User Name: Brian Cook
`Date and Time: Wednesday, April 29, 2020 1:18:00 PM PDT
`Job Number: 115756157
`
`Document (1)
`
`1. Cypress Semiconductor Corp. v. GSI Tech., Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105363
`Client/Matter: 16020#0600000-00010
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`Brian Cook
`
`Petitioner STMicroelectronics, Inc., Ex. 1012
`IPR2021-00355, Page 1
`
`

`

` Neutral
`As of: April 29, 2020 8:18 PM Z
`
`Cypress Semiconductor Corp. v. GSI Tech., Inc.
`
`United States District Court for the Northern District of California
`
`July 29, 2014, Decided; July 29, 2014, Filed
`
`13-cv-02013-JST; 13-cv-3757-JST
`
`Reporter
`2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105363 *; 2014 WL 3735903
`
`CYPRESS SEMICONDUCTOR CORPORATION,
`Plaintiff, v. GSI TECHNOLOGY, INC., Defendant.
`
`Prior History: Cypress Semiconductor Corp. v. GSI
`Tech., Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31462 (N.D. Cal.,
`Mar. 9, 2014)
`
`Core Terms
`
`Patent, detecting, memory, amplifying, sending,
`specification, signal, storage, terms, construe, parties,
`includes, argues, path, comprising, skill, configured,
`intrinsic, words, disputed claim, Dictionary, customary,
`plurality, patentee, array, read and write, plain meaning,
`concurrent, extrinsic, invention
`
`Counsel: [*1] For Cypress Semiconductor Corporation,
`Plaintiff: Erin Catherine Jones, LEAD ATTORNEY, Fish
`& Richardson P.C., Redwood City, CA; Anthony Van
`Nguyen, PRO HAC VICE, Fish & Richardson, P.C.,
`Houston, TX; Bryan Alan Blumenkopf, Fish &
`Richardson P.C., San Diego, CA; David Scott Morris,
`PRO HAC VICE, David Michael Hoffman, Fish
`Richardson P.C., Austin, TX; David Michael Hoffman,
`Fish Richardson P.C., Austin, TX; Jeffrey A.
`Shneidman, Matthew Carl Berntsen, PRO HAC VICE,
`Frank E Scherkenbach, Fish & Richardson P.C.,
`Boston, MA; Thomas L. Halkowski, PRO HAC VICE,
`Fish & Richardson P.C., Wilmington, DE.
`
`For GSI Technology, Inc., Defendant: Michael Gerald
`Schwartz, LEAD ATTORNEY, Alan Averell Limbach,
`Andrew P. Valentine, Brent Kevin Yamashita, Erik R.
`
`Fuehrer, Gerald T. Sekimura, Mark Fowler, Saori Kaji,
`Timothy Lohse, DLA Piper LLP (US), East Palo Alto,
`CA.
`
`Judges: JON S. TIGAR, United States District Judge.
`
`Opinion by: JON S. TIGAR
`
`Opinion
`
`ORDER CONSTRUING CLAIMS OF U.S. PATENT
`NOS. 6,651,134 AND 7,142,477
`
`Re: ECF No. 74 (Case No. 13-cv-2013)
`
`I. INTRODUCTION
`
`On May 20, 2014, the Court held a hearing for the
`purpose of construing disputed terms in the claims of
`United States Patent Nos. 6,651,134 ("the '134 Patent")
`and 7,142,477 ("the '477 Patent"). [*2] Now, after
`consideration of the arguments and evidence presented
`by the parties, and the relevant portions of the record,
`the Court construes the terms as set forth below.
`
`II. BACKGROUND
`
`A. Procedural History
`
`In these now-consolidated action, Plaintiff Cypress
`
`Brian Cook
`
`Petitioner STMicroelectronics, Inc., Ex. 1012
`IPR2021-00355, Page 2
`
`

