throbber
Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
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`
`
`
`
`Paper 52
`Entered: January 11, 2023
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`GOOGLE LLC,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`NEONODE SMARTPHONE LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`
`IPR2021-01041
`Patent 8,095,879 B2
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Before KARA L. SZPONDOWSKI, CHRISTOPHER L. OGDEN, and
`SCOTT B. HOWARD, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`OGDEN, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`JUDGMENT
`Final Written Decision
`Determining No Challenged Claims Unpatentable
`35 U.S.C. § 318(a)
`
`

`

`IPR2021-01041
`Patent 8,095,879 B2
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`
`I. INTRODUCTION
`
`Petitioner Google LLC (“Google”) filed a Petition (Paper 6, “Pet.”)
`for inter partes review of claims 1–7, 9, 12, 13, and 15–17 of U.S. Patent
`No. 8,095,879 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’879 patent”). Based on the Petition and
`preliminary filings, the Board instituted trial. (Paper 19). Patent Owner
`Neonode Smartphone LLC (“Neonode”) then filed a Patent Owner Response
`under seal (Paper 29, “PO Resp.”; public redacted version as Ex. 2060),
`Google filed a Reply to the Patent Owner Response (Paper 35, “Pet.
`Reply”), and Neonode filed a Sur-reply (Paper 44, “PO Sur-reply”).
`We held an oral hearing on October 17, 2022, and the transcript is
`entered on the record. Paper 50 (“Tr.”).
`This is a final written decision under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) as to whether
`the claims challenged in the inter partes review are unpatentable. For the
`reasons below, we conclude that Google has not shown that any claims of
`the ’879 patent are unpatentable.
`
`II. BACKGROUND
`
`A. RELATED PROCEEDINGS
`
`The parties identify the following as related matters: Neonode
`Smartphone LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 6:20-cv-00505 (W.D. Tex. filed June 8,
`2020); and Neonode Smartphone LLC v. Samsung Electronics Co., No. 6:20-
`cv-00507 (W.D. Tex. filed June 8, 2020). Pet. 106; Paper 3, 2.
`The Board has issued a previous final written decision addressing the
`’879 patent. See Samsung Electronics Co. v. Neonode Smartphone LLC,
`IPR2021-00144, Paper 59 (PTAB Dec. 15, 2022); Pet. 106, Paper 3, 2.
`
`2
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`IPR2021-01041
`Patent 8,095,879 B2
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`
`B.
`
`THE ’879 PATENT (EX. 1001)
`
`The ’879 patent relates to a user interface on a mobile handheld
`computer device that has a touch-sensitive display screen divided into a
`menu area and a display area. See Ex. 1001, 1:6–9, code (57). The user
`interface is “specifically adapted to be used with a small computer unit
`where the size of the touch sensitive area is in the order of 2–3 inches” and
`the interface can “be operated by one hand.” Id. at 3:1–6.
`Figure 1 of the ’879 patent, reproduced below, illustrates such a user
`interface:
`
`
`Figure 1 depicts touch-sensitive area 1 on a mobile handheld device.
`Ex. 1001, 3:22–23, 3:51–53. It is divided into menu area 2 and display area
`3. Id. at 3:53–54. Menu area 2 is a narrow strip along the lower part of
`touch-sensitive area 1 that contains predefined functions 21 (a general
`application-dependent function), 22 (a keyboard), and 23 (a task and file
`manager). Id. at 4:1–6; see also id. at 2:7–10.
`Functions 21, 22, and 23 in menu area 2 “can be activated when the
`touch sensitive area detects a movement of an object with its starting point
`within the representation of the function on the menu area and with a
`
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`direction from the menu area to the display area.” Ex. 1001, 1:65–2:5, 2:11–
`14. This method of activation is shown in Figure 2, reproduced below:
`
`
`Figure 2, above, illustrates a touch gesture by which a user may activate
`functions 21, 22, or 23 in area 2. See Ex. 1001, 3:24–25. This gesture begins
`when object 4 (a thumb as shown in Figure 2, but it could be any finger, a
`pen, or another pointing device, id. at 6:11–15) touches the display at point A
`within representation 21, 22, or 23, and moves in direction B away from
`menu area 2 into display area 3. Id. at 4:7–11.
`When a user activates the first function, display area 3 displays icons
`representing services or settings, depending on the current active application.
