IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`WACO DIVISION
`
`6:20-CV-00663-ADA
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`§§§§§§§§
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`KOSS CORPORATION,
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`PLANTRONICS, INC. AND
`POLYCOM, INC.,
`Defendants.
`
`ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE
`UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
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`Came on for consideration this date is Defendants Plantronics, Inc. and Polycom, Inc.’s
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`(collectively “Poly”) Motion to Transfer to the Northern District of California (“NDCA”)
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`pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). After careful consideration of the Motion, the Parties’ briefs,
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`and the applicable law, the Court GRANTS Defendant Poly’s Motion to Transfer.
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`I. INTRODUCTION
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`A party seeking a transfer to an allegedly more convenient forum carries a significant
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`burden. Babbage Holdings, LLC v. 505 Games (U.S.), Inc., No. 2:13-CV-749, 2014 U.S. Dist.
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`LEXIS 139195, at *12–14 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 1, 2014) (stating the movant has the “evidentiary
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`burden” to establish “that the desired forum is clearly more convenient than the forum where the
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`case was filed”). The burden that a movant must carry is not that the alternative venue is more
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`convenient, but that it is clearly more convenient. In re Volkswagen, Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 314 n.
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`10 (5th Cir. 2008) (hereinafter “Volkswagen II) (emphasis added). The Court finds that Poly has
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`satisfied its significant burden to establish that NDCA is a clearly more convenient venue and
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`transfer is warranted.
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`Bose Exhibit 1099
`Bose v. Koss
`IPR2021-00297
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`1
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`

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`A. Section 1404 Transfer
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`II. LEGAL STANDARD
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`Title 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) provides that, for the convenience of parties and witnesses, a
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`district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have
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`been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented. “Section 1404(a)
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`is intended to place discretion in the district court to adjudicate motions for transfer according to
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`an ‘individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness.’” Stewart Org., Inc.
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`v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988) (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622
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`(1964)). The party moving for transfer carries the burden of showing good cause. Volkswagen II,
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`545 F.3d at 314 (“When viewed in the context of § 1404(a), to show good cause means that a
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`moving party, in order to support its claim for a transfer, must . . . clearly demonstrate that a
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`transfer is ‘[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.’”) (quoting
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`28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)).
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`“The preliminary question under § 1404(a) is whether a civil action ‘might have been
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`brought’ in the destination venue.” Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 312. If so, in the Fifth Circuit, the
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`“[t]he determination of ‘convenience’ turns on a number of public and private interest factors,
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`none of which can be said to be of dispositive weight.” Action Indus., Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar.
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`Co., 358 F.3d 337, 340 (5th Cir. 2004). The private factors include: “(1) the relative ease of
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`access to sources of proof; (2) the availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of
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`witnesses; (3) the cost of attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all other practical problems
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`that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” In re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d 201,
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`203 (5th Cir. 2004) (hereinafter “Volkswagen I”) (citing to Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S.
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`235, 241 n.6 (1982)). The public factors include: “(1) the administrative difficulties flowing from
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`2
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`court congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized interests decided at home; (3) the
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`familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case; and (4) the avoidance of
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`unnecessary problems of conflict of laws of the application of foreign law.” Id. Courts evaluate
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`these factors based on “the situation which existed when suit was instituted.” Hoffman v. Blaski,
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`363 U.S. 335, 343 (1960).
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`A plaintiff’s choice of venue is not an independent factor in the venue transfer analysis,
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`and courts must not give inordinate weight to a plaintiff’s choice of venue. Volkswagen II, 545
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`F.3d at 313 (“[W]hile a plaintiff has the privilege of filing his claims in any judicial division
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`appropriate under the general venue statute, § 1404(a) tempers the effects of the exercise of this
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`privilege.”). However, “when the transferee venue is not clearly more convenient than the venue
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`chosen by the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s choice should be respected.” Id. at 315; see also QR Spex,
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`Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 507 F.Supp.2d 650, 664 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (characterizing movant’s burden
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`under § 1404(a) as “heavy”).
