Case 2:20-cv-00123-JRG-RSP Document 61 Filed 08/03/20 Page 1 of 16 PageID #: 664
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
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`ESTECH SYSTEMS, INC.
`
`
`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`TARGET CORPORATION
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`
`
`Case No. 2:20-cv-00123-JRG
`LEAD CASE
`
`
`Case No. 2:20-cv-00122-JRG
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`
`Case No. 2:20-cv-00126-JRG
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`
`Case No. 2:20-cv-00127-JRG
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`Case No. 2:20-cv-00128-JRG
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`§
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`DEFENDANTS WELLS FARGO & COMPANY AND WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.’s,
`RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO ESTECH’S
`MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND INFRINGEMENT CONTENTIONS
`
`
`PLAINSCAPITAL BANK
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`BOKF, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
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`BBVA USA BANCSHARES, INC.
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`WELLS FARGO & COMPANY, ET AL.
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`Defendants.
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`Estech Systems, Inc. (“Estech”) dropped the ’349 Patent from the case against Wells Fargo
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`Bank, N.A. and Wells Fargo & Co. (collectively, “Wells Fargo”), and for two reasons, this Court
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`should not allow Estech to add it back into the case. First, Estech’s amendment is futile because,
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`as Wells Fargo detailed in its Motion to Dismiss, (a) Estech has not stated a claim for infringement
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`of the expired ’349 Patent sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion; and (b) Estech’s
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`infringement contentions do not satisfy the disclosure requirements under P.R. 3-1. See Dkt. 22.
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`Second, Estech has not established good cause for the amendment under P.R. 3-6(b).
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`STATEMENT OF FACTS
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`
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`On April 28, 2020, Estech filed its Complaint against Wells Fargo alleging infringement
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`of four patents, including the ’349 Patent. See Compl. (Dkt. 1) ¶¶ 53–63. The ’349 Patent was
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`filed on December 31, 1997, issued on May 23, 2000, and central to this case, expired on December
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`31, 2017. On June 19, 2020, Wells Fargo filed its Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) on the
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`grounds that Estech has not stated a claim for infringement of the ’349 Patent because, among
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`other grounds, its allegations do not satisfy the notice requirements and because Estech did not—
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`and cannot—allege that Wells Fargo knew about the ’349 Patent before the Complaint, and without
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`such knowledge, Estech cannot show entitlement to damages. See Dkt. 22.
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`On July 6, 2020, Estech served its court-mandated infringement contentions. In its eight-
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`page cover pleading, Estech made the following disclosures as to its infringement allegations here
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`none of which disclosed, identified, or referenced the expired ’349 Patent:
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`• “P.R. 3-1(a): Identification of Infringed Claims,” identifying and defining the ’298,
`’684, and ’699 Patents as the “Asserted Patents,” identifying allegedly infringed
`claims of the the ’298, ’684, and ’699 Patents, and omitting any reference to the
`’349 Patent or claims of the ’349 Patent:
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`1
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`Dkt. 43-2, at ECF pg. 2.
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`
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`• “P.R. 3-1(b):
`identifying
`Instrumentalities,”
`of Accused
`Identification
`instrumentalities for the ’298,’684, and’699 Patents, and omitting any reference to
`the ’349 Patent or claims of the ’349 Patent. Dkt. 43-2, at ECF pg. 2–5.
`• “P.R. 3-1(c): Claim Charts,” stating that Estech was attaching claim charts
`“identifying specifically where each element of each asserted claim is found within
`the accused instrumentalities . . . attached hereto as Exhibit A (’298 Patent), Exhibit
`B (’684 Patent), and Exhibit C (’699 Patent). Dkt. 43-2, at ECF pg. 6.
`• “P.R. 3-1(d): Disclosure of Literal Infringement and Infringement under the
`Doctrine of Equivalents,” in which Estech cited Exhs. A–C (corresponding to charts
`for the’298,’684, and’699 Patents), to support its position that each claim limitation
`for each asserted claim is infringed literally and under the doctrine of equivalents.
`• “P.R. 3-1(e): Disclosure of Priority Claims,” identifying the priority date of the
`’298, ’684, and ’699 Patents, but omitting any reference to the ’349 Patent or its
`priority date.
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`Dkt. 43-2, at ECF pg. 6.
