IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`WACO DIVISION
`
`BROADBAND iTV, INC.,
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`DISH NETWORK L.L.C.,
`Defendant.
`
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
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`6-19-CV-00716-ADA
`
`MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
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`Before the Court is Defendant DISH Network L.L.C.’s (“DISH”) motion to transfer
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`venue to the District of Colorado pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or alternatively to the Austin
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`Division of the Western District of Texas (“Motion to Transfer”). ECF No. 37. After careful
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`consideration of the parties’ briefs and the applicable law, the Court DENIES DISH’s Motion to
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`Transfer.
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`I. BACKGROUND
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`Plaintiff Broadband iTV, Inc. (“BBiTV”) filed this lawsuit on December 19, 2019,
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`alleging that DISH’s video on-demand (“VOD”) services using set-top-boxes and mobile apps
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`infringe U.S. Patent Nos. 9,648,388, 9,998,791, 10,028,026, and 10,506,269 (the “Asserted
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`Patents”). Pl.’s Compl., ECF No. 1. On May 7, 2020, DISH filed this motion to transfer venue
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`under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) requesting that this case be transferred to the District of Colorado or,
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`in the alternative, to the Austin Division of the Western District of Texas (“WDTX”). Def.’s
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`Mot., ECF No. 37. BBiTV filed a response opposing to DISH’s motion (ECF No. 42) and DISH
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`filed a reply (ECF No. 43).
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`1
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`BBiTV EX2043
`AT&T v. Broadband iTV
`IPR2021-00556
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`

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`BBiTV is a Delaware corporation headquartered in Honolulu, Hawaii. ECF No. 1 at 2.
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`DISH is established under the laws of the State of Colorado, with a principal place of business in
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`Englewood, Colorado. Pl.’s Compl., ECF No. 1 at 5 and Def.’s Answer, ECF No. 52, at 5.
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`II. LEGAL STANDARD
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`In patent cases, motions to transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) are governed by the law of
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`the regional circuit. In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 28 U.S.C.
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`§ 1404(a) provides that, “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, . . . a district court may
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`transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to
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`any district or division to which all parties have consented.” Id. “Section 1404(a) is intended to
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`place discretion in the district court to adjudicate motions for transfer according to an
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`‘individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness.’” Stewart Org., Inc. v.
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`Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988) (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964)).
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`The preliminary question under Section 1404(a) is whether a civil action “might have
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`been brought” in the transfer destination venue.” In re Volkswagen, Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 312 (5th
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`Cir. 2008) (hereinafter “Volkswagen II”). If the destination venue would have been a proper
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`venue, then “[t]he determination of ‘convenience’ turns on a number of public and private
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`interest factors, none of which can be said to be of dispositive weight.” Action Indus., Inc. v. U.S.
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`Fid. & Guar. Co., 358 F.3d 337, 340 (5th Cir. 2004). The private factors include: “(1) the
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`relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the availability of compulsory process to secure
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`the attendance of witnesses; (3) the cost of attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all other
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`practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” In re Volkswagen
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`AG, 371 F.3d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 2004) (hereinafter “Volkswagen I”) (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v.
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`Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6 (1982)). The public factors include: “(1) the administrative
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`difficulties flowing from court congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized interests
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`decided at home; (3) the familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case; and (4)
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`the avoidance of unnecessary problems of conflict of laws of the application of foreign law.” Id.
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`Courts evaluate these factors based on the situation which existed at the time of filing, rather
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`than relying on hindsight knowledge of the defendant’s forum preference. Hoffman v. Blaski, 363
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`U.S. 335, 343 (1960).
