`Kamperman
`
`( 10 ) Patent No . : US 10 , 298 , 564 B2
`( 45 ) Date of Patent :
`* May 21 , 2019
`
`US010298564B2
`
`( 54 ) SECURE AUTHENTICATED DISTANCE
`MEASUREMENT
`( 71 ) Applicant : KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS N . V . ,
`Eindhoven ( NL )
`( 72 ) Inventor : Franciscus L . A . J . Kamperman ,
`Geldrop ( NL )
`( 73 ) Assignee : KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS N . V . ,
`Eindhoven ( NL )
`Subject to any disclaimer , the term of this
`patent is extended or adjusted under 35
`U . S . C . 154 ( b ) by 0 days .
`This patent is subject to a terminal dis
`claimer .
`( 21 ) Appl . No . : 16 / 117 , 019
`Aug . 30 , 2018
`( 22 ) Filed :
`Prior Publication Data
`( 65 )
`US 2019 / 0014106 A1 Jan . 10 , 2019
`
`( * ) Notice :
`
`( 63 )
`
`Related U . S . Application Data
`Continuation of application No . 15 / 352 , 646 , filed on
`Nov . 16 , 2016 , now Pat . No . 10 , 091 , 186 , which is a
`( Continued )
`Foreign Application Priority Data
`( 30 )
`Jul . 26 , 2002
`( EP )
`. . . . . . . . . . . . 02078076
`( 51 )
`Int . Cl .
`H04L 29 / 06
`( 2006 . 01 )
`H04L 9 / 14
`( 2006 . 01 )
`( Continued )
`( 52 ) U . S . CI .
`CPC . . . . . . . . . . H04L 63 / 0823 ( 2013 . 01 ) ; G06F 21 / 10
`( 2013 . 01 ) ; H04L 9 / 14 ( 2013 . 01 ) ;
`( Continued )
`
`EP
`JP
`
`( 56 )
`
`( 58 ) Field of Classification Search
`CPC . . . . . H04L 63 / 0823 ; H04L 9 / 14 ; H04L 63 / 107 ;
`HO4L 63 / 062 ; H04L 43 / 16 ;
`( Continued )
`References Cited
`U . S . PATENT DOCUMENTS
`4 , 438 , 824 A
`3 / 1984 Mueller - Scholoer
`4 , 688 , 036 A
`8 / 1987 Hirano et al .
`( Continued )
`FOREIGN PATENT DOCUMENTS
`1100035 AL
`5 / 2001
`H04306760 A
`10 / 1992
`( Continued )
`OTHER PUBLICATIONS
`Ikeno et al “ Modern Cryptography Theory ” Japan , Institute of
`Electronics , Information and Communication Engineers , Nov . 15 ,
`1997 , p . 175 - 177 .
`( Continued )
`Primary Examiner — Darren B Schwartz
`ABSTRACT
`( 57 )
`The invention relates to a method for a first communication
`device to perform authenticated distance measurement
`between the first communication device and a second com
`munication device , wherein the first and the second com
`munication device share a common secret and the common
`secret is used for performing the distance measurement
`between the first and the second communication device . The
`invention also relates to a method of determining whether
`data stored on a first communication device are to be
`accessed by a second communication device . Moreover , the
`invention relates to a communication device for performing
`authenticated distance measurement to a second communi
`cation device . The invention also relates to an apparatus for
`playing back multimedia content comprising a communica
`tion device .
