Case 6:19-cv-00236-ADA Document 70 Filed 04/03/20 Page 1 of 35
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`WACO DIVISION
`
`SOLAS OLED LTD.,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`Case No. 6:19-cv-00236-ADA
`
`v.
`
`LG DISPLAY CO., LTD.,
`LG ELECTRONICS, INC., and
`SONY CORPORATION,
`
`Defendants.
`
`SOLAS’S RESPONSIVE CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`“generates, as the gradation signal, a non-light emitting display voltage …” (’137
`patent claim 15) “a non-light emitting display voltage …is generated as the gradation
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`“through a data line . . . through the data line . . . through the data line”” (’137 patent
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`I. DISPUTED TERMS FOR ’137 PATENT ......................................................................................... 1
`A.
`“a gradation current having a current value” (’137 patent claims 10, 36) ......................... 1
`B.
`“gradation signal” (’137 patent claims 10, 15, 36, 37, 39 ) ...................................................... 5
`C.
`signal (’137 patent claim 39) ....................................................................................................................... 8
`D.
`claims 10, 16) ................................................................................................................................................. 10
`E.
`“before” (’137 patent claim 10) / “after” (’137 patent claim 36) ........................................ 13
`II. DISPUTED TERMS FOR ’891 PATENT ....................................................................................... 14
`A.
`“a third thin film transistor …” (’891 patent claims 1, 3) ...................................................... 14
`B.
`“current measuring” (’891 patent claims 1, 3) ......................................................................... 16
`C.
`side of said light emitting diode” (’891 patent claim 3) .................................................................. 18
`III.
`DISPUTED TERMS FOR ’068 PATENT ................................................................................... 20
`A.
`lines” (’068 patent claim 13) .................................................................................................................... 20
`B.
`“patterned” (’068 patent claims 1, 13) ........................................................................................ 24
`C.
`“patterned together” (’068 patent claims 1, 13) ...................................................................... 25
`D.
`“signal lines” (’068 patent claims 1, 13) ...................................................................................... 27
`E.
`“feed interconnections” (’068 patent claims 1, 10, 12, 13, 17) ............................................ 28
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`“wherein all above mentioned elements of the driving circuit are located at a same
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`“formed on said plurality of supply lines along said plurality of supply lines” (’068
`patent claim 1) “connected to said plurality of supply lines along said plurality of supply
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`i
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`TABLE OF EXHIBITS AND ABBREVIATIONS
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`
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`Ex 1 Document Description
`1 Declaration of Richard A. Flasck in support of Solas’s opening
`claim construction brief
`2 U.S. Patent No. 7,907,137
`3 U.S. Patent No. 7,432,891
`4 U.S. Patent No. 7,573,068
`5
`Parties’ joint revised list of terms/constructions dated March 6, 2020
`6 Microsoft Computer Dictionary (3rd ed., 1997), definition of
`“signal”
`7 McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific and Technical Terms (4th ed.,
`1989), definition of “data transmission line”
`8 Merriam-Webster Dictionary (avail. at www.merriam-webster.com,
`accessed Feb 2020), definitions of “along” and “together”
`9 Dictionary.com (avail. at www.dictionary.com, accessed Feb. 2020),
`definitions of “along” and “together”
`10 Defendant LG Display’s petition for inter partes review in IPR2020-
`00177 on the ’891 patent
`11 Defendant LG Display’s expert declaration by Dr. Hatalis in inter
`partes review in IPR2020-00177 on the ’891 patent
`12 U.S. Patent No. 5,106,652
`13 U.S. Patent No. 5,981,317
`14 U.S. Patent Appl. Pub. No. 2002/0101172
`15 U.S. Patent No. 7,250,722
`16 Declaration of Richard A. Flasck in support of Solas’s responsive
`claim construction brief
`17 US Patent App. Pub. 2004/0239596
`Declaration of Douglas R. Holberg in support of Defendants’
`
`opening claim construction brief (Dkt. 67-2)
`
`Abbreviation
`Flasck. Decl.