`

`2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105363, *2
`
`Page 2 of 9
`
`Semiconductor Corporation
`accuses
`("Cypress")
`Defendant GSI Technology Inc.'s ("GSI") of infringing
`seven patents (the "Patents-in-Suit"), including the '134
`and '477 Patents, which relate to computer memory,
`and in particular to systems and methods for making
`faster Static Random Access Memory
`("SRAM").
`Consolidated Amended Complaint
`for Patent
`Infringement, ECF No. 96. Cypress alleges that, by
`manufacturing and selling GSI's SigmaQuad product
`line, among other Cypress products, GSI has directly
`infringed the Patents-in-Suit. Complaint ¶ 21.
`
`GSI denies infringement. GSI Technology, Inc.'s Answer
`to Consolidated Amended Complaint ¶ 4. Pursuant to
`Patent Local Rule 4-3(c), the parties have identified, and
`briefed the construction of, ten terms in the Patents-in-
`Suit that are most significant to the resolution of this
`case. ECF No. 88. However, GSI has also sought inter
`partes review of five of the Patents-in-Suit. GSI has
`moved to [*3] stay this action against two of the
`Patents-in-Suit, and expects to move to stay the action
`against
`three more patents
`in August. Therefore,
`pursuant to the Court's May 6 order, ECF No. 102, the
`Court proceeds now to construe only those terms
`contained in the '134 and '477 Patents, the two patents
`for which GSI has not sought inter partes review.
`
`B. Legal Standard
`
`The construction of terms found in patent claims is a
`question of law to be determined by the Court. Markman
`v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed.
`Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370, 116 S. Ct.
`1384, 134 L. Ed. 2d 577 (1996). "[T]he interpretation to
`be given a term can only be determined and confirmed
`with a full understanding of what the inventors actually
`invented and intended to envelop with the claim."
`Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir.
`2005) (quoting Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' per
`Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
`Consequently, courts construe claims in the manner that
`"most naturally aligns with the patent's description of the
`invention." Id.
`
`The first step in claim construction is to look to the
`language of the claims themselves. "It is a 'bedrock
`principle' of patent law that 'the claims of [*4] a patent
`define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the
`right to exclude.'" Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312 (quoting
`Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys.,
`Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). A disputed
`claim term should be construed in light of its "ordinary
`
`and customary meaning," which is "the meaning that the
`term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in
`question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the
`effective filing date of the patent application." Phillips,
`415 F.3d at 1312. In some cases, the ordinary meaning
`of a disputed term to a person of skill in the art is readily
`apparent, and claim construction involves "little more
`than the application of the widely accepted meaning of
`Id. at 1314. Claim
`commonly understood words."
`construction may deviate
`from
`the ordinary and
`customary meaning of a disputed term only if (1) a
`patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own
`lexicographer, or (2) the patentee disavows the full
`scope of a claim term either in the specification or
`during prosecution. Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm't
`Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
`
`Ordinary and customary meaning is not the same as
` [*5] a dictionary definition. "Properly viewed,
`the
`'ordinary meaning' of a claim term is its meaning to the
`ordinary artisan after reading the entire patent. Yet
`heavy reliance on the dictionary divorced from the
`intrinsic evidence risks transforming the meaning of the
`claim term to the artisan into the meaning of the term in
`the abstract, out of its particular context, which is the
`specification." Id. at 1321. Typically, the specification "is
`the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term."
`Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576,
`1582
`(Fed. Cir. 1996).
`It
`is
`therefore
`"entirely
`appropriate
`for a court, when conducting claim
`construction, to rely heavily on the written description for
`guidance as to the meaning of claims." Phillips, 415
`F.3d at 1315. However, while the specification may
`describe a preferred embodiment, the claims are not
`necessarily limited only to that embodiment. Id.
`
`Finally, courts may consider extrinsic evidence in
`construing claims, such as "expert and
`inventor
`testimony,
`dictionaries,
`and
`learned
`treatises."
`Markman, 52 F.3d at 980. Expert testimony may be
`useful to "provide background on the technology at
`issue, to explain how an invention works, [*6] to ensure
`that the court's understanding of the technical aspects of
`the patent is consistent with that of a person of skill in
`the art, or to establish that a particular term in the patent
`or the prior art has a particular meaning in the pertinent
`field." Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318. However, extrinsic
`evidence is "less reliable than the patent and its
`prosecution history in determining how to read claim
`terms." Id. If intrinsic evidence mandates the definition
`of a term that is at odds with extrinsic evidence, courts
`must defer to the definition supplied by the former. Id.
`
`Brian Cook
`
`Petitioner STMicroelectronics, Inc., Ex. 1012
`IPR2021-00355, Page 3
`
`