`
`53 Claims , 3 Drawing Sheets
`
`303
`
`MEM
`
`313
`
`Rx DS
`
`MOD DS
`
`315
`
`TX MOD DS
`
`MEM
`
`321
`
`MOD DS
`
`305
`
`Tx DS
`
`317
`
`RX MOD DS
`
`319
`
`MOD DSN
`AX MOD DS2
`NY
`
`323
`Calc dist
`
`325
`
`JOK
`
`TCL Exhibit 1001
`
`
`
`US 10 , 298 , 564 B2
`Page 2
`
`( 52 )
`
`( 58 )
`
`( 56 )
`
`( 2006 . 01 )
`( 2006 . 01 )
`( 2013 . 01 )
`( 2006 . 01 )
`( 2009 . 01 )
`( 2009 . 01 )
`
`Related U . S . Application Data
`continuation of application No . 15 / 229 , 207 , filed on
`Aug . 5 , 2016 , now Pat . No . 9 , 590 , 977 , which is a
`continuation of application No . 14 / 538 , 493 , filed on
`Nov . 11 , 2014 , now Pat . No . 9 , 436 , 809 , which is a
`continuation of application No . 10 / 521 , 858 , filed as
`application No . PCT / IB03 / 02932 on Jun . 27 , 2003 ,
`now Pat . No . 8 , 886 , 939 .
`( 51 ) Int . C1 .
`H04L 12 / 26
`H04L 9 / 32
`GO6F 21 / 10
`H04L 9 / 30
`H04W 24 / 00
`H04W 12 / 06
`U . S . CI .
`CPC . . . . . . . . . . . . . H04L 9 / 30 ( 2013 . 01 ) ; H04L 9 / 3263
`( 2013 . 01 ) ; H04L 43 / 0852 ( 2013 . 01 ) ; H04L
`43 / 16 ( 2013 . 01 ) ; H04L 63 / 062 ( 2013 . 01 ) ;
`H04L 63 / 107 ( 2013 . 01 ) ; G06F 2221 / 07
`( 2013 . 01 ) ; G06F 2221 / 2111 ( 2013 . 01 ) ; H04L
`63 / 0428 ( 2013 . 01 ) ; H04L 2463 / 101 ( 2013 . 01 ) ;
`H04W 12 / 06 ( 2013 . 01 ) ; H04W 24 / 00
`( 2013 . 01 )
`Field of Classification Search
`CPC . . . . . HO4L 43 / 0852 ; H04L 9 / 3263 ; H04L 9 / 30 ;
`H04L 63 / 0428 : HO4L 2463 / 101 : G06F
`21 / 10 ; G06F 2221 / 07 ; G06F 2221 / 2111 ;
`H04W 24 / 00 ; H04W 12 / 06
`See application file for complete search history .
`References Cited
`U . S . PATENT DOCUMENTS
`4 , 926 , 480 A
`5 / 1990 Chaum
`5 , 126 , 746 A
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`6 , 550 , 011 B1 *
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`4 / 2009
`7 , 787 , 865 B2
`8 / 2010 Willey
`7 , 898 , 977 B2
`3 / 2011 Roese
`8 , 068 , 610 B2 11 / 2011 Moroney
`8 , 107 , 627 B2
`1 / 2012 Epstein
`8 , 352 , 582 B2
`1 / 2013 Epstein
`8 , 997 , 243 B2
`3 / 2015 Epstein
`2001 / 0008558 A1 7 / 2001 Hirafuji
`2001 / 0043702 A1 11 / 2001 Elteto et al .
`2001 / 0044786 AL 11 / 2001 Ishibashi
`2001 / 0050990 A1 *
`12 / 2001 Sudia
`
`G06Q 20 / 02
`380 / 286
`
`1 / 2002 Traw . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G06F 21 / 10
`2002 / 0007452 A1 *
`713 / 152
`2002 / 0026424 A1 2 / 2002 Akashi
`2002 / 0026576 A1
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`2002 / 0035690 A1 3 / 2002 Nakano
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`2003 / 0021418 Al
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`2003 / 0174838 A1 *
`9 / 2003 Bremer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . HO4L 63 / 0428
`380 / 270
`2003 / 0184431 Al 10 / 2003 Lundkvist
`2003 / 0220765 AL 11 / 2003 Overy et al .
`2004 / 0015693 AL
`1 / 2004 Kitazumi
`2004 / 0025018 A1 *
`2 / 2004 Haas
`. . . . . . . . . . .
`2004 / 0080426 A1
`4 / 2004 Fraenkel
`2005 / 0114647 A15 / 2005 Epstein
`2005 / 0265503 A1 12 / 2005 Rofheart et al .
