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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`__________________
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`__________________________________________________________________
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`GOOGLE LLC,
`Petitioner,
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`v.
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`RFCYBER CORP.,
`Patent Owner.
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`Patent No. 9,189,787
`Filing Date: May 28, 2013
`Issue Date: November 7, 2015
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`
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`Inventors: Liang Seng Koh, Futong Cho, Hsin Pan, and Fuliang Cho
`Title: METHOD AND APPARATUS FOR CONDUCTING
`E-COMMENCE AND M-COMMENCE
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`
`__________________________________________________________________
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`PATENT OWNER’S SURREPLY
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`Case No. IPR2021-00955
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`__________________________________________________________________
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`INTRODUCTION
`Google’s Reply does not identify any developments in the District Court
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`IPR2021-00955
`PATENT NO. 9,189,787
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`I.
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`Litigation that would tilt the Fintiv analysis towards institution. In a case like this one,
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`where the nearly all substantive work will be complete before the Board’s Institution
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`Decision, Google’s belated stipulation is not enough to justify institution.
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`II. THE DISTRICT COURT’S TRIAL DATE IS EIGHT MONTHS
`BEFORE THE PROJECTED STATUTORY DEADLINE FOR A
`FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
`As noted in Patent Owner’s POPR, the District Court in the Texas Action has
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`scheduled trial for March 2022. POPR at 20-21. The projected statutory deadline for
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`this proceeding is in November 2022, eight months later. Id. This factor thus weighs
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`heavily in favor of discretionary denial. E.g., Google LLC v. Ecofactor, Inc., IPR2021-
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`00488, Paper No. 12, at 11-12 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 11, 2021) (“Ecofactor”) (trial date six
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`months ahead of Final Written Decision deadline weighed in favor of denying
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`institution).
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`Google’s only response is to speculate, again, that the case may be transferred
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`or stayed pending resolution of Google’s motion to transfer. Reply at 4-5. The Court
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`is unlikely to grant Google’s motion; indeed, Judge Gilstrap has denied Google’s
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`motion to transfer in at least one other case concerning the same accused products at
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`issue in the parallel litigation between the parties in this proceeding. See Personalized
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`Media Commc’ns, LLC v. Google LLC, 2:19-cv-00090-JRG, Dkt. No. 291 (E.D. Tex.
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`1
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`Jul. 30, 2020). Google does not offer any explanation as to why the District Court
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`IPR2021-00955
`PATENT NO. 9,189,787
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`would reach a different result here. In any event, the Board considers “trial dates that
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`have been set in parallel litigations,” and speculative delays are not relevant to this
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`factor. E.g., Ecofactor, IPR2021-00488, Paper No. 12, at 11-12 (finding factor
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`weighed in favor of discretionary denial and noting “Because the trial in the District
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`Court proceeding is scheduled more than six months before the due date for the Final
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`Written Decision, even if there are some delays, the District Court proceeding is likely
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`to result in a trial verdict in advance of our statutory due date.”).
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`III. THE PARTIES HAVE INVESTED HEAVILY IN THE DISTRICT
`COURT PROCEEDINGS AND WILL HAVE INVESTED EVEN
`MORE BY THE INSTITUTION DECISION
`Google argues that this factor weighs against denial because, in Google’s view,
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`little work will have been completed relating to validity. Reply at 2-4. Google is
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`wrong.
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`The parties have already invested heavily in validity issues. As discussed in the
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`POPR, the parties have invested heavily in claim construction issues and discovery,
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`including discovery related to validity. POPR at 21-22.
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`Moreover, by the time of the Board’s Institution Decision, the parties and the
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`District Court will have invested far more. Fact discovery will be complete, and expert
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`discovery will be nearly so. Id. The parties will have served both opening and rebuttal
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`expert reports on validity and infringement and will be in the midst of expert
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`2
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`depositions and preparing dispositive motions. Id. In similar circumstances, the Board
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`IPR2021-00955
`PATENT NO. 9,189,787
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`has held that this factor strongly favors denying institution. E.g., Cisco Sys., Inc. v.
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`Estech Sys., Inc., IPR2021-00333, Paper No. 12 at 10-11 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 7, 2021).
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`Google’s cited cases dealt with far different situations. In Huawei Techs. Co.,
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`v. WSOU Invs., LLC, the Board found this factor to weigh in favor of institution when
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`fact discovery and expert discovery would not be complete until four and six months
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`after the institution decision, respectively. IPR2021-00229, Paper 10 at 11-13
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`(P.T.A.B. Jul. 1, 2021). Similarly, in Apple, Inc. v. Koss Corp., at the time of the
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`institution decision, “fact discovery ha[d] just begun, final infringement and invalidity
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`contentions are not yet due, and expert discovery is months away.” IPR2021-00381,
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`Paper No. 15 at 16-17 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 2, 2021). Finally, in Sand, the Board again noted
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`that “fact discovery is still ongoing, expert reports are not yet due, and substantive
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`motion practice is yet to come.” Sand Revolution II, LLC v. Cont’l Intermodal Group-
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`Trucking LLC, IPR2019-001393, Paper No. 24 at 10-11 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 16, 2020).