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`’137 patent
`’891 patent
`’068 patent
`Joint Chart
`MS Dict.
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`McGraw-Hill
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`Merriam-Webster
`
`Dictionary.com
`
`’891 IPR Pet.
`
`’891 IPR Decl.
`
`’652 patent
`’317 patent
`’173 app. pub.
`’722 patent
`Flasck Resp.
`Decl.
`Ono
`Holberg Decl.
`
`
`1 Exhibits 1–15 submitted with Solas’s opening claim construction brief (Dkt. 68-2 to 68-16).
`Exhibits 16–17 are attached to this brief.
`
`ii
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`I.
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`DISPUTED TERMS FOR ’137 PATENT
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`A.
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`“a gradation current having a current value” (’137 patent claims 10, 36)
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`Solas’s Proposed Construction
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`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
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`a current having a current value and conveying
`information about a level
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`an actual current (not voltage) with a value
`corresponding to a luminance level
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`
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`Defendants’ brief attacks a strawman. This term requires that there be a current, and Solas’s
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`construction fully acknowledges that. See Flasck Resp. Decl. ¶¶ 2–8. As both sides recognize, a
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`current is a physical quantity with a broadly accepted meaning. Both sides agree that a current, in
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`the context of the ’137 patent, is a “flow of electric charge.” Defs.’ Br. at 2; Flasck Decl., at ¶ 31.
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`Indeed, both sides cite the same dictionary definition for current:
`
`
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`Microsoft Computer Dictionary (1997), Dkt. 67, Ex. 4; see Flasck Decl., Dkt. 68, Ex. 1, ¶ 66. But
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`Defendants’ construction does not attempt to define current. Rather, they attempts to exclude
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`things that in fact meet the commonly used definition of current from the scope of this term.
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`Contrary to the assertions in Defendants’ opening brief, Solas does not view voltage and
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`current as “interchangeable synonyms.” Defs. Br., Dkt. 67 at 6. Solas enthusiastically agrees that
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`current and voltage are well-defined, distinct electrical phenomena. And Solas has no plan to point
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`to some different type of physical quantity, such as voltage, mass, capacitance, magnetic field, or
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`temperature, and call that other physical quantity a current.
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`Nevertheless, Defendants’ proposed parenthetical “(not voltage)” invites reversible legal
`
`error. Defendants have not shown any disclaimer, let alone one that needlessly requires the
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`negative limitation they seek to import. And, to make matters worse, that negative limitation here
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`concerns an inextricably intertwined electrical phenomena.
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`It is undisputed that current and voltage are inextricable intertwined. Indeed, the intrinsic
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`and extrinsic record are one-sided on this fact. As just one example, Defendants conspicuously did
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`not obtain or present any expert opinions about a POSITA viewpoint on this issue.
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`Despite not presenting any such evidence, Defendants still cannot avoid the well-
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`established fact that the two phenomena are so intertwined. Both sides used an analogy of water
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`flowing through a pipe or hose in explaining the concepts of current and voltage in their opening
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`submissions. Defs.’ Br., Dkt. 67 at 2–3; Flasck Decl., Dkt. 68, Ex. 1, ¶¶ 30–34. As Defendants
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`presented the analogy, “[c]urrent is like the rate at which the water flows, and voltage is like the
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`water pressure that forces the water through the pipe.” Defs.’ Br., Dkt. 67 at 2–3. In the pipe, when
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`you take away the pressure, the flow stops. In an analogous manner, current and voltage in a circuit
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`are interconnected. As Defendants’ expert explains, “‘[v]oltage’ is the potential energy required
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`to move electrons from one point to another in a circuit,” i.e., it provides the energy needed to
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`make a current flow. Holberg Decl., Dkt. 67, Ex. 1, ¶ 26.
