Standardization in
`Technology-Based Markets
`
`Gregory Tassey
`
`Senior Economist
`National Institute of Standards and Technology
`(gtassey@nist.gov)
`
`June 1999
`
`[Forthcoming in Research Policy]
`
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`Standardization in Technology-Based Markets
`
`Gregory Tassey1
`Senior Economist, National Institute of Standards and Technology
`
`Abstract
`
`The complexity of modern technology, especially its system character, has led to an increase the number
`and variety of standards that affect a single industry or market. Standards affect the R&D, production, and
`market penetration stages of economic activity and therefore have a significant collective effect on innovation,
`productivity, and market structure. Standards are classified into product-element and nonproduct categories
`because the two types arise from different technologies and require different formulation and implementation
`strategies. Because standards are a form of technical infrastructure, they have considerable public good
`content. Research policy must therefore include standardization in analyses of technology-based growth
`issues.
`
`Keywords: standardization, innovation, R&D, economic growth, industry structure
`
`Through R&D-performing industries and the effect of new technologies on other parts of the
`economy, technology accounts for one-third to more than one-half of U.S. GDP growth and at least
`two-thirds of productivity growth. However, the so-called “high-tech” sector only contributes
`approximately 7 percent of U.S. GDP.2 This relatively small direct contribution implies substantial
`leverage by this sector on the overall economy, but also that extensive diffusion of new technology
`must take place if adequate productivity growth rates are to be achieved by the entire economy.
`Standardization affects both innovation and technology diffusion. It also can influence industry
`structure and thereby help determine which firms benefit and which do not from technological
`change. Thus, a concern of R&D policy should be the evolutionary path by which a new technology
`
`1 Email: tassey@nist.gov. The author is grateful to Albert N. Link for comments on previous drafts.
`2 Tassey [1997]. The high-tech sector is defined here as consisting of four major categories: high-tech
`manufacturing (IT-related plus industrial electronics), communication services, software and computer-
`related services, and pharmaceuticals). For alternative definitions of IT-related high-tech industries, see
`American Electronics Association [1997, p. 128] and Department of Commerce [1998, Appendix p. A1–2].
`The AEA definition results in a 6.1 GDP estimate for 1996 and the Commerce definition yields about 8
`percent for 1998. To either of these definitions should be added pharmaceuticals, which brings the AEA-
`defined high-tech sector’s GDP contribution to 7 percent.
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`or, more accurately, certain elements of a new technology become standardized. Over a
`technology’s life cycle, standardization can affect economic efficiency. However, these effects can
`be both positive and negative. For example, standardization can increase efficiency within a
`technology life cycle, but it also can prolong existing life cycles to an excessive degree by inhibiting
`investment in the technological innovation that creates the next cycle.
`Standardization can and does occur without formal promulgation as a “standard.” This
`distinction between de facto and promulgated standards will be made apparent and discussed in the
`following sections. In one sense, standardization is a form rather than a type of infrastructure
`because it represents a codification of an element of an industry’s technology or simply some
`information relevant to the conduct of economic activity. On the other hand, the selection of one of
`several available forms of a technology element as “the standard” has potentially important
`economic effects.
`
`1. Economic Functions of Standards
`
`A standard can be defined generally as a construct that results from reasoned, collective choice
`and enables agreement on solutions of recurrent problems. Looked upon in this way, a standard can
`be viewed as striking a balance between the requirements of users, the technological possibilities and
`associated costs of producers, and constraints imposed by government for the benefit of society in
`general (Germon [1986]).
`More functionally, an industry standard is a set of specifications to which all elements of
`products, processes, formats, or procedures under its jurisdiction must conform. The process of
`standardization is the pursuit of this conformity, with the objective of increasing the efficiency of
`economic activity.
`
`1.1. Nature and Scope of Impacts
`
`Standards played an important role in the industrial revolution. They allowed factories to
`achieve economies of scale and enabled markets to execute transactions in an equitable and efficient
`manner. Standardization of parts made supplier specialization possible and increased efficiency over
`the entire product life cycle by facilitating part repair or replacement.