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`Along with providing no “single claim chart” for the ’349 Patent, Estech did not mention
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`the ’349 Patent in any of the six sections of its eight-page disclosure identifying the asserted patents
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`and related information required under the Local Patent Rules. Accordingly, Estech made clear in
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`its infringement contentions it was no longer asserting the ’349 Patent, which was reasonable
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`considering Wells Fargo’s position in its Motion to Dismiss that the expired ’349 Patent should
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`not have been asserted in the first place.1
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`1 Given Estech’s clear exclusion of the ’349 Patent from its infringement contentions, there was
`no “omission” to clarify with Estech. See Mot. at 1. Estech’s position it was no longer asserting
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`2
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`On July 14, 2020, Wells Fargo filed its Reply in support of its Motion to Dismiss, and in
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`reliance on Estech’s infringement contentions devoid of any reference to the ’349 Patent, did not
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`advance any further arguments.
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`On July 15, 2020, Estech advised Wells Fargo it “inadvertently omitted” the ’349 Patent
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`from its infringement contentions. Instead of serving its amended infringement contentions
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`immediately, Estech elected to make service contingent on receipt of Wells Fargo’s position on
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`Estech’s Motion for Leave to Amend. On July 16, 2020, Wells Fargo advised Estech of its position
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`on Estech’s Motion for Leave to Amend, and made itself available on July 17, 2020 for a meet and
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`confer.
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`ARGUMENT
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`I.
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`Estech’s Motion Should be Denied Because the Proposed Amendment Cannot
`Survive Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss and Does Not Satisfy the Local Patent Rules’
`Disclosure Requirements, and is, Therefore, Futile.
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`Estech’s proposed amendment to add back the ’349 Patent to the case should be denied
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`because it is futile. When addressing a motion for leave to amend, courts in this district consider
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`whether the proposed amendment would be futile. E.g., IDB Ventures, LLC v. Charlotte Russe
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`Holdings, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 3d 541, 554 (E.D. Tex. 2018) (considering whether amendments to
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`the complaint and infringement contentions would be futile). If the proposed amendment would
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`not survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, then the amendment is futile and the motion for leave should
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`be denied. Raytheon Co. v. Indigo Sys. Corp., No. 4:07-CV-109, 2008 WL 3852715, at *3 (E.D.
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`Tex. Aug. 14, 2008) (“[I]f the revision would not survive a motion made under Rule 12(b)(6), the
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`motion for leave to amend should be denied.”).
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`the ’349 Patent was so obvious from its infringement contentions, Wells Fargo was not “left
`wondering” why the ’349 Patent was not included at all in the contentions. See id. at 5.
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`3
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`Here, Estech’s Motion to add the ’349 Patent back into to this case is futile for two reasons.
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`First, Estech’s proposed infringement contentions do not—and, indeed, cannot—cure the fatal
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`deficiencies in the Estech’s Complaint as laid out in Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss,
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`incorporated by reference.2 Estech’s Complaint does not plausibly allege infringement of the ’349
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`Patent because Estech fails to specify any particular accused instrumentalities, and fails to allege
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`pre-suit knowledge or marking of the ’349 Patent.3 See Dkt. 22. at 4; Dkt. 43, at 2–3. Indeed,
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`Estech failed to identify a single product or infringing act by Wells Fargo, and failed to allege any
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`plausible basis for pre-suit knowledge of the ’349 Patent. This failure to allege any basis for pre-
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`suit knowledge dooms Estech’s claims for recovery of any alleged indirect infringement or willful
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`infringement of the ’349 Patent because it expired in December 2017, nearly three years before
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`this lawsuit. Therefore, unlike the other three asserted patents, which have not expired, Estech
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`cannot rely on the Complaint’s providing notice of the ’349 Patent to satisfy its pleading
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`requirements. Since Estech’s amendment adding back the ’349 Patent will not survive a Rule
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`12(b)(6) motion, the amendment is futile and Estech’s Motion should be denied.
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`Second, Estech’s amendment is also futile because Estech’s proposed contentions for the
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`’349 Patent do not satisfy the disclosure requirements in the Local Patent Rules. Patent Rule 3-1
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`mandates that infringement contentions provide “‘particular theories of infringement with
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`2 Estech’s July 6, 2020, Infringement Contentions are deficient as a whole. Wells Fargo identified
`many of the deficiencies in its Reply in support of its Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 43), and after
`compliance with the Court’s meet-and-confer requirements, may seek the Court’s assistance with
`any remaining deficiencies.