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`This connection between the gradation current and voltages is described explicitly in the
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`specification. The gradation current is generated within the gradation signal generation unit from
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`a voltage using a “voltage-current converter.” ’137 patent at 10:45–11:3. This current supplies the
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`electric charges to charge the capacitor with “the voltage component Vdata appropriately
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`corresponding to the gradation signal (display data),” providing a “current/voltage conversion
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`function.” Id. at 22:37–54, 24:38–39. The result of this process is a “gradation voltage” that is
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`applied to the gate of the drive transistor. Id. at 2:49–52, 11:4–13.
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`The claim as written requires a current. Defendants seek to add a new requirement, that
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`there not also be a voltage present. By analogy, they seek to require that the water flow from the
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`pipe even though the pressure is turned off. Even if a current without a voltage were physically
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`possible, such a construction would improperly exclude the preferred embodiments, which utilize
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`both currents and voltages together in delivering signals that control pixel brightness.
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`None of the cases cited by Defendants supports the negative limitations they seek to include
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`here. Cave Consulting does not endorse the use of negative limitations in claim constructions at
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`all. Cave Consulting Group, LLC v. OptumInsight, Inc., 725 Fed. Appx. 988, 990 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
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`(unpublished). In that case, neither party proposed a construction with a negative limitation, and
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`the district court did not adopt such a construction. Id. at 990. In reversing the district court, the
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`Federal Circuit did not adopt any explicit construction, but simply held that when properly
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`construed the claims did not encompass a certain category of embodiments. Id. at 995–96.
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`In Symantec, the effect of the court’s construction was to define the claim term “normal”
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`as “typical attack-free.” Trustees of Columbia U. in City of New York v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d
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`1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2016). This construction was based on clear statements in the specification
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`equating “normal” with “free of attacks.” Id. Likewise, the court’s construction in Mangosoft
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`actually defined the term “migrate” based upon how the term was used in the specification.
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`Mangosoft Intell. Prop., Inc. v. Skype Techs. SA, CIV. A. 2:06-CV-390, 2008 WL 3852740, at *7
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`(E.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2008). In neither case did the court insert extraneous negative limitations into
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`terms with undisputed plain and ordinary meaning, as Defendants seek to do here.
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`In both RFID and Computer Docking Station, the Federal Circuit did endorse a negative
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`limitation. But in each case, the negative limitation was based on a “clear and unmistakable”
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`disclaimer of scope due to statements made during prosecution to distinguish prior art. RFID
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`Tracker, Ltd. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 342 Fed. Appx. 628, 631–32 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
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`(unpublished)); Computer Docking Station v. Dell, 519 F.3d 1366, 1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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`Defendants suggest that the patentee disavowed any use of voltages during prosecution.
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`But the statements cited by Defendants concerning voltages do not meet the “clear and
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`unambiguous” standard required for prosecution disclaimers. Contl. Circuits LLC v. Intel Corp.,
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`915 F.3d 788, 798 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“the statement in the prosecution history must be clear and
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`unambiguous, and constitute a clear disavowal of scope”). The amendment that Defendants point
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`to added a requirement of a “gradation current having a current value.” Dkt. 67, Ex. 5 at 2. It said
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`nothing whatsoever about voltages.
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`As for the statements during prosecution distinguishing the Ono prior art reference,
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`Defendants quote statements from two different paragraphs. In the first of these paragraphs, the
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`applicant described disclosures from Ono and specifically calls out three voltages used in Ono: the
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`“data voltage,” the “threshold voltage,” and the voltage obtained by adding these two voltages.
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`Dkt. 67, Ex. 7 at 32. In the other paragraph, the applicant distinguished Ono, explaining that Ono
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`“does not disclose generating a supplying a gradation current as a gradation signal.” Id. The natural
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`reading of these two paragraphs is that none of the voltages disclosed in Ono is a “gradation
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`current” (due to the uncontroversial fact that a voltage is not a current) and that claim 1 as amended
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`required a “gradation current” (likewise uncontroversial). No narrowing of the claims is suggested
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`by these statements during prosecution beyond what is already explicit in the claims. Nothing in
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`these statements suggests that the claims would not cover an embodiment that contained a
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`gradation current but also contained one or more voltages. And even if such a suggestions could
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`be discerned in the prosecution history, these statements do not meet the standard of “clear and
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`unambiguous” disavowal of such embodiments from the claims.