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`The burden to prove that a case should be transferred for convenience falls squarely on
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`the moving party. In re Vistaprint Ltd., 628 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The burden that a
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`movant must carry is not that the alternative venue is more convenient, but that it is clearly more
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`convenient. Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 314 n.10. Although the plaintiff’s choice of forum is not
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`a separate factor entitled to special weight, respect for the plaintiff’s choice of forum is
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`encompassed in the movant’s elevated burden to “clearly demonstrate” that the proposed
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`transferee forum is “clearly more convenient” than the forum in which the case was filed. In re
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`Vistaprint Ltd., 628 F.3d at 314–15. While “clearly more convenient” is not necessarily
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`equivalent to “clear and convincing,” the moving party “must show materially more than a mere
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`preponderance of convenience, lest the standard have no real or practical meaning.” Quest
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`NetTech Corp. v. Apple, Inc., No. 2:19-cv-118, 2019 WL 6344267, at *7 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 27,
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`2019).
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`III. ANALYSIS
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`The threshold determination in the Section 1404 analysis is whether this case could
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`initially have been brought in the destination venue—the District of Colorado. Neither party
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`contests that venue is proper in the District of Colorado and that this case could have been
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`3
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`brought there. Thus, the Court proceeds with its analysis of the private and public interest
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`factors.
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`A. The Private Interest Factors Weigh Against Transfer.
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`i. The Relative Ease of Access to Sources of Proof
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`“In considering the relative ease of access to proof, a court looks to where documentary
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`evidence, such as documents and physical evidence, is stored.” Fintiv Inc. v. Apple Inc., No.
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`6:18-cv-00372, 2019 WL 4743678, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2019). “[T]he question is relative
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`ease of access, not absolute ease of access.” In re Radmax, 720 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2013)
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`(emphases in original). “In patent infringement cases, the bulk of the relevant evidence usually
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`comes from the accused infringer. Consequently, the place where the defendant’s documents are
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`kept weighs in favor of transfer to that location.” In re Apple Inc., 979 F.3d 1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir.
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`2020) (citing In re Genentech, 566 F.3d at 1345).
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`1. Witnesses Are Not Sources of Proof
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`BBiTV argues in its response that DISH employs over 1,000 employees in its
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`remanufacturing and call center facilities in this District, and numerous of them can be sources of
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`proof. Pl.’s Resp., ECF No. 42 at 6. BBiTV also identifies several DISH employees and
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`contractors that are allegedly located in this District and “likely have pertinent knowledge.” Id. at
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`6–7. Additionally, BBiTV argues that a third-party company, Broadcom’s Systems on a Chip
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`(“SoCs”), “employs over 100 engineers at its Austin campus, and thus likely has relevant
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`information in this District.” Id. at 7.
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`This Court, in following Federal Circuit precedent, has made clear that witnesses are not
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`sources of proof to be analyzed under this factor; rather, the Court considers only documents and
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`physical evidence. Netlist, Inc. v. SK hynix Inc. et al, No. 6:20-cv-00194-ADA (W.D. Tex. Feb.
`
`
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`4
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`2, 2021) (“The first private factor, ease of access to sources of proof, considers ‘documents and
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`physical evidence’ as opposed to witnesses.”) (emphasis added); In re Apple Inc., 979 F.3d at
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`1339 (“[t]his factor relates to the ease of access to non-witness evidence, such as documents and
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`other physical evidence”); Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 315 (“All of the documents and physical
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`evidence relating to the accident are located in the Dallas Division”). Thus, any analysis
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`pertaining to witnesses is more appropriately assessed under the second or third private factor.
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`2. Electronic Documents Are Accessible with Relative Ease
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`DISH argues that bulk of its relevant source code, potentially relevant documentary
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`evidence concerning design and development, and non-technical documents, such as marketing
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`documents and financial records, are kept in the District of Colorado, and little if any relevant
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`documents are likely to be found in the Western District of Texas. Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 37 at 4.