`2006 / 0294362 Al 12 / 2006 Epstein
`FOREIGN PATENT DOCUMENTS
`1 / 1994
`H0619948 A
`H08234658 A
`9 / 1996
`9170364 A
`6 / 1997
`H09170364 A
`6 / 1997
`4 / 1999
`11101035 A
`11208419 A
`8 / 1999
`2000357156 A
`12 / 2000
`9 / 2001
`2001249899 A
`2001257672 A
`9 / 2001
`2002124960
`4 / 2002
`7 / 2002
`2002189966 A
`10 / 1997
`9739553 Al
`9949378
`9 / 1999
`7 / 2001
`0152234 Al
`0193434 Al
`12 / 2001
`0233887 A2
`4 / 2002
`5 / 2002
`0235036 A1
`02054353 AL
`7 / 2002
`
`
`
`See eeee
`
`JP
`JP
`JP
`WO
`WO
`Wo
`WO
`WO
`WO
`WO
`
`H04L 45 / 26
`713 / 168
`
`OTHER PUBLICATIONS
`Modern Cryptography Theory ( 1986 ) Chapter 9 , ISBN : 4 - 88552
`064 - 9 ( Japanese ) .
`Hayashi et al Encryption and Authentication Program Module ,
`Technical Paper ( Japanese ) NTT R & D vol . 44 , No . 10 Oct . 1 , 1995 .
`Stefan Brands and Devid Chaum “ Distance Bounding Protocols "
`Eurocrypt ' 93 , ( 1993 ) p . 344 - 359 .
`Tim Kindber & Kan Zhang " Context Authention Using Constrained
`Channels ” pp . 1 - 8 , Apr . 16 , 2001 .
`Hitachi Ltd . , 5C Digital Transmission Content Protection White
`Paper Rev . 1 . 0 Jul . 14 , 1998 , p . 1013 .
`Boyd et al “ Protocols for Authention and Key Establishment ”
`Spring - Verlag , Sep . 17 , 2003 , p . 116 - 120 , 195 , 305 .
`High Bandwidth Digital Content Protection System Feb . 17 , 2000 .
`High Bandwidth Digital Content Protection System Revision 1 . 0
`Erratum Mar . 1 , 2001 .
`Digital Transmission Content Protection Specification vol . 1 Hitachi
`Ltd . Revision 1 . 0 Apr . 12 , 1999 .
`Digital Transmission Content Protection Specification vol . 1 ( Infor
`mational Version ) Hitachi Ltd . Revision 1 . 2A Feb . 25 , 2002 .
`SmartRightTM Certification for FCC Approval for Use with the
`Broadcast Flag , Mar . 1 , 2004 .
`SmartRightTM Copy Protection for System for Digital Home Net
`works , Deployment Process , CPTWG , Nov . 28 , 2001 .
`SmartRightTM Copy Protection System for Digital Home Networks ,
`CPTWG , May 24 , 2001 .
`SmartRightTM Digital Broadcast Content Protection , Presentation to
`FCC , Apr . 2 , 2004 ( cited in litigation ) .
`
`TCL Exhibit 1001
`
`
`
`US 10 , 298 , 564 B2
`Page 3
`
`( 56 )
`
`References Cited
`OTHER PUBLICATIONS
`SmartRightTM Technical White Paper , Version 1 . 7 , Jan . 2003 ( “ White
`Paper ” ) ( cited in litigation ) .
`Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol ( ISAKMP ) ,
`Request for Comments 2408 ( “ RFC 2408 % ) — cited in litigation ,
`Nov . 1998 .
`International Standard ISO / IEC 11770 - 3 ( 1st ed . ) ( “ ISO 11770
`3 ” ) , Nov . 1 , 1999 .
`Scott Crosby , et al . , " A Cryptanalysis of the High - bandwidth Digital
`Content Protection System ” Computer and Communications Secu
`rity , ( 2001 ) .
`SmartRightTM Specifications Sep . 26 , 2001 .