`Ex. 1001, 2:18–20. Figure 3, reproduced below, illustrates the touch screen
`after function 21 has been activated:
`
`
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`
`
`Ex. 1001, 3:26. Figure 3, above, shows that after a user activates function 21
`with the gesture as illustrated in Figure 2, display area 3 displays icons 211–
`216, which each represent services or functions depending on the currently
`active application. Id. at 4:12–15. If, for example, the active application
`handles a picture, then the icons showing on display area 3 after a user
`activates the first function can include services such as “save to disk,” “send
`as SMS,” or “delete,” or settings such as “resolution,” “colour,” or
`“brightness.” Id. at 4:24–28.
`Analogously, selecting function 22 activates a keyboard, and selecting
`function 23 activates a library of available applications and files on the
`device. Ex. 1001, 4:36–38, 4:63–65, Figs. 5–6. If there is no currently active
`application, the icons may “represent services or settings of the operations
`system of the computer unit, such as background picture, clock alarm 215,
`users 213, help 211, etc.” Id. at 4:29–33.
`
`
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`
`C. CHALLENGED CLAIMS AND GROUNDS
`
`Claim 1, the only independent claim, is as follows:
`1. A non-transitory computer readable medium storing a
`computer program with computer program code, which, when read
`by a mobile handheld computer unit, allows the computer to
`present a user interface for the mobile handheld computer unit, the
`user interface comprising:
`[a] a touch sensitive area in which a representation of a function
`is provided,
`wherein the representation consists of only one option for
`activating the function and
`wherein the function is activated by a multi-step operation
`comprising (i) an object touching the touch sensitive area
`at a location where the representation is provided and then
`(ii) the object gliding along the touch sensitive area away
`from the touched location,
`wherein the representation of the function is not relocated
`or duplicated during the gliding.
`
`[b]
`
`[c]
`
`[d]
`
`Ex. 1001, 6:45–59 (Google’s reference letters added).
`Google argues six grounds for inter partes review, as shown in the
`following table:
`
`
`
`
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`6
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`Patent 8,095,879 B2
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`
`Claim(s) Challenged 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis
`1–5, 13, 15–17
`103(a)1
`Robertson, 2 Maddalozzo3
`6, 7, 9
`103(a) 
`Robertson, Maddalozzo, Vayda4
`Robertson, Maddalozzo, Bedford-
`12
`103(a) 
`Roberts5
`1, 4–6, 13, 15–17
`103(a) 
`Tarpenning6
`2, 3, 7, 9
`103(a) 
`Tarpenning, Vayda
`12
`103(a) 
`Tarpenning, Bedford-Roberts
`
`Pet. 1–2.
`
`D. DECLARATORY TESTIMONY
`
`Google submits two declarations of Dr. Jacob O. Wobbrock as expert
`testimony. Exs. 1003, 1032; see also Ex. 1004 (curriculum vitae). Google
`also relies on a declarations of Rachel J. Watters (Ex. 1018) and Kelley M.
`Hayes Greenhill (Ex. 1019) as to Robertson’s public availability.
`Neonode submits a declaration of Dr. Craig Rosenberg. Ex. 2019; see
`also Ex. 2002 (curriculum vitae). Neonode also submits declarations of
`
`
` 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006), amended by Leahy–Smith America Invents Act,
`Pub. L. No. 112-29 § 103, sec. (n)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 287, 293 (2011)
`(effective Mar. 16, 2013). The ’879 patent issued from an application filed
`on December 10, 2002, which is before the effective date of this amendment
`to section 103. See Ex. 1001, code (22).
`2 George G. Robertson et al., Buttons as First Class Objects on an
`X Desktop, UIST: Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on User Interface
`Software and Technology: Hilton Head, South Carolina, USA, 35–44 (Nov.
`11–13, 1991) (Ex. 1005).
`3 Maddalozzo et al., US 7,768,501 B1, issued Aug. 3, 2010 (Ex. 1006).
`4 Vayda et al., US 5,745,717, issued Apr. 28, 1998 (Ex. 1007).
`5 Bedford-Roberts, US 5,870,092, issued Feb. 9, 1999 (Ex. 1008).
`6 Tarpenning et al., US 6,181,344 B1, issued Jan. 30, 2001 (Ex. 1009).
`
`7
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`Joseph Shain (Ex. 2008), Ulf Mårtensson (Ex. 2054), Per Bystedt (Ex. 2055
`under seal; public redacted copy as Ex. 2061), and Marcus Bäcklund
`(Ex. 2056) relating to alleged objective indicia of non-obviousness and the
`early development of touch-screen phones that, according to Neonode,
`embody the challenged claims.
