`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS INC., CELLTRION, INC., and
`APOTEX, INC.,
`Petitioners,
`
`v.
`
`REGENERON PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`
`
`
`Inter Partes Review No.: IPR2021-008811
`
`
`U.S. Patent No. 9,254,338 B2
`Filed: July 12, 2013
`Issued: February 9, 2016
`Inventor: George D. Yancopoulos
`
`Title: USE OF A VEGF ANTAGONIST TO TREAT
`ANGIOGENIC EYE DISORDERS
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`
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`
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`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S
`MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE
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`
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`1 IPR2022-00258 and IPR2022-00298 have been joined with this proceeding.
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`
`
`I.
`II.
`III.
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`INTRODUCTION. .......................................................................................... 1
`LEGAL STANDARD. .................................................................................... 1
`PO’S MOTION IS PROCEDURALLY DEFICIENT. ................................... 1
`A.
`PO Has Not Made Timely Objections to Evidence. ............................. 1
`B.
`PO’s Motion Is an Unauthorized (and Previously-Denied)
`Motion To Strike. .................................................................................. 3
`IV. PETITIONER’S REPLY PROPERLY RESPONDS TO PO’S RESPONSE
`ARGUMENTS. ............................................................................................... 5
`PO HAS NOT MADE A SUFFICIENT CASE FOR EXCLUSION OF
`UNCITED EXHIBITS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY. ................................. 7
`VI. EXHIBITS 1154 AND 1173 ARE RELEVANT AND ADMISSIBLE. ........ 9
`VII. APPENDIX A TO THE ALBINI REPLY DECLARATION IS
`ADMISSIBLE. .............................................................................................. 11
`VIII. CONCLUSION. ............................................................................................. 12
`
`
`
`V.
`
`i
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`
`
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`
`ABB Inc. v. Roy-G-Biv Corp.,
`IPR2013-00062 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 11, 2014) .........................................................3, 4
`Aisin Seiki Co. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC,
`IPR2017-01539 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 12, 2018) ............................................................. 6
`Apple Inc. v. Achates Reference Publ’g, Inc.,
`IPR2013-00080 (P.T.A.B. June 2, 2014) ............................................................... 2
`Apple v. Andrea Elecs. Corp.,
`949 F.3d 697 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ................................................................................ 6
`Avaya Inc. v. Network-1 Sec. Sols., Inc.,
`IPR2013-00071 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 2, 2013) ............................................................... 2
`Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC,
`805 F.3d 1064 (Fed. Circ. 2015) ........................................................................4, 6
`Google Inc. v. Visual Real Estate, Inc.,
`IPR2014-01340 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 25, 2016).............................................................. 4
`Idemitsu Kosan Co. v. SFC Co.,
`870 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2017) .............................................................................. 7
`Invue Sec. Prods., Inc. v. Merch. Techs., Inc.,
`IPR2013-00122 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 10, 2013) .............................................................. 5
`K-40 Elecs., LLC v. Escort, Inc.,
`IPR2013-00203 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 27, 2014) ............................................................. 2
`Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co.,
`CBM2012-00002 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 23, 2014) ........................................................... 1
`Oxford Nanopore Techs. Ltd. v. Univ. of Washington,
`IPR2014-00513 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 26, 2016)............................................................ 11
`Peabody Coal Co. v. McCandless,
`255 F.3d 465 (7th Cir. 2001) .................................................................................. 8
`
`ii
`
`
`
`
`
`Puzhen Life USA, LLC, v. Esip Series 2, LLC,
`IPR2017-02197(P.T.A.B. Feb. 27, 2019) ..........................................................4, 5
`Square Inc. v. 4361423 Canada Inc.,
`IPR2019-01649 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 22, 2021) ............................................................. 8
`Twitter, Inc. v. Vidstream, LLC,
`IPR2017-00829 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 28, 2019) .............................................................. 4
`Regulations
`37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c) ................................................................................................... 1
`37 C.F.R. § 42.62(a) ................................................................................................... 1
`37 C.F.R. § 42.64 .............................................................................................. 1, 2, 3
`37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(1) .............................................................................................. 2
`37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(2) ..........................................................................................2, 3
`37 C.F.R. § 42.64(c) ................................................................................................... 7
`37 C.F.R. §42.6(a)(3) ............................................................................................... 12
`
`
`
`iii
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`
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`I.
