Case 6:20-cv-01128-ADA-DTG Document 121 Filed 08/15/22 Page 1 of 11
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`WACO DIVISION
`
`STRATOSAUDIO, INC.,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`SUBARU OF AMERICA, INC.,
`
`Defendant.
`
`Case No. 6:20-cv-1128-ADA
`
`DEFENDANT SUBARU OF AMERICA, INC.’S REPLY IN SUPPORT
`OF ITS MOTION TO STRIKE EXPERTS OPINIONS REGARDING CLAIM
`CONSTRUCTION
`
`StratosAudio Exhibit 2020
`Hyundai v StratosAudio
`IPR2021-01267
`Page 1 of 11
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`Case 6:20-cv-01128-ADA-DTG Document 121 Filed 08/15/22 Page 2 of 11
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
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`I.
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`II.
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`ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................2
`A.
`Dr. Mangione-Smith and Dr. Moon impose an additional, unstated
`limitation to claim 9 of the ’081 patent, invoking special descriptions of
`the specification, which is an improper claim construction argument. ....................2
`“Location information” is not the plain and ordinary meaning of the term
`“location,” contrary to Dr. Mangione-Smith’s claim construction
`arguments. ................................................................................................................4
`CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................6
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`B.
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`i
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`
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`Page(s)
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`Cases
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`Cordis Corp. v. Boston Sci. Corp.,
`561 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2009)..............................................................................................2, 4
`
`CytoLogix Corp. v. Ventana Med. Sys., Inc.,
`424 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2005)..............................................................................................2, 4
`
`Karlin Tech., Inc. v. Surgical Dynamics, Inc.,
`177 F.3d 968 (Fed. Cir. 1999)....................................................................................................5
`
`Pisony v. Commando Constrs., Inc.,
`No. 6:17-cv-55-ADA 2020, WL 4934463 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2020) ....................................5
`
`Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc.,
`308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002)..................................................................................................5
`
`VLSI Technology LLC v. Intel Corp.,
`No. 6:21-CV-057-ADA, 2022 WL 1477725 (W.D. Tex. May 10, 2022) .................................1
`
`YETI Coolers, LLC v. RTIC Coolers, LLC,
`Case No. 1:15-CV-597, 2017 WL 404519 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2017) .....................................5
`
`ii
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`StratosAudio’s Opposition to Subaru’s Motion to Strike Expert Opinions Regarding
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`Claim Construction (Dkt. No. 100 or “Motion”) confirms that Dr. Moon’s and Dr. Mangione-
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`Smith’s opinions are improperly arguing claim construction. The Court should strike these
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`opinions.
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`Claim 9[c] of the ’081 patent recites “an output of the first receiver module or the second
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`receiver module.” The plain language requires only one output, not two. If an accused product
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`or the prior art has “an output of the first receiver module,” for example, this limitation can be
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`met, and no second output is needed. This Court has previously explained that an argument
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`attempting to vary the plain meaning of a term to require “separate and distinct” structures
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`requires claim construction. See VLSI Technology LLC v. Intel Corp., No. 6:21-CV-057-ADA,
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`2022 WL 1477725, at *7 (W.D. Tex. May 10, 2022) (stating that “to the extent Intel contends the
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`‘first master device’ and ‘programmable clock controller’ must always comprise entirely
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`separate and distinct circuits, Intel appears to be asking this Court for a new claim
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`construction”).
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`Similarly, “location information” is not the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim term
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`“location.” Claim 12 of the ’405 patent recites “determining a location of the electronic
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`receiving device …” and “transmitting … a response message comprising … the location of the
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`electronic receiving device.” The claim does not recite determining or transmitting location
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`“information” of the electronic receiving device. That Dr. Mangione-Smith is attempting to
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`import new meaning to this claim from elsewhere is apparent from his deposition testimony that
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`he is “quite confident that [he] understand[s] what the inventors intended” and that “what the
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`inventors intended is relevant” in construing the term “location.” Ex. 3 to Mot., Mangione-Smith
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`Dep. at 120:3-21.