`SmartRightTM Copy Protection System for Digital Home Networks ,
`CPTWG , Jul . 11 , 2001 .
`Bruce Schneier , Applied Cryptography ( 2d ed . 1996 ) ( " Schneier ” ) .
`Steven M . Bellovin and Michael Merritt , “ Encrypted Key Exchange :
`Password - Based Protocols Secure Against Dictionary Attacks ” ,
`2002 .
`
`RFC 2463 Internet Control Message Protocol Dec . 1998 .
`RFC2246 the TLS Protocol , Jan . 1999 .
`Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol ( ISAKMP ) ,
`Request for Comments 2408 ( “ RFC 2408 ” ) , Nov . 1998 .
`Declaration of William Rosenblatt , Microsoft Exhibit 1009 , Dec . 8 ,
`2017 .
`Supplemental Declaration of William Rosenblatt , Microsoft Exhibit
`1015 , Apr . 20 , 2018 .
`Petition for Inter Parties Review of USP 8543819 , Dec . 8 , 2017 .
`Patent Owner ' s Preliminary Response , Mar . 13 , 2018 .
`Petitioners ' Reply to Patent Owner ' s Preliminary Response , Apr .
`20 , 2018 .
`Patent Owner ' s Sur - Reply to Petitioners ' Reply , May 4 , 2018 .
`Petition for Inter Parties Review of USP 9436809 , Dec . 8 , 2017 .
`Markman Order Filed Jul . 11 , 2017 .
`Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol ( ISAKMP ) ,
`Request for Comments 2407 ( “ RFC 2407 " ) , Nov . 1998 .
`Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol ( ISAKMP ) ,
`Request for Comments 2409 ( “ RFC 2409 " ) , Nov . 1998 .
`* cited by examiner
`
`TCL Exhibit 1001
`
`
`
`U . S . Patent
`
`May 21 , 2019
`
`Sheet 1 of 3
`
`US 10 , 298 , 564 B2
`
`109
`
`- 111
`
`XE FIG . 1
`
`201
`
`205
`
`Auth .
`
`207
`
`209
`
`Dist
`
`| 211
`
`Com Data
`
`FIG . 2
`
`203
`
`TCL Exhibit 1001
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`
`
`U . S . Patent
`
`May 21 , 2019
`
`Sheet 2 of 3
`
`US 10 , 298 , 564 B2
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`303
`
`307
`
`MEM
`
`MOD DS
`
`305
`
`MEM
`
`MOD DS
`
`311
`Rx DS
`
`315
`
`TX MOD DS
`
`Tx DS
`317
`RX MOD DS
`
`319
`
`MOD DS =
`RX MOD DS ?
`325 NY
`
`! OK
`
`Calc dist
`
`FIG . 3
`
`TCL Exhibit 1001
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`
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`atent
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`May 21 , 2019
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`Sheet 3 of 3
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`US 10 , 298 , 564 B2
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`Rx
`
`406
`
`413
`
`417
`
`415
`
`mo
`
`mem
`
`FIG . 4
`
`TCL Exhibit 1001
`
`
`
`US 10 , 298 , 564 B2
`
`technologies such as encryption , watermarking and right
`SECURE AUTHENTICATED DISTANCE
`MEASUREMENT
`descriptions ( e . g . rules for accessing and copying data ) .
`One way of protecting content in the form of digital data
`is to ensure that content will only be transferred between
`This application is a continuation of the patent application
`entitled “ Secure Authenticated Distance Measurement ” , 5 devices if
`filed on Nov . 16 , 2016 and afforded Ser . No . 15 / 352 , 646
`the receiving device has been authenticated as being a
`which is a continuation of the application filed Aug . 5 , 2016
`compliant device , and
`and afforded Ser . No . 15 / 229 , 207 which is a continuation of
`the user of the content has the right to transfer ( move ,
`the application filed Nov . 11 , 2014 and afforded Ser . No .
`copy ) that content to another device .