`3 The ’349 Patent has both method and system claims. See Huawei Techs. Co. v. T-Mobile US,
`Inc., 2017 WL 4183103, at *2-3 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 4, 2017) (“Neither the term ‘patented’ nor the
`term ‘article’ necessarily implies that the marking statute is limited solely to the device or
`apparatus claim that the patentee is asserting in the ‘infringement action’ . . . . As a result, a logical
`interpretation of the statute is that a patentee must mark any product covered by any claim of the
`asserted patent.”).
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`4
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`sufficient specificity to provide defendants with notice of infringement beyond that which is
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`provided by the mere language of the patent [claims] themselves.’” Davis-Lynch, Inc. v.
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`Weatherford Int'l, Inc., No. CIV.A. 6:07-CV-559, 2009 WL 81874, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 12, 2009)
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`(emphasis added) (alteration in original) (quoting STMicroelectronics, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 308
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`F. Supp. 2d 754, 755 (E.D. Tex. 2004)). Most relevant here, Rule 3-1(b) requires Estech to
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`identify, “[s]eparately for each asserted claim, each accused apparatus, product, device, process,
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`method, act or other instrumentality . . . of [the] opposing party of which the party is aware,” and
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`Rule 3-1(c) requires “[a] chart identifying specifically where each element of each asserted claim
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`is found within each Accused Instrumentality.” P.R. 3-1(b) & (c). Crucially, Estech cannot “rely
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`on vague, conclusory language or simply mimic the language of the claims” in its infringement
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`contentions. Davis-Lynch, 2009 WL 81874, at *2 (emphasis added); see also Connectel, LLC v.
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`Cisco Sys., Inc., 391 F. Supp. 2d 526, 528 (E.D. Tex. 2005) (“PICs providing vague, conclusory
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`language or simply mimicking the language of the claims when identifying infringement fail to
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`comply with Patent Rule 3-1.”).
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`Similar to Estech’s deficient Complaint, the proposed amendment for the expired ’349
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`Patent does not meet even the minimum specificity requirements under P.R. 3-1(c), justifying
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`denial of Estech’s Motion. Estech used generic descriptors of equipment and systems used by
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`virtually every commercial enterprise today. For example, Estech identifies (1) “[s]ervers and
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`networking equipment (e.g., hubs, switches, routers and server) that provide VoIP services
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`(including voice mail) to Wells Fargo’s VoIP telephony devices, including, but not limited to
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`servers that provide VoIP services to Wells Fargo,” and (2) “VoIP telephony devices . . . including,
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`but not limited to” a list of a dozen different business telephones. See Ex. 1, Estech’s Proposed
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`Am. Disclosure of Asserted Claims & Infringement Contentions (“Proposed Infringement
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`5
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`Contentions”), at 5. Estech’s repeated use of “including, but not limited to” and Estech’s attempt
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`to shoe-horn in “all related software for the hardware components identified” amplifies the
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`boundless nature of these alleged instrumentalities. Id. This Court has previously recognized that
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`the use of such “catch-all language,” which “puts the onus on [the accused infringer] to determine
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`what devices infringe,” is contrary to the intent of the Patent Rules. Alacritech Inc. v. CenturyLink,
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`Inc., No. 2:16-CV-00693-JRG-RSP, 2017 WL 3007464, at *3 (E.D. Tex. July 14, 2017). Without
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`additional context and details, it is impossible for Wells Fargo to identify what systems or
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`equipment Estech’s proposed contentions reference.
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`Further, Estech’s proposed contentions do not satisfy P.R. 3-1(c) because they consist
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`entirely of “vague, conclusory language [that] simply mimic[s] the language of the claims.” Davis-
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`Lynch, 2009 WL 81874, at *2. In its proposed six-page claim chart for the ’349 Patent, Estech
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`identifies six claims and eleven elements (not counting the preambles), but, for the disclosure of
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`“Infringing Product/Structure/Act,” Estech does not provide even a single citation, reference,
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`diagram, or picture, as demonstrated in Estech’s proposed disclosure for Claim 1:
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`6
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`See Ex. 2, Exhibit D to Estech’s Proposed Infringement Contentions (emphasis added).
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`Instead of actually providing the requisite disclosure, Estech resorts to referencing vague
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`instrumentalities and parroting the exact language used in the claims. See Ex. 2, Exhibit D to
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`Estech’s Proposed Infringement Contentions. The highlighting in the above excerpt confirms this;
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`Estech’s infringement contentions for Claim 1 largely recite the claim language word-for-word.