`
`III. GROUNDS OF THE PETITION
`
`For the reasons below, we determine that Google has not shown, by a
`preponderance of the evidence, that claims 1–7, 9, 12, 13, and 15–17 of the
`’879 patent are unpatentable under the grounds of the Petition. Before
`analyzing these grounds in detail, we address two matters that will underlie
`our analysis: the level of ordinary skill in the art and the construction we will
`apply to the claim terms.
`
`A.
`
`LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART
`
`The level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the time of the
`invention is a factor in how we construe patent claims. See Phillips v. AWH
`Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). It is also one of
`the factors we consider when determining whether a patent claim would
`have been obvious over the prior art. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383
`U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).
`To assess the level of ordinary skill, we construct a hypothetical
`“person of ordinary skill in the art,” from whose vantage point we assess
`obviousness and claim interpretation. See In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357
`(Fed. Cir. 1998). This legal construct “presumes that all prior art references
`
`
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`in the field of the invention are available to this hypothetical skilled artisan.”
`Id. (citing In re Carlson, 983 F.2d 1032, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
`For Google, Dr. Wobbrock testifies that a person of ordinary skill in
`the art at the time of the invention, would have had “at least a bachelor’s
`degree in Computer Science, Human-Computer Interaction, Symbolic
`Systems, or related engineering disciplines, and at least two years of
`experience designing and programming graphical user interfaces,” but that
`“[r]elevant work experience can substitute for formal education and
`advanced degree studies could substitute for work experience.” Ex. 1003
`¶ 49.
`
`Testifying for Neonode, Dr. Rosenberg states that for his declaration,
`he “will apply the same definition of the level of skill of a [person of
`ordinary skill in the art]” as Dr. Wobbrock. Ex. 2019 ¶ 27.
`We find Dr. Wobbrock’s uncontested articulation to be reasonable in
`light of the subject matter involved in the ’879 patent and the asserted prior
`art. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:49–61 (stating that the ’879 patent addresses
`technical problems including “to provide a user-friendly interface . . . on a
`small handheld computer unit”). Thus, we adopt it for our decision.
`
`B. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`
`In an inter partes review, we construe a patent claim “using the same
`claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a
`civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2020). This
`generally includes “construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and
`customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in
`the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” Id. The ordinary
`
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`and customary meaning of a claim term “is its meaning to the ordinary
`artisan after reading the entire patent,” and “as of the effective filing date of
`the patent application.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313, 1321. There are only two
`circumstances in which a construction departs from the ordinary and
`customary meaning: “1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as
`[their] own lexicographer, or 2) when the patentee disavows the full scope of
`a claim term either in the specification or during prosecution.” Thorner v.
`Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Any
`such special meaning of a term “must be sufficiently clear in the
`specification that any departure from common usage would be so understood
`by a person of experience in the field of the invention.” Multiform
`Desiccants Inc. v. Medzam Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
`To construe the claim terms, “we look principally to the intrinsic
`evidence of record, examining the claim language itself, the written
`description, and the prosecution history, if in evidence.” DePuy Spine, Inc. v.
`Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
`Google does not propose any explicit claim constructions in its
`Petition. See Pet. 4. Neonode does not propose any explicit constructions
`either, but in its Response, Neonode raises a number of claim construction
`arguments regarding the term gliding . . . away as it appears in limitation 1c,
`to which Google responds in its Reply. See PO Resp. 31–50, 66–69; Pet.
`Reply 7–12, 19–21; see also PO Sur-reply 1–10, 19–21. We do not need to
`construe this term explicitly for our decision, and to the extent we need to
`interpret this or any other terms, we address the terms below in the context
`of the prior art. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor
`Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms
`
`
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`‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the
`controversy’ . . . .” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci & Eng’g, Inc., 200
`F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).
`
`C. GROUNDS BASED ON ROBERTSON
`
`In the first ground of the Petition, Google argues that claims 1–5, 13,
`and 15–17 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over
`Robertson in view of Maddalozzo. Pet. 5–64. For this ground, we focus on
`Google’s challenge to sole independent claim 1 and particularly limitation
`1c (Pet. 25–29), after which we address the remaining claims and the
`remaining grounds.