`14 / 538 , 493 which claims priority pursuant to 35 USC 120 , 10
`If transfer of content is allowed , this will typically be
`priority to and the benefit of the earlier filing date of , that
`performed in an encrypted way to make sure that the content
`patent application entitled “ Secure Authenticated Distance
`cannot be captured illegally in a useful format .
`Measurement ” , filed on Jan . 21 , 2005 and afforded Ser . No .
`Technology to perform device authentication and
`10 / 521 , 858 ( now U . S . Pat . No . 8 , 886 , 939 ) , which claimed 15 encrypted content transfer is available and is called a secure
`priority to and the benefit of the earlier filing date , as a
`authenticated channel ( SAC ) . Although it might be allowed
`National Stage Filing of that international patent application
`to make copies of content over a SAC , the content industry
`filed on Jun . 27 , 2003 and afforded serial number PCT )
`is very bullish on content distribution over the Internet . This
`IB2003 / 02932 ( WO2004014037 ) , which claimed priority to
`results in disagreement of the content industry on transfer
`and the benefit of the earlier filing date of that patent 20 ring content over interfaces that match well with the Inter
`application filed on Jul . 26 , 2002 and afforded serial number
`net , e . g . Ethernet .
`EP 02078076 . 3 , the contents of all of which are incorporated
`Further , it should be possible for a user visiting his
`by reference , herein .
`neighbor to watch a movie , which he owns , on the neigh
`This application is further related to that patent applica -
`bor ' s big television screen . Typically , the content owner will
`tion entitled “ Secure authenticated Distance Measurement ” , 25 disallow this , but it might become acceptable if it can be
`filed on Jul . 24 , 2009 and afforded Ser . No . 12 / 508 , 917 ( now
`proved that a license holder of that movie ( or a device that
`U . S . Pat . No . 8 , 543 , 819 ) , issued Sep . 24 , 2013 ) , which
`the license holder owns ) is near that television screen .
`claimed priority to and the benefit of the earlier filing date
`It is therefore of interest to be able to include an authen
`of that patent application entitled “ Secure Authenticated
`ticated distance measurement when deciding whether con
`Distance Measurement " , filed on Jan . 21 , 2005 and afforded 30 tent should be accessed or copied by other devices .
`Ser . No . 10 / 521 , 858 ( now U . S . Pat . No . 8 , 886 , 939 ) , the
`In the article by Stefan Brands and David Chaum , “ Dis
`contents of which are incorporated by reference herein .
`tance - Bounding protocols ” , Eurocrypt ' 93 ( 1993 ) , Pages
`The invention relates to a method for a first communica
`344 - 359 , integration of distance - bounding protocols with
`tion device to performing authenticated distance measure
`public - key identification schemes is described . Here dis
`ment between a first communication device and a second 35 tance measurement is described based on time measurement
`communication device . The invention also relates to a
`using challenge and response bits and with the use of a
`method of determining whether data stored on a first com -
`commitment protocol . This does not allow authenticated
`munication device is to be accessed by a second communi -
`device compliancy testing and is not efficient when two
`cation device . Moreover , the invention relates to a commu -
`devices must also authenticate each other .
`nication device for performing authenticated distance 40
`It is an object of the invention to obtain a solution to the
`measurement to a second communication device . The inven -
`problem of performing a secure transfer of content within a
`tion also relates to an apparatus for playing back multimedia
`limited distance .
`content comprising a communication device .
`This is obtained by a method for a first communication
`Digital media have become popular carriers for various
`device to performing authenticated distance measurement
`types of data information . Computer software and audio 45 between the first communication device and a second com
`information , for instance , are widely available on optical
`munication device , wherein the first and the second com
`compact disks ( CDs ) and recently also DVD has gained in
`munication device share a common secret and the common
`distribution share . The CD and the DVD utilize a common
`secret is used for performing the distance measurement
`standard for the digital recording of data , software , images ,
`between the first and the second communication device .
`and audio . Additional media , such as recordable discs , 50
`Because the common secret is being used for performing
`solid - state memory , and the like , are making considerable
`the distance measurement , it can be ensured that when
`measuring the distance from the first communication device
`gains in the software and data distribution market .