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`1
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`Only the Court can perform claim construction. Cordis Corp. v. Boston Sci. Corp., 561
`
`F.3d 1319, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009); CytoLogix Corp. v. Ventana Med. Sys., Inc., 424 F.3d 1168,
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`1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The experts’ attempts to vary the construction must be prevented.
`
`I.
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`A.
`
`Dr. Mangione-Smith and Dr. Moon impose an additional, unstated
`limitation to claim 9 of the ’081 patent, invoking special descriptions of the
`specification, which is an improper claim construction argument.
`
`Dr. Mangione-Smith and Dr. Moon read “an output” as meaning “there must be two
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`outputs, and the claimed information is shown on only one of the outputs.” This is not the plain
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`meaning of “an output.”
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`Paragraph 89 of the Mangione-Smith Report begins with the statement that “[c]laim 9
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`recites a structural limitation of the claimed system: the system must have an ‘output’ of the
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`‘first receiver module’ and an ‘output’ of the ‘second receiver module.’” Paragraph 90 of the
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`Mangione-Smith Report echoes that “for a system to infringe claim 9 of the ’081 patent, the
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`system must include two receiving modules, each with an output.” Similarly, Paragraph 100 of
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`the Moon Report states that “[c]laim 9 requires two outputs, one output for the first receiver
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`module and one output for the second receiver module, with at least one output configured to
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`present both media content concurrently.” But no limitation of claim 9 recites or requires two
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`outputs under the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase “an output of the first receiver
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`module or the second receiver module.” Ex. 1, U.S. Patent No. 8,166,081 at claim 9. The literal
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`meaning of the words of the claim is that the information can be shown on an output, whether it
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`appears with the first receiver module or the second receiver module. Requiring “two” outputs
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`to exist is an additional, unwritten limitation being imposed on the claim by Mangione-Smith
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`and Moon to avoid prior art.
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`2
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`StratosAudio argues that requiring two outputs is “what the claim says.” It is not. Claim
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`9 recites “a first receiver module,” “a second receiver module,” and “an output system
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`configured to present concurrently the first media content and the second media content on an
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`output of the first receiver module or the second receiver module.” Ex. 1, U.S. Patent No.
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`8,166,081 at claim 9. The “configured to” language clearly does not require two outputs,
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`requiring only configuration. The operative clause requiring “an output system” requires only
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`that it present the first media content and the second media content somewhere – on “an” output
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`of either the first or the second receiver module. The requirement to have two outputs – one for
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`the first receiver module and a different one for the second receiver module – appears nowhere in
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`the claim.
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` Not even the Mangione-Smith or Moon Reports contend that requiring two outputs is
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`“what the claim says” or that they apply the claims “as they are written.” Opp. at 3. Rather, the
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`Moon Report argued that the inventors used “and/or” in the specification and “or” in the claim,
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`and this somehow imported “and” from the specification to modify “or” in the claims:
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`When discussing presentation of the first and second media content on an
`output, the use of “and/or” in the specification versus “or” in claim element
`9[c] of the challenged claims has meaning. While the specification contemplates
`that the first and second media content may be presented separately or together on
`the primary device and/or the ancillary device, claim element 9[c] requires
`concurrently presenting the “first media content” and “second media content”
`together on “an output of the first receiver module or the second receiver
`module.” ’081 patent at 35:34-35.
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`Ex. 2, Moon Report ¶ 46 (emphasis added). This is plainly a claim construction argument. Dr.
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`Moon never explained the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “or,” instead invoking
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`allegedly special descriptions in the specification to import a claim construction for the term
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`“or.” StratosAudio repeats this argument in the Opposition. Opp. at 4 (“If StratosAudio wanted
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`to claim a single output, it could have simply recited ‘an output.’ But that is not the claim
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`3
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`StratosAudio wrote….”).1 In the first place, this is wrong. Claim 9 does recite “an output.”