`A claim is unpatentable under § 103(a) for obviousness if the
`differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are “such
`that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
`invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
`subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406
`(2007). When a ground in a petition is based on a combination of references,
`we consider “whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known
`elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” Id. at 418 (citing In
`re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
`We base our obviousness inquiry on factual considerations including
`(1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) any differences between the
`claimed subject matter and the prior art, (3) the level of skill in the art, and
`(4) any objective indicia of obviousness or non-obviousness that may be in
`evidence. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18.
`
`
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`
`Considering these factors, we determine for the reasons below that
`Google has not shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 1 is
`unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Robertson in view of
`Maddalozzo.
`
`1.
`
`Overview of Robertson (Ex. 1005)
`
`Robertson describes a high-level user interface toolkit, called
`“XButtons,” which supports on-screen buttons as first-class objects on an
`X Window system desktop. Ex. 1005, 35. According to Robertson, XButtons
`typically appear as small rectangular screen objects, usually have some text
`that indicates what their action is, and may include a field for editable text.
`Id. at 38. A group of XButtons is shown in Figure 1, which we reproduce
`below.
`
`
`
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`IPR2021-01041
`Patent 8,095,879 B2
`
`Figure 1, above, illustrates a sample set of XButtons including one for a
`“Phone” function. Ex. 1005, 38–39. XButtons can have multiple associated
`actions, each selected by simple mouse or pen gestures such as “flick left,”
`“flick right,” “flick up,” “flick down,” “click,” “rubout,” “check,” or
`“insert.” Id. at 39. For example, “[t]he ‘Phone’ button will let you type the
`name of someone, then pop up a window with their phone number (by
`clicking) or dial the number (with the flick right gesture).” Id.
`“If the user is unfamiliar with the action of a particular button, a menu
`can be popped up to reveal which gestures are supported (and what they
`do),” using a particular gesture. Ex. 1005, 39. The menu associated with the
`“Phone” XButton is shown in Figure 2, which we reproduce below.
`
`
`Figure 2, above, illustrates a sample menu for an XButton. Ex. 1005, 39–40.
`The menu shows all potential user manipulations of the XButton; for
`
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`example, it shows that the “Click” gesture is associated with “Get phone #”
`and the “Flick Right” gesture is associated with “Dial phone #.” Id.
`XButtons may also have associated with them a button editor, as
`shown in Figure 3, which we reproduce below.
`
`
`Figure 3 shows a button editor for the “Phone” XButton whose menu is
`shown in Figure 2. Ex. 1005, 40–41. The button editor is a structured
`property-sheet editor designed specifically for editing an XButton. Id. at 40.
`The editor fields at the top specify the appearance of the button. Id. The
`
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`IPR2021-01041
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`middle of the editor specifies the action language, the various actions, and
`the text to appear in the menu for each action. Id. Toward the bottom of the
`editor are fields (“Attribute” and “Value”) that allow the user to view and
`replace user-defined properties. Id.
`
`2.
`
`Limitation 1c
`
`Because we find that Google has not shown that the combination of
`Robertson and Maddalozzo teaches or suggests limitation 1c, we need only
`address that limitation in our decision. Moreover, because Google relies only
`on Robertson for limitation 1c, we need not address Google’s arguments
`concerning Maddalozzo. See Pet. 25–29 (not referring to Maddalozzo in the
`context of limitation 1c). 7
`Limitation 1c recites “wherein the function is activated by a multi-step
`operation comprising (i) an object touching the touch sensitive area at a
`location where the representation is provided and then (ii) the object gliding
`along the touch sensitive area away from the touched location.” Ex. 1001,
`6:52–57. An example of this operation is the gesture illustrated in Figure 2
`of the ’879 patent, which we discuss above. See supra Section II.B.
`Google contends that Robertson discloses this recited multi-step
`operation by disclosing that a user can activate a “dialphone” function to call
`a phone number by “placing a pen on the phone button, then sliding the pen
`to the right along the touch-sensitive interface to perform a ‘flick right’
`gesture.” Pet. 25 (citing Ex. 1005, 38–39; Ex. 1003 ¶ 107). Google contends
`
`
`
` 7
`
` For claim 1, Google relies on Maddalozzo solely for teaching the
`preamble. See Pet. 12–19.