`The substantially superior quality of the digital format as
`to the second communication device , it is the distance
`compared to the analog format renders the former substan -
`between the right devices that is being measured .
`tially more prone to unauthorized copying and pirating , 55
`The method combines a distance measurement protocol
`further a digital format is both easier and faster to copy .
`with an authentication protocol . This enables authenticated
`Copying of a digital data stream , whether compressed ,
`device compliancy testing and is efficient , because a secure
`uncompressed , encrypted or non - encrypted , typically does
`channel is anyhow needed to enable secure communication
`not lead to any appreciable loss of quality in the data . Digital
`between devices and a device can first be tested on compli
`copying thus is essentially unlimited in terms of multi - 60 ancy before a distance measurement is executed .
`generation copying . Analog data with its signal to noise ratio
`In a specific embodiment , the authenticated distance mea
`loss with every sequential copy , on the other hand , is
`surement is performed according to the following steps ,
`naturally limited in terms of multi - generation and mass
`transmitting a first signal from the first communication
`copying .
`device to the second communication device at a first
`The advent of the recent popularity in the digital format 65
`time t1 , the second communication device being
`adapted for receiving the first signal , generating a
`has also brought about a slew of copy protection and DRM
`systems and methods . These systems and methods use
`second signal by modifying the received first signal
`
`TCL Exhibit 1001
`
`
`
`US 10 , 298 , 564 B2
`
`The invention also relates to a method of determining
`according to the common secret and transmitting the
`whether data stored on a first communication device are to
`second signal to the first device ,
`receiving the second signal at a second time t2 ,
`be accessed by a second communication device , the method
`comprising the step of performing a distance measurement
`checking if the second signal has been modified according
`between the first and the second communication device and
`to the common secret ,
`checking whether the measured distance is within a pre
`determining the distance between the first and the second
`defined distance interval , wherein the distance measurement
`communication device according to a time difference
`is an authenticated distance measurement according to the
`between t1 and t2 .
`above . By using the authenticated distance measurement in
`When measuring a distance by measuring the time dif
`ference between transmitting and receiving a signal and 10 connection with sharing data between devices , unauthorized
`distribution of content can be reduced .
`using a secret , shared between the first and the second
`In a specific embodiment the data stored on the first
`communication device ,
`for determining whether the
`device is sent to the second device if it is determined that the
`returned signal really originated from the second commu
`data stored on the first device are to be accessed by the
`nication device , the distance is measured in a secure authen 15 second device .
`ticated way ensuring that the distance will not be measured
`The invention also relates to a method of determining
`to a third communication device ( not knowing the secret ) .
`whether data stored on a first communication device are to
`Using the shared secret for modifying the signal is a simple
`be accessed by a second communication device , the method
`comprising the step of performing a distance measurement
`way to perform a secure authenticated distance measure
`ment .
`20 between a third communication device and the second
`In a specific embodiment the first signal is a spread
`communication device and checking whether the measured
`spectrum signal . Thereby a high resolution is obtained and
`distance is within a predefined distance interval , wherein the
`it is possible to cope with bad transmission conditions ( e . g .
`distance measurement is an authenticated distance measure
`ment according to the above . In this embodiment , the
`wireless environments with a lot of reflections ) .
`In another embodiment the step of checking if the second 25 distance is not measured between the first communication
`signal has been modified according to the common secret is
`device , on which the data are stored , and the second com
`performed by the steps of ,
`munication device . Instead , the distance is measured
`generating a third signal by modifying the first signal
`between a third communication device and the second
`communication device , where the third communication
`according to the common secret ,
`comparing the third signal with the received second 30 device could be personal to the owner of the content .
`signal .
`The invention also relates to a communication device for
`This method is an easy and simple way of performing the
`performing authenticated distance measurement to a second
`check , but it requires that both the first communication
`communication device , where the communication device
`device and the second communication device know how the
`shares a common secret with the second communication
`first signal is being modified using the common secret .
