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` UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
` WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
` WACO DIVISION
`STRATOSAUDIO, INC.
`) Docket No. WA 20-CA-1128 ADA
` )
`vs.
` ) Waco, Texas
` )
`SUBARU OF AMERICA, INC. ) August 31, 2022
`
`
`
`TRANSCRIPT OF VIDEOCONFERENCE MOTIONS HEARING
` BEFORE THE HONORABLE DEREK T. GILLILAND
` *** Sealed ***
`
`APPEARANCES:
`For the Plaintiff:
`
`Mr. Henry Y. Huang
`Ms. Hallie E. Kiernan
`Mr. Jonathan J. Lamberson
`White & Case, LLP
`3000 El Camino Real
`Two Palo Alto Square, Suite 900
`Palo Alto, California 94306
`Mr. Daniel S. Sternberg
`White & Case, LLP
`75 State Street
`Boston, Massachusetts 02109
`Mr. Jeffrey D. Parks
`Friedman, Suder & Cooke
`604 East 4th Street, Suite 200
`Fort Worth, Texas 76102
`
`For the Defendant:
`
`
`
`Mr. Matthew Satchwell
`Mr. Paul R. Steadman
`DLA Piper, LLP
`444 West Lake Street, Suite 900
`Chicago, Illinois 60606
`
`LILY I. REZNIK, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (AUSTIN)
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`StratosAudio Exhibit 2021
`Hyundai v StratosAudio
`IPR2021-01267
`Page 1 of 22
`
`

`

`2
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`(Appearances Continued:)
`For the Defendant:
`
`Transcriber:
`
`
`Mr. John M. Guaragna
`DLA Piper, LLP
`303 Colorado Street, Suite 3000
`Austin, Texas 78701
`
`Ms. Lily Iva Reznik, CRR, RMR
`501 West 5th Street, Suite 4153
`Austin, Texas 78701
`(512)391-8792
`
`Proceedings reported by digital sound recording,
`transcript produced by computer-aided transcription.
`
`LILY I. REZNIK, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (AUSTIN)
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`(Proceedings commence at 1:33 p.m.)
`THE COURT: We're here on several motions and I'm
`going to start by asking Ms. Copp to call the case.
`THE CLERK: Yes, your Honor.
`Calling Case No. WA-20-CV-1128, styled,
`StratosAudio, Incorporated vs. Subaru of America,
`Incorporated. Called for sealed motions hearing.
`THE COURT: All right. Could I get announcements
`starting with the plaintiff. Anybody here from the
`plaintiff?
`MR. LAMBERSON: Good morning, your Honor.
`Jonathan Lamberson for Plaintiff StratosAudio.
`With me today is Jeff Park, Michael Songer, Dan Sternberg,
`Hallie Kiernan and Henry Huang.
`THE COURT: All right. Very good. Good to see
`all of you today.
`And on behalf of defendants, please.
`MR. GUARAGNA: Good afternoon, your Honor.
`It's John Guaragna from DLA Piper.
`THE COURT: All right.
`MR. GUARAGNA: Along -- good to see you, your
`Honor. Along with me, we have Mr. Paul Steadman and Matt
`Satchwell, also from DLA paper, and the three of us will
`be the primary speakers today.
`THE COURT: All right. Very good.
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`LILY I. REZNIK, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (AUSTIN)
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`Page 3 of 22
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`4
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`I know we had sent kind of the Court's
`preliminary thoughts shortly before lunch, and so, you
`kind of saw the order that we had laid the motions out in
`in that chart. I don't know if you want to take them in
`that order, if the parties want to address them in a
`different order.
`MR. GUARAGNA: I could maybe speak to that and
`streamline things a bit, your Honor. John Guaragna from
`DLA Piper.
`So, your Honor, with respect to the summary
`judgment motion and the Court's tentative ruling, I wanted
`to appraise the Court that yesterday, we had informed the
`plaintiff that we were withdrawing our defense as to
`infectious unenforceability on the 307 patent, which I
`understand the plaintiff agrees mooted that issue with
`respect to summary judgment. So I think that issue is off
`the table and the Court need not address it. But if the
`plaintiff wanted to comment, I could pause there for a
`moment.
`
`THE COURT: Okay. Just if Mr. Lamberson or
`Songer, Sternberg, somebody'd just confirm that's agreed
`to.
