Cypress Semiconductor Corporation v. GSI Technology, Inc., Not Reported in...
`2014 Markman 3735903
`
`2014 WL 3735903
`United States District Court,
`N.D. California.
`
`Cypress Semiconductor Corporation, Plaintiff,
`v.
`GSI Technology, Inc., Defendant.
`
`Case Nos. 13–cv–02013–JST, 13–cv–3757–JST
`|
`Signed July 29, 2014
`
`Go to Markman Construed Terms
`
`Attorneys and Law Firms
`
`David Michael Hoffman, Fish Richardson P.C., Austin, TX,
`Frank E. Scherkenbach, Fish & Richardson, Boston, MA,
`Rudy Y. Kim, Morrison & Foerster, Palo Alto, CA, Thomas
`L. Halkowski, Fish & Richardson P.C., Wilmington, DE, for
`Plaintiff.
`
`Gerald T. Sekimura, Saori Kaji, DLA Piper US LLP, San
`Francisco, CA, Mark D. Fowler, Michael G. Schwartz,
`Michael Gerald Schwartz, Timothy W. Lohse, DLA Piper
`LLP, East Palo Alto, CA, for Defendant.
`
`ORDER CONSTRUING CLAIMS OF U.S.
`PATENT NOS. 6,651,134 AND 7,142,477
`
`Re: ECF No. 74 (Case No. 13–cv–2013)
`
`JON S. TIGAR, United States District Judge
`
`I. INTRODUCTION
`*1 On May 20, 2014, the Court held a hearing for the
`purpose of construing disputed terms in the claims of
`United States Patent Nos. 6,651,134 (“the '134 Patent”) and
`7,142,477 (“the '477 Patent”). Now, after consideration of
`the arguments and evidence presented by the parties, and the
`relevant portions of the record, the Court construes the terms
`as set forth below.
`
`II. BACKGROUND
`
`A. Procedural History
`In
`these now-consolidated action, Plaintiff Cypress
`Semiconductor Corporation (“Cypress”) accuses Defendant
`GSI Technology Inc.'s (“GSI”) of infringing seven patents
`(the “Patents–in–Suit”), including the '134 and '477 Patents,
`which relate to computer memory, and in particular to
`systems and methods for making faster Static Random Access
`Memory (“SRAM”). Consolidated Amended Complaint for
`Patent Infringement, ECF No. 96. Cypress alleges that, by
`manufacturing and selling GSI's SigmaQuad product line,
`among other Cypress products, GSI has directly infringed the
`Patents–in–Suit. Complaint ¶ 21.
`
`GSI denies infringement. GSI Technology, Inc.'s Answer to
`Consolidated Amended Complaint ¶ 4. Pursuant to Patent
`Local Rule 4–3(c), the parties have identified, and briefed
`the construction of, ten terms in the Patents–in–Suit that are
`most significant to the resolution of this case. ECF No. 88.
`However, GSI has also sought inter partes review of five of
`the Patents–in–Suit. GSI has moved to stay this action against
`two of the Patents–in–Suit, and expects to move to stay
`the action against three more patents in August. Therefore,
`pursuant to the Court's May 6 order, ECF No. 102, the Court
`proceeds now to construe only those terms contained in the
`'134 and '477 Patents, the two patents for which GSI has not
`sought inter partes review.
`
`B. Legal Standard
`The construction of terms found in patent claims is a question
`of law to be determined by the Court. Markman v. Westview
`Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc),
`aff'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). “[T]he interpretation to be given
`a term can only be determined and confirmed with a full
`understanding of what the inventors actually invented and
`intended to envelop with the claim.” Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Renishaw PLC
`v. Marposs Societa' per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir.
`1998)). Consequently, courts construe claims in the manner
`that “most naturally aligns with the patent's description of the
`invention.” Id.
`
`The first step in claim construction is to look to the language
`of the claims themselves. “It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent
`law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention to which
`the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’ ” Phillips, 415
`F.3d at 1312 (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water
`Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
`A disputed claim term should be construed in light of its
`
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`“ordinary and customary meaning,” which is “the meaning
`that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art
`in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective
`filing date of the patent application.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at
`1312. In some cases, the ordinary meaning of a disputed
`term to a person of skill in the art is readily apparent, and
`claim construction involves “little more than the application
`of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood
`words.” Id. at 1314. Claim construction may deviate from
`the ordinary and customary meaning of a disputed term only
`if (1) a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own
`lexicographer, or (2) the patentee disavows the full scope of
`a claim term either in the specification or during prosecution.
`Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm't Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362,
`1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
`
`guidance as to the meaning of claims.” Phillips, 415 F.3d
`at 1315. However, while the specification may describe a
`preferred embodiment, the claims are not necessarily limited
`only to that embodiment. Id.
`
`Finally, courts may consider extrinsic evidence in construing
`claims, such as “expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries,
`and learned treatises.” Markman, 52 F.3d at 980. Expert
`testimony may be useful to “provide background on the
`technology at issue, to explain how an invention works, to
`ensure that the court's understanding of the technical aspects
`of the patent is consistent with that of a person of skill in
`the art, or to establish that a particular term in the patent or
`the prior art has a particular meaning in the pertinent field.”
`Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318. However, extrinsic evidence is
`“less reliable than the patent and its prosecution history in
`determining how to read claim terms.” Id. If intrinsic evidence
`mandates the definition of a term that is at odds with extrinsic
`evidence, courts must defer to the definition supplied by the
`former. Id.
`
`C. Jurisdiction
`Since this is an action “relating to patents,” the Court has
`jurisdiction pursuant to U.S.C. § 1338(a).
`
`III. ANALYSIS
`
`*2 Ordinary and customary meaning is not the same
`as a dictionary definition. “Properly viewed, the ‘ordinary
`meaning’ of a claim term is its meaning to the ordinary
`artisan after reading the entire patent. Yet heavy reliance
`on the dictionary divorced from the intrinsic evidence risks
`transforming the meaning of the claim term to the artisan
`into the meaning of the term in the abstract, out of its
`particular context, which is the specification.” Id. at 1321.
`Typically, the specification “is the single best guide to the
`meaning of a disputed term.” Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic,
`Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). It is therefore
`“entirely appropriate for a court, when conducting claim
`A. “Memory” (claims 1, 7, 15 & 17 of the '134 Patent)
`construction, to rely heavily on the written description for
`Disputed Claim Term
`Cypress's Proposal
`GSI's Proposal
`
`
`
`“memory”
`Plain meaning, which is
`“addressable storage”
`
`“circuit elements used to store
`
`data”
`
`Claim 1 recites “a circuit comprising” two elements, the first
`of which is “a memory comprising a plurality of storage
`elements each configured to read and write data in response
`to an internal address signal[.]” '134 Patent 5:23–26, Exh.
`F to Declaration of David M. Hoffman (“Hoffman Decl.”),
`ECF No. 68–7. GSI argues that the “memory” claimed by
`this language is a specific type of memory—“addressable
`storage”—while Cypress contends that the memory claimed
`in this part of the patent extends to the broadest possible use
`of the term “memory.”
`
`customary meaning. Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365. But that only
`begs, rather than answers, the question of what the ordinary
`and customary meaning of this term is. The Court must seek
`the meaning that a person of ordinary skill in the art would
`attribute to the term in the context of the intrinsic and extrinsic
`record, id., rather the meaning the term might carry when
`divorced from the context of the patent. 1
`
`Unless the patentee has acted as her own lexicographer, or
`clearly disavowed the full scope of a claim term, she is
`entitled to the broadest possible scope of a term's ordinary and
`
`Here, the surrounding claim language supports GSI's
`construction. Cypress and GSI both argue that the “memory”
`term should with construed with reference to the language
`following the words “a memory comprising.” 2 Cypress
`argues that “claim 1 expressly sets forth the requirements for
`the claim [sic] memory—namely that it must be a plurality of
`
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`storage elements with a particular configuration.” Cypress's
`Opening Claim Construction Brief (“Open.Br.”) 15:19–22.
`Cypress argues that the post-“comprising” language “sets
`forth the requirements” of the claimed memory. But when
`applying that language, Cypress acknowledges that the
`claimed memory must be a plurality of storage elements,
`and then descends abruptly into generality by admitting
`only that the plurality must have some undefined “particular
`configuration.”