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`Although the physical location of electronic documents does affect the outcome of this
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`factor under current Fifth Circuit precedent (see Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 316), this Court has
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`stressed that the focus on physical location of electronic documents is out of touch with modern
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`patent litigation. Fintiv, 2019 WL 4743678, at *8; Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Apple Inc., 6-19-CV-
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`00532-ADA, 2020 WL 3415880, at *9 (W.D. Tex. June 22, 2020) (“[A]ll (or nearly all)
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`produced documents exist as electronic documents on a party’s server. Then, with a click of a
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`mouse or a few keystrokes, the party [can] produce[] these documents” and make them available
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`at almost any location). Other courts in the Fifth Circuit similarly found that access to documents
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`that are available electronically provides little benefit in determining whether a particular venue
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`is more convenient than another. See Uniloc USA Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Am., No. 2:16-cv-642-
`
`JRG, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 229560, at *17 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2017) (“Despite the absence of
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`newer cases acknowledging that in today’s digital world computer stored documents are readily
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`5
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`moveable to almost anywhere at the click of a mouse, the Court finds it odd to ignore this reality
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`in favor of a fictional analysis that has more to do with early Xerox machines than modern server
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`forms.”).
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`DISH admits that its documents are stored electronically. ECF No. 38, Minnick Decl. 4-
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`5. DISH also does not argue that there are any non-electronic documents or it would be difficult
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`or burdensome to make such electronic documents available in this District.
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`Therefore, the Court finds that this factor is neutral.
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`ii. The Availability of Compulsory Process to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses
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`In this factor, the Court considers particularly non-party witnesses whose attendance may
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`need to be secured by a court order. Fintiv, 2019 WL 4743678, at *5 (citing Volkswagen II, 545
`
`F.3d at 316); Uniloc, 2020 WL 3415880, at *10. Under the Federal Rules, a court may subpoena
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`a witness to attend trial only (a) “within 100 miles of where the person resides, is employed, or
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`regularly transacts business in person”; or (b) “within the state where the person resides, is
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`employed, or regularly transacts business in person, if the person . . . is commanded to attend a
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`trial and would not incur substantial expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(1)(A), (B)(ii); Gemalto S.A.
`
`v. CPI Card Grp. Inc., No. 15-CA-0910, 2015 WL 10818740, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 16, 2015).
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`
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`DISH argues that the District of Colorado could compel the attendance of its two former
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`employees, while this Court cannot. Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 37 at 6. However, Dish fails to show
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`that either of the two former employees is unwilling to attend trial. When the movant has not
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`alleged or shown that any witnesses are unwilling to testify, this private interest carries far less
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`weight. Turner v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 6:19-cv-642-ADA-JCM, 2020 WL 210809, at *3
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`(W.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 2020)).
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`DISH also argues that there are several non-party prior art witnesses that reside in the
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`District of Colorado. Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 37 at 6. Specifically, DISH argues that some of these
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`prior art witnesses are likely trial witnesses because there is a priority date dispute and it is useful
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`for them to explain in person how a prior art system works. Id. at 7 and Def.’s Reply, ECF No.
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`43 at 3. The Court is unpersuaded for the following reasons.
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`First, DISH again fails to show that the identified prior artists are unwilling to testify.
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`Second, “[i]t is highly unlikely that prior art inventors will testify at trial, therefore, the weight
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`afforded their presence in the transfer analysis will be minimal.” East Tex. Boot Co., LLC v.
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`Nike, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-0290-JRG-RSP, 2017 WL 2859065, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2017);
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`CloudofChange, LLC v. NCR Corp., No. 6-19-cv-00513, Dkt. 28 at 7 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2020)
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`(citation omitted) (“[T]he Court notes that prior art witnesses are generally unlikely to testify at
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`trial . . ..”). Third, even if testimony from any of the prior art witnesses is necessary to resolve
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`the priority date dispute, a deposition will be sufficient. See, e.g., Virginia Innovation Scis., Inc.
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`v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 4:18-CV-474, 2019 WL 3082314, n. 24 (E.D. Tex. July 15, 2019) and
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`VirtualAgility, Inc. v. Salesforce.com, Inc., No.2:13-cv-00011-JRG, 2014 WL 459719, at *5
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`(E.D. Tex. Jan. 31, 2014). DISH fails to explain whether or how it would be inconvenienced by
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`presenting the prior art witnesses’ deposition testimony at trial. Fourth, while there is some
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`benefit to providing live witnesses at trial, the Fifth Circuit has observed that a videotaped
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`deposition “allows jurors to gauge the witness's attitude reflected by his motions, facial
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`expressions, demeanor and voice inflections.” Battle ex rel. Battle v. Mem'l Hosp. at Gulfport,
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`228 F.3d 544, 554 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1188 (5th Cir.