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`Defendants also suggest that Solas’s construction “would create needless ambiguity” (Dkt.
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`67 at 5), but it is Defendants’ construction that introduces ambiguity. Defendants’ use of the word
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`“actual” appears to suggest that some currents are “actual currents” and that other currents fall
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`short of that lofty designation. But neither Defendants’ opening brief nor the intrinsic record
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`supports this distinction or explains what sort of entity could be a “current” (as in Solas’s
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`construction), but not also be an “actual current” (as in Defendants’ construction). Under
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`Defendants’ construction, the jurors will be left to speculate at what “false currents,” “almost
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`currents,” “partial currents,” or “just-barely currents” are meant to fall outside the scope of “actual
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`current.” But in their speculation, the jurors will be left with the unmistakable impression that the
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`Court put its thumb on the scale and instructed them that “current” in the claims has some special
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`meaning, which excludes things that would otherwise fall within the scope of the term “current.”
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`In construing the term in this manner, the Court would needlessly invite error.
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`“Current” has a clear and undisputed meaning. This term requires that there be a current
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`that meets the requirements of the limitation—nothing more. Defendants’ efforts to limit the
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`claims by excluding currents that meet the plain meaning of this term are unsupported by the
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`record, invite confusion and error, and should be rejected.
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`B.
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` “gradation signal” (’137 patent claims 10, 15, 36, 37, 39 )
`
`Solas’s Proposed Construction
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`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
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`signal conveying information about a level
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`a gradation current with a current value
`sent to a pixel to set a luminance gradation
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`
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`Defendants’ proposed construction wrongly attempts to distort the well understood term
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`“signal” with a lengthy and incorrect construction. But Defendants provide no justification for
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`construing the well understood claim term at all—and certainly no reason for construing it in the
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`way that they want: replacing it with fourteen different words of their choosing.
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`Defendants do not dispute that the term “signal” has a plain meaning. As the intrinsic and
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`extrinsic record make obvious, of course it does. And Defendants also do not—and could not—
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`argue that the patentee disclaimed from that well understood plain meaning or that the patentee
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`acted as his own lexicographer in defining it in his own way. These established points alone are
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`dispositive: the term “signal” needs no further construction. Rather, where a term is used in
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`accordance with its plain meaning, the court should not replace it with different language. Thorner
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`v. Sony Computer Ent. Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“we do not redefine
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`words. Only the patentee can do that.”).
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`Even if the claim term “signal” did need to be replaced, Defendants’ proposed replacement
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`would lead to reversible error. Defendants’ construction incorrectly requires that the “gradation
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`signal” always must be a “gradation current” and have a “current value.” But that contradicts the
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`intrinsic record and excludes embodiments.
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`On the patent specification, Defendants’ proposal contradicts the numerous examples of
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`“gradation signals” that are “non-light emitting display voltages” cited in Solas’s opening brief.
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`Defendants proposal would exclude all this. See Flasck Decl. ¶¶ 72–73. Such constructions are
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`“rarely, if ever, correct.” SanDisk Corp. v. Memorex Prod., Inc., 415 F.3d 1278, 1285 (Fed. Cir.
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`2005). And for their part, Defendants provide no intrinsic or expert testimony that would ever
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`suggest that a POSITA would view this disputed term as one of the “rarely, if ever, correct”
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`scenarios in which to apply this exclusion.
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`On the claims, though they require generating and/or supplying “a gradation current . . . as
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`a gradation signal.” ’137 patent at 58:5–12, 62:55–60, that does not mean that a “gradation signal”
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`as used in the ’137 patent can only ever be a gradation current. If anything, that language suggests
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`the opposite, because if a “gradation signal” is necessarily a “gradation current,” there would be
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`no reason to use both terms in the same claims. And Defendants’ proposal outright contradicts
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`dependent claims, which, consistent with the specification, makes clear that a gradation signal can
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`also be “a voltage.” See ’137 cl. 15, 39.
