Case 6:20-cv-01213-ADA Document 29 Filed 06/04/21 Page 1 of 16
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`WACO DIVISION
`
`Ocean Semiconductor LLC,
`
`Plaintiff
`
`v.
`
`Renesas Electronics Corporation and Renesas
`Electronics America, Inc.,
`
`Defendants
`
`Civil Action No.: 6:20-cv-1213
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`PATENT CASE
`
`RENESAS’S RESPONSE TO OCEAN SEMICONDUCTOR’S MOTION FOR
`PRE-TRIAL CONSOLIDATION OF CO-PENDING RELATED CASES
`
`IPR2021-01342
`Ocean Semiconductor Exhibit 2035
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`

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`Case 6:20-cv-01213-ADA Document 29 Filed 06/04/21 Page 2 of 16
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`I.
`II.
`III.
`A.
`
`B.
`C.
`D.
`IV.
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
`LEGAL STANDARD ......................................................................................................... 1
`ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................... 2
`Ocean’s Motion for Consolidation Is Based on its Misapprehension of this Court’s
`Practices and Orders ........................................................................................................ 2
`Ocean Ignores Key Differences Among the WDTX Defendants .................................... 4
`Ocean Completely Misstates the Prejudice to the Parties ................................................ 8
`Consolidation Will Not Serve Judicial Efficiency ........................................................... 9
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 10
`
`
`
`
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`IPR2021-01342
`Ocean Semiconductor Exhibit 2035
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`Case 6:20-cv-01213-ADA Document 29 Filed 06/04/21 Page 3 of 16
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`In re Air Crash Disaster at Florida Everglades,
`549 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1977) ...................................................................................................2
`
`Arnold & Co., LLC v. David K. Young Consulting, LLC,
`No. SA-13-CV-00146-DAE, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50103 (W.D. Tex. Apr.
`8, 2013) ......................................................................................................................................1
`
`Certified/LVI Environmental Servs., Inc. v. PI Construction Corp.,
`No. SA-01-CA-1036-FB-NN, 2003 WL 1798542 (W.D. Tex. March 3, 2003) .......................2
`
`Cont’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Platzer,
`304 F. Supp. 228 (S.D. Tex. 1969) ............................................................................................5
`
`DAC Surgical Partners P.A. v. United Healthcare Services, Inc
`No. 4:11-cv-1355-MFH, 2013 WL 3229686 (S.D. Tex. June 24, 2013)...................................9
`
`Dryshod Int’l, LLC v. Haas Outdoors, Inc.,
`No. 1:18-CV-596-RP, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179931 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 18,
`2019) ..........................................................................................................................................7
`
`DynaEnergetics Eur. GmbH v. Hunting Titan, Inc, KTech,
`6:20-cv-00069-ADA, 2020 WL 3259807 (W.D. Tex. June 16, 2020) ......................................2
`
`Frazier v. Garrison ISD,
`980 F.2d 1514 (5th Cir. 1993) ...................................................................................................5
`
`Gentry v. Smith,
`487 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1973) .....................................................................................................1
`
`Keranos, LLC v. Analog Devices, Inc.,
`No. 2:10CV207, 2012 WL 12892441 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 1, 2012)......................................3, 8, 10
`
`Lay v. Spectrum Clubs, Inc.,
`No. SA-12-CV-00754-DAE, 2013 WL 788080 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2013) ..........................2, 4
`
`Neutron Depot, LLC v. Bankrate, Inc.,
`No. 2:14-cv-192, 2016 WL 3536721 (S.D. Tex. June 29, 2016).............................................10
`
`Pedigo v. Austin Rumba, Inc.,
`No. 08-803, 2010 WL 2730463 (W.D. Tex. June 24, 2010) .................................................4, 5
`
`Pfeffer v. HAS Retail, Inc
`No. SA-11-cv-959-XR, 2012 WL 394645, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2012) ............................6
`
`IPR2021-01342
`Ocean Semiconductor Exhibit 2035
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`Case 6:20-cv-01213-ADA Document 29 Filed 06/04/21 Page 4 of 16
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`Raymond v. Ivest Props.,
`No. SA-20-CV-00965-FB, 2021 WL 725819 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 17, 2021) ................................7
`
`Rembrandt Data Storage, LP v. Seagate Tech. LLC,
`No. 10-CV-693-BBC, 2011 WL 12872499 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 2, 2011) ....................................9
`
`St. Bernard Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Hosp. Serv. Ass’n of New Orleans, Inc.,