`
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`that, according to Robertson, “‘gesture[s] must start in an XButton,’ but ‘can
`move outside the XButton’ while performed.” Id. (alteration in original)
`(quoting Ex. 1005, 43) (citing Ex. 1005, 39; Ex. 1003 ¶ 106). Thus, Google
`depicts this operation with an annotated version of Robertson’s Figure 1,
`which we reproduce below:
`
`
`
`Pet. 26. In the above figure, Google annotates Robertson’s Figure 1 by
`highlighting the “Phone” XButton (in which has been entered a particular
`phone number) in blue and showing an orange pen and a path it would
`allegedly make starting on the phone number and ending outside the
`XButton. See Pet. 25–26.
`Alternatively, Google contends that Robertson discloses activating an
`“xbedit” function to open the “Phone” button’s button editor by “touching a
`pen (or finger) to the phone button, then sliding the pen away from the initial
`touched location in the shape of a caret to perform an ‘Insert gesture.’”
`
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`Pet. 26–27 (citing Ex. 1005, 39–40; Ex. 1003 ¶ 108). Google depicts this
`operation with another annotated version of Robertson’s Figure 1, which we
`reproduce below:
`
`
`Pet. 27. Shown above is Robertson’s Figure 1 that Google has annotated to
`highlight the “Phone” XButton (in which has been entered a particular phone
`number) in blue and showing an orange pen and a path it would allegedly
`make starting on the phone number, moving diagonally upward and to the
`right outside the XButton, and then moving diagonally downward and to the
`right. See id.
`In its Response, Neonode contends that Google has failed to support
`its contention that Robertson’s “flick-right” and “insert” gestures reflect the
`stylus performing an operation that comprises “gliding . . . away.” See PO
`Resp. 31. First, Neonode contends that based on the prosecution history and
`
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`extrinsic evidence, the term gliding means more than simply any movement
`along the touch sensitive area. See id. 32–35.
`In particular, Neonode notes that during prosecution of the ’879
`patent, the original language describing the gesture in limitation 1c was
`“moving in a direction from a starting point that is the representation [of a
`function] . . . to said display area.” PO Resp. 33 (alterations in original)
`(quoting Ex. 1002, 201). Neonode argues that, after the Examiner rejected
`claims with the above language, “[i]n further prosecution and in explaining
`the gesture the Applicant sought to claim,” the applicant encouraged the
`Examiner to watch a video (Ex. 2020) demonstrating the gesture on
`Neonode’s N2 mobile device. Id. (citing Ex. 1002, 214–15). Neonode
`contends that this video depicts a gesture that is “similar to what today’s
`systems refer to as a ‘swipe’ gesture, where, e.g., the thumb is placed on a
`representation of a function (menu item with an arrow) and through a
`swiping motion, the menu screen opens.” Id. at 32–34 (citing Ex. 2020, time
`codes 00:26–00:27).
`Then, according to Neonode, “[i]n the subsequent office action, the
`Examiner acknowledged the ‘swiping’ gesture of the claims, but recognized
`that the then drafted claims[] simply required ‘moving’ the object, and were
`thus too broad to limit the claims to a swipe/glide gesture.” PO Resp. 34
`(citing Ex. 1002, 258 (“[T]he Examiner feels that the limitations, as claimed,
`. . . are still too broad to suggest without research what was shown in the
`video demonstration.”)). Then, Neonode argues that after an examiner
`interview “to properly claim the present invention,” the applicant amended
`the claim to its current form, “gliding along the touch sensitive area away
`from the location.” Id. (quoting Ex. 1002, 334; then quoting id. at 317–18).
`
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`
`Thus, Neonode contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art
`would have understood from the prosecution history that the word gliding as
`recited in limitation 1c carries a more specific meaning than mere
`movement. PO Resp. 35 (citing Ajinomoto Co. v. ITC, 932 F.3d 1342, 1351
`(Fed. Cir. 2019)).