`
`Introduction.
`Patent Owner (“PO”) has moved for the “extraordinary relief” that the Board
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`exclude Petitioner’s Reply arguments and evidence. (See Paper 83). But, PO has not
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`carried its burden to establish that any portion of Petitioner’s Reply, nor any of its
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`evidence, should be excluded. Denial of PO’s Motion is warranted for the following
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`reasons.
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`II. Legal Standard.
`Exclusion “is an exceptional remedy that the Board expects will be granted
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`rarely.” (Consolidated Trial Practice Guide Update (Nov. 2019) (“TPG”), 80). The
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`party moving to exclude evidence bears the burden of proof to establish that it is
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`entitled to the relief requested—namely, that the objected-to material is inadmissible
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`under the Federal Rules of Evidence. 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.20(c), 42.62(a). The Board
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`has emphasized that “[t]here is a strong public policy for making all information
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`filed in a non-jury, quasi-judicial administrative proceeding available to the public,
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`especially in an [IPR] which determines the patentability of claim[s] in an issued
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`patent.” Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., CBM2012-00002, Paper
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`66, 60 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 23, 2014).
`
`III. PO’s Motion Is Procedurally Deficient.
`PO Has Not Made Timely Objections to Evidence.
`PO’s Motion does not comply with the procedural requirements of 37 C.F.R.
`
`A.
`
`§ 42.64. As a threshold matter, PO seeks exclusion of Petitioner’s Reply, (see Mot.,
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`1
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`
`
`
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`13-14), but Rule 42.64 pertains to evidence, not pleadings.
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`Additionally, PO failed to provide the required notice via objections to
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`evidence, contrary to the Rule, thus depriving Petitioner of any potential remedial
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`measures provided by 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(2). “A party wishing to challenge the
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`admissibility of evidence other than deposition evidence, must file any objections
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`within five business days of service of evidence to which the objection is directed.”
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`(TPG, 78-79 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(1))). PO’s failure to lodge such objections
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`in the record warrants denial. See K-40 Elecs., LLC v. Escort, Inc., IPR2013-00203,
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`Paper 46, 4-5 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 27, 2014) (denying motion to exclude “[i]n view of
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`[PO’s] failure to comport with the requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 42.64 [i.e., timely
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`object]”); Apple Inc. v. Achates Reference Publ’g, Inc., IPR2013-00080, Paper 90,
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`49, 52 (P.T.A.B. June 2, 2014) (denying a motion to exclude for failure to allege that
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`an objection was timely served).
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`Regarding the Reply, PO fails to point to a single objection on the record to
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`support its Motion. Nor can it. PO did not object to the admissibility of Petitioner’s
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`Reply in its Objections (Paper 68), and certainly did not “identify the grounds for
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`the objection with sufficient particularity to allow correction in the form of
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`supplemental evidence.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(1); see also Avaya Inc. v. Network-1
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`Sec. Sols., Inc., IPR2013-00071, Paper 75, 4 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 2, 2013) (exclusion
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`motions “must identify specifically each piece of evidence sought to be excluded,
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`2
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`
`
`
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`identify where in the record the evidence was relied upon by the opposing party,
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`identify where in the record the corresponding objection was made, and explain the
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`objection” (interpreting Rule 42.64)); ABB Inc. v. Roy-G-Biv Corp., IPR2013-
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`00062, Paper 84, 27 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 11, 2014) (dismissing motion to exclude; “[PO]
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`does not identify where in the record an objection originally was made”). By failing
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`to file objections, PO denied Petitioner the ten days provided by the Rules for curing
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`any alleged deficiencies in the evidence. 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(2). Also, despite PO’s
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`suggestion otherwise, (Mot., 1), PO’s June 3, 2022 communication with the Board
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`does not satisfy PO’s obligations under 37 C.F.R. § 42.64. Rule 42.64 is explicit in
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`its instructions as to how a party must preserve admissibility objections; the rules do
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`not provide that a party may preserve its admissibility objections via unfiled email
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`correspondence to the Board.2
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`B.
`
`PO’s Motion Is an Unauthorized (and Previously-Denied) Motion
`To Strike.