`712 F.2d 978 (5th Cir. 1983) .................................................................................................4, 8
`
`StratosAudio Inc. v. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.,
`Case No. 6:20-CV-01131-ADA...........................................................................................3, 10
`
`U.S. v. Homeward Res., Inc.,
`No. 12-461, 2016 WL 777000 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 29, 2016) .........................................................5
`
`YETI Coolers, LLC v. RTIC Drinkware, LLC,
`No. 1:16-CV-909-RP, 2017 WL 5505325 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2017) ............................4, 5, 10
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) .......................................................................................................................9
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`IPR2021-01342
`Ocean Semiconductor Exhibit 2035
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Ocean Semiconductor LLC (“Ocean”) seeks to consolidate this action against Renesas
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`Electronics Corp. and Renesas Electronics America, Inc. (collectively “Renesas”) with the six
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`other actions that Ocean filed in this district1 (collectively the “WDTX Defendants”). Ocean’s
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`motion for consolidation should be denied. Ocean’s motion ignores both the general practices and
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`orders of this Court. Further, Ocean’s motion ignores important differences among the
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`Defendants. Ocean’s prejudice argument rings hollow given that Ocean – not the WDTX
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`Defendants – commenced these proceedings, and Ocean’s prejudice argument completely
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`disregards the prejudice the WDTX Defendants will suffer, individually and collectively, if
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`consolidation is order. Finally, Ocean improperly discounts that consolidation would make the
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`proceedings more complex and potentially unmanageable.
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`II.
`
`LEGAL STANDARD
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`Consolidation of parties for pretrial purposes is governed by Rule 42(a), and it is entirely
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`withing the court’s discretion to consolidate matters for pretrial purposes. See Gentry v. Smith,
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`487 F.2d 571, 581 (5th Cir. 1973). In determining whether to consolidate actions, “courts consider
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`factors such as whether the actions are pending before the same court; whether the actions involve
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`a common party; any risk of prejudice or confusion from consolidation; the risk of inconsistent
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`adjudications of common factual or legal questions if the matters are tried separately; whether
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`consolidation will reduce the time and cost of trying the cases separately; and whether the cases
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`are at the same stage of preparation for trial.” Arnold & Co., LLC v. David K. Young Consulting,
`
`LLC, No. SA-13-CV-00146-DAE, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50103, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 2013).
`
`1 Those defendants include MediaTek Inc. and MediaTek USA Inc. (collectively “MediaTek”);
`NVIDIA Corp. (“NVIDIA”); NXP USA, Inc. (“NXP”); Silicon Laboratories Inc. (“Silicon Labs”);
`STMicroelectronics, Inc. (“STM”); and Western Digital Technologies, Inc. (“Western Digital”).
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`IPR2021-01342
`Ocean Semiconductor Exhibit 2035
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`Case 6:20-cv-01213-ADA Document 29 Filed 06/04/21 Page 6 of 16
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a) specifically provides for consolidation to enhance judicial efficiency.
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`See In re Air Crash Disaster at Florida Everglades, 549 F.2d 1006, 1012 (5th Cir. 1977).
`
`Consolidation “is intended only as a procedural device used to promote judicial efficiency and
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`economy and the actions maintain their separate identities.” Lay v. Spectrum Clubs, Inc., No. SA-
`
`12-CV-00754-DAE, 2013 WL 788080, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2013) (internal quotations
`
`omitted).2 The party requesting consolidation bears the burden to demonstrate that consolidation
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`is suitable in a particular case. Certified/LVI Environmental Servs., Inc. v. PI Construction Corp.,
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`No. SA-01-CA-1036-FB-NN, 2003 WL 1798542, *2 (W.D. Tex. March 3, 2003).