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`III. BACKGROUND
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`Plantronics, Inc. and Polycom, Inc. are Delaware Corporations with their principal places
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`of business in Santa Cruz, California. Pl.’s Compl., ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 5–6. In 2018, Plantronics
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`acquired Polycom. Id. at ¶ 7. Plantronics and Polycom conduct their combined operations under
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`the name “Poly.” Id. Poly has one office in Austin, Texas where it sells, develops, and markets
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`its products. Id. at ¶ 8. However, Poly contends that its presence in the Western District and its
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`“satellite office” in Texas had no involvement with the accused products, no employees relevant
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`to this case, and no relevant documents. Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 29 at 1.
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`Plaintiff Koss Corp. is a Delaware Corporation with its principal place of business in
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`Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Pl.’s Compl. at ¶ 2. Koss markets a line of headphones and audio
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`3
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`accessories that are sold in at least eight cities in the Western District of Texas, including Waco.
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`Id. at ¶ 3. However, Koss owns no land, makes no products, and employs no personnel in Texas.
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`Def.’s Mot. at 2.
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`Koss filed this lawsuit on July 22, 2020, alleging patent infringement against Poly for
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`making, having made, using, importing, supplying, distributing, selling, or offering to sell its
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`Blackbeat-branded headphones (“the Accused product”). Pl.’s Compl. at ¶¶ 63, 76, 89, 102.
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`Specifically, Koss alleges infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 10,206,025 (“’025 patent”),
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`10,368,155 (“’155 patent”), 10,469,934 (“’934 patent”), 10,506,325 (“’325 patent”). Id. Koss
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`asserts that these patents relate to “the wireless headphone and wearable technology space.” Id.
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`at ¶ 56.
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`On December 18, 2020, Poly filed this motion to transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. §
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`1404(a). Def.’s Mot. at 1. Specifically, Poly requests that this Court transfer the instant case from
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`the Western District of Texas (“WDTX”) to the Northern District of California (“NDCA”). Id.
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`IV. ANALYSIS
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`As a preliminary matter, neither party contests the fact that venue is proper in NDCA and
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`that this case could have been filed there.
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`A. The Private Interest Factors Weigh In Favor of Transfer.
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`i. The Relative Ease of Access to Sources of Proof
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`Poly argues that the relative ease of access to sources of proof favors transfer to NDCA.
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`Def.’s Mot. at 9. Specifically, Poly notes that all U.S. documents pertaining to the conceptual
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`and functional design, development, and market of the accused products are located within
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`NDCA in Santa Cruz, California. Id. Further, Poly notes that third-party documents—
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`4
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`particularly Apple’s documents concerning Apple Siri, Apple Music, and Apple iPhones—
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`potentially relevant to this case are also located in NDCA. See generally, Def.’s Mot.
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`In response, Koss attacks Poly’s argument that all relevant U.S. documents are located in
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`NDCA by noting that “like most international corporations, Poly is set up to allow the share of
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`relevant information to whatever location that needs the information.” Pl.’s Opp. at 5–6. Koss
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`further suggests that the memories of deposition witnesses have proven faulty. Id. at 6.
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`Consequently, Koss infers that such witnesses are unlikely to or need not testify at trial. Id.
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`Moreover, Poly argues that WDTX is in fact more convenient than NDCA. Id. Specifically, Koss
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`observes that its IT vendor, Synectics, is located in Texas. Id. at 7. The servers, where Koss’s
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`alleged relevant documents are located in Dallas in the Northern District of Texas. Id.
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`In reply, Poly correctly notes that this factor concerns the physical location of relevant
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`documents and not their general accessibility. Def.’s Reply at 1. Furthermore, Poly observes that
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`Koss only shows that relevant documents were accessible in a number of cities outside the U.S.
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`but does not show that the documents were ever accessed from Texas. Id. Additionally, Poly
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`argues that Koss has incorrectly conflated two issues. Id. Specifically, Poly alleges that Koss’s
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`treatment of witnesses as sources of proof is inappropriate and that the present factor only relates
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`to the ease of access of non-witness evidence. Id. at 2. Moreover, Poly argues that the location of
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`documents held by Koss’s IT vendor, Synectics, is irrelevant. Id. Poly notes that the Federal
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`Circuit has rejected the use of vendors “to create ‘a fiction’ that documents are stored in Texas.”
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`Id. (quoting In re Hoffman-La Roche Inc., 587 F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). Finally, Poly
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`notes that, to prevail on this factor, it does not need to demonstrate that each and every relevant
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`document is located in NDCA. Id. Consequently, Poly concludes that this factor weighs heavily
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`in favor of transfer.