`
`*3 The “particular configuration” is defined specifically
`in the claim language. The plurality of storage elements
`must each be “configured to read and write data in response
`to an internal address signal.” '134 Patent 5:24–26. GSI's
`construction gives meaning to this claim language, and makes
`clear that the memory claimed in claim 1 does not include
`any elements that are used to store data, but only storage
`elements that are “addressable,” meaning they are configured
`to read and write data in response to an internal address label.
`By declining to give meaning to this portion of the claim
`language, Cypress's view of claim scope is too broad. The
`Court is persuaded that one of ordinary skill of the art would
`understand this language to require “addressable storage,”
`rather than encompass any circuit elements that store data. See
`Declaration of Robert Murphy (“Murphy Decl.”) ¶¶ 19–23,
`ECF No. 74–1; cf. Declaration of Vivek Subramanian ¶ 27,
`ECF No. 80–4 (in which Cypress's expert never commits to
`a specific understanding of what the “plain meaning” of the
`claimed “memory” is in the specific context of the patent).
`
`'134 Patent 1:47–50, and describes a process of reading and
`writing data using addresses. Id. 1:11–14, 3:2–4. The Court
`does not limit the claim language to specific embodiments in
`the specification. But the specification fails to indicate that
`the patentee's view of the claimed memory includes elements
`that are not addressable storage.
`
`Cypress's arguments from the specification, on the other hand,
`are unpersuasive. Open. Br. 15:24–16:6. Cypress points to
`standard language of non-exclusivity, such as the statement
`that the memory array may be implemented by “other
`appropriate memory to meet the design criteria of a particular
`implementation.” '134 Patent 2:33–38. However open this
`language might be, it cannot be open enough to include
`elements not contained within the claim language. The claim
`language requires addressable storage.
`
`The Court finds GSI's construction warranted by the intrinsic
`record alone. But it is worth noting that, even if the Court were
`to set aside the context of the surrounding claim language,
`GSI's construction is consistent with the concept of “memory”
`as it would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the
`art. “Memory” is commonly defined in technical dictionaries
`as “addressable storage.” IEEE Dictionary of Electrical and
`Electronics Terms (6th ed. 1996)) at 645; The Authoritative
`Dictionary of IEEE Standards Terms (7th ed. 2000)) at 684
`(Exhs. L & N to Schwartz Decl., ECF Nos. 75–12 & 75–14).
`
`The Court adopts GSI's construction.
`
`GSI also points out that the specification refers to claimed
`B. “Address Signal” (claims 1, 2, 12 & 16 of the '134
`memory as comprising “storage elements each configured to
`Patent)
`read and write data in response to an internal address signal,”
`Disputed Claim Term
`Cypress's Proposal
`
`
`“address signal”
`Plain meaning, which is “a
`
`signal containing location
`information”
`
`
`GSI's Proposal
`
`“a signal for determining
`the address location in the
`memory array from which
`data is read to or to which
`data is written”
`
`limitations is most plausibly read as requiring that the address
`signal determine the address location in the memory array.
`Cypress's construction, on the other hand, would read out
`of the claims the requirement that the plurality of storage
`elements, and the logic circuit, respond to “an internal address
`signal,” and “an external address signal.” '134 Patent 5:24–
`26, 5:28–29. Cypress's construction gives meaning to the term
`“address,” a term understood to have a particular meaning by
`
`The parties appear to agree that the claimed “address signal”
`is limited to being one that determines the “address location in
`the memory array”—that is to say, whether the claim requires
`an addressable memory array.
`
`Again, the language of the claim terms supports GSI's
`construction. The specification uses the terms “memory” and
`“memory array” interchangeably. '134 Patent at 2:30–38,
`3:2–4. Given this, the surrounding claim language in both
`
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`one of ordinary skill in the art, and adapts it to apply in the
`context of the claim language.
`
`The Court adopts GSI's construction.
`Disputed Claim Term
`
`
`“detecting read data”
`
`
`Disputed Claim Term
`
`
`“detecting read data”
`
`
`C. “sensing read data” (claims 1, 8, 15, 18, 24, 35 & 43
`of the '477 Patent)
`Cypress's Proposal (In
`GSI's Proposal (In Opening
`Opening Briefs)
`Briefs)
`
`
`Plain meaning, which is
`Detecting read data
`“amplifying and detecting
`
`read data”
`
`Construction Unopposed
`by Cypress (In Reply Brief)
`
`“Detecting read data,” “with
`the additional guidance that
`‘detecting read data includes
`amplifying’ ”
`
`*4 This dispute over claim scope has evolved over the course
`of briefing.