`In a modern economy, standards constitute a pervasive infrastructure affecting the technology-
`based economy in a number of important and relatively complex ways. Some of these impacts even
`appear contradictory. For example, whereas the traditional economic function of standards in
`production can restrict product choice in exchange for the cost advantages of economies of scale,
`other types of standards common to advanced production and service systems can actually facilitate
`product variety and hence choice for the customer.
`Fig. 1 depicts the multiple functions performed by standards. These functions transcend the
`three major stages of technology-based activity (cid:190) R&D, production, and market penetration, and
`are difficult to construct and implement because many important technologies have both an intrinsic
`
`2
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`Acceptance
`Test
`Standards;
`National Test
`Facilities
`
`Technical Basis for
`Standards
`
`Measurement and
`Test Methods
`
`Materials
`Characteristics
`Databases
`
`Proprietary
`Technologies
`
`Generic
`Technologies
`
`Infratechnologies
`
`Science Base
`
`Fig. 1. Roles of Standards in a Technology-Based Industry
`
`Interface
`Standards
`Strategic
`Planning
`
`Production
`
`Transaction
`Standards
`Market
`Development
`
`Value
`Added
`
`Process & Quality
`Control Standards
`
`Standardization of
`Technology Elements
`
`Entrepreneurial
`Activity
`
`Risk
`Reduction
`
`complexity and a "systems" character. Such characteristics demand more sophisticated
`technological foundations for standards and imply the need for technically competent standards
`setting processes.
`The greater complexity of technologies and the associated networks of firms and supporting
`infrastructure that develop and disseminate these technologies mean that supply chains are becoming
`the most important level of policy analysis. Greater distribution of R&D among materials and
`equipment suppliers, manufacturers of products, and providers of services increasingly characterize
`high-tech supply chains. The
`consequent increase in market
`transactions involving technology
`also demands standards to reduce
`the associated transaction costs.
`Technology consists of a
`number of discrete elements that
`tend to evolve in different
`institutional settings. These
`elements have distinctly different
`character and require different types
`and combinations of standards to
`effect efficient development and
`utilization (Tassey [1992, 1997]).
`Many variations exist but broadly
`defined they fall into the three
`major categories shown in Fig. 1:
`(1) The fundamental or generic technology base of the industry on which subsequent market
`applications (products and services) are based
`(2) A set of infratechnologies that provide a varied and critical technical infrastructure to support
`for development of the generic technology and subsequent market applications
`(3) The market applications (proprietary technologies)
`Because the type of R&D required for each element differs significantly, so do private-sector
`investment incentives with the result that underinvestment varies across the different elements of an
`industrial technology. The greater the infrastructural character of a technology, the more
`underinvestment is likely to occur. Standards and thus their technical underpinnings have a strong
`infrastructure character, so that underinvestment is common.
`
` 1.2. Basic Functions of Standards
`
`To analyze the economic functions of standards in a technology-based economy, a taxonomy is
`required that classifies standards by functions having unique economic characteristics. For the
`purpose of economic impact assessment, the functions of standards are classified into four
`
`3
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`categories.3 The positive effects of each of the four functions are described below. However, as
`discussed in later sections, standards also can have negative economic consequences or simply fail to
`achieve their maximum potential economic benefit.
`
`1.2.1. Quality/Reliability
`Standards are developed to specify acceptable product or service performance along one or
`more dimensions such as functional levels, performance variation, service lifetime, efficiency, safety,
`and environmental impact. A standard that specifies a minimum level of performance often
`provides the point of departure for competition in an industry. For example, a case study by Putnam,
`Hayes and Bartlett [1982] points out that when an automobile manufacturer develops a new engine,
`the company specifies the minimum acceptable lubrication attributes. This specification then
`becomes the basis for competition among petroleum companies, who either compete on price at the
`minimum specified level of quality or by offering motor oil with a level of performance above the
`minimum.