`PO’s Motion (Section II(A)) is premised entirely on the argument that the
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`Reply raises “new” arguments. But, a motion to exclude is not the proper vehicle for
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`2 PO’s current Motion seeks broader relief than PO’s June 3 communication to the
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`Board. (Compare 6-3-22 D. Caine email to PTAB (objecting only to page 29 of the
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`Reply), with Mot., 13 (seeking exclusion of page 22 of the Reply)). For this reason
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`alone, PO’s motion to exclude “Paper 61 at 22 (lines 4 and 5)” must fail.
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`3
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`
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`
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`PO’s argument, per the Board’s rules. (TPG, 79 (“Nor should a motion to exclude
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`address arguments or evidence that a party believes exceeds the proper scope of reply
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`or sur-reply.”)). Indeed, the PTAB has repeatedly held that a motion to exclude is
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`not the appropriate vehicle for consideration of whether a party has improperly
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`raised new arguments.3 See Twitter, Inc. v. Vidstream, LLC, IPR2017-00829, Paper
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`68, 47-48 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 28, 2019) (“timeliness arguments are not properly the
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`subject of a motion to exclude, which should seek to exclude evidence as
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`inadmissible, but rather should have been filed as a motion to strike because they
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`seek to exclude belatedly presented evidence that [PO] contends exceeds the proper
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`scope of reply”); Puzhen Life USA, LLC, v. Esip Series 2, LLC, IPR2017-02197,
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`Paper 24, 48, 51 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 27, 2019) (denying PO’s motion to exclude and
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`noting that the proper procedure would have been to request authorization to file a
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`motion to strike); Google Inc. v. Visual Real Estate, Inc., IPR2014-01340, Paper 38
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`(P.T.A.B. Feb. 25, 2016) (denying PO’s motion to exclude because a “motion to
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`exclude is not a proper vehicle for a party to raise the issue of testimony in a rebuttal
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`declaration exceeding the permissible scope of reply testimony”); Belden Inc. v.
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`Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1082 (Fed. Circ. 2015); ABB, IPR2013-00062, Paper
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`84, 27.
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`3 PO, as it must, acknowledges this fact. (Mot., 3 n.3)
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`4
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`
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`Although presented under the guise of a “Motion to Exclude,” PO’s July 20,
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`2022 submission is an unauthorized de facto motion to strike. The Board has already
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`considered, and denied, PO’s earlier request for authorization to move to strike. (See
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`6-7-22 PTAB email order (“The Board also denies Patent Owner’s request to file a
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`motion to strike in either of the proceedings.”)).4 Thus, PO’s efforts to end-run the
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`Board’s prior denial of its motion to strike request should not be tolerated, and its
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`unauthorized Motion warrants expungement. See Invue Sec. Prods., Inc. v. Merch.
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`Techs., Inc., IPR2013-00122, Paper 27 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 10, 2013) (party’s filing of an
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`unauthorized motion warranted expungement of that motion); Puzhen, IPR2017-
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`02197, Paper 24, 49 (declining to treat a motion to exclude as a motion to strike
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`because PO did not request authorization).
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`IV. Petitioner’s Reply Properly Responds to PO’s Response Arguments.
`In its Reply, Petitioner “merely responded to [PO’s] arguments, as it was
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`entitled to do.” Aisin Seiki Co. v. Intell. Ventures II LLC, IPR2017-01539, Paper 43,
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`4 In its June 7 Order, the Board directed PO to “file, with its Sur-Reply, a table
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`identifying any portion of the Reply that [PO] considers to have exceeded the scope
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`of the Reply. Alternatively, [PO] may simply address those contentions, or the merits
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`of any newly-raised arguments or evidence in its Sur-Reply.” (6-7-22 PTAB email).
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`Notwithstanding the Board’s offer, PO chose not to submit a table.
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`5
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`
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`69-70 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 12, 2018) (denying PO’s motion to strike after determining
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`that the Reply was “directly responsive to [PO’s] arguments raised in its Response”);
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`Belden, 805 F.3d at 1082. As shown below, the Reply arguments and evidence are
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`not “impermissible new matter,” and refusal to consider them would be legal error.
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`Apple v. Andrea Elecs. Corp., 949 F.3d 697, 706 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (holding that the
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`Board erred in refusing to consider petitioner’s reply arguments and evidence where
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`the Board had “pars[ed] [Petitioner’s] arguments on reply with too fine a filter”).
