throbber

`Paper No. 13
`Filed: March 23, 2022
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`_______________
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`_______________
`
`
`TCL INDUSTRIES HOLDINGS CO. AND HISENSE CO., LTD.
`
`Petitioners
`
`v.
`
`PARKERVISION, INC.
`
`Patent Owner
`
`_______________
`
`
`Case No. IPR2021-00990
`Patent No. 7,110,444
`
`________________________________________________________
`
`PETITIONERS’ MOTION FOR ROUTINE AND/OR ADDITIONAL
`DISCOVERY UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.51(b)
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`IPR2021-00990
`Petitioners’ Motion for Routine and/or Additional Discovery
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I.
`
`PARKER VISION SHOULD BE ORDERED TO PRODUCE ITS
`FINAL INFRINGEMENT CONTENTIONS AS “ROUTINE”
`DISCOVERY .................................................................................................. 2
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`ParkerVision’s Inconsistent Positions on “Storage Element” .............. 3
`
`The Final Infringement Contentions Are Routine Discovery ............... 8
`
`II.
`
`ALTERNATIVELY, PARKERVISION SHOULD BE ORDERED
`TO PRODUCE ITS FINAL INFRINGEMENT CONTENTIONS AS
`“ADDITIONAL” DISCOVERY ..................................................................... 9
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`There Is More Than a Possibility or Mere Allegation That the
`Requested Discovery Will Yield Useful Information. ........................ 10
`
`Patent Owner Does Not Seek Petitioner’s Litigation Positions
`or Their Underlying Basis ................................................................... 11
`
`Petitioners Cannot Generate Equivalent Information by Other
`Means .................................................................................................. 11
`
`The Request for ParkerVision’s Final Infringement Contentions
`Is Easily Understandable and Not Overly Burdensome ...................... 11
`
`III. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 12
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`i
`
`
`

`

`
`IPR2021-00990
`Petitioners’ Motion for Routine and/or Additional Discovery
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc.,
`239 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001)..................................................................................................7
`
`Bestway (USA), Inc. v. Team Worldwide Corp.,
`IPR2018-00859, Paper 67 (April 9, 2019) .........................................................................10, 11
`
`Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee,
`579 U.S. 261 (2016) ...................................................................................................................9
`
`Garmin Int’l, Inc. v. Cuozzo Speed Techs. LLC,
`IPR2012-00001, Paper 26 (PTAB Mar. 5, 2013) ..............................................................10, 11
`
`Intel Corp. v. ParkerVision, Inc.,
`IPR2020-01265, Paper 44 (FWD) .............................................................................................3
`
`Nestle USA, Inc. v. Steuben Foods, Inc.,
`884 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008)..................................................................................................6
`
`ParkerVision, Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc.,
`621 F. App’x 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ..................................................................................4, 5, 6
`
`ParkerVision, Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc.,
`Case No. 6:14-cv-00687, Dkt. 683 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 9, 2022) ...................................................8
`
`ParkerVision, Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc.,
`No. 3:11-CV-719-J-37TEM, 2013 WL 633077 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 20, 2013) ..........................4, 5
`
`RPX Corp. v. ParkerVision, Inc.,
`IPR2014-00948 Paper 7 .............................................................................................................5
`
`Other Authorities
`
`37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a)...........................................................................................................................9
`
`37 C.F.R. §42.51(b)(1)(iii) ...............................................................................................................1
`
`37 C.F.R. §42.51(b)(2)(i) .......................................................................................................2, 9, 10
`
`Rule 42.51(b)(1)(iii) .........................................................................................................................9
`
`
`
`
`ii
`
`

`

`
`IPR2021-00990
`Petitioners’ Motion for Routine and/or Additional Discovery
`
`
`
`Pursuant to the Board’s e-mail to counsel dated March 9, 2022 authorizing
`
`this motion, TCL Industries Holdings Co., Ltd. (“TCL”) and Hisense Co. Ltd.
`
`(“Hisense”) (collectively, “Petitioners”) moves for an Order requiring Patent
`
`Owner ParkerVision, Inc. (“ParkerVision”) to produce discovery comprising its
`
`Final Infringement Contentions for Patent No. 7,110,444 (the “’444 patent”) from
`
`the underlying litigations between the parties in the Western District of Texas
`
`(“WDTX”). Counsel for Petitioners already has the requested discovery in their
`
`possession by virtue of their participation in the underlying litigations, and so
`
`granting this motion would not burden ParkerVision in any way. Further,
`
`Petitioners offered to file the materials under seal, yet ParkerVision still refuses to
`
`allow its Final Infringement Contentions to be seen by the Board.
`
`
`
`The motion should be granted for two independent reasons. First, the Final
`
`Infringement Contentions are required “routine” discovery under 37 C.F.R.
`
`§42.51(b)(1)(iii) because, in its Patent Owner Response (Paper 12), ParkerVision
`
`has taken positions that are inconsistent with positions it took in the Final
`
`Infringement Contentions. Alternatively, the requested discovery should be
`
`
`
`
`1
`
`