`
`1.2.2. Information Standards
`Standards help provide evaluated scientific and engineering information in the form of
`publications, electronic data bases, terminology, and test and measurement methods for describing,
`quantifying, and evaluating product attributes. In technologically advanced manufacturing
`industries, a range of measurement and test method standards provide information, which, by virtue
`of being universally accepted, greatly reduce transaction costs between buyer and seller. In their
`absence, especially for complex, technology-based products, considerable disagreement will often
`ensue over verification of performance claims. These disputes raise the cost of consummating a
`marketplace transaction, which is reflected in higher prices charged. The economic impact is to
`slow market penetration.
`Measurement methods are also essential to conduct state-of-the-art research. In today’s
`semiconductor R&D, scientists and engineers must be able to measure the distances between
`individual atoms (dopants) that are added to silicon to achieve the desired millions of high-density
`electronic functions on a single chip. Standardization of some of these methods is essential for the
`efficiency of R&D itself. For example, being able to replicate and verify research results is often
`critical to obtaining follow-on research funding or commitment to commercialization. Standardized
`scientific and engineering data (in the sense of having been critically evaluated and verified for
`accuracy) and standardized equipment calibration techniques are also essential for efficient R&D.
`Finally, the typical manufacturing process is increasingly measurement intensive because of
`growing demands for quality and real-time process control. Traditional manufacturing processes
`tested products after a production run. The inefficiency of this approach is large, not only because of
`the wasted material and labor when a production run must be scrapped, but also because of down
`
`3 This taxonomy follows Tassey [1982, 1992, 1997] and Link and Tassey [1987]. David [1987] proposes a
`similar taxonomy based on three kinds of standards (reference, minimum quality, and compatibility). Other
`taxonomies have been developed based on the process by which a standard comes into existence. For
`example, David and Greenstein [1990] provide a framework to classify standards as de facto (“unsponsored”
`or “sponsored”) or promulgated (voluntary or dejure).
`
`4
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`time and hence unused capacity incurred while a problem is identified and fixed. 4 The availability of
`computers makes possible the real-time monitoring and control of a process, potentially enabling
`instant adjustment of process variables.
`When fully implemented, real-time control can virtually eliminate waste and increases product
`mix flexibility. However, real-time control of a production process is a complex systems
`technology, requiring large numbers of sensors, computers, and software. Standardization of certain
`performance measurements for, say, a sensor facilitates design of the equipment. Equally large
`efficiency gains can occur from standardization of certain elements of the actual methods or
`techniques of process control, as adherence to these standards often removes the need for much of
`the post production testing. Finally, whatever production strategy is adopted, the equipment that
`helps execute the strategy must be periodically calibrated by standards in order to ensure maximum
`efficient performance.
`
`1.2.3. Compatibility/Interoperability
`Standards specify properties that a product must have in order to work (physically or
`functionally) with complementary products within a product or service system. This function of
`standards has been the most intensively studied by economists.5 Compatibility or interoperability is
`typically manifested in the form of a standardized interface between components of a larger system.
`An effective interface standard does not affect the design of the components themselves, such as
`numerically controlled machine tools or the components of these tools, including controllers. In
`fact, interface standards provide “open” systems and thereby allow multiple proprietary component
`designs to coexist — that is, they enable innovation at the component level by being competitively
`neutral with respect to design. In effect, competitors can innovate on "either side" of the interface,
`while the consumer of the product system can select the particular components that optimize system
`design. They also allow substitution of more advanced components as they become available over
`time, thereby greatly reducing the risk of obsolescence of the entire system. Widespread factory
`automation as it is currently evolving in advanced economies likely will not proceed without these
`standards.
`Without interface standards, large companies often supply “turnkey” systems where proprietary
`interfaces link components. However, the cost to the user can be high because the system is not
`optimized for the user’s particular needs (competitors will typically offer components that are
`superior to some of those in the turnkey system) and price competition will not be a factor when
`system components need replacement.
`In such situations, system design can still be optimized. However, the cost of modifying
`physical and functional interfaces to allow components from different vendors to work together (i.e.,
`to “interoperate”) is usually prohibitive. Moreover, full functionality is often not obtained by
`reengineering proprietary (nonstandard) interfaces.
`
`
`4 Scrap can result when periodic testing of product reveals an attribute flaw. All units produced between the
`sample product tested and the previous test are equally defective.