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`More importantly, because claim 9 recites “an output,” the Moon/Mangione-Smith/StratosAudio
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`argument that it somehow requires two outputs rather than one output is classic claim
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`construction, which does not belong in StratosAudio’s expert reports. Cordis Corp. v. Boston
`
`Sci. Corp., 561 F.3d 1319, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009); CytoLogix Corp. v. Ventana Med. Sys., Inc.,
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`424 F.3d 1168, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
`
`Perhaps recognizing the weakness of the Opposition, StratosAudio shifts the issue,
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`focusing on another party’s argument at a recent IPR hearing. Opp. at 3. StratosAudio fails to
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`explain the context or provide the arguments in detail, but just argues that “the arguing attorney
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`(and therefore Subaru) acknowledged that claim 9 of the ’081 patent requires two outputs” and
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`“Subaru cannot now contend that less than two outputs are required.” Opp. at 3. The transcript
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`of the IPR hearing is not available as of August 14, 2022, and is not in the record here. But even
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`if were, it tacitly admits that StratosAudio is attempting to perform claim construction using an
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`IPR proceeding, which is something for the Court – not StratosAudio’s experts.
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`B.
`
`“Location information” is not the plain and ordinary meaning of the term
`“location,” contrary to Dr. Mangione-Smith’s claim construction arguments.
`
`Claim 12 of the ’405 patent requires, among other things, (i) “determining a location of
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`the electronic receiving device utilizing” a GPS system, a triangulation system, or a geographic
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`location system, and (ii) “transmitting electronically to a computer server a response message
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`comprising at least the uniquely identifying data specific to at least the second media content and
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`the location of the electronic receiving device.” Under the Court’s claim construction order,
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`the term “location” carries its plain and ordinary meaning. Ex. 2 to Mot., Dkt. 65 (Claim
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`1 Footnote 1 of the Opposition also invokes written descriptions in the specification to argue that
`claim 9 requires two outputs. Opp. at 5.
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`4
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`Construction Order). The Mangione-Smith Report states that “[t]he link conveys location
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`information,” arguing that the limitation “location” is met by this nebulous “location
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`information.” The Mangione-Smith Report clearly equates “location information” to the claimed
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`“location” that must be present in the accused products. If there were any doubt that this was Dr.
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`Mangione-Smith’s intent, the Report goes on to argue that “this limitation would be met under
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`the doctrine of equivalents” and “[a] person of ordinary skill would understand that sending a
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`link to Apple Maps performs the same function of sending location information (the location of
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`the sender)” (emphasis added).
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`Subaru’s Motion pointed out that “location information” is not the plain and ordinary
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`meaning of the term “location.” Mot. at 3-4. The plain meaning of “location” is a place – a
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`latitude and longitude, or other place designation. The Opposition admits that Subaru is applying
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`the plain and ordinary meaning of this term:
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`Subaru imposes its own new construction of “location”: “The location of the
`receiving device is just that—an address, a latitude and longitude, a place name,
`or something else denoting a specific location.” Id. (emphasis added).
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`Opp. at 6. The Opposition complains that “Subaru never proposed this construction during the
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`Markman proceedings, its expert did not offer this construction in his report, and Subaru cites no
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`evidentiary basis for its new definition.” Opp. at 6-7. This has it backwards – Subaru and its
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`expert witness applied the plain and ordinary meaning of a “location” as the Court’s claim
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`construction order required. Subaru’s expert Dr. Shoemake is allowed to consult ordinary
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`dictionary definitions to illustrate ordinary meanings. Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix,
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`Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Karlin Tech., Inc. v. Surgical Dynamics, Inc., 177
`
`F.3d 968, 971 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Pisony v. Commando Constrs., Inc., No. 6:17-cv-55-ADA 2020,
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`WL 4934463, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2020) (using Merriam-Webster in a different context to
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`5
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`find the plain and ordinary meaning of a claim term); YETI Coolers, LLC v. RTIC Coolers, LLC,
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`Case No. 1:15-CV-597, 2017 WL 404519, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2017).