`

`
`IPR2021-00990
`Petitioners’ Motion for Routine and/or Additional Discovery
`
`ordered as “additional” discovery under 37 C.F.R. §42.51(b)(2)(i) because it is in
`
`the interests of justice.1
`
`
`
`I.
`
`PARKER VISION SHOULD BE ORDERED TO PRODUCE ITS
`FINAL INFRINGEMENT CONTENTIONS AS “ROUTINE”
`DISCOVERY
`
`
`
`ParkerVision’s Patent Owner Response is inconsistent with its previous
`
`positions on a key claim limitation that could dispose of this IPR. In opposition to
`
`Ground 1 of the Petition, ParkerVision argues that Tayloe does not disclose a
`
`“storage element.” Paper 12 at 59-72. Similarly, in opposition to Ground 2,
`
`ParkerVision argues that Lam in view of Enz/Tayloe do not disclose a “storage
`
`
`
`
` Petitioners did not attach the Final Infringement Contentions to this motion
`
` 1
`
`because ParkerVision contends that the materials are “confidential.” ParkerVision
`
`contends it paid a third party to do reverse engineering on the accused products,
`
`which are publicly available smart TVs containing Wi-Fi chips manufactured by
`
`other third parties. The Final Infringement Contentions contain screen shots of
`
`circuit diagrams from the reverse engineering ParkerVision commissioned.
`
`ParkerVision contends that it has a non-disclosure agreement with the third-party
`
`reverse engineering firm requiring the documents to be filed under seal in litigation
`
`or in IPR proceedings.
`
`2
`
`

`

`
`IPR2021-00990
`Petitioners’ Motion for Routine and/or Additional Discovery
`
`element.” Id. at 74-77. ParkerVision’s inconsistent positions with respect to the
`
`“storage element” claim term are discussed below.
`
`A.
`
`ParkerVision’s Inconsistent Positions on “Storage Element”
`
`
`
`In another IPR involving the same ’444 patent that is at issue here, the Board
`
`construed “storage element” to mean “an element of a system that stores non-
`
`negligible amounts of energy from an input EM signal.” Paper 12 at 2 (quoting
`
`Intel Corp. v. ParkerVision, Inc., IPR2020-01265, Paper 44 (FWD) at 41). There,
`
`the Board found that another patent that was incorporated by reference into the
`
`’444 patent, i.e., Patent No. 6,061,551 (“the ’551 patent”), has an express
`
`definition of “storage module.” IPR2020-01265, Paper 44 at 14-42.
`
`
`
`In its Patent Owner Response, ParkerVision attempts to further construe the
`
`phrase “non-negligible” in the Board’s construction, arguing that the amount of
`
`energy on the capacitor must be shown “mathematically” in a complex, three-step
`
`calculation that compares the calculated total “available energy” to the “energy in
`
`a capacitor.” Paper 12 at e.g., 59-65. In its Final Infringement contentions in the
`
`underlying TCL/Hisense litigations, however, ParkerVision did not disclose any
`
`such mathematical calculations, nor did it argue that such calculations are
`
`somehow required to show that a capacitor performs the routine function of storing
`
`“non-negligible” amounts of energy as it has here. Instead, ParkerVision’s Final
`
`3
`
`

`

`
`IPR2021-00990
`Petitioners’ Motion for Routine and/or Additional Discovery
`
`Infringement Contentions simply point to a capacitor in a Wi-Fi chip and identify
`
`that capacitor as the alleged “storage element.”2
`
`
`
`ParkerVision’s newly minted “mathematical calculations” are also
`
`inconsistent with, and precluded by, the Federal Circuit’s decision in ParkerVision,
`
`Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc., 621 F. App’x 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2015). One of the patents at
`
`issue there was the ’551 patent. In the claim construction proceedings preceding
`
`the Federal Circuit’s decision, ParkerVision itself argued that “transferring non-
`
`negligible amounts of energy” means “transferring energy (i.e., voltage and current
`
`over time) in amounts that are distinguishable from noise.” ParkerVision, Inc. v.
`
`Qualcomm Inc., No. 3:11-CV-719-J-37TEM, 2013 WL 633077, at *5-*7 (M.D.
`
`Fla. Feb. 20, 2013). ParkerVision did not allege that non-negligible energy needed
`
`to be mathematically determined. See id. Nor did ParkerVision argue that “non-
`
`negligible” compares the energy in a capacitor to the total “available energy” (as in
`
`ParkerVision’s Patent Owner Response here); instead, ParkerVision argued that
`
`
`
`
` At a minimum, ParkerVision should be required to submit its Final Infringement
`
` 2
`
`Contentions for the Board’s in camera review in the event it disputes any of the
`
`descriptions provided by Petitioners herein.
`
`4
`
`