`
`MR. LAMBERSON: I think if -- I think if they're
`withdrawing it, it is agreed to. The only thing I would
`point out, it was totally briefed and if the Court's
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`LILY I. REZNIK, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (AUSTIN)
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`Page 4 of 22
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`5
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`already written it up, I don't -- we don't much care
`whether it's ordered or dropped. I don't know
`procedurally whether it matters.
`THE COURT: Okay. Yeah. If it doesn't matter
`procedurally to the parties, then we'll just hold that
`that one is moot and won't issue any further ruling
`regarding that; and that's with regard to infectious
`unenforceability of the 307 patent. Okay.
`MR. GUARAGNA: I'm sorry, your Honor.
`THE COURT: Oh, go ahead, Mr. Guaragna.
`MR. GUARAGNA: I just had -- thank you, your
`Honor. I just had another comment on the summary judgment
`motion. With respect to the other two grounds on the
`motion for partial summary judgment, Subaru is willing to
`rest on the papers and could give the Court back that time
`for the argument this afternoon.
`THE COURT: Okay. Perfect. And that's with
`regard to docket No. 101.
`MR. GUARAGNA: Correct, your Honor.
`THE COURT: Correct? Okay. Excellent. Well,
`we'll issue a ruling on the papers that's along the lines
`of what we indicated in the chart. And I'm trying to read
`to catch up with the e-mail. Let's see, now, do we need
`to hear argument on docket 100 and that being one of the
`motions to strike the expert opinion?
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`LILY I. REZNIK, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (AUSTIN)
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`Page 5 of 22
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`MR. STEADMAN: Your Honor, this is Paul Steadman
`for Subaru.
`Whether we need to hear argument on that, I think
`would be better informed if we understood the basis of
`your ruling. You denied the motion in your provisional
`ruling and I'm not -- I'm unsure what the basis of that
`is. If the basis is that your Honor believes that they
`are not performing claim construction, I'd like five
`minutes to convince you otherwise. But if there was a
`different basis, then I would consider resting on my
`papers or making a different explanation, depending on
`what the basis of the ruling is.
`THE COURT: Okay. And now, Mr. Steadman, I
`appreciate that and you did kind of hit the nail on the
`head there. The basis for it is that it appeared to me
`that it is -- it was proper expert opinion testimony
`rather than a claim construction issue. So if you want to
`present argument on that, I'd be glad to hear it.
`MR. STEADMAN: All right. Let me take a run at
`that, your Honor, and see if I can further elucidate that
`in way that might change your Honor's mind. With your
`Honor's concurrence, I'll share the screen here.
`THE COURT: All right. That sounds good.
`MR. STEADMAN: Okay. So we know from the 02
`Micro vs. Beyond Innovation case that claim construction's
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`LILY I. REZNIK, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (AUSTIN)
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`Page 6 of 22
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`a matter for the Court and not for the jury. There are
`times, as this court has recognized in Yeti Coolers, that
`an expert can elucidate what the plain and ordinary
`meaning of the term is. And in this case, the Court has
`ordered that all the terms will have their plain and
`ordinary meanings. However, if that strays into claim
`construction, then that goes too far and, unfortunately,
`creates an 02 Micro problem where the jury's being asked
`to decide a claim construction issue. I think your Honor
`understands that, but that's the background.
`So here in claim 9, we have a claim that requires
`a first receiver module that receives a first media
`content and a second receiver module that receives a
`second media content. So neither one of those modules is
`recited as having an output. And then, there's an output
`system configured to present some stuff on an output.
`That is one. An output of either the first receiver
`module or the second receiver module.
`The way that plaintiff and their expert read
`that, they read that the system -- and they intend to tell
`the jury that the system must include two receiving
`modules, each with an output. That is, they're reading
`the claim to require two outputs. We require the claim to
`only require one output. So that's a clear claim
`construction difference. That difference does not make a
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`LILY I. REZNIK, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (AUSTIN)
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`Page 7 of 22
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`8
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`difference for infringement, but it does make a difference
`for invalidity because their primary, perhaps their only
`differentiation of at least one of the prior art
`references is that it does -- that it lacks two outputs.
`It only has one output.