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`While it is true infringement contentions “are not meant to provide a forum for litigation on the
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`substantive issues,” they must at least be reasonably precise and detailed enough to put the
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`defendant on notice as to the plaintiff’s theory of infringement. Realtime Data, LLC v. Packeteer,
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`Inc., No. 6:08-cv-144, 2009 WL 2590101, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 2009). Here, Estech’s
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`proposed amendment fails to satisfy even the most minimal specificity requirements.
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`7
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`Rather than providing the requisite specificity, Estech instead relies extensively on this
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`Court’s software limitation provisions in the Court’s Sample Discovery Order. Specifically, for
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`ten of the eleven elements in the six asserted claims in the proposed amendment, Estech contends
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`“Wells Fargo’s specific implementation is defined in its source code, so this is a software limitation
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`under Section 3(a) of Chief Judge Gilstrap’s Sample Discovery Order for Patent Cases.” E.g.,
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`Ex. 2, at 1. Instead of citing the Court’s Sample Discovery Order for a legitimate purpose—i.e.,
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`as a placeholder for claim elements that truly are software—Estech uses the provision to delay
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`disclosure to Wells Fargo or to mask its own deficient pre-suit investigation.4 Either way, after a
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`supposedly sufficient pre-suit investigation and nearly three months into the case, Estech cannot
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`satisfy its obligations under the Patent Rules with anything more than the claim language and a
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`plan to supplement based on source code review. Indeed, Estech provides no explanation for why
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`it needs source code review for asserted claim limitations directed to components of VoIP
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`telephony networks and systems to comply with its disclosure requirements.
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`Accordingly, because Estech’s proposed amendment lacks both specificity and
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`particularity, it does not satisfy the requirements of P.R. 3-1. Estech’s Motion is therefore futile,
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`and should be denied.
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`4 Estech’s strategy of characterizing almost every element in its proposed amendment as a
`“software limitation” simply compounds the lack of specificity and notice to Wells Fargo
`regarding Estech’s theory of infringement. Section 3(a) of the Court’s Sample Discovery Order
`provides that a party need not comply with P.R. 3-1 for software limitations until 30 days after
`source code “for each Accused Instrumentality is produced by the opposing party.” As stated
`above and argued in Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss, Estech’s Complaint and infringement
`contentions fail to give notice to Wells Fargo as to the actual identity of the products which Estech
`allege infringe, and thus by invoking the source code for each of these unidentified products,
`Estech simply exacerbates the deficient nature of its contentions and allegations.
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`8
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`II.
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`Estech’s Motion Should Be Denied Because It Has Not Established Good Cause for
`Leave to Amend.
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`Estech’s Motion should be denied because Estech has not established good cause to add
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`the ’349 Patent back into the case. Because Estech seeks to amend for reasons unrelated to claim
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`construction, Patent Rule 3-6(b) requires a showing of good cause, based on a four-factor analysis:
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`“(1) the explanation for the party’s failure to meet the deadline, (2) the importance of what the
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`court is excluding, (3) the potential prejudice if the court allows that thing that would be excluded,
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`and (4) the availability of a continuance to cure such prejudice.” IDB Ventures, 360 F. Supp. 3d
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`at 549. Here, based on this four-factor analysis, the Court should deny Estech’s Motion.
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`a.
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`Estech’s Explanation for Failure to Meet the Deadline Justifies Denial.
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`Estech’s complete exclusion of the ’349 Patent from its infringement contentions could not
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`have been inadvertent. Forgetting to attach a single claim chart, forgetting to list one patent among
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`many, or forgetting to list one asserted claim might qualify as inadvertent, unintentional, or
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`accidental. This situation is dramatically different. As shown here and in Wells Fargo’s Reply to
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`its Motion to Dismiss, Estech completely dropped the ’349 Patent from its infringement
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`contentions. See Dkt. 43, at 1 n.1. It cannot be the case that excluding from your infringement
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`contentions 25% of the patents asserted is mere inadvertence.
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`Indeed, the ’349 Patent is pointedly absent from the cover pleading and attachments Estech
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`served on the infringement contentions deadline, which indicates exclusion, not oversight. See
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`Dkt. 43-2. Furthermore, the cover pleading identifies Defendants Wells Fargo & Co. and Wells
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`Fargo Bank. N.A. by name, suggesting that the contentions were not prepared en masse for all
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`defendants in the now-consolidated cases, but specifically for Wells Fargo, and thus the ’349
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`Patent was intentionally omitted from the contentions prepared for Wells Fargo. Accordingly,
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`Estech’s exclusion of the ’349 Patent in its entirety could not have been inadvertent.