`

`
`IPR2021-00990
`Petitioners’ Motion for Routine and/or Additional Discovery
`
`non-negligible energy is an amount that is merely “distinguishable from noise.”
`
`See id.
`
`
`
`The district court accepted ParkerVision’s proposed construction with minor
`
`amendment, holding that “transferring non-negligible amounts of energy” means
`
`“transferring energy in amounts that are distinguishable from noise.”
`
`ParkerVision, Inc, 2013 WL 633077, at *7 (emphasis added). And ParkerVision
`
`did not dispute that construction on appeal. ParkerVision, Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc.,
`
`621 F. App’x 1009, 1018 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“That construction is not disputed on
`
`appeal.”). ParkerVision’s inventor, Mr. Sorrells—who is also named as the lead
`
`inventor of the ’835 patent (see Ex. 1001)—“explained at trial that transferring a
`
`non-negligible amount of energy into the storage capacitor means ‘that you have to
`
`transfer enough energy to overcome the noise in the system to be able to meet your
`
`specifications.’” 621 F. App’x at 1019 (emphasis added). Then, in another IPR
`
`involving U.S. Patent No. 6,370,371, ParkerVision told the PTAB that the Middle
`
`District of Florida’s construction of “non-negligible” amounts of energy is correct.
`
`RPX Corp. v. ParkerVision, Inc., IPR2014-00948 Paper 7, Patent Owner
`
`Preliminary Response, (Sept. 24, 2014) at 23 (“[T]he Court adopted the exact same
`
`5
`
`

`

`
`IPR2021-00990
`Petitioners’ Motion for Routine and/or Additional Discovery
`
`construction that Patent Owner now advances for ‘non-negligible amounts of
`
`energy.’”) (ParkerVision’s emphasis).3
`
`
`
`Moreover, in the Qualcomm litigation, Mr. Sorrells testified that when a
`
`product functions according to its specifications, this “is proof that a ‘non-
`
`negligible’ amount of energy is transferred to the storage element in those
`
`products.” 621 F. App’x at 1019 (emphasis added). “Mr. Sorrells’ testimony thus
`
`establishes that to determine whether or not energy in amounts distinguishable
`
`from noise has been transferred from the carrier signal, one may look to whether
`
`the down-converting circuit functions in practice. If a circuit successfully down-
`
`converts, that is proof that enough energy has been transferred to overcome the
`
`noise in the system.” Id. (emphasis added).4
`
`
`
`
` Therein, ParkerVision also argued that “the Specification supports Patent
`
` 3
`
`Owner’s construction that ‘a storage module’ means ‘an apparatus that stores non-
`
`negligible amounts of energy from the carrier signal.’” Id.
`
`4 This testimony precludes ParkerVision’s brand new argument that non-negligible
`
`amounts of energy must be mathematically calculated, as a percentage of the total
`
`available energy that is stored in a capacitor. See Nestle USA, Inc. v. Steuben
`
`Foods, Inc., 884 F.3d 1350, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[I]t is the identity of the issues
`
`6
`
`

`

`
`IPR2021-00990
`Petitioners’ Motion for Routine and/or Additional Discovery
`
`
`
`In keeping with Mr. Sorrells’ testimony about how to prove that a capacitor
`
`has a “non-negligible” amount of energy, ParkerVision’s Final Infringement
`
`Contentions against TCL and Hisense identify a capacitor in a Wi-Fi chip as a
`
`“storage element.” No mathematical calculations are shown or even mentioned as
`
`being needed. The Final Infringement contentions are thus inconsistent with
`
`ParkerVision’s new mathematical-calculation construction of “non-negligible,”
`
`making them highly relevant to the issues before the Board here. “A patent may
`
`not, like a ‘nose of wax,’ be twisted one way to avoid anticipation and another to
`
`find infringement.” Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343,
`
`1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Sterner Lighting, Inc. v. Allied Elec. Supply, Inc.,
`
`431 F.2d 539, 544 (5th Cir. 1970) (citing White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 51
`
`(1886)).5
`
`
`
`
`that were litigated that determines whether collateral estoppel should apply.”)
`
`(original emphasis, internal quotations omitted).
`
`5 In a motion filed today in IPR2021-00985 concerning related Patent No.
`
`7,292,835 (“the ’835 patent”), Petitioners showed that ParkerVision’s Final
`
`Infringement Contentions are also inconsistent with ParkerVision’s arguments in
`
`IPR2021-00985 regarding the “cable modem” term in the ’835 patent.
`
`7
`
`