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`At bottom, StratosAudio and its expert are attempting stealth claim construction.
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`StratosAudio accuses a GPS system of meeting various elements of the claim. Claim element
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`12[g] requires “transmitting . . . a response message comprising “the location of the electronic
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`receiving device.” Notably, claim 12 does not recite “location information about the electronic
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`receiving device” – it requires a “location of the electronic receiving device.” The Mangione-
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`Smith Report is attempting to broaden the claim by arguing that the much broader category
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`“location information” (i.e. any information about the location) literally meets the term
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`“location.” This is classic claim construction, which is left to the Court and should be stricken.
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`II.
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`CONCLUSION
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`StratosAudio’s Opposition and the Mangione-Smith Report argue claim constructions.
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`Claim 9[c] of the ’081 patent does not require two outputs under the ordinary meaning of the
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`phrase “an output of the first receiver module or the second receiver module.” StratosAudio’s
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`experts try to impose an additional limitation of requiring two outputs, by channeling the
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`inventors’ alleged intent to narrow the ordinary meaning of the term “or.” Likewise,
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`StratosAudio’s expert imposed a new, broader claim construction of the term “location.” These
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`are classic claim construction arguments, which must be excluded.
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`Accordingly, the Court should strike the plainly improper and incorrect claim
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`construction arguments of Dr. Mangione-Smith and Dr. Moon’s expert reports and testimony,
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`including:
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` Mangione-Smith Report: Paragraphs 89 and 90, and Page 54 of Exhibit D (discussing
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`“location information”);
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`Case 6:20-cv-01128-ADA-DTG Document 121 Filed 08/15/22 Page 10 of 11
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` Mangione-Smith Deposition Transcript: Pages 120:3-121:3 (discussing “location
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`information”) and 158:13-164:2 (discussing claim 9[c] of the ’081 patent);
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` Moon Report: Paragraphs 99-103, 108-112, 118-122, 126-127 and 134-135.
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`Dated: August 15, 2022
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`/s/ Paul R. Steadman
`John M. Guaragna
`Texas Bar No 24043308
`DLA PIPER LLP (US)
`401 Congress Avenue, Suite 2500
`Austin, TX 78701-3799
`Tel: 512.457.7125
`Fax: 512.457.7001
`john.guaragna@us.dlapiper.com
`
`Paul R. Steadman (Pro Hac Vice)
`Illinois Bar No. 6238160
`paul.steadman@dlapiper.com
`Matthew Satchwell (Pro Hac Vice)
`Illinois Bar No. 6290672
`matthew.satchwell@dlapiper.com
`Shuzo Maruyama (Pro Hac Vice)
`Illinois Bar No. 6313434
`shuzo.maruyama@dlapiper.com
`Stephanie Lim (Pro Hac Vice)
`Illinois Bar No. 6324246
`stephanie.lim@dlapiper.com
`Robert Groselak (Pro Hac Vice)
`Illinois Bar No. 6332753
`DLA PIPER LLP (US)
`444 West Lake Street, Suite 900
`Chicago, IL 60606
`Telephone: (312) 368-4000
`Facsimile: (312) 236-7516
`
`Sangwon Sung (Pro Hac Vice)
`California Bar No. 309380
`sangwon.sung@dlapiper.com
`DLA PIPER LLP (US)
`2000 University Avenue
`East Palo Alto, CA 94303
`Telephone: (650) 833-2000
`Facsimile: (650) 833-2001
`
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`Attorneys for Defendant Subaru of America,
`Inc.
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I hereby certify that on the 15th day of August 2022, I electronically filed the foregoing
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`with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system and served a copy via electronic mail to all
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`counsel of record.
`
`/s/ Paul R. Steadman
`Paul R. Steadman
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