`
`III. ARGUMENT
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`Ocean’s request for consolidation should be denied both because consolidation will not
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`provide the benefits that Ocean seeks and because an analysis under the case law in this district
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`does not weigh in favor of consolidation. Ocean’s motion to consolidate is based on its flawed
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`analysis of two of the factors used in a consolidation analysis, namely the risk of an inconsistent
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`adjudication of common factual and legal questions and the risk of prejudice from consolidation.
`
`A.
`
`Ocean’s Motion for Consolidation Is Based on its Misapprehension of this
`Court’s Practices and Orders
`
`Ocean’s motion for consolidation, and statements by its counsel during a meet-and-confer
`
`with counsel for the WDTX Defendants, suggest that Ocean misunderstands this Court’s standard
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`practices. Renesas does not oppose a coordinated Markman hearing and briefing, as is this Court’s
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`standard practice, and informed Ocean of its position prior to the filing of its motion.
`
`Rather than consolidate the seven pending actions filed by Ocean, Renesas supports the
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`2 Fifth Circuit law indicates that consolidation is a procedural issue. See DynaEnergetics Eur.
`GmbH v. Hunting Titan, Inc, KTech, 6:20-cv-00069-ADA, 2020 WL 3259807, *1 (W.D. Tex.
`June 16, 2020) (citing K-Tech Telecomms., Inc. v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 714 F.3d 1277, 1282
`(Fed. Cir. 2013).
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`IPR2021-01342
`Ocean Semiconductor Exhibit 2035
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`Case 6:20-cv-01213-ADA Document 29 Filed 06/04/21 Page 7 of 16
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`Court’s standard practice of using Rule 42 to increase efficiency. Renesas endorses an efficient
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`Rule 42 case management approach to conserve judicial economy, such as coordinating the
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`Markman hearings and briefing. See, e.g., Keranos, LLC v. Analog Devices, Inc., No. 2:10CV207,
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`2012 WL 12892441, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 1, 2012) (denying consolidation where defendants did
`
`not oppose “an efficient Rule 42 case management approach, including joint claim construction
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`hearings and a common claim construction order.”). Indeed, this Court typically does not
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`consolidate cases having similar asserted patents. See, e.g., StratosAudio Inc. v. Volkswagen Group
`
`of America, Inc., Case No. 6:20-CV-01131-ADA, Joint Motion for Entry of Disputed Scheduling
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`Orders (D.I. 29) (W.D. Tex. May 27, 2021).
`
`During a meet-and-confer after the filing of Ocean’s motion, counsel for the WDTX
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`Defendants asked counsel for Ocean specifically what Ocean hoped to gain from consolidation.
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`One of the issues raised by Ocean was a limitation on the amount of discovery the WDTX
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`Defendants would be entitled to in a consolidated action. This is in direct contradiction to this
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`Court’s Order Governing Proceedings – Patent Case, which provides for individual discovery
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`limits even in consolidated case,3 and would be highly prejudicial to the WDTX Defendants.
`
`Counsel for Ocean also referenced the amount of summary judgment briefing should be limited so
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`that Ocean would not have to respond to 40 pages worth of briefing from each of the WDTX
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`Defendants. As with limits on discovery, this Court’s Order Governing Proceedings – Patent Case
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`3 The Order Governing Proceedings – Patent Cases stated that “A ‘side’ shall mean the plaintiff
`(or related plaintiffs suing together) on the one hand, and the defendant (or related defendants sued
`together) on the other hand. In the event that the Court consolidates related cases for pretrial
`purposes, with regard to calculating limits imposed by this Order, a “side” shall be interpreted as
`if the cases were proceeding individually. For example, in consolidated cases the plaintiff may
`serve up to 30 interrogatories on each defendant, and each defendant may serve up to 30
`interrogatories on the plaintiff.” Order Governing Proceedings – Patent Case (Version 3.3) at 2
`n. 2 (emphasis added).
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`IPR2021-01342
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`references a limit “per side” on summary judgment briefing, which even if the cases were
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`consolidated, would not limit the WDTX Defendants to a joint summary judgment filing or a
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`shared page limit. In short, it is unclear to Renesas what actual benefits Ocean seeks that
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`consolidation would provide.