`

`
`IPR2021-00990
`Petitioners’ Motion for Routine and/or Additional Discovery
`
`
`B.
`
`The Final Infringement Contentions Are Routine Discovery
`
`
`
`As shown above, ParkerVision’s Patent Owner Response is inconsistent
`
`with ParkerVision’s Final Infringement Contentions as to the “storage element”
`
`claim term. In its email to the Board of March 9, 2022, ParkerVision did not
`
`dispute this. Instead, ParkerVision argued only that Petitioners had “waived” any
`
`ability to address ParkerVision’s mathematical calculations as to the “storage
`
`element” issue. This is wrong of course; a party cannot “waive” a response to an
`
`argument that ParkerVision never made in the underlying litigation and raised for
`
`the very first time in its Patent Owner Response.6 Indeed, that is the very purpose
`
`of allowing a Petitioner Reply. Further, ParkerVision can raise any timeliness
`
`arguments in its Sur-Reply or by way of a motion to exclude; there is no basis for
`
`
`
` This is not the first time ParkerVision radically changed theories. In IPR2021-
`
` 6
`
`01265, the Board excluded ParkerVision’s “storage element” arguments.
`
`IPR2021-01265, Paper 44 at 70 (“… Patent Owner could have asserted that Tayloe
`
`was distinguishable on this basis, but did not do so.”) (Board’s emphasis). More
`
`recently, the Middle District of Florida excluded ParkerVision’s expert
`
`(ParkerVision, Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc., Case No. 6:14-cv-00687, Dkt. 683 (M.D.
`
`Fla. Mar. 9, 2022) (granting motion at Dkt. 491)) and entered summary judgment
`
`in favor of defendant Qualcomm (id. at Dkt. 686 (granting motion at Dkt. 494)).
`
`8
`
`

`

`
`IPR2021-00990
`Petitioners’ Motion for Routine and/or Additional Discovery
`
`ParkerVision to shield its Final Infringement Contentions from the Board’s review
`
`during the discovery period of these proceedings.
`
`
`
`Patents are “affected with a public interest.” 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a).
`
`ParkerVision should not be allowed to frustrate the Board’s statutory obligation to
`
`take “a second look at an earlier administrative grant” of the challenged patent by
`
`taking one position in allegedly “confidential” Final Infringement Contentions that
`
`it refuses to produce in IPR discovery, while taking an entirely inconsistent
`
`position in its IPR papers in an attempt to avoid cancellation. See Cuozzo Speed
`
`Techs., LLC v. Lee, 579 U.S. 261, 279 (2016). Rule 42.51(b)(1)(iii) is specifically
`
`designed to prevent such abuses: “a party must serve relevant information that is
`
`inconsistent with a position advanced by the party during the proceeding.”
`
`(emphasis added). The Board should grant the motion for this reason alone.
`
`II. ALTERNATIVELY, PARKERVISION SHOULD BE ORDERED TO
`PRODUCE ITS FINAL INFRINGEMENT CONTENTIONS AS
`“ADDITIONAL” DISCOVERY
`
`
`
`The Board may grant additional discovery where necessary “in the interests
`
`of justice.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.51(b)(2)(i). This standard is plainly met here. As
`
`discussed above, ParkerVision has placed the construction and scope of “storage
`
`element” at issue in this IPR, as well as the nature of the evidence required to show
`
`that this claim element is met in the prior art. And as shown above, ParkerVision’s
`
`Patent Owner Response is inconsistent with its Final Infringement Contentions on
`
`9
`
`