`

`2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105363, *6
`
`Page 3 of 9
`
`C. Jurisdiction
`
`Since this is an action "relating to patents," the Court
`has jurisdiction pursuant to U.S.C. § 1338(a). III.
`ANALYSIS
`
`A. "Memory" (claims 1, 7, 15 & 17 of the '134 Patent)
`
`Go to table1
`
`Claim 1 recites "a circuit comprising" two elements, the
`first of which is "a memory comprising a plurality of
`storage elements each configured to read and write
`data in response to an internal address signal[.]" '134
`Patent 5:23-26, Exh. F to Declaration of David M.
`Hoffman ("Hoffman Decl."), ECF [*7] No. 68-7. GSI
`argues that the "memory" claimed by this language is a
`specific type of memory — "addressable storage" —
`while Cypress contends that the memory claimed in this
`part of the patent extends to the broadest possible use
`of the term "memory."
`
`the patentee has acted as her own
`Unless
`lexicographer, or clearly disavowed the full scope of a
`claim term, she is entitled to the broadest possible
`scope of a term's ordinary and customary meaning.
`Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365. But that only begs, rather
`than answers, the question of what the ordinary and
`customary meaning of this term is. The Court must seek
`the meaning that a person of ordinary skill in the art
`would attribute to the term in the context of the intrinsic
`and extrinsic record, id., rather the meaning the term
`might carry when divorced from the context of the
`patent.1
`
`Here, the surrounding claim language supports GSI's
`construction. Cypress and GSI both argue that the
`"memory" term should with construed with reference to
`the
`language
`following
`the words
`"a memory
`comprising."2 Cypress argues that "claim 1 expressly
`
`1 For this reason, the court does not endorse the approach
`urged by Cypress's counsel at the hearing. Counsel urged a
`narrower approach to construction, arguing that the only
`relevant term is "memory" itself. Counsel argued that GSI's
`construction arguments were off-point because "if [the term] is
`further limited by other language, that's fine," but irrelevant
` [*8] to claim construction. Neighboring claim language must
`be relevant to the task of construction, since the task is to
`determine the plain and ordinary meaning of the language in
`the context of the intrinsic record.
`
`sets forth the requirements for the claim [sic] memory —
`namely that it must be a plurality of storage elements
`with a particular configuration." Cypress's Opening
`Claim Construction Brief
`("Open. Br.") 15:19-22.
`Cypress argues that the post-"comprising" language
`"sets forth the requirements" of the claimed memory.
`But when
`applying
`that
`language, Cypress
`acknowledges that the claimed memory must be a
`plurality of storage elements, and
`then descends
`abruptly into generality by admitting only that the
`plurality must have some undefined
`"particular
`configuration."
`
`The "particular configuration" is defined specifically in
`the claim language. The plurality of storage elements
`must each be "configured to read and write data in
`response to an internal address signal." '134 Patent
`5:24-26. GSI's construction gives meaning to this claim
`language, and makes clear that the memory claimed in
`claim 1 does not include any elements that [*10] are
`used to store data, but only storage elements that are
`"addressable," meaning they are configured to read and
`write data in response to an internal address label. By
`declining to give meaning to this portion of the claim
`language, Cypress's view of claim scope is too broad.
`The Court is persuaded that one of ordinary skill of the
`art would understand
`this
`language
`to
`require
`"addressable storage," rather than encompass any
`circuit elements that store data. See Declaration of
`Robert Murphy ("Murphy Decl.") ¶¶ 19-23, ECF No. 74-
`1; cf. Declaration of Vivek Subramanian ¶ 27, ECF No.
`80-4 (in which Cypress's expert never commits to a
`specific understanding of what the "plain meaning" of
`the claimed "memory" is in the specific context of the
`patent).
`
`2 That is to say, Cypress pointedly does not argue that the
`language following the words "memory comprising" is merely
`exemplary; it acknowledges the language is limiting. [*9] This
`concession
`is a
`little surprising because
`"[t]he
`term
`'comprising' is well understood to mean 'including but not
`limited to.'" CIAS, Inc. v. Alliance Gaming Corp., 504 F.3d
`1356, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am.
`Sci. & Eng'g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 811 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). But
`what CIAS and other cases generally mean by this is that "the
`claims do not exclude the presence in the accused device or
`method of factors in addition to those explicitly recited." CIAS,
`504 F.3d at 1360 (quoting In Georgia—Pacific Corp. v. United
`States Gypsum Co., 195 F.3d 1322, 1327-28 (Fed.Cir.1999)).
`Here, the "comprising" language is "open" in the sense that
`the claimed memory might conceivably include elements other
`than the two identified limiting elements. But they still cannot
`fail to include those limiting elements.
`
`Brian Cook
`
`Petitioner STMicroelectronics, Inc., Ex. 1012
`IPR2021-00355, Page 4
`
`