`
`GSI's Revised Proposal (At
`Hearing)
`
`“Amplifying read data
`resulting in the detection of
`read data”
`
`
`customary use by banging it against the top of the nail instead
`of carefully cutting into the nail or carving it.
`
`The parties agree that the process of “sensing” can be
`understood as “detecting.” At least from the briefing, the
`parties appeared to dispute whether the “detecting” process
`claimed in these patent claims necessarily also involves
`amplifying. Open. Br. 18:12–19:2; GSI's Responsive Claim
`Construction Brief (“Resp. Br.”) 30:4–6, ECF No. 74.
`Cypress, proposing a limitation on its own patent's scope,
`argues that amplifying is an essential requirement of the
`claimed process of “detecting.” See Plaintiff Cypress's Reply
`Claim Construction Brief at 16:21–22, n. 4 (“Cypress
`would not oppose the adoption of [GSI's] construction with
`the additional guidance that ‘detecting read data includes
`amplifying’ ”).
`
`Cypress's strongest argument comes not from the use of the
`term “detecting,” but rather from the fact that, in the fifth
`element of claim 1, the entity performing the “detecting” is
`a “sense amplifier.” The specification also notes at numerous
`places that it is a sense amplifier that performs the detecting
`function. '477 Patent at 4:1–3, 4:6–7, 6:48, 7:7–9, 8:57–60.
`
`In English, if a person said “I used a chisel to hammer that
`nail,” we would not assume that the person actually chiseled
`the nail. To the contrary, the fact that the person used the verb
`“hammer” implies that she probably did not use the chisel
`for its customary function; she probably used the chisel in
`a manner more befitting a hammer. Since any solid, hand-
`held object is capable of being used as a hammer, we would
`understand that the person probably gave the chisel a non-
`
`But we are not speaking English. We are speaking patent law.
`And in light of the claim language and the other aspects of
`the intrinsic record, it seems plain that the “detecting” process
`claimed in this claim limitation is one through which values
`are amplified. If the claimed “amplifiers” detect without
`amplifying, then they are not amplifiers in any way, and the
`patentee would not have identified them as such. They would
`be called “detectors” or “sensors.” A person of ordinary skill
`in the art would understand that, when a “sense amplifier” is
`called upon to perform a “detecting” function, it does so by
`first amplifying.
`
`In the papers, GSI argued that “none of the asserted claims (or
`any of the other claims of the '477 patent) recite amplifying
`the read data—rather, the claimed step is ‘sensing’ the
`data.” Resp. Br. 30:6–8. But this just reinforces the fact
`that the claimed “sensing” process includes amplifying.
`Since data must be amplified to be read, since there is no
`specific process identified for amplifying before detection,
`and since “sense amplifiers” are the components identified
`as “detecting,” amplifying must be part of the “detecting”
`process. Just as GSI persuaded the Court to construe the terms
`discussed supra in light of the surrounding claim language,
`the Court is persuaded here by Cypress to construe the
`claimed “detecting” process with reference to the surrounding
`“amplifier” language.
`
`*5 “Sensing” means “detecting.” To the extent it is
`necessary to resolve a dispute between the parties as to claim
`
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`scope, the Court concludes that the “sensing” process claimed
`in these terms involves amplifying.
`
`At the hearing, however, it did not appear that the parties
`disputed whether the claimed “sensing” includes a process
`of amplification. To the contrary, GSI proposed a new
`“compromise” construction explicitly acknowledging as
`much: “amplifying read data resulting in the detection of
`read data.” This new proposal brings GSI's understanding
`of claim scope vanishingly close to Cypress's most recent
`understanding of claim scope from its reply brief: “detecting
`read data” ... “with the additional guidance that ‘detecting
`read data includes amplifying.” 3
`
`“sensing,” and that any process of “detecting” is also
`“sensing.” Cypress's second “construction” also could be
`understood in this manner, since a juror might read the
`directive “sensing read data includes amplifying” to mean that
`any process of “amplifying” is “included” within the process
`of “sensing.”