`There's no question that what they're doing here
`is claim construction. The expert says that the
`specifications -- he's looking to the specification to
`read in this limitation to the claim 9. He's looking to
`the specification to say that they must each individually
`have the capacity to present the first and media -- second
`media content and have two outputs. For his part, their
`other technical expert says the same thing. Claim 9
`requires two outputs. He doesn't say why he's making that
`claim construction.
`It's fairly clear why -- it's fairly clear that
`they're actually doing claim construction. If you look at
`the slides that they presented for this hearing, for
`example, they're looking to the preferred embodiment.
`Now, looking to the preferred embodiment and pulling in a
`limitation from the preferred embodiment to the claims is
`a classic claim construction argument. One that would
`have to be decided by the Court and has not been fully
`briefed to this court.
`They made many, many references to that preferred
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`LILY I. REZNIK, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (AUSTIN)
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`Page 8 of 22
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`

`9
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`embodiment. They did in this slide, they did in this
`slide. In this slide, they actually look to the figures
`and try to full the figures into the claim construction.
`Then they go even farther looking to the specification and
`start talking about the benefits of the patented approach,
`and then, require the claim to meet those benefits. That
`is the same as what Dr. Mangione-Smith said he was doing
`in the testimony that I quoted in the brief where he says,
`well, I read that it way because it has to have all the
`benefits of the claimed invention.
`Plaintiff itself at one of its own slides, slide
`46, remarks that undue reliance on the specification to
`explain and expound on a specific meaning is improper. So
`that is a claim construction position which arguably is
`improper. But again, we haven't draft -- we haven't
`briefed that. If we're going to do full claim
`construction of that term, we'd have to actually brief
`that.
`
`They made another claim construction counterarg
`-- they made another counterargument in their brief saying
`that they're not -- their expert's not relying on
`extrinsic evidence, but elsewhere in their brief, they
`explicitly rely on extrinsic evidence reaching out to
`inter partes review proceedings. So again, classic claim
`construction to try to reach out to something outside the
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`LILY I. REZNIK, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (AUSTIN)
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`Page 9 of 22
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`claim and bring it into the claim in order to interpret
`the claim.
`Whether that's the plain and ordinary meaning
`might be disputed, but really, it's not. StratosAudio in
`its own brief said if they wanted to claim single output,
`it could have simply recited an output. But that's
`exactly what the claim does say. It says an output system
`configured to present this stuff on an output. That is
`one or one or more. Not two or two or more.
`Again, elsewhere in their own briefing, they say
`that in patent claims, an indefinite article "a" or "an"
`carries the meaning of one or more. Again, that's what
`the claim says, but that's not how their expert is reading
`the claim. And they put that same case in their slides
`for argument today.
`When there -- if there were any doubt about
`whether they're doing claim construction, in their brief,
`they actually made a very telling mistake. They said the
`disputed limitation recites and then, they went on to note
`that it was the output. Well, it's not the output. It's
`an output, which is one or more. So we don't -- I would
`urge the Court that what they are doing with their two
`experts is plainly claim construction to turn an output
`into two outputs. A first receiver module output and a
`required second receiver module output. And if they
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`LILY I. REZNIK, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (AUSTIN)
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`Page 10 of 22
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`

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`wanted that claim construction, they're going to have to
`brief it and get the Court to decide it. They can't
`simply allow their expert to make that argument to the
`jury.
`
`We had a second claim construction argument in
`our papers that we asked the Court to look at. That had
`to do with this idea of determining a location and the
`difference between a location and location information.
`That one, I think, is also fairly simple to resolve as a
`claim construction dispute. Their own expert, when I
`asked him at his deposition whether he was reading
`location to be location information, he said, again, he
`was quite confident that the -- that he knew what the
`inventors meant. Well, that's nice, but that's a claim
`construction dispute, not a reading of the plain meaning
`of location.
`And he admitted that there was something more
`about location information that was not location. It's
`information about location and he gave an -- I'm sorry, he
`gave an example in that deposition, which was quoted in
`our brief, that location information might be that the
`building is red. Well, the building being red is not the
`location of the building. It's information about the
`building, but that's clearly not the same as what the
`claim says.
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`LILY I. REZNIK, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (AUSTIN)
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`Page 11 of 22
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`This dispute is material because in the case,
`what they want to tell the jury is that location
`information isn't a location, like 6th and Main or a
`certain latitude and longitude. It's hard to see here,
`but what they want to say is that ETA or estimated time of
`arrival is location. Well, if your estimated time of
`arrival to a certain location is an hour, you could be an
`hour away at different speeds in any direction from that
`location. It's actually not transmitting the location.