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`To the extent Estech’s “simple oversight and mistake” justification for omitting the ’349
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`Patent boils down to an excuse that Estech confused its allegations against Wells Fargo with other
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`cookie-cutter allegations it has brought against other defendants in which Estech did not assert the
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`’349 Patent, that is the result of lack of preparedness rather than inadvertence, and yet another
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`symptom of Estech’s bringing suit against Wells Fargo (and the other defendants) based on nothing
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`more than conjecture and supposition. The Patent Rules impose a burden on patent plaintiffs to
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`“formulate, test, and crystallize their infringement theories before stating their preliminary
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`infringement contentions.” Connectel, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 527 (emphasis added); see Alacritech,
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`2017 WL 3007464, at *1 (“The Patent Rules demonstrate high expectations as to plaintiffs’
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`preparedness before bringing suit . . . .”). Here, where Estech’s contentions are so generic and
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`unspecific so as to be interchangeable between alleged infringers—such that it is not immediately
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`obvious to Estech it served the “wrong” contentions omitting an entire patent—Estech has not
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`provided the requisite detail in its infringement theories as required by the Patent Rules. While
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`inadvertent mistake can suffice as an explanation for why leave to amend could be required in
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`some circumstances, the exigencies of the case at hand do not support Estech’s attempt to take
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`cover behind a supposed oversight, and thus this factor weighs against amendment.
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`b.
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`Estech’s Amendment Is Not Important Because It Is Futile.
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`As discussed, Estech’s proposed amendment is futile, and therefore, cannot be important.
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`“[A] court, in assessing the importance of an amendment, must make a ‘pragmatic judgment on
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`the likelihood that the newly asserted [claim] will succeed.’” IDB Ventures, 360 F. Supp. 3d at
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`554 (quoting Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1455, 2017 WL 1512334, at
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`*5 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2017)). Here, Estech’s infringement claims for the ’349 Patent will not
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`succeed because (1) Estech has not stated a claim sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion; and
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`(2) Estech’s proposed contentions do not satisfy the disclosure requirements of P.R. 3-1.5 Given
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`Estech’s election to file a deficient complaint and to serve deficient infringement contentions, the
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`’349 Patent is not important, and this factor weighs in favor of denying Estech’s Motion.
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`c.
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`Permitting Amendment Prejudices Defendants.
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`Allowing Estech to add back the ’349 Patent unfairly prejudices Wells Fargo in at least
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`two ways. First, Estech’s continued failure to comply with the disclosure requirements prejudices
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`Wells Fargo. Despite filing suit months ago, Estech has yet to comply with disclosure
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`requirements for both its pleadings and infringement contentions, begging the question: at what
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`point will Wells Fargo know Estech’s infringement allegations? The Patent Rules contemplate
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`that infringement contentions result in a “clear path,” in which the contentions “focus[] discovery
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`on building precise final infringement . . . contentions and narrow[] issues for Markman, summary
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`judgment, trial, and beyond.” Davis-Lynch, 2009 WL 81874, at *2. Ideally, the parties should be
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`well on their way to narrowing the case, but instead Estech’s proposed contentions for the ’349
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`Patent herald the infliction of expansive and burdensome discovery obligations for Wells Fargo.
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`As discussed, Estech’s amendment is not only unlimited—repeatedly using “including, but not
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`limited to,” and shoe-horning in for each “instrumentality” “all related software for the hardware
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`5 In addition, Estech argues that including the ’349 Patent in this case is important to the Court’s
`docket because Estech has also asserted it against Target Inc. and the Regus Group, other
`defendants in the consolidated case. However, both Target and the Regus Group have already
`moved to dismiss Estech’s infringement claims relating to the ’349 Patent for reasons similar to
`those expressed in Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss. See Dkt. 35; Estech Systems, Inc. v. Regus
`Mgmt. Grp., LLC, No 2:20-cv-143-JRG-RSP, Dkt. 11 (E.D. Tex. June 22, 2020). Accordingly,
`Estech’s deficient claims regarding the ’349 Patent will not move forward against any defendant,
`justifying denial of Estech’s request to add it back into this case. Moreover, Estech’s contention
`that adding the ’349 Patent avoids the burden of parallel proceedings on the Court belies the fact
`that it is Estech’s disregard for the Court’s rules and deadlines regarding service of infringement
`contentions—as well as its failure to prepare adequately prior to suit and provide sufficient
`contentions—which has resulted in the instant motion practice.