`

`2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105363, *9
`
`Page 4 of 9
`
`GSI also points out that the specification refers to
`claimed memory as comprising "storage elements each
`configured to read and write data in response to an
`internal address signal," '134 Patent 1:47-50, and
`describes a process of reading and writing data using
`addresses. Id. 1:11-14, 3:2-4. The Court does not limit
`the claim language to specific embodiments in the
`specification. But the specification fails to indicate that
` [*11] view of
`the patentee's
`the claimed memory
`includes elements that are not addressable storage.
`
`Cypress's arguments from the specification, on the other
`hand, are unpersuasive. Open. Br. 15:24-16:6. Cypress
`points to standard language of non-exclusivity, such as
`the statement
`that
`the memory array may be
`implemented by "other appropriate memory to meet the
`design criteria of a particular implementation." '134
`Patent 2:33-38. However open this language might be, it
`cannot be open enough
`to
`include elements not
`contained within
`the claim
`language. The claim
`language requires addressable storage.
`
`The Court finds GSI's construction warranted by the
`intrinsic record alone. But it is worth noting that, even if
`the Court were
`to set aside
`the context of
`the
`surrounding claim
`language, GSI's construction
`is
`consistent with the concept of "memory" as it would be
`understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art.
`"Memory" is commonly defined in technical dictionaries
`as "addressable storage." IEEE Dictionary of Electrical
`and Electronics Terms (6th ed. 1996)) at 645; The
`Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE Standards Terms (7th
`ed. 2000)) at 684 (Exhs. L & N to Schwartz Decl., ECF
`Nos. 75-12 & 75-14).
`
`The Court adopts [*12] GSI's construction.
`
`B. "Address Signal" (claims 1, 2, 12 & 16 of the '134
`Patent)
`
`Go to table2
`
`The parties appear to agree that the claimed "address
`signal" is limited to being one that determines the
`"address location in the memory array" - that is to say,
`whether the claim requires an addressable memory
`array.
`
`Again, the language of the claim terms supports GSI's
`construction. The specification uses the terms "memory"
`and "memory array" interchangeably. '134 Patent at
`2:30-38, 3:2-4. Given
`this,
`the surrounding claim
`
`language in both limitations is most plausibly read as
`requiring that the address signal determine the address
`location in the memory array. Cypress's construction, on
`the other hand, would read out of the claims the
`requirement that the plurality of storage elements, and
`the logic circuit, respond to "an internal address signal,"
`and "an external address signal." '134 Patent 5:24-26,
`5:28-29. Cypress's construction gives meaning to the
`term [*13] "address," a term understood to have a
`particular meaning by one of ordinary skill in the art, and
`adapts it to apply in the context of the claim language.
`
`The Court adopts GSI's construction.
`
`C. "sensing read data" (claims 1, 8, 15, 18, 24, 35 &
`43 of the '477 Patent)
`
`Go to table3
`
`This dispute over claim scope has evolved over the
`course of briefing. The parties agree that the process of
`"sensing" can be understood as "detecting." At least
`from the briefing, the parties appeared to dispute
`whether the "detecting" process claimed in these patent
`claims necessarily also involves amplifying. Open. Br.
`18:12-19:2; GSI's Responsive Claim Construction Brief
`("Resp. Br.") 30:4-6, ECF No. 74. Cypress, proposing a
`limitation on its own patent's scope, [*14] argues that
`amplifying is an essential requirement of the claimed
`process of "detecting." See Plaintiff Cypress's Reply
`Claim Construction Brief at 16:21-22, n. 4 ("Cypress
`would not oppose the adoption of [GSI's] construction
`with the additional guidance that 'detecting read data
`includes amplifying'").
`
`Cypress's strongest argument comes not from the use
`of the term "detecting," but rather from the fact that, in
`the fifth element of claim 1, the entity performing the
`"detecting" is a "sense amplifier." The specification also
`notes at numerous places that it is a sense amplifier that
`performs the detecting function. '477 Patent at 4:1-3,
`4:6-7, 6:48, 7:7-9, 8:57-60.
`
`In English, if a person said "I used a chisel to hammer
`that nail," we would not assume that the person actually
`chiseled the nail. To the contrary, the fact that the
`person used the verb "hammer" implies that she
`probably did not use the chisel for its customary
`function; she probably used the chisel in a manner more
`befitting a hammer. Since any solid, hand-held object is
`capable of being used as a hammer, we would
`understand that the person probably gave the chisel a
`
`Brian Cook
`
`Petitioner STMicroelectronics, Inc., Ex. 1012
`IPR2021-00355, Page 5
`
`