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`Notably, PO does not allege that it has been denied a meaningful opportunity to
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`respond to the purportedly “new” reply arguments or evidence. The Federal Circuit
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`has affirmed the Board in denying a motion to exclude where the appellant had
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`means to address the evidence substantively, as was the case here. See Belden, 805
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`F.3d at 1082. As in Belden, PO has had sufficient opportunity through cross-
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`examination and sur-reply briefing to address the Reply arguments and evidence;
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`thus, PO’s Motion should be denied.
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`PO argues that Petitioner’s Reply argument that “VEGF Trap-Eye was
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`publicly distributed” improperly “expand[s] its Grounds 1 and 3-5 anticipation
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`theories beyond those set forth in its Petition” because “Petitioner could have
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`presented [it] earlier.” (Mot., 2, 5; see also id., 3-4). But, Petitioner could not, in fact,
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`have made this argument earlier, because this argument was not relevant until PO
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`injected the issue of VEGF Trap-Eye’s public availability into the case via its PO
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`6
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`
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`Response and its reliance on a non-public confidential research agreement
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`(Ex.2096). (See Paper 40, 24-25 & n.11; Ex.2050, ¶¶70-72 (citing Ex.2096, PO’s
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`confidential clinical study agreement); Paper 73, 18 (citing POR to support argument
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`that VEGF Trap-Eye was not in the public domain)). Indeed, Petitioner could not
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`have predicted at the time of the Petition the existence of the non-public
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`confidentiality agreement relied upon by PO to try to distinguish the claims from the
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`prior art. Petitioner is thus entitled to counter. See Idemitsu Kosan Co. v. SFC Co.,
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`870 F.3d 1376, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (rejecting PO’s “new argument” argument
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`since “[Petitioner] simply countered, as it was entitled to do”).
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`V.
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`PO Has Not Made a Sufficient Case for Exclusion of Uncited Exhibits and
`Expert Testimony.
`PO moves for exclusion of Petitioner’s exhibits and expert declaration
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`testimony on the basis that they are “not cited in the pleadings,” and thus
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`“irrelevant.” (Mot., 6-7, 13).5 Consistent with the PTAB’s general preference for
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`inclusion, and because PO has failed to meet its burden of proving this evidence is
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`in any way prejudicial,6 PO’s Motion must be denied. Where necessary,
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`5 PO’s conclusory assertion in footnote 6 regarding the admissibility of Exs.1118,
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`1121, and 1124 under FRE 802, 901, and/or 1006, fails to “explain the objections”
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`as required by 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(c), thus warranting denial.
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`6 By contrast, Petitioner explained in its Motion to Exclude that PO’s uncited
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`7
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`
`
`
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`administrative agencies further relax the rules of evidence to account for the skill
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`possessed by administrative judges to handle evidence that may otherwise mislead
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`a jury. See Peabody Coal Co. v. McCandless, 255 F.3d 465, 469 (7th Cir. 2001).
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`As an initial matter, PO’s contention that paragraphs 17 and 70 of the
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`Gerritsen Declaration (Ex.1003) and paragraph 86 of the Albini Reply Declaration
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`(Ex.1114) is “[u]ncited expert declaration testimony,” (Mot., 13), is misleading.
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`These passages are cited by other experts. (See Ex.1115, ¶86 n.3 (citing Ex.1003,
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`¶17); Ex.1137, ¶63 n.75 (citing Ex.1003, ¶70); Ex.1137 ¶77 nn.106 & 108 (citing
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`Ex.1114, ¶86)).
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`Furthermore, the identified exhibits and expert testimony are a matter of
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`public record, and the Board may have its own reasons for wanting to consult any of
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`these exhibits or take public notice of them. PO has provided no legitimate
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`justification for excluding this evidence altogether at this time. Thus, rather than the
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`exceptional remedy of complete exclusion, the Board can, in its discretion, assign
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`weight to the evidence as appropriate, as it has done in prior IPRs. See, e.g., Square
`
`Inc. v. 4361423 Canada Inc., IPR2019-01649, Paper 43, 33 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 22,
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`2021).
`
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`exhibits are unfairly prejudicial, in addition to being irrelevant. (Paper 82, 5, 8).