`Next, Neonode argues that Google has failed to show that a person of
`ordinary skill in the art would have understood Robertson’s “flick” gesture
`to comprise “gliding.” PO Resp. 35. Neonode first points to dictionary
`definitions in which the word flick denotes a sharp or jerky motion, whereas
`the word glide denotes a smooth, continuous motion. Id. at 35–38 (citing
`Exs. 2049, 2052, 2050, 2057; Ex. 2019 ¶¶ 78–79). Neonode also points to
`more recent developer guidelines to show that leading smart phone
`developers Apple and Google have distinguished between “flick” and
`“swipe” gestures. Id. at 39–40 (citing Ex. 2022, 4; Ex. 2023, 6; Ex. 2029, 2;
`Ex. 2019 ¶¶ 80–81). According to Dr. Rosenberg, in Google’s Android
`operating system, a “flick” gesture simulates a fast spinning motion, and in
`later Android releases, the gesture “creates a momentum effect where the
`scroller initially moves at a given velocity, and gradually slows down,”
`whereas “a ‘swipe’ gesture is used to close an application.” Ex. 2019 ¶¶ 82–
`83 (citing Ex. 2025, 21; Ex. 2026, 5; Ex. 2027, 8 (calling the gesture
`“fling”); Ex. 2028, 1).
`Neonode argues that the difference between “glide” (“swipe”) and
`“flick” gestures is analogous to the difference between “walking and
`running,” which are distinct movements. PO Resp. 41 (citing Ex. 2019 ¶ 84).
`In the context of operating a touchscreen with a pen on a 1991 desktop
`(allegedly consistent with how the term is used today), Dr. Rosenberg
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`testifies that “[i]n a flick gesture, the pen would touch the screen, but only
`moves on the screen for a very short distance and is quickly lifted from the
`screen in a ‘jerky’ motion.” Ex. 2019 ¶¶ 85–86.
`Thus, Neonode disagrees with how Google depicts a “flick right”
`gesture in its annotated version of Robertson’s Figure 1, reproduced above.
`PO Resp. 42. According to Neonode, neither Google nor Dr. Wobbrock have
`explained why the gesture would have been a several-inches-long
`continuous movement, as depicted, which does not reflect the plain meaning
`of flick as a “short, jerky motion.” Id. at 42–43. Although Neonode
`acknowledges that Robertson’s system is capable, in general, of recognizing
`gestures that begin within an XButton and extend outside of it, Neonode
`disagrees that this would necessarily be the case for the “flick right” gesture,
`unless the gesture began close to the edge of the XButton. Id. at 43–44
`(citing Ex. 2019 ¶ 89).
`Dr. Rosenberg also states that Robertson “discloses that a drag-and-
`drop operation can be performed on its XButtons,” so “[i]f Robertson’s
`‘flick’ was really a glide,” then if the user performed a gesture as depicted in
`Google’s annotated version of Figure 1, “Robertson’s system would not
`know whether the movement of a mouse/pen was a drag-and-drop operation
`or a glide gesture.” Ex. 2019 ¶ 90 (citing Ex. 1005, 39, 40, 42). On the other
`hand, “a ‘flick’ gesture is readily recognizable due to its higher speed and
`shorter distance—which, as Robertson indicates, is not intended to (even if it
`‘can’) go outside of the XButton itself.” Id.
`Neonode also disputes that a person of ordinary skill in the art would
`have interpreted Robertson’s “insert” gesture—which Robertson describes
`as “like an editor’s caret”—to comprise a “gliding . . . away” movement.
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`PO Resp. 45 (quoting Ex. 1005, 40). According to Neonode, “[a]n editor’s
`caret—‘^’—has a sharp angle and is usually smaller than the text.” Id. at 47–
`48 (citing Ex. 2019 ¶ 99). According to Dr. Rosenberg, forming this gesture
`would involve “two jerky movements connected together,” or “drawing a
`first sharp, short line, and then sharply changing direction and drawing a
`second sharp, short line.” Ex. 2019 ¶ 100. Thus, Neonode disagrees with
`Google’s depiction of two large lines that extend outside the XButton and
`even over neighboring XButtons. PO Resp. 49–50 (citing Ex. 2019 ¶¶ 101–
`102). Rather, according to Dr. Rosenberg, Robertson’s “insert” gesture
`would more closely resemble the depiction shown in Neonode’s own
`annotated version of Figure 1, which we reproduce below:
`
`Ex. 2019 ¶ 102. Neonode’s annotated version of Robertson’s Figure 1
`depicts an orange caret roughly on the same scale as the text that would
`appear in the “Phone” XButton, and a pen “with the correct approximate
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`scale of the size of the pen compared to a typical desktop of 1991.” PO
`Resp. 49 (citing Ex. 2019 ¶¶ 101–102).
`In its Reply, Google contends that we should decline to construe
`gliding . . . away as Neonode contends because doing so would render claim
`1 unpatentable for lack of written description, because the original disclosure
`of the ’879 patent only described general movements, not specifically a
`gliding gesture. Pet. Reply 7–8 (citing Ruckus Wireless, Inc. v. Innovative
`Wireless Sols., LLC, 824 F.3d 999, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Novozymes A/S v.