`

`2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105363, *14
`
`Page 5 of 9
`
`non-customary use by banging it against the top of the
` [*15] nail instead of carefully cutting into the nail or
`carving it.
`
`But we are not speaking English. We are speaking
`patent law. And in light of the claim language and the
`other aspects of the intrinsic record, it seems plain that
`the "detecting" process claimed in this claim limitation is
`one through which values are amplified. If the claimed
`"amplifiers" detect without amplifying, then they are not
`amplifiers in any way, and the patentee would not have
`identified
`them as such. They would be called
`"detectors" or "sensors." A person of ordinary skill in the
`art would understand that, when a "sense amplifier" is
`called upon to perform a "detecting" function, it does so
`by first amplifying.
`
`In the papers, GSI argued that "none of the asserted
`claims (or any of the other claims of the '477 patent)
`recite amplifying the read data — rather, the claimed
`step is 'sensing' the data." Resp. Br. 30:6-8. But this just
`reinforces the fact that the claimed "sensing" process
`includes amplifying. Since data must be amplified to be
`read, since there is no specific process identified for
`amplifying before detection, and since
`"sense
`amplifiers" are the components identified as "detecting,"
`amplifying must [*16] be part of the "detecting" process.
`Just as GSI persuaded the Court to construe the terms
`discussed supra in light of the surrounding claim
`language, the Court is persuaded here by Cypress to
`construe the claimed "detecting" process with reference
`to the surrounding "amplifier" language.
`
`is
`it
`the extent
`"Sensing" means "detecting." To
`necessary to resolve a dispute between the parties as to
`claim scope, the Court concludes that the "sensing"
`process claimed in these terms involves amplifying.
`
`At the hearing, however, it did not appear that the
`parties disputed whether the claimed "sensing" includes
`a process of amplification. To
`the contrary, GSI
`proposed a new "compromise" construction explicitly
`acknowledging as much: "amplifying read data resulting
`in the detection of read data." This new proposal brings
`GSI's understanding of claim scope vanishingly close to
`Cypress's most recent understanding of claim scope
`from its reply brief: "detecting read data" . . . "with the
`additional guidance that 'detecting read data includes
`amplifying."3
`
`GSI argues that its construction is necessary because
`Cypress's construction could be read to encompass
`post-detection amplification
`that
`is unrelated
`to
`detection. That is to say, it is possible that a juror might
`apply Cypress's "amplifying and detecting" construction
`in a disjunctive sense, concluding that any process of
`"amplifying" is "sensing," and that any process of
`"detecting"
`is also
`"sensing." Cypress's second
`"construction" also could be understood in this manner,
`since a juror might read the directive "sensing read data
`includes amplifying" to mean that any process of
`"amplifying"
`is
`"included" within
`the process of
`"sensing."
`
`recent
`to GSI's most
`Cypress's only objection
`construction is that the words "resulting in" might create
`introduce ambiguities, but the Court sees at least as
`many ambiguities in Cypress's proposed construction.
`Cypress does not argue [*18] from the record that the
`claimed "sensing" process
`includes post-detection
`amplification that is unrelated to the detection process.
`To resolve any dispute between the parties as to claim
`scope, the Court construes "sensing read data" as
`"amplifying read data resulting in the detection of the
`read data."
`
`D. "sending write data"/ "write data is sent across a
`write path" (Claims 1, 8, 18 & 36 of the '477 Patent)
`
`Go to table4
`
`It isn't clear that adding the words "process of" alters the
`meaning of GSI's construction in any way that would be
`particularly obvious to a juror. But from the papers, it is
`clear that the claim dispute the Court must resolve is
`whether the write data must be in movement to qualify
`as being in the process of being "sent."
`
`this dispute can be seen by
`importance of
`The
`examining method claim 8. To perform the fourth step of
`claim 8, the actor must be "sending write data across a
`write data path . . . while sending read data." Cypress
`argues that the actor performing [*19] the claimed
`method step is still "sending" data that is parked in a
`register, provided that the data is somewhere "in transit"
`between the beginning and the end of the process of
`
`3 In most situations, the Court strongly discourages parties
`from proposing new and revised constructions for the first time
` [*17] hearing, since
`at a claim construction
`it unfairly
`
`prejudices
`the parties had
`the other party. But here,
`exchanged claim construction slides well before the hearing,
`and Cypress was aware of GSI's new proposal. In this
`situation, the process of briefing and arguing the parties'
`competing constructions clarified the dispute over claim scope.
`
`Brian Cook
`
`Petitioner STMicroelectronics, Inc., Ex. 1012
`IPR2021-00355, Page 6
`
`