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`Solas’s proposal, on the other hand, properly explains the plain meaning of this term, in
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`the context of the patent and claims—and does so consistent with the parties’ agreement on other
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`terms. The parties agree that “luminance gradation” means “light-emitting level.” Solas’s
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`construction is consistent with this—and only helps the fact-finder better understand “gradation”
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`as it is used in the “gradation signals” taught in the patent. Flasck Decl. ¶¶ 63–73.
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`Instead of providing any valid reason for construing that claim term, let alone construing
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`it in the overly narrow and distorted manner they seek, Defendants wrongly accuse Solas of
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`“ignor[ing]” surrounding claim language “generates a gradation current having a current value.”
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`Defs.’ Br., Dkt. 67 at 9. But even accepting this premise and ignoring the numerous defects in their
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`proposal, Defendants’ argument only confirms that no construction is necessary. The claim term
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`Defendants proposed construing is “gradation signal”—not the larger claim phrase—and their
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`proposed construction merely seeks to replace the single claim term “signal.” If the surrounding
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`language actually imposes the requirement that Defendants suggest, then there is no need to
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`redundantly burden the construction of “gradation signal” with that requirement as well. US
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`Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (claim construction is “not
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`an obligatory exercise in redundancy.”).2
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`At best, Defendants’ proposal is unhelpful. It incorporates by paraphrase requirements that
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`appear elsewhere in the claims such as the requirement that the “gradation current” be “supplie[d]
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`. . . to the display pixel” or that it be related to the “luminance gradation.” ’137 patent at 58:9–12.
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`2 All emphasis added unless otherwise noted.
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`This is unnecessary and confusing. And again, at worst, their proposal actually excludes
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`embodiments and creates tension with other parts of the intrinsic record, including the actual claim
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`language of dependent claims. Either way, it must fail. And as Defendants make clear with the
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`next “dispute” they raise, they appear to present their baseless and incorrect attorney argument on
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`this claim construction dispute to prop up another incorrect attorney argument on the next dispute.
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`C.
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` “generates, as the gradation signal, a non-light emitting display voltage …”
`(’137 patent claim 15) “a non-light emitting display voltage …is generated as the
`gradation signal (’137 patent claim 39)
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`Under controlling law, a claim is only invalid as indefinite if, when read in light of the
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`specification and prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the
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`art about the scope of the invention. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 898–
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`899 (2014). Defendants bear the burden of proving this defense by clear and convincing evidence.
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`BASF Corp. v. Johnson Matthey, Inc., 875 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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`But LG provides no evidence to meet its burden. Though given the opportunity, it provides
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`no testimony that a POSITA, with the patent and file history in hand, could not make any sense of
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`these dependent claims, as Defendants contend. It provides no other credible evidence to support
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`this incredible position, either. This stands in contrast to the considerable intrinsic and extrinsic
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`evidence provided by Solas. For example, Dr. Flasck’s testimony alone makes clear that, a
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`POSITA would immediately and easily understand the scope of dependent 15 and 39 in light of
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`the intrinsic record, precisely as Solas contends. See, e.g., Flasck Decl. ¶¶ 74–81.
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`Because Defendants bear a heavy burden on this indefiniteness defense, which involves
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`underlying factual questions, these facts alone is dispositive. The law on this point is
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`straightforward. For example, in Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co. Ltd., the Federal Circuit found
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`that Samsung points to no evidence showing the skilled artisans would find [the disputed element]
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`as lacking reasonable certainty in its scope. In contrast, Apple’s expert explained that [the] patent
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`provides skilled artisans with enough information to understand what [the disputed element] means
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`in the patent.” 786 F.3d 983, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Thus, the court held that district court was
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`correct in holding that “Samsung failed to carry its burden [on] indefiniteness,” even if the issue
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`concerned claim construction disputes. District courts have followed this approach as well. Fisher-
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`Rosemount Systems, Inc. v. ABB Ltd., Civ. No. 4:18-CV-00178, 2019 WL 6830806, at *10-11
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`(S.D. Tex. December 12, 2019) ( “patents are not addressed to lawyers, or even to the public
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`generally, but rather to those skilled in the relevant art”—and relying on patentee’s expert
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`testimony on how those skilled in art would understand the term to deny defendant’s summary
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`judgment of indefiniteness); f’real foods, LLC v. Hamilton Beach Brands, Inc., Civ. No. 16-41-
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`CFC, 2019 WL 1648411, at *2 (D. Del. April 16, 2019); (denying summary judgment of
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`indefiniteness because patentee’s technical expert raised an issue of fact.)