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`1982)). With remote witness testimony becoming a norm today, the Court is not convinced that
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`remote deposition or testimony at trial by any of the prior art witnesses would seriously
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`inconvenience DISH.
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`Finally, DISH argues that CableLabs, a Colorado-based nonprofit entity, is “likely to
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`have witnesses in Colorado” that can testify to important prior art. Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 37 at 8.
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`As BBiTV points out, DISH has not identified anyone at CableLabs who may hold relevant
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`information on this case or may be a potential witness. Pl.’s Resp., ECF No. 42 at 9. The Court
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`finds that this non-party entity does not have an effect on this factor. See MV3 Partners LLC v.
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`Roku, Inc., No. 6:18-cv-00308-ADA, Dkt. 74 at 6 (W.D. Tex. June 25, 2019).
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`
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`In view of the above, the Court finds this factor is neutral.
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`iii. The Cost of Attendance for Willing Witnesses
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` “Courts properly give more weight to the convenience of non-party witnesses than to
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`party witnesses.” Netlist, No. 6:20-cv-00194-ADA at 13; see Moskowitz Family LLC v. Globus
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`Med., Inc., No. 6:19-cv-00672-ADA, 2020 WL 4577710, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Jul. 2, 2020).
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`DISH contends that attending trial in the District of Colorado will be less burdensome for
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`its willing witnesses because members of DISH’s software design teams are based in Colorado.
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`Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 37 at 9. BBiTV contends that there are numerous DISH employees in this
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`District in its remanufacturing and call center facilities who are potential witnesses. Pl.’s Resp.,
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`ECF No. 42 at 11. BBiTV alleges that dozens of individuals in this District, purportedly working
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`for DISH based on their LinkedIn profiles, may possess relevant information to this case. Id. at 9.
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`However, LinkedIn profiles alone do not provide sufficient evidence that these individuals are
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`potential witnesses—they may contain inaccurate or outdated information that the Court cannot
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`verify.1 In addition, BBiTV fails to demonstrate that any of the DISH employees working in its
`
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`1 For example, DISH asserts in its reply brief that several individuals identified by BBiTV are not located in this
`District or have never worked for DISH. Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 43 at 1–2.
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`remanufacturing and call center facilities may possess software or hardware information relevant
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`to this case. Thus, the Court is not convinced that the individuals identified by BBiTV are
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`potential willing witnesses in this case.
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`Nonetheless, given typical time limits at trial, the Court does not assume that all of the
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`party and third-party witnesses listed in Section 1404(a) briefing will testify at trial. Fintiv, 2019
`
`WL 4743678, at *6. Rather, in addition to the party’s experts, the Court assumes that no more
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`than a few party witnesses—and even fewer third-party witnesses, if any—will testify live at
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`trial. Id. Therefore, long lists of potential party and third-party witnesses do not affect the Court’s
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`analysis for this factor. Id. Additionally, the “convenience of party witnesses is given little
`
`weight.” SynKloud Techs., LLC v. Dropbox, Inc., No. 6:19-cv-00525-ADA, 2020 WL 2494574,
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`at *4 (W.D. Tex. May 14, 2020).
`
`Although DISH also argues that a transfer to the District of Colorado would significantly
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`reduce the additional distance to be travelled by BBiTV witnesses, the Courts finds that the cost
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`of attendance for BBiTV witnesses is neutral. BBITV witnesses will have to travel more than
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`1,000 miles to attend trial regardless of the District, and the little cost difference, if there is any,
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`will again have minimal weight on this factor’s analysis. See SynKloud Techs., LLC v. Dropbox,
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`Inc., No. 6:19-cv-00525-ADA, 2020 WL 2494574, *5 (W.D. Tex. May 14, 2020).