`

`2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105363, *19
`
`Page 6 of 9
`
`detecting the read data. GSI argues the data must be
`moving at the time that the actor sends the read data.
`
`Cypress's argument is based on an analogy to the
`sending of a letter. Open. Br. 20:7-22. When the post
`office sends a letter, the letter often sits in a mailbox or
`a sorting center during the process. But one would still
`understand the letter to be in the process of being sent
`as long as it was somewhere between drop-off and its
`final destination. If the post office said it was "updating
`our website while sending our customer's letter," we
`would not expect the letters necessarily to be moving at
`the time the website was being updated. "Much like a
`letter in transit," Cypress argues, "the signals described
`in the '477 Patent move from place to place — stopping
`in one place for a short time before moving on the next
`place." Id. 20:21-22.
`
`This is fair enough, as far as it goes. But Cypress's
`analogy is apt only because of the particular features of
`the post office's sending process, rather than because
`of [*20] any meaning inherent in the word "sending." It
`is only because we understand the U.S. Post Office's
`"sending" process to involve starts and stops that
`Cypress's analogy is on point.
`
`But in other contexts, we would probably understand
`"sending"
`to
`require contemporaneous movement,
`without any starts and stops. For example, imagine the
`same letter-sending process from the perspective of the
`letter-writer rather than the postal service. The writer is
`only "sending" the letter while she is writing the address,
`affixing a stamp, and taking it to be dropped in a
`mailbox. If the writer said she was "whistling a tune
`while sending a letter," we would probably assume she
`was whistling while walking the letter to the post office,
`or while dropping it inside a mailbox. We would probably
`not assume she was sitting at her desk whistling while a
`letter sat in her office outbox waiting to be picked up in
`the afternoon mail.
`
`The question is whether, in light of the intrinsic and
`extrinsic record, the "sending" process claimed in the
`Patent is more akin to the first use of the term "sending"
`or the second.
`
`GSI primarily cites language in the specification that
`uses the words "while" and "is sent." See, [*21] e.g.,
`'477 Patent 4:18-19 ("While sensing the read data, write
`data is sent across a write data pass"). But the use of
`these words does not strongly indicate whether the
`process is more like the first example discussed supra
`or more
`like
`the second. GSI argues
`that
`the
`specification suggests that the write data path must be a
`
`conduit for "concurrent movement of data." But the
`specification actually says only that the path "allow[s]"
`concurrent movement, not that all movement across the
`path must necessarily always be moving continuously
`and concurrently with sensing. Id. 3:37. And GSI
`profoundly overreaches by arguing
`that Cypress's
`expert had previously argued that actual movement is
`required to satisfy the claim language. While this is true,
`the expert stated that "data that is sitting in the register
`or in the buffer qualifies as moving data." Exh. J to
`Hoffman Decl.
`
`Cypress, on the other hand, has a stronger argument
`from the specification. Figure 5 includes a graphic
`depiction of the "read" and "write" processes. That figure
`indicates data momentarily at various components
`within the circuit while still in the process of being sent.
`The shaded hexagonal between overlap 98 and overlap
` [*22] 100 depicts a point in the process in which the
`data arrives and waits at the final stage of the write path
`for reading, or "sensing" to finish. This demonstrates
`that the claimed "sending" process claimed is not
`necessarily limited to one in which data continually
`moves throughout the process. As Cypress is entitled to
`the broadest possible scope of the claim language, the
`Court does not construe the term to contain the
`limitation GSI urges the Court to impose.
`
`The Court adopts Cypress's construction of this term.
`
`E. Agreed Constructions
`
`The parties agree on the following constructions, see
`ECF No. 88, and the Court adopts them at the parties'
`request:
`
`Go to table5
`
`IV. CONCLUSION
`
`The Court construes the identified claim terms as stated
`above.
`
`IT IS SO ORDERED.
`
`Dated: July 29, 2014
`
`/s/ Jon S. Tigar
`
`JON S. TIGAR
`
`Brian Cook
`
`Petitioner STMicroelectronics, Inc., Ex. 1012
`IPR2021-00355, Page 7
`
`