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`8
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`
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`VI. Exhibits 1154 and 1173 Are Relevant and Admissible.
`PO’s motion to exclude Exhibits 1154 and 1173, and Petitioner’s and its
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`expert’s arguments that rely upon them (i.e., Paper 61, 37; Ex.1137, ¶¶85-89 &
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`nn.134-39), should be denied. The objected-to exhibits consist of complaints filed
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`by the USDOJ and Horizon Healthcare Services, Inc. against PO regarding an
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`allegedly illegal kickback scheme concerning Eylea. (See Exs.1154; 1173).
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`Neither of these exhibits are “hearsay” under FRE 801(c). Critically,
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`Petitioner does not offer these exhibits for the truth of the allegations therein (i.e., to
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`show that PO violated the federal Anti-Kickback statute). (See Paper 61, 37 (Dr.
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`Manning’s lack of awareness that the kickbacks “’subsidize[d] Eylea’s high price
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`for Medicare patients’ to generate over $1.6B in Eylea sales…undermines
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`commercial success”)). Instead, Petitioner offers this evidence to undermine the
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`credibility of PO’s commercial success expert, Dr. Manning, who admittedly did not
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`address (or, by his own admission, even consider) any impact of PO’s payments to
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`the Chronic Disease Fund (“CDF”). (Id.; Ex.1151, 152:13-25). In addition to Dr.
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`Manning’s failure to consider the impact of CDF payments, the prepared-for-
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`litigation financial documents that purportedly support Eylea’s commercial success7
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`do not reflect the CDF payments, as Dr. Manning conceded at deposition. (Ex.1151,
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`173:5-13, 178:22-183:7, 183:14-184:11, 199:4-200:19). Consequently, Exhibits
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`7 See Exs.2169-70, 2285, and Ex.2052 at Attachments D1-D4 and D7.
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`9
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`
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`1154 and 1173 bear on the credibility of Dr. Manning’s commercial success opinions
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`and this evidence should not be excluded. Additionally, PO’s suggestion that
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`Exhibits 1154 and 1173 are “unsworn attorney argument” is inaccurate. (Mot., 9).
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`Both Exhibits 1154 and 1173 include numerous complaint exhibits consisting of
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`PO’s own emails, presentations, projections, and webpage excerpts. (See Ex.1154,
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`40-232; Ex.1173, 45-190). Such statements fall within the party-opponent statement
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`exception to the hearsay rule, and are admissible against PO. FRE 801(d)(2).
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`Finally, contrary to PO’s assertions, (Mot., 8-10), Exhibits 1154 and 1173 are
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`directly relevant to rebutting PO’s and its expert’s contentions that: PO’s rebate and
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`discount programs for Eylea were limited and “unlikely to have been a key factor
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`driving Eylea’s commercial success,” (Ex.2052, ¶¶112-13); Eylea’s market share
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`performance is “a strong indication of the product’s commercial success,” (id., ¶85);
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`and “Eylea’s commercial success is not attributable to Regeneron’s donation to the
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`[CDF] for co-pay assistance,” (Paper 73, 37). Any payments made by PO to a co-
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`pay foundation that reduced (or eliminated) Medicare patient co-pays and
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`deductibles directly bears on PO’s commercial success arguments. As to prejudice,
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`the Board has previously stated that the danger of prejudice in an IPR proceeding is
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`considerably lower than before a jury in a district court proceeding, because the
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`Board has significant experience in evaluating expert testimony. Oxford Nanopore
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`10
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`
`
`
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`Techs. Ltd. v. Univ. of Washington, IPR2014-00513, Paper 51, 55 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 26,
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`2016).
`
`VII. Appendix A to the Albini Reply Declaration is Admissible.
`PO has not met its burden of establishing that Albini Appendix A should be
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`excluded. (Mot., 11-13). Appendix A consists of excerpts of the deposition transcript
`
`of Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Albini, and was prepared in direct response to PO’s
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`arguments in its Response. (Ex.1114, ¶9 (“I prepared Appendix A…which presents
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`a side-by-side comparison of PO’s arguments that they purportedly cite me as
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`support against my actual opinions and testimony.”)).