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`Therefore, the Court finds that this factor is neutral or slightly favors transfer at the best.
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`iv. All Other Practical Problems That Make Trial of a Case Easy, Expeditious and
`Inexpensive
`
`When considering the private interest factors, courts must consider “all other practical
`
`problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d
`
`at 314. “Particularly, the existence of duplicative suits involving the same or similar issues may
`
`create practical difficulties that will weigh heavily in favor or against transfer.” PersonalWeb
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`9
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`Techs., LLC v. NEC Corp. of Am., Inc., No. 6:11-cv-655, 2013 WL 9600333, at *5 (E.D. Tex.
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`Mar. 21, 2013).
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`BBiTV has filed multiple lawsuits in this District involving at least three of the four
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`patents asserted in this case.2 The cases involve overlapping issues, such as claim construction,
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`invalidity, prior art, conception, and reduction to practice. This Court has recognized that
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`“judicial economy favors having the infringement of the same patent considered by one judge,”
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`SynKloud, 2020 WL 2494574, at *5. As this Court has recognized, “transfer of this case ‘would
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`lead to two separate cases in two separate Courts about the same claims in the same patents,
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`which would create a disruption in judicial economy, not to mention a possibility of obtaining
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`inconsistent rulings.’” STC.UNM v. Apple Inc., No. 6:19-cv-00428-ADA, Dkt. 59 at 12 (quoting
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`East Texas Boot Co., LLC v. Nike, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-0290-JRG-RSP, 2017 WL 2859065, at *6
`
`(E.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2017)).
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`Because parallel litigation concerning the same patents at issue is pending in this District,
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`this factor strongly weighs against transfer.
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`B. The Public Interest Factors Weigh Against Transfer.
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`i. Administrative Difficulties Flowing from Court Congestion
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`The relevant inquiry under this factor is actually “[t]he speed with which a case can come
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`to trial and be resolved[.]” In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2009). A faster
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`average time to trial means a more efficient and economical resolutions of the claims at issue.
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`DISH suggests that this factor is either neutral or weighs in favor of transfer because this Court
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`has seen a surge of new filings, while the entire District of Colorado had only 56 patent cases
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`filed in 2019. Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 37 at 13. However, DISH offers no evidence that this case
`
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`2 Broadband iTV, Inc. v. AT&T Services, Inc., AT&T Communications LLC, and DirecTV, Case No. 1:20-cv-00717-
`ADA (consolidated case). Three of the Asserted Patents (U.S. Patent Nos. 9,648,388, 9,998,791, 10,028,026) in this
`case are also asserted in the -717 case currently pending in this Court.
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`be resolved faster in the District of Colorado. Further, according to data provided by
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`DocketNavigator, the average time to trial in the District of Colorado for patent cases was over
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`40 months in 2019 (before the Covid-19 pandemic). Pl.’s Resp., ECF No. 42 at 12. By contrast,
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`in this Court’s Order Governing Proceedings, trial is anticipated to be held approximately 52
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`weeks after the Markman hearing. Thus, this Court’s default schedule would lead to a trial date
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`much sooner than the average time to trial in the District of Colorado.
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`DISH argues that “the scheduling impact of the current pandemic . . . is still unknown.”
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`Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 43 at 5. However, DISH has provided no evidence that the scheduling of
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`this case has been impacted by the Covid-19 pandemic. On the contrary, this Court held a
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`Markman hearing for this case on November 13, 2020 in the middle of the pandemic. Further,
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`this Court has demonstrated its capability of conducing in-person jury trials in a safe and
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`efficient manner in the COVID-19 pandemic. This Court held its first patent jury trial in October
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`2020, and has held three more in-person jury trials in the first quarter of 2021 already. Thus, this
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`Court is fully open and equipped to safely conduct jury trials in the COVID-19 pandemic.