`DuPont Nutrition Biosciences APS, 723 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2013); D
`Three Enters., LLC v. SunModo Corp., 890 F.3d 1042, 1050–51 (Fed. Cir.
`2018)).
`Neonode counters in its Sur-reply that the “gliding . . . away”
`language in limitation 1c finds support in Figure 2 of the original disclosure
`leading to the ’879 patent, which depicts a gliding motion and not a flick.
`PO Sur-reply 7–8 (citing Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., 815 F.3d
`1331, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). But in any event, Neonode argues that
`construing terms to preserve validity is only “a last resort if the claim is ‘still
`ambiguous’ after ‘applying all the available tools of claim construction.’” Id.
`at 7 (quoting Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 911 (Fed.
`Cir. 2004)). Neonode contends that this is not the case here, because “the
`prosecution history clearly and unambiguously informs a [person of ordinary
`skill in the art] that the claimed ‘gliding . . . away’ is distinct from ‘moving-
`from-to.’” Id.
`Next, Google contends that on cross-examination, Dr. Rosenberg
`could not delineate the boundary between a “flick” and a “glide,” and
`admitted that “both flick and glide gestures start at a touched location and
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`move away from the touched location while continuing to touch the screen”
`and “that the distinction is arbitrary.” Pet. Reply 8, 9–10, 11 (citing
`Ex. 1031, 27:15–29:6, 31:15–32:12, 34:24–35:17; Ex. 1001, 2:61–67, 5:33–
`35). Google also argues that “Neonode’s citations to general-purpose
`dictionaries [or development guides] are unavailing because they are either
`after-arising or improperly contradict the intrinsic record, which describes
`only ‘movement’ without regard to speed or distance.” Id. at 10 (footnote
`omitted) (citing Eon Corp. IP Holdings v. Silver Spring Networks, Inc., 815
`F.3d 1314, 1320–21 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Profectus Tech. LLC v. Huawei Techs.
`Co., 823 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Seabed Geosolutions (US) Inc. v.
`Magseis FF LLC, 8 F.4th 1285, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2021)).
`Neonode disagrees that Dr. Rosenberg admitted that the distinction
`between “flick” and “glide” is arbitrary; according to Neonode, he merely
`testified “that ‘one number’ would not suffice to distinguish between a ‘flick’
`and a ‘glide’ since it would depend on various factors such as screen size,
`resolution of the screen, [and] whether a stylus or finger is used.” PO Sur-
`reply 3 (citing Ex. 1031, 28:16–29:6). Neonode contends that this does not
`make the distinction arbitrary, and that Google has been able to distinguish
`between “flick” and “swipe” gestures in its own documentation for the
`Android operating system. Id. (citing PO Resp. 40–41).
`Neonode also contends that Google’s arguments in its Reply that
`Robertson’s “flick” falls within the scope of the recited “gliding . . . away”
`gesture are conclusory and untethered to any further testimony, including by
`Dr. Wobbrock. PO Sur-reply 1–2. And according to Neonode, while Google
`criticizes Neonode’s dictionary definitions, Google provides none of its own.
`Id. at 2. Neonode disagrees that its dictionary evidence is irrelevant because
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`it is “after-arising,” because Neonode provides dictionary definitions from
`the early 1990s as well as later definitions to show consistency over time. Id.
`(citing Exs. 2049, 2052, 2050, 2057). As to the Apple and Google
`development guides, Neonode acknowledges that they are from after 2002,
`the earliest priority date of the ’879 patent, but contends that Google
`“presents no evidence for the insinuation that these terms were used
`differently in 2002.” Id. at 3.
`Next, Google contends that (1) during prosecution, the applicant
`“never distinguished ‘gliding’ from other gestures or movement generally,
`and in fact equated other gestures with a glide,” and “[t]he examiner also
`continued to search ‘flick as relevant after the amendment,” Pet. Reply 8
`(citing Ex. 1002, 381, 482, 496–497, 585); and (2) “Neonode’s citation
`[during prosecution] to its after-arising N2 advertisement . . . is not relevant
`because it was used to distinguish ‘the representation of the function is not
`relocated or duplicated during the gliding’ limitation [1d], not between
`‘gliding’ and another movement type,” id. at

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