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`Instead of providing any convincing evidence, Defendants admittedly only piggyback on
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`their brief, yet fatally flawed, attorney argument that “gradation signal” must be construed as
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`“gradation current.” Defs’ Br. at 9-10 (The [indefiniteness] dispute here rises and falls with the
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`construction of ‘gradation signal.’”). But that fails for the same reasons their construction of
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`“gradation signal” fails. And it is no substitute for clear and convincing evidence in any event.
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`Indeed, even ignoring Solas’s expert, the intrinsic record alone also confirms Defendants
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`could not meet their burden even, if they had tried much harder and actually presented meaningful
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`evidence. That is because the intrinsic and other extrinsic evidence makes clear that Defendants’
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`defense has several fundamental and fatal defects as explained in Solas’s opening brief. See Br. at
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`10–13 (discussing the teachings of patent specification, figures, claims, and dependent claims).
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`This evidence demonstrates and Defendants’ indefiniteness assertion must fail.
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`This evidence stand in sharp contrast to the single substantive case on which Defendants
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`rely, the decades-old Process Control decision, which merely stood for the unremarkable
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`proposition that where “claims are susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation and that
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`interpretation results in a nonsensical construction of the claim as a whole, the claim must be
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`invalidated.” Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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`Here, the exact opposite is true: there is only one reasonable construction: it is Solas’s construction,
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`not Defendants’ tortured construction.
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`D.
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`“through a data line . . . through the data line . . . through the data line”” (’137
`patent claims 10, 16)
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`Solas’s Proposed Construction
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`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
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`plain and ordinary meaning. “a data line” means
`“one or more data lines.” The antecedent basis
`for “the data line” is “a data line.”
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`the gradation current is supplied, the threshold
`voltage is detected, and the compensation
`voltage is applied through the same data line
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`
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`The parties present a legal dispute about the meaning of “a data line” and “the data line.”
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`As to “a data line,” the indefinite article “a” in patent parlance means “one or more.” See Br. at 14
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`(quoting KCJ Corp. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1351, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). “That ‘a’ or
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`‘an’ can mean ‘one or more’ is best described as a rule, rather than merely as a presumption or
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`even a convention.” Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir.
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`2008). Defendants acknowledge this and appear to agree that “a data line” means “one or more
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`data lines.” See Defs.’ Br. at 11.
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`As to “the data line,” it takes antecedent basis from the earlier term “a data line.” But this
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`does not imply a singular data line. Rather: “The use of definite articles ‘the’ or ‘said’ in a claim
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`to refer back to the same claim term does not change the general plural rule, but simply reinvokes
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`that non-singular meaning.” Baldwin at 1342–43 (where a claim element may be plural, a later
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`reference to that same element “does not alter that meaning in the slightest”).
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`Defendants seek an exception to the established rule by requiring all “data line” terms to
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`refer to “the same singular data line.” See Defs.’ Br. at 12. But such exceptions are “extremely
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`limited: a patentee must ‘evince a clear intent’” to limit the term to the singular. Baldwin at 1342.
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`And Defendants are required to show that “the language of the claims themselves, the
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`specification, or the prosecution history necessitate a departure from the rule.” Id. at 1342–1343.
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`Here, Defendants make no showing based on the claims or specification. Neither the claims
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`nor the specification require the recited functions be performed through the same, singular data
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`line. For example, there is no reason the gradation current cannot be supplied through two data
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`lines and the voltage is detected and applied through one or more of those data lines.