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`5
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`This Court determines that this factor weighs in favor of transfer. First, we address
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`Koss’s attack on the credibility of Poly’s witnesses. It is not proper for this court, when
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`considering a motion to transfer venue, to probe the credibility of witnesses. See RMail Ltd. V.
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`DocuSign, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-299-JRG, 2012 WL 1416299, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 24, 2012)
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`(noting that regardless of the weight a fact-finder may give a witness at trial, their status in the
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`court’s venue analysis is not altered because the movant claims their future testimony is
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`irrelevant and that such aspersions cannot draw the Court’s analysis into a speculative
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`discounting of a witness’s value). Thus, Koss’s attempt to discount the memories of Poly’s
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`witnesses is not relevant to the Court’s analysis here. Instead, this Court leaves such
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`determinations to the ultimate fact-finder.
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`Second, Poly overstates the scope of the Federal Circuit’s holding in In re Hoffman-La
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`Roche. There, the Federal Circuit did not hand down a blanket, categorical ban on using vendor
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`documents. Rather, the Federal Circuit’s concern was that the nonmovant relocated a number of
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`its documents from California to Texas to “manipulate the propriety of venue.” Hoffman, 587
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`F.3d at 1336–37. The court noted that “section 1404(a) should be construed to prevent parties
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`who are opposed to a change of venue from defeating a transfer which, but for their own
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`deliberate acts or omissions, would be proper, convenient, and just.” Id. (quoting Van Dusen v.
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`Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 624 (1964)) (internal quotes omitted). The Federal Circuit then reasoned
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`that a “plaintiff’s attempts to manipulate venue in anticipation of litigation or a motion to transfer
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`falls squarely within these prohibited activities.” Id. Here, Poly does not allege that either Koss
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`or Synectics moved these documents to Synectics’s Texas servers in preparation for litigation or
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`the motion at hand. Thus, Poly’s reliance on Hoffman is misplaced.
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`6
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`Third, this Court rejects Koss’s argument that the location of Poly’s documents is less
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`relevant because they are accessible from any Poly office. Fifth Circuit precedent makes clear
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`that this factor speaks to the physical location of documents; it does not concern the locations
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`from which such documents are accessible. See In re Genentech, 556 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir.
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`2009) (“[T]he place where the defendant’s documents are kept weighs in favor of transfer to that
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`location.”) (emphasis added). Although this Court views this precedent as at odds with the
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`realities of modern patent litigation, until the Fifth Circuit changes this precedent this Court is
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`bound by that rule.
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`Having dispensed with these preliminary matters, this Court now weighs the arguments
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`and evidence germane to this factor. After carefully reviewing both, this Court determines that
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`this factor favors transfer to NDCA. This Court agrees with Poly that its engineering
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`documents—pertaining to the design and development of the accused features and products—
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`and Apple’s documents weigh in favor of transfer. However, we do not agree with Koss that its
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`documents on Synectics’s servers weigh against transfer. Those documents are not even stored
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`within this district. Instead, Synectics’s servers are located in Dallas within the Northern District
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`of Texas. Poly’s showing that additional, third-party documents—Apple’s documents—are
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`located in NDCA further tips the scales in favor of transfer. Consequently, Poly has pointed to
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`both party and non-party sources of proof that are located in NDCA whereas Koss has not
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`identified any sources of proof from this District. Thus, this Court concludes that the relative
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`access to sources of proof weighs in favor of transfer.
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`ii. The Availability of Compulsory Process to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses
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`Poly contends that the availability of compulsory process weighs strongly in favor of
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`transfer to NDCA. Def’s Mot. at 11. Poly identifies four of its former employees that it intends
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`7
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`to call as witnesses. Def’s Mot. at 10. Specifically, Victoria Pires—a former Poly Senior Product
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`Manager—supervised the “design and development of accused functionalities, including the
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`relevant software and connectivity with smart phones such as Apple iPhones.” Id. at 4. But Poly
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`notes that Ms. Pires lives in Mountain View, California in NDCA. Id. Further, Poly maintains
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`that Ms. Pires, as well as three other third-party witnesses, will not testify unless compelled to do
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`so by subpoena. Id. at 10.
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`Poly further contends that because its former employees are not currently employed by a
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`codefendant Poly’s case for transfer is stronger than the case for transfer in Parus. Id. at 11.