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`Ocean also has not demonstrated sufficient basis to support a request for filing of joint
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`briefs in the event of any consolidation, nor is Renesas aware of any supporting case law that
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`supports such a prejudicial assertion. Cf Lay, 2013 WL 788080, at *2 (consolidation “does not
`
`merge the suits into a single action or change the rights of the parties”); St. Bernard Gen. Hosp.,
`
`Inc. v. Hosp. Serv. Ass’n of New Orleans, Inc., 712 F.2d 978, 989 (5th Cir. 1983) (“Consolidation
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`is improper if it would prejudice the rights of the parties.”) For these reasons, Ocean’s request
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`should be denied.
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`B.
`
`Ocean Ignores Key Differences Among the WDTX Defendants
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`As a threshold matter, Ocean has the burden to prove that the cases have common questions
`
`of law and fact. YETI Coolers, LLC v. RTIC Drinkware, LLC, No. 1:16-CV-909-RP, 2017 WL
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`5505325, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2017). The mere presence of similar questions is not sufficient.
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`Id. (denying consolidation where “the questions arising in each case are not the same”). Ocean’s
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`arguments for consolidation are based on its assertion that all of the cases against the WDTX
`
`Defendants are essentially the same, and that not consolidating them would lead to the danger of
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`inconsistent outcomes. In doing so, Ocean ignores key differences among the WDTX Defendants
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`and overplays any potential danger of inconsistent outcomes.
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`Ocean has failed to show that there are any actual “common question of law or fact”
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`sufficient to warrant consolidation—beyond claim construction to which Renesas has agreed to
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`consolidation. A motion to consolidate must meet this “threshold requirement.” Pedigo v. Austin
`
`Rumba, Inc., No. 08-803, 2010 WL 2730463, at *1 (W.D. Tex. June 24, 2010). Even where
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`IPR2021-01342
`Ocean Semiconductor Exhibit 2035
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`Case 6:20-cv-01213-ADA Document 29 Filed 06/04/21 Page 9 of 16
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`common questions of law and fact exhibit, “the mere presence of a common question does not
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`require consolidation” and whether to grant the motion becomes an issue of judicial discretion.
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`Pedigo, 2010 WL 2730463, at *1; U.S. v. Homeward Res., Inc., No. 12-461, 2016 WL 777000, at
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`*1 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 29, 2016). Moreover, even if Ocean could show some common issues (which
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`it cannot), additional factors must be weighed by the court when deciding whether consolidation
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`is appropriate. See Frazier v. Garrison ISD, 980 F.2d 1514, 1531 (5th Cir. 1993); YETI, 2017 WL
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`5505325, at *2. Indeed, mere overlap between multiple actions is not sufficient to establish
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`consolidation, but requires balancing against “inconvenience, delay and confusion that might
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`result.” Cont’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Platzer, 304 F. Supp. 228, 229 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
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`Ocean attempts to create common questions of fact by relying on the similarity of its
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`Complaints against the WDTX Defendants, which is, at best, self-serving. See D.I. 24 at 1-2. The
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`allegations in Ocean’s Complaints are not facts. Ocean simply ignores the important differences
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`in its own infringement allegations. The patents-in-suit relate to various aspects of data collection
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`and analysis in the process of making semiconductors. There is no overlap of accused products.
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`While some of the products are fabricated by a common foundry partner (SMSC), SMSC uses
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`many different processes to fabricate integrated circuits. Furthermore, many accused products are
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`fabricated by different companies, using different fabrication lines and methods. For example,
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`Ocean accuses products that Renesas makes exclusively on its own fabrication lines, as well as
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`products made by STM, NXP, and Western Digital on their own lines. Further, there is no complete
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`overlap regarding which accused third party software tools each WDTX Defendant uses. As a
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`result, while there are similarities, the factual allegations against each WDTX Defendant are
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`different, which significantly limits any benefit in pre-trial consolidation.