`35 device and where the communication device comprises
`In a specific embodiment the first signal and the common
`means for measuring the distance to the second device using
`secret are bit words and the second signal comprises infor -
`the common secret .
`mation being generated by performing an XOR between the
`In an embodiment the device comprises :
`bit words . Thereby , it is a very simple operation that has to
`means for transmitting a first signal to a second commu
`meal
`be performed , resulting in demand for few resources by both 40
`nication device at a first time tl , the second commu
`nication device being adapted for receiving the first
`the first and the second communication device when per
`signal , generating a second signal by modifying the
`forming the operation .
`received first signal according to the common secret
`In an embodiment the common secret has been shared
`before performing the distance measurement , the sharing
`and transmitting the second signal ,
`means for receiving the second signal at a second time t2 ,
`being performed by the steps of ,
`performing an authentication check from the first com
`means for checking if the second signal has been modified
`munication device on the second communication
`according to the common secret , and
`device by checking whether the second communication
`means for determining the distance between the first and
`the second communication device according to a time
`device is compliant with a set of predefined compliance
`rules ,
`difference between tl and t2 .
`if the second communication device is compliant , sharing
`The invention also relates to an apparatus for playing back
`the common secret by transmitting the secret to the
`multimedia content comprising a communication device
`according to the above .
`second communication device .
`This is a secure way of performing the sharing of the
`In the following preferred embodiments of the invention
`secret , ensuring that only devices being compliant with 55 will be described referring to the figures , wherein :
`compliance rules can receive the secret . Further , the shared
`FIG . 1 illustrates authenticated distance measurement
`secret can afterwards be used for generating a SAC channel
`being used for content protection ,
`between the two devices . The secret could be shared using
`FIG . 2 is a flow diagram illustrating the method of
`e . g . key transport mechanisms as described in ISO 11770 - 3 .
`performing authenticated distance measurement ,
`Alternatively , a key agreement protocol could be used , 60
`FIG . 3 illustrates in further detail the step of performing
`which e . g . is also described in ISO 11770 - 3 .
`the authenticated distance measurement shown in FIG . 2 ,
`In another embodiment the authentication check further
`FIG . 4 illustrates a communication device for performing
`comprises checking if the identification of the second device
`authenticated distance measurement .
`is compliant with an expected identification . Thereby , it is
`FIG . 1 illustrates an embodiment where authenticated
`ensured that the second device really is the device that it 65 distance measurement is being used for content protection .
`should be . The identity could be obtained by checking a
`In the center of the circle 101 a computer 103 is placed . The
`computer comprises content , such as multimedia content
`certificate stored in the second device .
`
`45
`
`50
`
`TCL Exhibit 1001
`
`
`
`US 10 , 298 , 564 B2
`
`First device - > Second device : R3 | | Text 1
`being video or audio , stored on e . g . a hard disk , DVD or a
`where R , is a random number
`CD . The owner of the computer owns the content and
`Second device - > First device : CertA | | Token AB
`therefore the computer is authorized to access and present
`Where CertA is a certificate of A
`the multimedia content for the user . When the user wants to
`TokenAB = R _ | | RA | B | Text3 | | $ S ( R
`make a legal copy of the content to another device via e . g . 5
`R
`| | B | | Text2 )
`R , is a random number
`a SAC , the distance between the other device and the
`Indentifier B is an option
`computer 103 is measured and only devices within a pre
`sS4 is a signature set by A using private key SA
`defined distance illustrated by the devices 105 , 107 , 109 ,
`If TokenAB is replaced with the token as specified in ISO
`111 , 113 inside the circle 101 are allowed to receive the
`content . Whereas the devices 115 , 117 , 119 having a distance 10 11770 - 3 we at the same time can do secret key exchange . We
`to the computer 101 being larger than the predefined dis -
`can use this by substituting Text2 by :
`Text2 : = ePB ( A | | K | | Text2 ) | | Text3
`tance are not allowed to receive the content .
`In the example a device is a computer , but it could e . g .