`

`
`IPR2021-00990
`Petitioners’ Motion for Routine and/or Additional Discovery
`
`both scores. Therefore, the motion can also be granted under 37 C.F.R. §
`
`42.51(b)(2)(i). See Bestway (USA), Inc. v. Team Worldwide Corp., IPR2018-
`
`00859, Paper 67 (April 9, 2019) at 8-9 (ordering production of “confidential expert
`
`reports and deposition transcripts” because “[i]nconsistent positions taken by
`
`Patent Owner’s declarant as to underlying factual inquiries in an obviousness
`
`analysis would be useful to Petitioners” and because “Petitioners could not obtain
`
`the information from other sources.”).
`
`
`
`In assessing whether to grant additional discovery, the Board applies a five
`
`factor “necessary in the interest of justice” standard. See Garmin Int’l, Inc. v.
`
`Cuozzo Speed Techs. LLC, IPR2012-00001, Paper 26 at 6-7 (PTAB Mar. 5, 2013).
`
`All five Garmin factors support granting Patent Owner’s motion.
`
`A. There Is More Than a Possibility or Mere Allegation That the
`Requested Discovery Will Yield Useful Information.
`
`
`
`ParkerVision produced its Final Infringement Contentions in the underlying
`
`WDTX litigations, so this is not a fishing expedition for something that may or
`
`may not exist. And since these materials are inconsistent with ParkerVision’s
`
`Patent Owner Response, the information is useful in this IPR. Bestway (USA), Inc.
`
`v. Team Worldwide Corp., IPR2018-00859, Paper 67 (April 9, 2019) at 8-9
`
`(ordering production of “confidential expert reports and deposition transcripts”
`
`because “[i]nconsistent positions taken by Patent Owner’s declarant as to
`
`10
`
`

`

`
`IPR2021-00990
`Petitioners’ Motion for Routine and/or Additional Discovery
`
`underlying factual inquiries in an obviousness analysis would be useful to
`
`Petitioners” and because “Petitioners could not obtain the information from other
`
`sources.”).
`
`B.
`
`Patent Owner Does Not Seek Petitioner’s Litigation Positions or
`Their Underlying Basis
`
`
`
`Petitioners are not trying to discover the underlying basis for ParkerVision’s
`
`litigation positions; they seek only to show the inconsistencies between the Patent
`
`Owner’s Response and its existing Final Infringement Contentions.
`
`C.
`
`Petitioners Cannot Generate Equivalent Information by Other
`Means
`
`
`
`This factor strongly favors Petitioners because ParkerVision will not make
`
`its Final Infringement Contentions available unless the Board grants this motion.
`
`Bestway (USA), Inc. v. Team Worldwide Corp., IPR2018-00859, Paper 67 (April 9,
`
`2019) at 8-9 (ordering production of “confidential expert reports and deposition
`
`transcripts” where “Petitioners could not obtain the information from other
`
`sources.”).
`
`D. The Request for ParkerVision’s Final Infringement Contentions
`Is Easily Understandable and Not Overly Burdensome
`
`
`
`The fourth and fifth Garmin factors also favor Petitioners, which seek only
`
`the ability to use in this IPR documents that are already in ParkerVision’s
`
`immediate possession.
`
`11
`
`

`

`
`IPR2021-00990
`Petitioners’ Motion for Routine and/or Additional Discovery
`
`III. CONCLUSION
`
`
`
`The Board should order ParkerVision to produce its Final Infringement
`
`Contentions from the TCL and Hisense WDTX litigations as “routine” and/or
`
`“additional” discovery. If the motion is granted, Petitioners are willing to submit
`
`the Final Infringement Contentions as sealed exhibits under a protective order.
`
`
`Dated: March 23, 2022
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`By: /s/ Kristopher L. Reed
`Kristopher L. Reed
`Reg. No. 58,694
`kreed@kilpatricktownsend.com
`Edward J. Mayle
`Reg. No. 65,444
`tmayle@kilpatricktownsend.com
`Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP
`1400 Wewatta St. Suite 600
`Denver, CO 80202
`
`Matias Ferrario
`Reg. No. 51,082
`mferrario@kilpatricktownsend.com
`Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP
`1001 West Fourth Street
`Winston-Salem, NC 27101-2400
`
`Counsel for Petitioners
`
`
`
`12
`
`

`

`
`IPR2021-00990
`Petitioners’ Motion for Routine and/or Additional Discovery
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`
`
`The undersigned certifies that a copy of the this paper was served on March
`
`23, 2022, via electronic mail to counsel for Patent Owner:
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Dated: March 23, 2021
`
`
`
`
`
`Ron Daignault
`rdaignault@daignaultiyer.com
`Jason Charkow
`jcharkow@daignaultiyer.com
`Chandran Iyer
`cbiyer@daignaultiyer.com
`Stephanie Mandir
`smandir@daignaultiyer.com
`
`
`
`
`By: /s/ Edward J. Mayle
`Edward J. Mayle
`Reg. No. 65,444
`
`Counsel for Petitioners
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`13
`
`

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