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`PO’s reliance on a district court decision, Orchestrate HR, does not support
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`exclusion of evidence in an IPR. (See Mot., 12 (citing 2017 WL 273669 (N.D. Tex.
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`Jan. 20, 2017))). Unlike depositions in district court litigation, which primarily serve
`
`a fact-gathering purpose, deposition testimony taken in an IPR is actual admitted
`
`testimony, and often the only testimonial evidence the Board will have. Also, as PO
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`acknowledges, the entirety of Dr. Albini’s deposition transcript is of record in this
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`proceeding (Ex.2287), and thus there is no legitimate concern that “the Appendix
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`does not fairly reproduce the entirety of Dr. Albini’s deposition testimony.” (Mot.,
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`13). A motion to exclude is not the proper paper for addressing the substantive issue
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`of whether Dr. Albini’s quoted testimony was taken out of context. (See TPG, 79
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`(“A motion to exclude is not a vehicle for addressing the weight to be given
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`11
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`
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`
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`evidence—arguments regarding weight should appear only
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`in
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`the merits
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`documents.”)). PO had the opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Albini regarding
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`Appendix A, which it did, (see Ex.2287, 244:9-256:2), and PO should have
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`presented its merit-based arguments regarding Appendix A in its Sur-Reply.
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`Additionally, PO’s incorporation-by-reference argument appears to be
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`premised on a misunderstanding of 37 C.F.R. §42.6(a)(3), which prohibits the
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`incorporation of arguments from one document into another document. Appendix A
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`consists only of excerpts of Paper 38 (POR) and Exhibit 2130 (Albini Tr.), without
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`any argument or expert commentary. Thus, Petitioner is not improperly
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`incorporating arguments from Appendix A into another document. Nor does
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`Appendix A “attempt to circumvent the Board’s word count rules,” (Mot., 11-13),
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`as expert declarations are not subject to word count restrictions.
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`VIII. Conclusion.
`For the above-stated reasons, PO’s Motion fails to justify why PO is entitled
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`to “an exceptional remedy that the Board expects will be granted rarely.” (TPG, 80).
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`Although presented under the guise of a “Motion to Exclude,” PO’s submission
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`merely repackages PO’s motion to strike argument that the Board has already
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`considered (and rejected)—i.e., that the Reply exceeds the scope of the instituted
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`grounds. PO’s attempt to get a second bite at the motion-to-strike-apple is improper
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`12
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`and ignores the Board’s June 7 Order.
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`Dated: July 27, 2022
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`Respectfully Submitted,
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`RAKOCZY MOLINO MAZZOCHI SIWIK LLP
`
`/Paul J. Molino/
`Paul J. Molino
`Registration No. 45,350
`6 West Hubbard Street
`Chicago, IL 60654
`Telephone:
`(312) 222-6300
`Facsimile:
`(312) 843-6260
`paul@rmmslegal.com
`
`
`Counsel for Petitioner
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`13
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
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`Petitioner’s Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Evidence was served
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`on July 27, 2022, via electronic mail by agreement of the parties, to the following
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`counsel for record of Patent Owners:
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`Alice S. Ho (Lim. Rec. No. L1162)
`Victoria Reines
`Jeremy Cobb
`Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP
`601 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
`Washington D.C. 20001
`Tel: 202.942.5000
`Fax: 202.942.5999
`Alice.Ho@arnoldporter.com
`Victoria.Reines@arnoldporter.com
`Jeremy.Cobb@arnoldporter.com
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`Deborah E. Fishman (Reg. No. 48,621)
`David A. Caine (Reg. No. 52,683)
`Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP
`3000 El Camino Real
`Five Palo Alto Square, Suite 500
`Palo Alto, California 94306-3807
`Telephone: 650.319.4519
`Telephone: 650.319.4710
`Facsimile: 650.319.4573
`Deborah.Fishman@arnoldporter.com
`David.Caine@arnoldporter.com
`RegeneronEyleaIPRs@arnoldporter.com
`
`Daniel Reisner
`Matthew M. Wilk
`Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP
`250 West 55th Street
`New York, New York 10019-9710
`Telephone: 212.836.8000
`Fax: 212.836.8689
`Daniel.Reisner@arnoldporter.com
`Matthew.Wilk@arnoldporter.com
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`/Paul J. Molino/
` Paul J. Molino (Reg. No. 45,350)
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`14
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