`Where eP , is encrypted with Public key B
`also be a DVD drive , a CD drive or a Video , as long as the
`A is identifier of A
`device comprises a communication device for performing 15
`K
`is a secret to be exchanged
`In this case the second device 203 determines the key ( i . e .
`the distance measurement .
`In a specific example the distance might not have to be
`has key control ) , this is also called a key transport protocol ,
`but also a key agreement protocol could be used . This may
`measured between the computer , on which the data are
`stored , and the other device , it could also be a third device
`be undesirable in which case it can be reversed , such that the
`e . g . a device being personal to the owner of the content 20 first device determines the key . A secret key has now been
`which is within the predefined distance .
`exchanged according to step 207 in FIG . 2 . Again , the secret
`In FIG . 2 a flow diagram illustrates the general idea of
`key could be exchanged by e . g . a key transport protocol or
`performing authenticated distance measurement between
`a key agreement protocol .
`two devices , 201 and 203 each comprising communication
`After the distance has been measured in a secure authen
`devices for performing the authenticated distance measure - 25 ticated way as described above content , data can be sent
`ment . In the example the first device 201 comprises content
`between the first and the second device in step 211 in FIG .
`which the second device 203 has requested . The authenti
`2 .
`cated distance measurement then is as follows . In step 205
`FIG . 3 illustrates in further detail the step of performing
`the first device 201 authenticates the second device 203 ; this
`the authenticated distance measurement . As described above
`could comprise the steps of checking whether the second 30 the first device 301 and the second device 303 have
`device 203 is a compliant device and might also comprise
`exchanged a secret ; the secret is stored in the memory 305
`the step of checking whether the second device 203 really is
`of the first device and the memory 307 of the second device .
`the device identified to the first device 201 . Then in step 207 ,
`In order to perform the distance measurement , a signal is
`the first device 201 exchanges a secret with the second
`transmitted to the second device via a transmitter 309 . The
`device 203 , which e . g . could be performed by transmitting 35 second device receives the signal via a receiver 311 and 313
`a random generated bit word to second device 203 . The
`modifies the signal by using the locally stored secret . The
`secret should be shared securely , e . g . according to some key
`signal is modified according to rules known by the first
`management protocol as described in e . g . ISO 11770 .
`device 301 and transmitted back to the first device 301 via
`Then in step 209 , a signal for distance measurement is
`a transmitter 315 . The first device 301 receives the modified
`transmitted to the second device 203 ; the second device 40 signal via a receiver 317 and in 319 the received modified
`modifies the received signal according to the secret and
`signal is compared to a signal , which has been modified
`retransmits the modified signal back to the first device . The
`locally . The local modification is performed in 321 by using
`first device 201 measures the round trip time between the
`the signal transmitted to the second device in transmitter 309
`signal leaving and the signal returning and checks if the
`and then modifying the signal using the locally stored secret
`returned signal was modified according to the exchanged 45 similar to the modification rules used by the second device .
`secret . The modification of the returned signal according to
`If the received modified signal and the locally modified
`some secret will most likely be dependent on the transmis
`signal are identical , then the received signal is authenticated
`sion system and the signal used for distance measurement ,
`and can be used for determining the distance between the
`i . e . it will be specific for each communication system ( such
`first and the second device . If the two signals are not
`50 identical , then the received signal cannot be authenticated
`as 1394 , Ethernet , Bluetooth , IEEE 802 . 11 , etc . ) .
`The signal used for the distance measurement may be a
`and can therefore not be used for measuring the distance as
`normal data bit signal , but also special signals other than for
`illustrated by 325 . In 323 the distance is calculated between
`data communication may be used . In an embodiment spread
`the first and the second device ; this could e . g . be performed
`spectrum signals are used to be able to get high resolution
`by measuring the time , when the signal is transmitted by the
`and to be able to cope with bad transmission conditions ( e . g . 55 transmitter 309 from the first device to the second device and
`measuring when the receiver 317 receives the signal from
`wireless environments with a lot of reflections ) .
`In a specific example a direct sequence spread spectrum
`the second device . The time difference between transmittal
`signal is used for distance measurement ; this signal could be
`time and r
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