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`While in Parus the third-party witnesses were employees of the co-defendant, the third-party
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`witnesses, here, are not. Id. Since the decision in Parus indicated that the availability of
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`compulsory process was neutral, the Court determine that the factor favors transfer in light of
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`Poly’s stronger showing. Id.
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`Koss argues that its third-party vendor, Synectics, and its key contact, Mr. Tom Petrone,
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`fall within this Court’s subpoena power whereas they do not fall within the subpoena power of
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`NDCA. Pl.’s Opp. at 7. Mr. Petrone is the co-owner of Koss’s IT vendor Synectics. Id.
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`Moreover, Koss argues that Poly’s alleged key third-party witnesses are, in fact, all equally
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`suited to provide the same testimony. Id. at 8. Thus, Koss concludes, “the ability to compel these
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`[witnesses] to attend trial is of little consequence.” Id. Koss further contends that Hytham
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`Alihassan resides in Austin, Texas. Id. Since Mr. Alihassan lives within this Court’s subpoena
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`power and outside that of NDCA, Koss contends that his testimony, as well as that of Mr.
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`Petrone, weigh against transfer. Id. at 9.
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`In its Reply, Poly argues that the availability of compulsory process to secure witnesses
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`heavily favors transfer. Pl.’s Reply at 2. Specifically, Poly notes that NDCA has subpoena power
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`8
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`over Michael Sagan, a key inventor witness, as well as four third-party witnesses. Id. While Koss
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`argues that Poly’s witnesses did not reveal specific knowledge critical to the merits of the case,
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`Poly responds by noting that this argument is legally and factually deficient. Id. Poly notes that
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`the Fifth and Federal Circuits have held that movants need not prove specific knowledge of a
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`potential witness. Id. at 3. Poly argues that Koss’s arguments are factually deficient by noting
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`that witnesses were provided with a broad and unanswerable memory test. Id. Nevertheless, the
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`witnesses indicated that they had special knowledge pertaining to the accused products and
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`features. Id.
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`Poly replies to Koss’s argument that the relevance of Poly’s witnesses is undercut by the
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`fact that the accused features were designed abroad; Poly notes that the engineering—albeit
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`performed outside the U.S.—was directed by these former employees. Id. at 4. Thus, Poly argues
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`that the product managers that it offers as witnesses have more important information than the
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`foreign engineers who also worked on the accused products. Id.
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`Poly summarizes by asserting that there are no relevant witnesses in WDTX. While Koss
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`asserts that Mr. Alihassan has relevant information, it has provided no indication of what that
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`information is. Id. Poly also disputes whether Mr. Petrone has any important information to
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`offer. Id. Consequently, Poly argues that the availability of compulsory process weighs in favor
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`of transfer. Id.
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`This Court determines that the available sources of proof weighs in favor of transfer. This
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`Court affords party witnesses little weight. ADS Sec. L.P. v. Advanced Detection Sec. Servs.,
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`Inc., No. A-09-CA-773-LY, 2010 WL 1170976, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 23, 2010). Such
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`witnesses—especially employee witnesses—are given little weight because the Parties can
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`compel them to testify at trial. Gardipee v. Petroleum Helicopter, 49 F. Supp. 2d 925, 929 (E.D.
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`9
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`Tex. 1999). Conversely, because the Parties cannot compel third-party witnesses to testify in the
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`way they can compel their employee witnesses, the convenience of third-party witnesses is given
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`considerable weight. See id. Importantly, this Court attaches weight to this factor to the extent
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`that the third-party witnesses are unwillingly to testify. Turner v. Cincinnati Insurance Co., No.
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`6:19-cv-642-ADA-JCM, 2020 WL 210809, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 1, 2020) (“[T]he compulsory
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`process factor weighs against transfer when neither side claims a witness would be unwilling to
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`testify.”) (citing Peregrine Myanmar Ltd. V. Segal, 89 F.3d 41, 47 (2d Cir. 1996)).
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`Here, Poly offers four third-party witnesses. All of these witnesses—Ms. Pires
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`especially—have key testimony; Ms. Pires, Mr. Criswell, and Mr. Kiner all played a role in the
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`design and development of the accused products or features. Def.’s Mot. at 5. Ms. Michelle
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`Viegas led the marketing of multiple accused products and features. Thus, Poly’s third-party
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`witnesses have relevant testimony to give. The witnesses have also indicated that they are
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`unwilling to travel to WDTX unless compelled to do so. Consequently, this Court determines
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`that Poly’s third-party witnesses weigh heavily in favor of transfer.