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`components . . . and systems that employ those hardware components”—but also non-specific,
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`with its vague references to generic “[s]ervers and networking equipment.” Estech’s amendment
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`is no notice to Wells Fargo of what it is being accused of, and thus imposes an impossible and
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`unfair burden on Wells Fargo. Permitting Estech’s claims on the ’349 Patent to proceed on such
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`limitless contentions would condone an expansive fishing expedition at Wells Fargo’s expense.
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`Accordingly, allowing Estech’s amendment prejudices Wells Fargo.
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`Secondly, because Wells Fargo reasonably understood the lack of contentions for the ’349
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`Patent to mean that Estech had abandoned the ’349 Patent, Wellss Fargo did not specifically
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`address the ’349 Patent in its Reply to the Motion to Dismiss. See Dkt. 43, at 8 (“As an initial
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`matter, since Estech did not serve infringement contentions for the ’349 patent, it is no longer
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`asserting the ’349 patent against the Defendants, and thus at least effectively concedes that it is not
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`entitled to any damages relating to alleged infringement of the ’349 patent.”). To the extent the
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`’349 Patent is added back to the case, Wells Fargo should be permitted additional briefing to
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`address it as it relates to the pending Motion to Dismiss.
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`For at least these two reasons, this factor weighs in favor of denying Estech’s Motion.
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`d.
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`A Continuance Will Not Cure the Prejudice to Wells Fargo to Respond to
`Deficient Contentions.
`
`A continuance will not ameliorate the prejudice discussed above, namely that the ’349
`
`Patent—which never should have been asserted—will be added back to the case. This prejudice
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`is not rooted in any sort of time constraint related to a set trial date, but instead stems from Estech’s
`
`extraordinarily unbounded and non-specific infringement contentions. Because the proposed
`
`infringement contentions for the ’349 Patent—like the Complaint—are not limited in any
`
`meaningful way, a continuance would do little, if anything, to address the prejudice their inclusion
`
`would create. As such, this factor weighs in favor of denying the motion.
`
`12
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`CISCO EXHIBIT 1022
`Page 13 of 16
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`

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`Case 2:20-cv-00123-JRG-RSP Document 61 Filed 08/03/20 Page 14 of 16 PageID #: 677
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`Accordingly, because all four factors weigh against granting leave to amend, Estech has
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`not shown good cause for amendment, and its Motion should be denied.
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`III. CONCLUSION
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`For the foregoing reasons, Wells Fargo respectfully requests the Court to deny Estech’s
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`Motion for Leave to Serve Amended Infringement Contentions.
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`
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`
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`13
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`CISCO EXHIBIT 1022
`Page 14 of 16
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`Case 2:20-cv-00123-JRG-RSP Document 61 Filed 08/03/20 Page 15 of 16 PageID #: 678
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`Dated: August 3, 2020
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted, by:
`
`/s/ Danielle Williams
`
`E. Danielle T. Williams
`North Carolina Bar No. 23283
`dwilliams@winston.com
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`300 S. Tryon Street, 16th Floor
`Charlotte, NC 28202
`Telephone: (704) 350-7790
`Facsimile: (704) 350-7800
`
`Dustin J. Edwards
`Texas Bar No. 24042335
`dedwards@winston.com
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`1111 Louisiana Street, 25th Floor
`Houston, TX 77002
`Telephone: (713) 651-2600
`Facsimile: (713) 651-2700
`
`Thomas M. Melsheimer
`Texas Bar No. 1392250
`tmelsheimer@winston.com
`James T. Underwood
`Texas Bar No. 24102587
`tunderwood@winston.com
`Katherine A. Marcom
`Texas Bar No. 24102137
`kmarcom@winston.com
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`2121 N. Pearl Street, Suite 900
`Dallas, TX 75201
`
`ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS,
`WELLS FARGO & COMPANY AND
`WELLS FARGO, N.A.
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`CISCO EXHIBIT 1022
`Page 15 of 16
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`Case 2:20-cv-00123-JRG-RSP Document 61 Filed 08/03/20 Page 16 of 16 PageID #: 679
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document has
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`been served on all counsel of record via the Court’s ECF system on August 3, 2020.
`
`
`
`
`/s/ Danielle Williams
`Danielle Williams
`
`
`
`
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`CISCO EXHIBIT 1022
`Page 16 of 16
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`