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`Further, Ocean’s mere assertion of infringement of some of the same patents is insufficient
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`IPR2021-01342
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`Case 6:20-cv-01213-ADA Document 29 Filed 06/04/21 Page 10 of 16
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`to establish consolidation. For example, in Pfeffer v. HAS Retail, Inc. the court denied
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`consolidation because of “independent fact scenarios” between nine lawsuits alleging the same
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`violation of the Electronic Funds Transfer Act (“EFTA”). No. SA-11-cv-959-XR, 2012 WL
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`394645, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2012). Here, as in Pfeffer, the cases comprise different defendants
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`having different and independent fact scenarios, and therefore, a mere allegation of infringement
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`is not sufficient to require consolidation. Further, a risk of confusion may result if consolidation
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`were to proceed. Here, even for pretrial purposes, the likelihood of confusion favors against
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`consolidation. Additionally, “a mere contention that failure to consolidate cases might lead to
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`inconsistent decisions is insufficient justification for a court to consolidate an action.” Pfeffer,
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`2012 WL 394645, at *1 (citing Frazier, 980 F.2d at 1532). The Court’s awareness of prior rulings
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`in related causes of actions will militate against any risk of inconsistent results and therefore there
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`is no need for consolidation.
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`Ocean argues that the fact that each WDTX Defendant filed separate motion to dismiss
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`based on different grounds is an example of a potential for inconsistent adjudication of common
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`issues. D.I. 24 at 5-6. To the contrary, the WDTX Defendants filed separate motions to dismiss
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`because each WDTX Defendant has its own set of facts that justify dismissal of the action against
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`it. Differently situated parties argue different facts and law about the insufficiency of Ocean’s
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`complaints. Indeed, as discussed above, there is no overlap of accused products, and many accused
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`products are fabricated by different companies, using different fabrication lines and methods. As
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`an example, Western Digital’s products are primarily flash-memory based products and other
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`defendant’s products are not primarily flash-memory based products. Further, different from other
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`defendants, only Western Digital sources most of its products accused of infringement from Kioxia
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`Corporation. Thus, even if the Court were to rule differently on each of the motions, that does not
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`mean that has been an inconsistent adjudication of common questions of fact and law – it means
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`that Court has found there to be differences in the factual records. The differences between the
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`briefing and any potential orders are not reasons to grant Ocean’s motion to consolidate – they are
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`reasons to deny it.
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`Finally, the cases that Ocean relies on are all distinguishable. See D.I. 24 at 4 (citing
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`Dryshod Int’l, LLC v. Haas Outdoors, Inc., No. 1:18-CV-596-RP, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179931,
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`at *5 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2019). Unlike in this case, where one party is seeking to consolidate a
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`number of actions with different defendants, there were common parties on both sides of the
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`matters in Dryshod. See Dryshod 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179931, at *2. This is fundamentally
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`different than this matter, as Renesas is not a party to any other action, nor are any of the WDTX
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`Defendants a party in more than one suit. Further, the parties opposing consolidation in Dryshod
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`argued that one of the suits should be dismissed without prejudice and the claims from the
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`dismissed suit should be brought as compulsory counter claims in the remaining suit. Dryshod,
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`2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179931, at *5. The court in Dryshod reasoned that if there were
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`compulsory claims at issue, consolidation was the appropriate remedy. Dryshod, 2019 U.S. Dist.
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`LEXIS 179931, at *5. There is no argument here than any of Ocean’s claims would be compulsory
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`counterclaims in another WDTX Defendant’s suit, and as such, Ocean’s reliance on Dryshod is
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`misplaced.4
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`The Court should deny Ocean’s motion for consolidation based on the factual differences
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`among the WDTX Defendants.
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`4 Ocean’s reliance on Raymond v. Ivest Props., No. SA-20-CV-00965-FB, 2021 WL 725819
`(W.D. Tex. Feb. 17, 2021) is likewise misplaced. Mot. at 6. In Raymond, consolidation was
`appropriate because of “common issues and parties” and since the plaintiff’s second case was
`intended to be filed as an amended complaint in the first case.” 2021 WL 725819, at *3.
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`IPR2021-01342
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`C.
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`Ocean Completely Misstates the Prejudice to the Parties
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`Ocean overstates any prejudice it might suffer without consolidation while downplaying
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`the actual prejudice that the WDTX Defendants would suffer if the Court were to grant Ocean’s
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`motion for consolidation.