`That's why they want to say location information. Now,
`perhaps the Court could read location broad enough to
`encompass ETA within the meaning of location, but that
`again would be a claim construction dispute and one that
`would have to be resolved by claim construction.
`So I guess, summing up, we think that both of
`their experts are making impermissible claim construction
`arguments that either have to be stricken from their
`reports and they're not allowed to testify as to those
`claim construction arguments before the jury or they have
`to be resolved by the Court under 02 Micro and not
`something that is decided by the experts and the jury.
`And that's all I have on that point.
`THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Steadman, just briefly and
`I think you kind of touched on it, but how do I know that
`their descriptions either with regard to the output or
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`LILY I. REZNIK, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (AUSTIN)
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`Page 12 of 22
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`with regard to the location terms are not just an
`explanation of how a person of ordinary skill in the art
`at the time of the patent would interpret those terms?
`MR. STEADMAN: I think that's relatively easy,
`your Honor. If they are just looking at the terms and
`saying in plain English or in technical English, it means
`that -- so there's a special meaning to a person of skill
`in the art, for example, you know, what a satellite is.
`We know a satellite has a meaning it's something that goes
`around the Earth. They could explain that that is what
`the meaning of the word "satellite" is to a person of
`ordinary skill in the art.
`Here, they're actually dissecting a phrase. An
`output system blah, blah, blah, configured to present this
`stuff on an output of the first receiver module or the
`second receiver module. And they're reading into this
`term "or" a lot of extra meaning to mean that there has to
`be two outputs, one of the first receiver module and one
`of the second receiver module, none of which is actually
`stated in the claim. And as I said, you know they're
`doing claim construction because they're doing things like
`referring to preferred embodiments, referring to drawings,
`referring to the benefits of the invention, and so forth.
`So those are the kinds of things that we see in
`claim construction briefs that are the basis of attorney
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`LILY I. REZNIK, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (AUSTIN)
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`Page 13 of 22
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`argument about why the Court should or should not read
`into a term a meaning beyond what the word is. In this
`case, the word is just "or." That's the only word that is
`here. And we cited in our brief various cases that the
`word "or" carries, you know, a singular or plural. It's
`one or more.
`So if there's an output of the first receiver
`module or if there's an output of the second receiver
`module, this claim is met. Nothing in this claim suggests
`on the terms in the claim that there has to first be an
`output of the first receiver module and also be an output
`of the second receiver module, and then, this stuff is
`presented on one or the other. But that's exactly how
`they're reading this term. They're saying the system must
`include two receiving modules that are not recited in the
`claim.
`
`THE COURT: Okay. Let me hear from the plaintiff
`on this.
`MR. LAMBERSON: Thank you, your Honor. Jonathan
`Lamberson for the plaintiff.
`Let me start by saying we're talking here about a
`motion to strike an expert report. But what is it that
`Subaru just pointed to say that we're doing claim
`construction in our expert report? They didn't point to
`our expert report. They pointed to our slides that we
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`LILY I. REZNIK, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (AUSTIN)
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`submitted here. Well, we did create slides in case your
`Honor wanted to talk about claim construction, but those
`are not in our expert report. Those -- what's covered in
`those slides is not, you know, what our experts say about
`the limitations. All our experts do is read the
`limitation as it's written and apply every word in the
`limitation.
`So I don't see how -- you know, what Subaru's
`point is to say that we created some slides in case we
`have claim construction, therefore, our experts are doing
`claim construction. That's simply not correct. The same
`with the IPR, you know, they say, well, Stratos referred
`to what happened in the IPR; therefore, they must be doing
`claim construction because that's extrinsic evidence.
`Again, our experts never pointed to the IPR. We've agreed
`via an agreed motion in limine that nobody's going to talk
`about the IPR at trial.
`The point that was being made there was simply
`that Subaru was taking inconsistent positions on what the
`claim means. And ultimately that's what I see this issue
`is coming down to. It's actually Subaru that doesn't like
`the plain language of the claim and that wants to change
`it and if we -- I don't know, Dan, can you bring up our
`slides? I don't think I'm going to be able to do it from
`my end. I'm -- my connection is sort of iffy. I'm going
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`LILY I. REZNIK, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (AUSTIN)
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`Page 15 of 22
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`16
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`to go to our slide 9. And perhaps the Court has a --
`obviously we don't need to project them. I don't know.