`5 See, for example, David and Steinmueller [1994], Kahin and Abbate [1995], and Link and Scott [1998].
`
`5
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`1.2.4. Variety Reduction
`Standards limit a product to a certain range or number of characteristics such as size or quality
`levels. The fourth function of standards is the traditional one of reducing variety to attain economies
`of scale. The majority of standards perform this function. However, variety reduction is no longer
`simply a matter of selecting certain physical dimensions of a product for standardization (such as the
`width between threads of a screw). Variety reduction is now commonly applied to nonphysical
`attributes such as data formats and combined physical and functional attributes such as computer
`architectures and peripheral interfaces.
`The process of setting variety reduction standards also varies significantly. Many standards of
`this type are viewed as infrastructure and thus adopted by an industry consensus process. However,
`standardization of some attribute or element of a product is just as often achieved through the
`marketplace by one firm gaining control of the underlying technology and using this control to force
`other manufacturers with whom that firm competes to adopt its version of the technology. The
`product element then becomes a de facto (non-consensus) standard.6
`Conceptually, the variety reduction function is the most difficult category of standardization to
`analyze because of its ability to either enhance or inhibit innovation. Variety reduction typically
`enables economies of scale to be achieved, but larger production volumes tend to promote more
`capital-intensive process technologies. This common evolutionary pattern of a technology over a
`number of product life cycles usually reduces the number of suppliers and increases their average
`size. Such trends may or may not reduce competition, but often progressively exclude small,
`potentially innovative firms from entry due to increased minimum efficient scale thresholds.
`
`2. Types of Standards
`
`Standards have been classified by the form they take. To varying degrees all four functions of
`standards specified above can be described alternatively in terms of design specifications or
`performance levels. Design-based standards are much more restrictive and can inhibit innovation to
`a greater degree than performance-based standards. The latter type allows flexibility in product or
`service design while still meeting the performance requirements of the standard. Thus, standards
`generally work more efficiently when they are performance based.
` The economic functions of standards aggregate into two basic categories (cid:190) product and non-
`product (cid:190) delineated by their relationship to product (or service) structure and their public good
`content. Distinctions between the two types are important because their economic roles are
`distinctly different and hence so are the processes by which they are set. The differences in public
`good content have important implications for policy because the rationales for government
`intervention are very different in the two cases.
`Simply put, standardization of one or more attributes of a product (or service) can convey direct
`competitive advantage to the owner/controller of the technology producing those attributes. They
`
`
`6 Intel’s microprocessor architecture and Microsoft’s operating system are well-known examples.
`
`6
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`therefore get considerable attention from economic growth strategists. Conversely, non-product
`standards tend to be competitively neutral, at least within an industry or trading block. Hence, they
`tend to get less attention. Yet, this latter category can be critical to the entire industry’s efficiency
`and its overall market penetration rate.
`
`2.1. Product-Element Standards
`
`Product-element standards typically involve one of the key attributes or elements of a product, as
`opposed to the entire product. Government, especially where large economies of scale are present or
`when early market entry is considered an essential part of a national economic strategy, mandates
`some product-element standards.
`In most cases, at least in the U.S. economy, market dynamics determine a de facto standard.
`Alternative technologies intensely compete until the dominant version gains sufficient market share
`to become the single standard. Market control by one firm can truncate this competitive process.
`Such control is particularly effective in cases of increasing returns and can quickly force acceptance
`of the monopolist’s proprietary technology element as the standard. However, the globalization of
`high-tech markets with shorter product life cycles is making single-firm dominance more difficult.
`In response, various combinations of vertical and horizontal consortia are promulgating product-
`element standards by consensus, at least within a single large economy or trading block.