`

`2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105363, *22
`
`Page 7 of 9
`
`United
`
`States
`
`District
`
`Judge
`
`Brian Cook
`
`Petitioner STMicroelectronics, Inc., Ex. 1012
`IPR2021-00355, Page 8
`
`

`

`2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105363, *22
`
`Page 8 of 9
`
`Table1 (Return to related document text)
`Disputed Claim Term
`Cypress's Proposal
`"memory"
`Plain meaning, which
`is "circuit elements
`
`used to store data"
`
`Table1 (Return to related document text)
`
`Table2 (Return to related document text)
`Disputed Claim Term
`Cypress's Proposal
`"address
`Plain meaning, which
`signal"
`is "a signal containing
`location information"
`
`Table2 (Return to related document text)
`
`GSI's Proposal
`"addressable storage"
`
`GSI's Proposal
`"a signal for determining
`the address location in the
`memory array from which
`
`data is read to or to which
`
`data is written"
`
`Table3 (Return to related document text)
`Disputed Claim
`Cypress's Proposal
`Term
`(In Opening Briefs)
`"detecting read data"
`Plain meaning, which
`is "amplifying and
`
`GSI's Proposal
`(In Opening Briefs)
`Detecting read data
`
`Disputed Claim
`Term
`"detecting read data"
`
`detecting read data"
`Construction Unopposed
`by Cypress (In Reply Brief)
`"Detecting read data,"
`"with the additional
`
`GSI's Revised Proposal
`(At Hearing)
`"Amplifying read data
`resulting in the
`
`guidance that 'detecting
`
`detection of read data"
`
`read data includes
`
`amplifying'"
`
`Table3 (Return to related document text)
`
`Table4 (Return to related document text)
`Disputed Claim Term
`"sending write data"/"write
`data is sent across a write
`path"
`
`Cypress's Proposal
`Plain meaning, which is "the
`process of moving the write
`data across a write path"
`
`Table4 (Return to related document text)
`
`GSI's Proposal
`Moving write
`data across a
`write path
`
`Table5 (Return to related document text)
`Patent
`Claim Term
`Joint Proposed Construction
`'477
`Latch
`One or more latches
`In Parallel
`Separately from
`
`While
`
`Partially concurrent or concurrent
`
`'134
`
`Non-Interruptible
`
`Cannot be stopped or terminated once initiated
`
`Brian Cook
`
`Petitioner STMicroelectronics, Inc., Ex. 1012
`IPR2021-00355, Page 9
`
`

`

`2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105363, *22
`
`Page 9 of 9
`
`Patent
`
`Claim Term
`Predetermined number
`
`Joint Proposed Construction
`A fixed number of internal address signals
`
`of internal
`
`address signals
`
`Table5 (Return to related document text)
`
`End of Document
`
`Brian Cook
`
`Petitioner STMicroelectronics, Inc., Ex. 1012
`IPR2021-00355, Page 10
`
`