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`In similar circumstances, courts have held multiple recited functions need not be performed
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`by a single element. In Elkay Mfg. v. Ebco Mfg. C, the Federal Circuit held that the plain meaning
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`of a claim that recited a feed tube to provide a flow path for delivering liquid and admitting air “is
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`not limited to a single feed tube with a single flow path for both liquid and air.” 192 F.3d 973, 977
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`(Fed. Cir. 1999). And in Freeny v. Fossil Group, the Eastern District held that multiple instances
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`of “the request authorization code” did not require construction and is not limited to “the same
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`request authorization code.” Case No. 2:18-CV-00049-JRG-RSP, 2019 WL 2078783, at *12–16
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`(E.D. Tex. May 10, 2019). As the court explained, “when the claim refers to outputting ‘the request
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`authorization code’ on a first signal, and outputting ‘the request authorization code’ on a second
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`signal, that language means that any of the ‘one or more request authorization codes’ can be
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`outputted on the first and second signals to satisfy the claim.” Id. at *14.
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`As to the prosecution history, Defendants fail to show disclaimer. In response to an
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`anticipation rejection, the applicants distinguished Ono as disclosing detecting a threshold voltage
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`based on “grounding line 6”—as opposed to a “data line.” Defs.’ Ex. 7 at 32; see also Ono at Fig.
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`1, [0027] (distinguishing “grounding conductor 6” from “data line 7,” and never characterizing the
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`grounding conductor as a data line). The applicants never disclaimed the possibility that supplying,
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`applying, and detecting could be performed through different data lines. This is not clear and
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`unmistakable disclaimer. See Golight, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 355 F.3d 1327, 1332 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2004) (where “statements in the prosecution history are subject to multiple reasonable
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`interpretations, they do not constitute a clear and unmistakable” disclaimer). Core Wireless v. LG
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`Elec., Inc., 880 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (same).
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`Defendants’ cited cases are inapposite and do not support its argument. These cases were
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`all discussed and distinguished in Freeny v. Fossil Group above, where the Eastern rejected a
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`similar argument to one Defendants now make. See 2019 WL 2078783, at *16. In In re Varma,
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`the court held that the claim limitation “a statistical analysis request corresponding to two or more
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`selected investments” could not be met by two separate requests where each request has just one
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`selected investment. 816, F.3d 1352 at 1362–63. This is the plain reading of the “corresponding
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`to” language in the claim. See id. No such language exist in the claims here. Likewise in Plano
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`Encryption Techs., LLC v. Alkami, Inc, the court construed “a storage medium having stored
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`therein a plurality of programming instructions” to mean just one storage medium storing the
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`instructions. 2:16-cv-01032, Dkt. 168, 2017 WL 3654122, at *18–22 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2017).
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`Again, this is a plain reading of “having stored therein.” No such limiting language exists in the
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`claims here. Finally, in TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Commc’ns Corp, the court construed “assembl[ing]
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`said video and audio components into an MPEG stream” to mean assembling those components
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`into only one stream because the patent specification required it. 516 F.3d 1290, 1303–04 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2008). Here, there is nothing in the specification that requires the supplying, applying, and
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`detecting functions to be on the same, singular data line.
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`E.
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`“before” (’137 patent claim 10) / “after” (’137 patent claim 36)
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`Term
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`Solas’s Proposed Construction Defendants’ Proposed Construction
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`“before”
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`“after”
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`plain and ordinary meaning
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`earlier in time (not at the same time)
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`plain and ordinary meaning
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`later in time (not at the same time)
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`
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`The Court is not required to construe the simple words “before” and “after.” As the Federal
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`Circuit instructed, “there are limits to the court’s duties at the claim construction stage. For
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`example, courts should not resolve questions that do not go to claim scope, but instead go to
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`infringement, or improper attorney argument.” Eon Corp. IP Holdings v. Silver Spring Networks,
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`815 F.3d 1314, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Indeed, “district courts are not (and shoul