`One of the more visible examples of the competitive effects of de facto standardization is the
`"architecture" of personal computers.7 Elements of computer architecture such as the operating
`system, the "bus," the graphical user interface, and the applications programming interface, have
`been the focus of intense competition by firms seeking to gain sufficient market control to “set” the
`de facto standard for the particular product element.8
`In this regard, Apple Computer made a brilliant move when it forced third-party software
`developers to adopt a standard "graphical user interface" so that all programs running on Apple's
`computers presented the user with the same screen format and command structure.9 However, Apple
`kept its hardware operating system proprietary (i.e., it did not adopt an open systems architecture
`strategy) and thus it had no chance to become the industry standard. This decision explains Apple’s
`initial prosperity and subsequent competitive decline. In contrast, Sun Microsystems opened the
`microprocessor architecture for its workstations in order to obtain help in gaining market share. It
`
`
`7 Architecture is the scheme by which the function of a product is allocated to physical components (Ulrich,
`[1995, p. 419]). Architecture is important because it provides a set of standardized product attributes and the
`rules or protocols for their interaction with other product elements.
`8 The business literature continues to debate the efficacy of competition to supply the product elements that
`constitute an architecture. See Morris and Ferguson [1993].
`9 The term graphical user interface refers to the use of "menus" of images instead of characters to indicate
`instruction options for the computer user. Apple pioneered this much-preferred format and also made this
`approach even more attractive to users by sticking to a standardized format for all application programs .
`
`7
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`was willing to share its markets in return for the increased probability that its architecture would
`become a standard and thereby create a large and stable customer base.
`The policy issue is thus: To the degree that certain product elements must become standardized
`to enable economies of scale and network externalities to be realized, the potentially large benefits
`that accrue to the firm owning the technology element are acceptable. However, this is the case as
`long as competition is not constrained in the other elements that make up the overall product or
`system technology.
`This caveat with respect to economic efficiency was the basis for charges by software firms that
`Microsoft was using its monopoly position as owner of the dominant operating system standard to
`gain unfair advantage in marketing its own versions of new operating system elements (such as a
`web browser) and applications programs that run on that operating system. Such charges were
`pursued in a 1998–1999 U.S. government antitrust lawsuit.
`In contrast, the Japanese PC industry has never been able to establish a single standard operating
`system. Reasons for this include (1) an oligopolistic industry structure (keiretsu), which has resulted
`in factionalism within the industry and thereby prevented a single standard (domestic or foreign)
`from gaining dominance; (2) a mainframe computer orientation, which for a long time relegated PCs
`to basically terminal status, thereby slowing market growth; (3) a reluctance to move away from
`customized software; and (4) a language barrier—the inability to export kanji-based software
`(Cotrell [1994]).
`Over a technology’s life cycle, additional elements of the product’s technology become
`standardized so that the product takes on a “commodity” character. Competition among suppliers of
`the “standardized” product then becomes increasingly based on price and service-related aspects of
`the product’s acquisition and use. Dell Computer, for example, has succeeded in the PC industry by
`being the low-cost producer and offering excellent before and after sales service. This evolutionary
`pattern was noted decades ago by the famous Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter [1950], who
`observed that one of the essential dynamics of capitalism is assuring that the "silk stockings" initially
`purchased only by the rich would eventually be items of mass consumption.
`
`2.2. Nonproduct Standards
`
`Nonproduct standards, as the name implies, derive from a different technical base than that upon
`which the attributes of the product itself depend. Industry organizations often set these standards
`using consensus processes. The technical bases (infratechnologies) for such standards have large,
`although not total, public good content, so that their provision frequently depends upon a
`combination of industry and government investment. Examples of infratechnologies frequently
`embodied in nonproduct standards include measurement and test methods, interface standards,
`scientific and engineering databases, and artifacts such as standard reference materials (Tassey
`[1997, Chaps. 8 and 9]).
`Most infratechnologies and therefore the resulting industry standards are derived from basic
`standards. Basic standards represent the most accurate statements of the fundamental laws of
`physics and have such diverse applications that they qualify as pure public goods and hence are
`
`8
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`Frequency
`Standard
`
`Laser Interferometer
`
`Line Reticle
`
`Line-Width
`Measurement
`Methods
`
`BASIC
`STANDARDS
`
`LABORATORY
`STANDARDS
`
`TRANSFER STANDARDS
`
`INDUSTRY STANDARDS:
`methodological/procedural/
`normative
`
`provided entirely by government. Basic standards are relatively few in number and are not easily
`transported to or used by industry. Thus, as indicated in Fig. 2, such standards are converted into
`working and transfer standards that convey the standardized information to industry. Large numbers
`of industry standards are based on (traced back to) basic standards. With respect to form, most
`industry standards are either method, procedural, or normative.10
`Fig. 2 provides an example of the hierarchy through which basic standards are utilized to
`develop infratechnologies upon which semiconductor industry standards are based. The production
`of semiconductor components is a
`highly demanding process. The
`densities of today's circuits are
`such that each conducting path
`("line") on a chip is a small
`fraction of the width of a human
`hair. These widths must be
`consistent with respect to design
`specifications to avoid thermal,
`electrical, and other problems.