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`Conversely, there is no evidence that the District of Colorado is fully open to this date or is
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`capable of safely holding in-person jury trials in the pandemic.3 If this case is transferred to the
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`District of Colorado, in addition to deferred trial settings as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic,
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`transferring this case and establishing a new schedule with a new presiding judge would cause
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`greater delay.
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`Therefore, this factor weighs heavily against transfer.
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`ii. Local Interest in Having Localized Interests Decided at Home
`
`
`3 The District of Colorado’s most recent General Order provides that “effective March 1, 2021, all civil and criminal
`jury trials scheduled to commence before any district or magistrate judge in any courthouse in the District of
`judicial officer.” See
`Colorado
`are CONTINUED
`subject
`to
`further order of
`the presiding
`http://www.cod.uscourts.gov/Portals/0/Documents/Orders/GO_2021-3_Court_Operations.pdf.
`
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`Under this factor, the Court must evaluate whether there is a local interest in deciding
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`local issues at home. Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 317. “A local interest is demonstrated by a
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`relevant factual connection between the events and the venue.” Word to Info, Inc. v. Facebook,
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`Inc., No. 3:14-cv-04387-K, 2015 WL 13870507, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Jul. 23, 2015).
`
`DISH states that the District of Colorado has a stronger local interest because Colorado is
`
`DISH’s home state. Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 43 at 5. However, DISH does not deny that it
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`employs over 1,000 employees and owns call centers, warehouses, a remanufacturing center, and
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`a service center in this District. Id. As such, this District also has a significant localized interest
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`in the case because DISH has a substantial presence here.
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`Because both districts have a significant interest in this case, the Court finds this factor
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`neutral.
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`iii. Familiarity of the Forum with the Law That will Govern the Case
`
`
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`Both parties agree that this factor is neutral. Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 37 at 14; Pl.’s Resp.,
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`ECF No. 42 at 14. The Court also agrees.
`
`iv. Avoidance of Unnecessary Problems of Conflict of Laws or in the Application of
`Foreign Law
`
`
`
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`Both parties agree that this factor is neutral. Id. The Court also agrees.
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`C. Intra-District Transfer
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`As an alternative, DISH requests that this case be transferred to the Austin Division of the
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`Western District of Texas. In the Fifth Circuit, the § 1404(a) factors apply to both inter-district
`
`and intra-district transfers under § 1404(b). In re Radmax Ltd., 720 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir.
`
`2013). It is well-settled that trial courts have even greater discretion in granting intra-district
`
`transfers than they do in the case of inter-district transfers. See, e.g., Sundell v. Cisco Systems
`
`Inc., 1997 WL 156824, at *1, 111 F.3d 892 (5th Cir. 1997) (“Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(b), the
`
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`district court has broad discretion in deciding whether to transfer a civil action from a division in
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`which it is pending to any other division in the same district.”).
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`DISH requests that this case be transferred to the Austin Division because it can be more
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`convenient for the parties and out-of-state witnesses to attend hearings and trial in Austin rather
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`than in Waco. Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 37 at 15. BBiTV does not object to that request. Pl.’s Resp.,
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`ECF No. 42 at 1. However, the Austin courthouse remains closed due to the Covid-19 pandemic
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`to this day, and it is not clear whether it will be open for jury trial in the near future. Thus,
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`DISH’s alternative request to transfer the case to the Austin Division is denied without prejudice.
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`DISH may refile its Motion to Transfer to the Austin Division if circumstances change when it
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`comes close to the trial.
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`IV. CONCLUSION
`
`Having considered the Section 1404(a) factors, the Court finds that DISH has not met its
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`significant burden to demonstrate that the District of Colorado is “clearly more convenient” than
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`this District. Therefore, the Court DENIES DISH’s Motion to Transfer to the District of
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`Colorado. The Court also DENIES WITHOUT PREDJUDICE DISH’s alternative Motion to
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`Transfer to the Austin Division of the Western District of Texas.
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`SIGNED this 20th day of April, 2021.
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`ALAN D ALBRIGHT
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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`13
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