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`In contrast, Koss—in its brief—points to only two witnesses: Mr. Petrone and Mr.
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`Alihassan. Mr. Alihassan, as a Poly employee, is a party witness and, thus, this Court affords him
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`little weight in this analysis. Mr. Petrone, however, is a third-party witness. With that said, Mr.
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`Petrone is unlikely to testify as the evidence sought from Synectrics concerns documents stored
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`on its servers.
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`Thus, Koss has four relevant third-party witnesses who are all unwilling to testify if trial
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`is held in WDTX. However, Koss presents one party witness and a third-party witness who is
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`unlikely to testify at trial. Consequently, this Court determines that this factor weighs in favor of
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`transfer.
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`10
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`iii. The Cost of Attendance for Willing Witnesses
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`The convenience of witnesses is the single most important factor in the transfer analysis.
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`In re Genentech, 566 F.3d at 1342. The Court should consider all potential material and relevant
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`witnesses. See Alacritech Inc. v. CenturyLink, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-00693-JRG-RSP, 2017 WL
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`4155236, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Sep. 19, 2017). The convenience of party witnesses is given little
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`weight. Sec. L.P. v. Advanced Detection Sec. Servs., Inc., No. A-09-CA-773-LY, 2010 WL
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`1170976, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 23, 2010), report and recommendation adopted in A-09-CA-
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`773-LY (ECF No. 20) (Apr. 14, 2010).
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`Poly argues that this factor also weighs in favor of transfer. Def’s Mot. at 12. Poly argues
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`that this venue is inconvenient for its employee witnesses, who must travel from Poly’s
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`headquarters in NDCA to WDTX. Id. 11–12. Moreover, Poly once again raises its non-party
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`witnesses, particularly Ms. Pires. Id. at 12. These witnesses would have to deal with long flight
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`times and for Ms. Pires—who is immunocompromised—this could prove hazardous. Id.
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`In response, Koss argues that the witnesses that Poly cites should be given little weight.
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`Pl.’s Opp. at 9. Specifically, Koss reiterates that Poly’s former employees have “no unique
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`relevant knowledge that makes them important to the case.” Id. Additionally, Koss contends that
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`its Synectics witnesses and Mr. Alihassan established that WDTX is a more convenient venue
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`for willing witnesses. Id. at 9–10. Finally, Koss observes that the cost of room and board in
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`Waco is much lower than that in NDCA. Id. at 10.
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`In reply, Poly observes that Koss’s argument regarding the cost of attendance of willing
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`witnesses merely rehashes its arguments concerning the availability of compulsory process. Pl.’s
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`Opp. at 4. While Koss argues that little weight should be given to Poly’s party witnesses, Poly
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`responds by noting that requiring a large number of employees to travel a significant distance
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`11
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`from their homes would incur a substantial cost that would be avoided by simply transferring the
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`case. Id.
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`This Court determines that this factor weighs in favor of transfer. Beginning with party
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`witnesses, Poly asserts that NDCA is more convenient for its employee witnesses whereas Koss
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`asserts that WDTX is more convenient for its party witnesses. Importantly, Mr. Alihassan—a
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`Poly employee—is a party witness; thus, this Court affords Mr. Alihassan’s convenience little
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`weight as to determining this factor. Since both parties have witnesses from each district, the
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`Parties’ employee witnesses—if they do not weigh in favor of transfer—at the very least are
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`neutral.
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`This Court now examines the third-party witnesses. Poly points to four witnesses that
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`have information relevant to the design and development of the accused products and features.
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`Even if this Court determines that Ms. Pires, Mr. Kiner, and Mr. Criswell all have duplicate
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`testimony, it is at least clear that the information that they would offer is distinct from what Ms.
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`Viegas would offer. Thus, Poly identifies at least two third-party witnesses for whom trial in
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`NDCA would be more convenient and less costly. Koss on the other hand offer Mr. Petrone as a
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`third-party witness. However, Mr. Petrone is unlikely to testify at trial. Koss offers Mr. Petrone
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`primarily because he is the co-owner of Synectics—Koss’s IT vendor. But all of Synectics’s
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`relevant information is contained in electronic documents stored on its Dallas servers. Apart
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`from this, Koss does not statee what Mr. Petrone would testify to at trial. Consequently, Poly
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`offers at least two third-party witnesses with varied information for whom NDCA would be less
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`costly and more convenient, whereas Koss provides only one third-party witness—who will
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`likely not be called upon to testify—for whom WDTX would be more convenient. Thus, this
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`Court determines that the third-party witnesses weigh in favor of transfer.
