requests. As such, this factor either weighs against consolidation or is at best neutral.
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`The remaining factors are neutral or weigh against consolidation
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`Ocean incorrectly argues that its decision to file seven cases in the same court at the same
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`time favors consolidation. Mot. at 4. But, such a filing strategy is common, and does not weigh
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`heavily in favor of consolidation. Neutron Depot, LLC v. Bankrate, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-192, 2016
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`WL 3536721, at *2 (S.D. Tex. June 29, 2016). And even though Ocean is a common party,
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`because the Defendants are all different entities, this factor weighs against consolidation or is
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`neutral. Id.
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`III. CONCLUSION
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`As explained above, Ocean fails to meet its threshold burden of demonstrating that these
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`seven cases have common questions of law and fact. The material facts needed to resolve each
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`case, such as the specific methods and tools used in manufacturing, are unquestionably unique to
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`each case. Further, even if there were sufficient common questions of fact and law, the relevant
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`factors strongly weigh against consolidation. Ocean’s Motion should be denied in its entirety.
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`- 10 -
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`IPR2021-01348
`Ocean Semiconductor Exhibit 2030
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`Case 6:20-cv-01214-ADA Document 25 Filed 06/04/21 Page 14 of 14
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`June 4, 2021
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`By: /s/ Marc B. Collier
`
`Marc B. Collier (SBN 00792418)
`marc.collier@nortonrosefulbright.com
`Eric C. Green (SBN 24069824)
`eric.green@nortonrosefulbright.com
`Catherine Garza (SBN 24073318)
`Cat.garza@nortonrosefulbright.com
`NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP
`98 San Jacinto Boulevard, Suite 1100
`Austin, Texas 78701
`Tel: (512) 474-5201
`Fax: (512) 536-4598
`
`Richard S. Zembek (SBN 00797726)
`richard.zembek@nortonrosefulbright.com
`Darren Smith (SBN 24088433)
`Darren.smith@nortonrosefulbright.com
`NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP
`1301 McKinney, Suite 5100
`Houston, Texas 77010-3095
`Tel: (713) 651-5151
`Fax: (713) 651-5246
`
`COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT SILICON
`LABORATORIES INC.
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I certify that on June 4, 2021, the foregoing was electronically filed with the Clerk of
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`Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to all counsel of
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`record.
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`
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`By: /s/ Eric C. Green
`
`Eric C. Green
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`
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`IPR2021-01348
`Ocean Semiconductor Exhibit 2030
`
`