`THE COURT: Well, I've gotta found them here.
`It's helpful if you've got them and could put it up, but
`if not, give me a second and I think I.
`MR. LAMBERSON: Mr. Sternberg, if you're -- yeah,
`looks like Dan is able to do this for me.
`THE COURT: Perfect.
`MR. LAMBERSON: So how do we know that it's
`Subaru that wants to change the language of the claim? We
`just need to look at their brief. What did they say in
`the motion? They say, well, even though the claim says
`"or," we're going to interpret that as and/or. And so,
`this -- I mean, this is changing the claim as it's
`written. If we go back to slide 8, I believe, the claim
`and the output system limitation doesn't say an output of
`the first receiver module and/or output of the second
`receiver module. It has "or." And so, if we go back to
`slide 9 -- actually, why don't we go to slide 11.
`And this is not only claim construction, it is
`incorrect claim construction. If we look at the very
`cases Subaru cited, they say there's no basis for changing
`"or" to "and" or "and/or." There's no reason to add "and"
`to a claim that recites "or." So our expert simply looked
`at the claim and read it as it's written. And it's Subaru
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`LILY I. REZNIK, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (AUSTIN)
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`Page 16 of 22
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`that's trying to change the claim and say no, it actually
`means something else. And the reason we refer to the IPR,
`if you go to the next slide, please, Subaru joined in this
`IPR Volkswagen, they said they're going to be an
`understudy of Volkswagen. And if we go to the next slide,
`these are pleadings from the IPR, you know, Subaru says
`we're not going to present any argument. We're not going
`to ask for any additional depositions or give any new
`evidence. We're going to be an understudy of Volkswagon.
`And this issue, if we go to the next slide, this and/or
`claim construction was raised by Volkswagen in January of
`2022. So if Subaru wanted to raise this construction
`here, they should have raised it a long time ago. But
`it's not -- you know, our experts aren't doing claim
`constructions by simply applying the word as it's written
`and not changing it as Subaru now wants you to do.
`And as I understand it, they also -- Subaru
`presents an alternative argument where they say, well,
`okay, we won't change it to and/or. We'll just read out,
`you know, half of the limitation where it talks about both
`modules. Well, that's not right either. All our expert
`did was read the claim as it's written. And it's not just
`an output, which is what Subaru wants to focus on.
`They say the rest of the claim is -- I think I
`heard the words blah, blah, blah for the rest of the
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`LILY I. REZNIK, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (AUSTIN)
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`Page 17 of 22
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`18
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`claim. Well, no. The rest of the claim, this is the
`system claim. And it's an output system and it's
`configured and there's two places that things can be
`output, and that's all our expert said. And that's what
`the word "or" means. You've got these two things and it
`has to be configured to output in that manner, and that's
`all their experts say.
`So, again, respectfully, our experts have applied
`the plain meaning. Subaru wishes that the claim said
`something else but it doesn't. And frankly, the other
`thing you don't see here is any citations for where
`Subaru's expert gave the understanding -- and this is all
`attorney argument from Subaru and this is new attorney
`argument being made, you know, long after it should have
`been in claim construction.
`But Subaru's experts -- we don't see any citation
`here where Subaru's expert said you should change "or" to
`"and/or," for example. We don't see anything where
`Subaru's expert said, you know, that the plain meaning is
`somehow different from what our experts explained. So
`there is nothing to strike here, your Honor, and we would
`respectfully submit that your tentative is correct and ask
`that you maintain it.
`THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Steadman, would you like
`to get a last word in?
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`LILY I. REZNIK, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (AUSTIN)
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`Page 18 of 22
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`MR. STEADMAN: I'm happy to get a last word in,
`your Honor. I don't think that this court is in a
`position to decide any binding effect of statements in the
`IPR. We dispute that that statement was actually even
`made by Volkswagen in the IPR, and we dispute that Subaru
`would be bound by it. That will be decided on a motion in
`limine next week, and I don't think it's before the Court
`except to say that it's clear claim construction.