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`Even then, the Board did not find that this factor weighed against denying institution.
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`Id. at 11.
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`Google also suggests that it was diligent in filing its Petition roughly nine
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`months after it was served with the complaint in the District Court Litigation because
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`it filed the Petition one week after being served with RFCyber’s infringement
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`contentions. Reply at 4. But the Petition does not even challenge every asserted claim
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`3
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`of the ’787 Patent (POPR at 23); this is not a situation where Google carefully chose
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`IPR2021-00955
`PATENT NO. 9,189,787
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`which claims to challenge based on infringement contentions. Google’s alleged
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`diligence is thus of little weight.
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`Accordingly, this factor weighs strongly in favor of denying institution.
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`IV. GOOGLE’S BELATED STIPULATION DOES NOT JUSTIFY
`INSTITUTION
`Google submitted a stipulation with its Reply. Google does not explain why it
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`did not provide a stipulation with its Petition. In any event, Google’s stipulation does
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`not justify ignoring the Fintiv factors and instituting trial on this Petition.
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`As discussed above, all other factors weigh in favor of denying institution. In
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`similar circumstances, where trial is long before the Final Written Decision date and
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`the parties will have completed or nearly completed discovery at institution, the Board
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`has denied institution. E.g., Cisco, IPR2021-00333, Paper No. 12 at 12-13.
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`Accordingly, the Board should disregard Google’s stipulation and deny institution.
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`V. ALL OTHER FACTORS FAVOR DENYING INSTITUTION
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`Google makes no argument in its Reply as to Fintiv Factor 1 (evidence that a
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`stay will be granted) and Factor 5 (that Petitioner is the Defendant in the District Court
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`Litigation). Accordingly, as explained in the POPR, these factors weigh in favor of
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`denying institution.
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`Factor 6 (other circumstances) also weighs in favor of denying institution.
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`4
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`Google argues that the public is best served by determining validity as soon as possible
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`IPR2021-00955
`PATENT NO. 9,189,787
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`because “RFCyber separately asserted the same patent against three additional
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`defendants over the course of a year.” Reply at 5. Other proceedings are not relevant
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`to the Fintiv factors, which consider “all relevant circumstances of the case.” Apple
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`Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2019-00019, Paper No. 11 at 5 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 20, 2020)
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`(precedential) (emphasis added). Unrelated proceedings against other defendants are
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`not circumstances of this case.
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`In any event, the quickest path to a determination of validity is through the
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`District Court trial, which will conclude eight months before the Final Written Decision
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`date in this proceeding. Google does not explain how the Board’s November 2022
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`decision would be more efficient than the District Court’s March 2022 decision on the
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`same issues.
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`Google does not address the POPR’s discussion of this factor. POPR at 24.
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`Accordingly, Factor 6 weighs in favor of denying institution.
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`VI. CONCLUSION
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`For the reasons discussed above and in the POPR, the Board should deny
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`institution.
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`Dated: September 22, 2021
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`/Vincent J. Rubino, III /
`Vincent J. Rubino, III (Reg. No. 68,594)
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`5
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`A copy of RFCYBER CORP.’S SURREPLY has been served on Petitioner’s
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`IPR2021-00955
`PATENT NO. 9,189,787
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`counsel of record as follows:
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`Andrew S. Ehmke
`Email: andy.ehmke.ipr@haynesboone.com
`Michael S. Parsons
`Email: michael.parsons.ipr@haynesboone.com
`Vinu Raj
`Email: vinu.raj.ipr@haynesboone.com
`Scott T. Jarratt
`Email: scott.jarratt.ipr@haynesboone.com
`Jonathan R. Bowser
`Email: jon.bowser.ipr@haynesboone.com
`Stephanie Sivinski
`Email: stephanie.sivinski.ipr@haynesboone.com
`HAYNES AND BOONE, LLP
`2323 Victory Avenue, Suite 700
`Dallas, Texas 75219
`
`Attorneys for Google LLC
`
`
`September 22, 2021
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`
`
`By:
`
`/Vincent J. Rubino, III /
`Vincent J. Rubino, III (Reg. No. 68,594)
`FABRICANT LLP
`411 Theodore Fremd Avenue, Suite 206 South
`Rye, New York 10580
`Tel. 212-257-5797
`Fax. 212-257-5796
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