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`12
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`Since the party witnesses are at least neutral and the third-party witnesses weigh in favor
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`of transfer, this Court determines that the cost to witnesses factor weighs in favor of transfer.
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`iv. All Other Practical Problems That Make Trial of a Case Easy, Expeditious and Inexpensive
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`Poly argues that judicial economy favors transfer because this case is in its early stages.
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`Def.’s Mot. at 12. Moreover, Poly contends that Koss cannot inoculate itself against transfer via
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`filing multiple related law suits in this court. Id .at 13. Further, Poly observes that its co-
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`defendants have also filed motions to transfer. Id. Specifically, Bose and Skullcandy have filed
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`motions to dismiss for improper venue whereas Apple has filed a motion to transfer to NDCA.
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`Id. Thus, to the extent that co-pending litigation weighs against transfer, that weight is undercut
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`by the filing of motions to transfer. Id.
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`In response, Koss argues that NDCA has not held a patent trial in almost a year. Pl.’s
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`Opp. at 10. Further, Koss attempts to undermine Poly’s contention that this case is still in the
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`early stages of litigation; particularly, Koss asserts that “[t]he parties have been actively involved
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`in advancing this case towards trial over the last six months” and that transferring this case will
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`result in a delayed trial date. Id. Moreover, Koss appeals to co-pending litigation; Koss has filed
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`related suits against four other defendants. Id. Koss further notes that it filed all co-pending suits
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`concurrently and that Poly has not submitted any petitions for Inter Partes Review regarding the
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`patents-at-issue. Id. at 10–11.
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`Poly argues that all other practical problems favor transfer. Pl.’s reply at 5. Specifically,
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`Poly argues that this case is still in its early stages. Id. In reply to Koss, Poly notes that although
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`the parties have proposed preliminary claim constructions, this does not constitute effort on the
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`part of the Court. Id.
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`13
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`This Court determines that this factor weighs slightly against transfer. This Court has
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`recently decided to deny Apple’s motion to transfer venue. Consequently, at least one co-
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`pending litigation has been retained by this Court. Retaining this case in WDTX would promote
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`judicial economy by avoiding duplicate procedures such as claim construction for example.
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`As to Poly’s argument that this litigation is still in its early stages. This Court notes that
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`the proper inquiry under § 1404(a) is what is most convenient for the Parties and witnesses.
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`Turner, 2020 WL 210809, at *5. While the Court agrees with Poly that the Parties’ proposals of
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`preliminary claim constructions has not required any act on the part of this Court, it is
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`nonetheless an act of the Parties and thereby relevant to this analysis. Further, even if this Court
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`finds that this case is still in the early stages of litigation; this is not a positive reason in favor of
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`transfer. After all, wherever this Court transfer the instant case the litigation will be in its early
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`stages as to that district. Thus, Poly’s showings on this matter do not show how this factor to
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`some extent weighs in favor of transfer; rather, Poly’s arguments merely mitigate Koss’s
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`arguments above concerning co-pending litigation.
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`Thus, the existence of co-pending related litigation in this district weighs against transfer
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`whereas the fact that this case in the early stages of litigation is merely neutral. Consequently, the
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`Court determines that this factor weighs slightly against transfer.
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`B. The Public Interest Factors Weighs in Favor of Transfer.
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`i. Administrative Difficulties Flowing From Court Congestion
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`Poly argues that Court congestion is neutral. Def.’s Mot. at 13. Poly argues that the
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`Federal Circuit has ruled that this factor is neutral as to transfers from WDTX to NDCA. Id.
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`Additionally, Poly argues that NDCA has historically decided cases faster than WDTX. Id.
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`Finally, Poly notes that this factor lends itself to speculation and, therefore, should not be used to
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`override the other factors. Id. at 14.
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`Koss responds by asserting that WDTX has advanced cases to trial and reduced court
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`congestion in a manner that NDCA has not. Pl.’s Opp. at 11. Koss emphasizes that the
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`touchstone for this factor is “the speed with which a case can come to trial and be resolved.” Id.