`The semiconductor producer
`therefore needs to be able to
`measure the widths of circuit lines
`that make up a “chip.”
`Particularly important are line
`widths on the masks that are used
`to inscribe the multiple layers of
`circuit patterns on the chip itself. Such masks are used to make tens of thousands of chips. Their
`quality greatly affects performance of the chips produced and hence a semiconductor manufacturer's
`production yield.
`The line-width measurement equipment must be calibrated against a physical standard, which
`has a pattern of lines whose thickness and spacing have been determined to a specified level of
`accuracy. This determination is done by an authoritative source, such as the National Institute of
`Standards and Technology (NIST) in the United States. The physical or "transfer" standard used by
`industry must be easily transportable (a reticule in the above example) in order to ensure widespread
`and accurate transfer of the infratechnology.
`The information transferred by a physical standard is itself determined or certified by a so-called
`working standard, which is laboratory based and more accurate but not readily transportable. In this
`example, the working standard is a laser interferometer, which measures and certifies the physical
`
`Fig. 2. Hierarchy of Nonproduct Standards (Tassey, Chap. 9)
`
`
`10 A normative standard is one in which a particular value (size, performance, quality, or design) is selected
`from a range of alternative values.
`
`9
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`dimensions of the line reticule prior to transfer to industry. Finally, the laser interferometer is itself
`dependent for calibration on a "basic" standard for length. 11
`The four basic functions of standards are all represented in the range of standards for a single
`industry like semiconductors. Many standards, like line-width measurement, provide information,
`while others affect variety reduction, quality, reliability, or compatibility. The collective economic
`impact of these standards is greatly magnified when an entire supply chain is considered.
`Semiconductors are a component of computers and communications equipment, which, in turn,
`constitute an information network. Each level in the supply chain requires an elaborate
`infrastructure of standards.12
`
`3. Market Structure Effects of Standards
`
`The market structure effects of standardization have important effects on the achievement of
`economic growth objectives. “Open systems” allow small and medium companies to participate in
`markets for system technologies by supplying components in which they have a comparative
`advantage. This diversification on the supply side of the market makes system optimization by users
`(the demand side) possible and increases price competition.
`Decisions by large companies to enter systems markets at the component level are also affected
`by the availability of interface standards. These firms typically target larger markets where they can
`benefit from economies of scale. A strategy of selling into markets characterized by proprietary
`turnkey systems requires a high degree of product segmentation in order to service each turnkey
`system integrator. This situation increases costs and constrains market growth projections, even
`with a superior technology. The more distributed the participants in a market, the more critical to
`technological innovation are open systems.
`A good example is medical services, which has traditionally suffered from excessive
`customization. Moreover, healthcare environments are becoming extremely distributed. In every
`
`11 Line-width measurement is just one of many infratechnologies that a competitive semiconductor industry
`must utilize. For example, current state-of-the-art chips consist of multiple layers of circuits. The circuits in
`each layer must be connected to adjoining layers. Accomplishing this very difficult manufacturing step
`requires a precise alignment of the “mask” (circuit pattern) for each layer. Until recently, the alignment
`process required multimillion-dollar optical equipment. NIST, however, developed a procedure that allows
`semiconductor manufacturers to ensure proper alignment of successive layers of an integrated circuit with a
`precision better than ten nanometers. This new calibration standard represents a more than fivefold
`improvement over current alignment calibration methods and is much less expensive. The cumulative
`economic impact of such advances in infratechnologies/standards is substantial and can greatly affect price
`as well as quality, and hence competitive position for the domest