`As to the word "and," we are not trying to read
`the claim as being "and." "Or" means "or." So if you're
`going to Molly's house or you're going to Jane's house, if
`you go to Molly's house and then, you go to Jane's house,
`you've gone to Molly or Jane's house. So "or" means "or"
`and in just simple English, it means one or both. You can
`go -- you can have red or blue, but if you have a marble
`that's red and a marble that's blue, you meet the
`limitation of a red or blue marble. And that's, I mean,
`just plain English.
`They are trying to change this claim, as I said,
`in order to require two things to be present which are not
`recited in the claim. And at the danger of repeating
`myself, they're trying to say that there must -- it must
`include two receiving modules each with an output and that
`is not recited. The first receiver module is not recited
`as having an output and the second receiver module is not
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`LILY I. REZNIK, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (AUSTIN)
`
`Page 19 of 22
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`recited as having an output. The output system only has
`to output to one or the other. It never says that both
`have to exist.
`So at a minimum, this is a claim construction
`dispute which they have raised on a phantom basis and want
`their expert to just be able to opine about based on the
`expert's understanding of what the inventors meant, not
`from the plain meaning of the term, and that's what we
`object to.
`THE COURT: Okay. Give me just a second off the
`
`record.
`
`MR. LAMBERSON: And, your Honor, I realize I
`forgot to address the location issue. Maybe you've
`already gone off the record.
`THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Lamberson, we'll go ahead
`and go back on real quick so you can address that.
`MR. LAMBERSON: Well, one sentence I think we all
`know what location means. The dispute is they say what we
`pointed to doesn't actually convey a location. We say it
`does. Whether our expert says location or location
`information is, you know -- when he says location
`information is clear he means information about their
`location. We just -- I don't even frankly understand what
`it is they're trying to strike here. But that's it on
`that. Thank you, your Honor.
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`LILY I. REZNIK, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (AUSTIN)
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`Page 20 of 22
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`THE COURT: Okay. All right. We'll go off the
`record just briefly.
`Okay. We're back on the record.
`And after viewing the expert reports and the
`briefs of the parties, I'm convinced that the discussions
`regarding both the output and the location are reasonable
`expert explanation of how a person of ordinary skill in
`the art would understand the phrases in the claims to be
`met and not to be -- and is not claim construction that
`would require the Court to conduct any further
`construction. I believe it is permissible explanation of
`how a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand
`the plain and ordinary meaning of those terms in both
`claim 9 and I believe it's claim 12.
`So I'm going to deny the motion to strike expert
`reports as described at docket No. 100. All right.
`And then, let's see, we've got docket 105 is
`next. This is the plaintiff's motion to strike Dr.
`Shoemake. Oh, is that one --
`MR. LAMBERSON: Yes, your Honor. Well, there's
`only one issue we're going to argue, your Honor. This is
`Mr. Lamberson again.
`THE COURT: Okay. All right. Go ahead.
`MR. LAMBERSON: And this is the issue with --
`it's the same issue, but it shows up in two places. If
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`LILY I. REZNIK, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (AUSTIN)
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`Page 21 of 22
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`68
`
`REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
`
`I, LILY I. REZNIK, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING
`WAS TRANSCRIBED FROM AN ELECTRONIC RECORDING MADE AT THE
`TIME OF THE AFORESAID PROCEEDINGS AND IS A CORRECT
`TRANSCRIPT, TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITY, MADE FROM THE
`PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER, AND THAT THE
`TRANSCRIPT FEES AND FORMAT COMPLY WITH THOSE PRESCRIBED BY
`THE COURT AND JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
`ON THIS 6th DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2022.
`
` ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
` L I L Y I .
` REZNIK,
` CRR,
` RMR
`
`
`
` O f f i c i a l C o u r t R e p o r t e r
`
`
`
` U n i t e d S t a t e s D i s t r i c t C o u r t
`
`
`
` A u s t i n D i v i s i o n
`
`
`
` 5 0 1 W e s t 5 t h S t r e e t,
`
`
`
` A u s t i n,
` T e x a s 7 8 7 0 1
`
`
`
` ( 5 1 2 ) 3 9 1 - 8 7 9 2
`
`
`
` S O T C e r t i f i c a t i o n N o.
`
`
`
` E x p i r e s:
` 1 - 3 1 - 2 3
`
` 4 4 8 1
`
` S u i t e 4 1 5 3
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`
`
`
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`LILY I. REZNIK, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (AUSTIN)
`
`Page 22 of 22
`
`

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