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`Ocean’s motion makes the bold assertion that Ocean would somehow be prejudiced if it
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`had to defend itself in multiple actions its chose to bring simultaneously. D.I. 24 at 4. Ocean goes
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`on to argue that each of the WDTX Defendants filing its own motion to dismiss “has required an
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`unnecessarily large amount of effort from Ocean to respond.” D.I. 24 at 4. Ocean’s motion is
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`silent on how consolidation would have limited the WDTX Defendants’ rights to file motions to
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`dismiss and how consolidation would absolve Ocean of its requirement for a well-pled complaint
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`against each WDTX Defendant. Any alleged prejudice that Ocean may suffer as a result of having
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`multiple cases going forward at the same time is a direct result of Ocean’s decision to file multiple
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`cases at once, and that should not weigh into the Court’s analysis.
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`Ocean’s argument that “[t]here is no risk of prejudice . . . if the actions are consolidated for
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`pre-trial purposes” is fundamentally flawed. D.I. 24 at 4. “[C]onsolidation is improper if it would
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`prejudice the rights of the parties.” St. Bernard Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Hosp. Serv. Ass’n of New
`
`Orleans, Inc., 712 F.2d 978, 989 (5th Cir. 1983). In fact, this Court would be unable to “ensure
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`that the rights of the parties are not prejudiced by the order of consolidation under the facts and
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`circumstances of the particular case.” See, e.g., Keranos, 2012 WL 12892441, at *3. As an initial
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`matter, the WDTX Defendants would be significantly prejudiced if Ocean was somehow able to
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`limit discovery and summary judgment briefing, as discussed above in Section II(A). Each of the
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`Defendants is differently situated and has different facts regarding its alleged infringement. See
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`Section II(B). Further, Renesas anticipates discovery from the other defendants may not be
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`applicable or relevant to Ocean’s lawsuit against Renesas because the factual issues regarding the
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`fabrication of accused devices by the other defendants is unlikely to have relevance to the factual
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`issues regarding Renesas’ own production lines. See e.g., Rembrandt Data Storage, LP v. Seagate
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`Tech. LLC, No. 10-CV-693-BBC, 2011 WL 12872499, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 2, 2011) (denying
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`consolidation where “[a]lthough plaintiff is asserting the same patents against both defendants,
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`each defendant makes different products that, if they do infringe, will likely infringe in different
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`ways” and “defendants are competitors . . . no reason to put defendants in a position in which they
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`might be forced to disclose sensitive information to each other, even if doing so would save some
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`time for the court”). For at least this reason, the Court should deny Ocean’s motion.
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`Further, Ocean argues that it would somehow be prejudiced if the WDTX Defendants were
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`“able each to allege a different set of alleged prior art.” D.I. 24 at 4. Ocean completely ignores
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`that limiting the WDTX Defendants to one set of prior art may be prejudicial due to the potential
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`estoppel under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2), should Ocean be successful in the IPRs filed by Western
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`Digital. Renesas should not be limited in terms of what prior art it asserts based on the prior art
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`Western Digital chose to raise or not raise in its IPR proceedings. Ocean is not prejudiced by
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`having to litigate the multiple matters it chose to file, despite its arguments to the contrary, but the
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`WDTX would be prejudiced if forced into a single proceedings for the alleged convenience of
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`Ocean. As such, the Court should deny Ocean’s motion for consolidation.
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`D.
`
`Consolidation Will Not Serve Judicial Efficiency
`
`Consolidation will not serve judicial efficiency nor reduce time and cost. Indeed, Ocean’s
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`reliance on DAC Surgical Partners P.A. v. United Healthcare Services, Inc. in support of the this
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`proposition is inadequate. In DAC Surgical Partners P.A, common defendants requested
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`consolidation where “the only meaningful difference is the names of the plaintiffs.” No. 4:11-cv-
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`1355-MFH, 2013 WL 3229686 (S.D. Tex. June 24, 2013). In contradistinction, this case has
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`significantly more meaningful differences. For example, Ocean requests consolidation of seven
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`Case 6:20-cv-01213-ADA Document 29 Filed 06/04/21 Page 14 of 16
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`actions having multiple distinct parties, with only a few common patents, tools, and a single
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`common foundry partner. Therefore, consolidation will not meaningfully lessen time and
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`discovery cost, nor improve judicial efficiency.