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`(quoting In re Apple, 929 F.3d 1332, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2020)). Koss asserts that the time-to-trial
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`has been determined in this District but is unknown in NDCA. Id.
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`This Court determines that this factor slightly weighs against transfer. This Court
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`acknowledges the Federal Circuit’s warning that this factor is the most speculative. In re
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`Genentech, 566 F.3d at 1347. But, nonetheless, it is unquestionable that WDTX is advancing
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`cases through the trial phase and alleviating docket congestion, whereas NDCA is not. Pl.’s Opp.
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`at 11. Because this fact weighs against transfer and Poly does not dispute this contention in its
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`reply, this Court determines that this factor weighs against transfer.
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`ii. Local Interest in Having Localized Interests Decided at Home
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`Poly argues that NDCA has a strong local interest in deciding this case. Def.’s Mot. at 14.
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`Poly first notes that mere presence within a district is not sufficient to establish a local interest;
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`rather, there must be a connection between the facts of the case and the venue district. Id. Poly
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`notes that such connections here are especially tenuous. Id. Specifically, Poly has only a small,
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`satellite office in Austin. The accused products were designed and engineered in NDCA, where
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`Poly’s principal offices are. Id. Additionally, the plaintiff, Koss, has not substantial contacts with
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`this district. Id. at 15.
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`In response, Koss argues that Poly has provided no evidence as to what activities its
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`Austin office performs. Pl.’s Opp. at 11. Specifically, Koss contends that Mr. Tom Puorro is the
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`general manager of Poly’s Austin office and that he leads product development. Id. at 12.
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`Regardless of the relevance of these activities, Koss argues that Poly’s presence within this
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`District on its own weighs against transfer. Id. at 12. Koss notably does not address the extent to
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`which NDCA has a local interest in resolving this case.
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`Poly responds by noting that Koss’s argument that Mr. Puorro’s testimony matters
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`clashes with its prior claim that the testimony of product managers—particularly Victoria Pires
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`and the other former employee witnesses—is less weighty than that of engineers. Pl.’s Reply at
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`5. Further, Poly notes that the accused products and features are discontinued, Mr. Puorro works
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`in McKinney, Texas outside WDTX, and Mr. Puorro has only worked for Poly since 2019. Id.
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`Finally, Poly concludes by noting that none of its Texas employees, including Mr. Puorro, has
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`every worked on the accused products. Id.
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`This Court determines that this factor weighs in favor of transfer. Notably, this factor
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`most notably regards not merely the parties’ significant connections to each forum writ large, but
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`rather the “significant connections between a particular venue and the events that gave rise to a
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`suit.” In re Apple Inc., 979 F.3d 1332, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Poly has noted that the accused
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`products and features were designed and developed in NDCA. While Koss has asserted that Tom
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`Puorro is a product development lead in Poly’s Austin office, Koss has not provided sufficient
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`evidence indicating that Mr. Puorro oversaw the development of the accused features or
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`products. To the contrary, Poly has stated that none of its Texas employees have worked on the
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`accused product. Thus, the facts that gave rise to this suit have more connections with NDCA
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`than they do with WDTX. Consequently, this Court determines that the instant factor weighs in
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`favor of transfer.
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`iii. Familiarity of the Forum With the Law That will Govern the Case
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`The parties contend, and this Court agrees, that this factor is neutral.
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`iv. Avoidance of Unnecessary Problems of Conflict of Laws or in the Application of Foreign
`Law
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`The parties contend, and this Court agrees, that this factor is neutral.
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`V. CONCLUSION
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`The Public Factors weigh in favor of transfer. Specifically, the parties assert and this
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`Court agrees that two of the factors are neutral. While this Court has determined that the court
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`congestion factor slightly weighs against transfer, this Court has held that the local-interest factor
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`definitively weighs in favor of transfer. After carefully weighing these factors against each other
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`in light of the Parties’ showings as to both, this Court concludes that the Public Factors weigh in
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`favor of transfer.
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`Moreover, the private factors weigh decidedly in favor of transfer. All of the private
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`factors, other than the practical-problems factor, weigh in favor of transfer. However, the Federal
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`Circuit has noted that the practical-problems factor should not be relied upon to override the
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`other factors. In re Google Inc., 2017 WL 977038, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Feb 23, 2017). Thus, where
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`Poly has provided strong showings in the other three private fact