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`Moreover, as the court described in YETI where the court denied consolidation,
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`consolidating these cases may actually yield a “significantly more complex case.” 2017 WL
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`5505325, at *3. Ocean’s request to consolidate will result in proceedings that are more
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`complicated, unwieldy, and ungovernable. Additionally, Ocean improperly alleges that the
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`simultaneous timing of filing of seven cases by the same plaintiff in the same court supports
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`consolidation. Mot. at 4. This is incorrect. Indeed, the simultaneous filing of multiple cases at the
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`same court is common, and is not sufficient support to justify consolidation. Neutron Depot, LLC
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`v. Bankrate, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-192, 2016 WL 3536721, at *1 (S.D. Tex. June 29, 2016).
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`Finally, this Court can employ Rule 42 without consolidation to increase efficiency.
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`Renesas endorses an efficient Rule 42 case management approach in handling the seven actions
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`currently pending in the Waco Division of the WDTX before Judge Albright to conserve judicial
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`economy. See, e.g., Keranos, 2012 WL 12892441, at *2 (denying consolidation where defendants
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`did not oppose “an efficient Rule 42 case management approach, including joint claim construction
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`hearings and a common claim construction order.”). Indeed, this Court typically does not
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`consolidate cases having similar asserted patents. See, e.g., StratosAudio Inc. v. Volkswagen Group
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`of America, Inc., Case No. 6:20-CV-01131-ADA, Joint Motion for Entry of Disputed Scheduling
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`Orders (D.I. 29) (W.D. Tex. May 27, 2021). For these additional reasons, the Court should deny
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`Ocean’s motion for consolidation.
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`IV. CONCLUSION
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`For the reasons stated above, Ocean’s motion for consolidation should be denied.
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`
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`
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`IPR2021-01342
`Ocean Semiconductor Exhibit 2035
`
`

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`Case 6:20-cv-01213-ADA Document 29 Filed 06/04/21 Page 15 of 16
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`Dated: June 4, 2021
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`
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`Respectfully submitted,
`
`/s/ Darryl Adams
`Darryl Adams, State Bar No. 00796101
`SLAYDEN GRUBERT BEARD PLLC
`401 Congress Ave, Ste 1650
`Austin, TX 78701
`Telephone: 512-402-3562
`dadams@sgbfirm.com
`
`Neel Chatterjee (admitted pro hac vice)
`GOODWIN PROCTER LLP
`601 Marshall Street
`Redwood City, CA 94063
`Telephone: (650) 752-3100
`Facsimile: (650) 853-1038
`DG-RenesasDCt@goodwinlaw.com
`
`Brett Schuman (admitted pro hac vice)
`GOODWIN PROCTER LLP
`Three Embarcadero Center
`San Francisco, CA 94111-4003
`Telephone: (415) 733-6000
`Facsimile: (415) 677-9041
`DG-RenesasDCt@goodwinlaw.com
`
`Patrick J. McCarthy (admitted pro hac vice)
`Kelly Grosshuesch (admitted pro hac vice)
`GOODWIN PROCTER LLP
`1900 N Street, N.W.
`Washington, D.C. 20036
`Telephone: (202) 346-4000
`Facsimile: (202) 346-4444
`DG-RenesasDCt@goodwinlaw.com
`
`Suhrid A. Wadekar (admitted pro hac vice)
`Sarah J. Fischer (admitted pro hac vice)
`GOODWIN PROCTER LLP
`100 Northern Avenue
`Boston, MA 02210
`Telephone: (617) 570-1465
`Facsimile: (617) 523-1231
`DG-RenesasDCt@goodwinlaw.com
`
`
`
`
`IPR2021-01342
`Ocean Semiconductor Exhibit 2035
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-01213-ADA Document 29 Filed 06/04/21 Page 16 of 16
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document has
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`been served on all counsel of record via the Court’s ECF system on June 4, 2021.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`/s/ Darryl Adams
`
`Darryl Adams
`Attorney for Defendants
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2021-01342
`Ocean Semiconductor Exhibit 2035
`
`