`
`Cypress's only objection to GSI's most recent construction
`is that the words “resulting in” might create introduce
`ambiguities, but the Court sees at least as many ambiguities
`in Cypress's proposed construction. Cypress does not argue
`from the record that the claimed “sensing” process includes
`post-detection amplification that is unrelated to the detection
`process. To resolve any dispute between the parties as to claim
`scope, the Court construes “sensing read data” as “amplifying
`read data resulting in the detection of the read data.”
`
`GSI argues that its construction is necessary because
`Cypress's construction could be read to encompass post-
`detection amplification that is unrelated to detection. That
`is to say, it is possible that a juror might apply Cypress's
`“amplifying and detecting” construction in a disjunctive
`sense, concluding that any process of “amplifying” is
`Disputed Claim Term
`Cypress's Proposal
`
`
`“sending write data”/“write
`Plain meaning, which is “the
`data is sent across a write
`process of moving the write
`path”
`data across a write path”
`
`
`It isn't clear that adding the words “process of” alters the
`meaning of GSI's construction in any way that would be
`particularly obvious to a juror. But from the papers, it is clear
`that the claim dispute the Court must resolve is whether the
`write data must be in movement to qualify as being in the
`process of being “sent.”
`
`D. “sending write data”/“write data is sent across a
`write path” (Claims 1, 8, 18 & 36 of the '477 Patent)
`
`GSI's Proposal
`
`Moving write data across a
`write path
`
`
`If the post office said it was “updating our website while
`sending our customer's letter,” we would not expect the letters
`necessarily to be moving at the time the website was being
`updated. “Much like a letter in transit,” Cypress argues, “the
`signals described in the '477 Patent move from place to place
`—stopping in one place for a short time before moving on the
`next place.” Id. 20:21–22.
`
`The importance of this dispute can be seen by examining
`method claim 8. To perform the fourth step of claim 8,
`the actor must be “sending write data across a write data
`path ... while sending read data.” Cypress argues that the actor
`performing the claimed method step is still “sending” data
`that is parked in a register, provided that the data is somewhere
`“in transit” between the beginning and the end of the process
`of detecting the read data. GSI argues the data must be moving
`at the time that the actor sends the read data.
`
`*6 Cypress's argument is based on an analogy to the
`sending of a letter. Open. Br. 20:7–22. When the post office
`sends a letter, the letter often sits in a mailbox or a sorting
`center during the process. But one would still understand
`the letter to be in the process of being sent as long as it
`was somewhere between drop-off and its final destination.
`
`This is fair enough, as far as it goes. But Cypress's analogy is
`apt only because of the particular features of the post office's
`sending process, rather than because of any meaning inherent
`in the word “sending.” It is only because we understand the
`U.S. Post Office's “sending” process to involve starts and
`stops that Cypress's analogy is on point.
`
`But in other contexts, we would probably understand
`“sending” to require contemporaneous movement, without
`any starts and stops. For example, imagine the same letter-
`sending process from the perspective of the letter-writer
`rather than the postal service. The writer is only “sending”
`the letter while she is writing the address, affixing a stamp,
`and taking it to be dropped in a mailbox. If the writer said
`she was “whistling a tune while sending a letter,” we would
`probably assume she was whistling while walking the letter
`
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`to the post office, or while dropping it inside a mailbox.
`We would probably not assume she was sitting at her desk
`whistling while a letter sat in her office outbox waiting to be
`picked up in the afternoon mail.
`
`The question is whether, in light of the intrinsic and extrinsic
`record, the “sending” process claimed in the Patent is more
`akin to the first use of the term “sending” or the second.
`
`GSI primarily cites language in the specification that uses
`the words “while” and “is sent.” See, e.g., '477 Patent 4:18–
`19 (“While sensing the read data, write data is sent across
`a write data pass”). But the use of these words does not
`strongly indicate whether the process is more like the first
`example discussed supra or more like the second. GSI argues
`that the specification suggests that the write data path must
`be a conduit for “concurrent movement of data.” But the
`specification actually says only that the path “allow[s]”
`concurrent movement, not that all movement across the
`path must necessarily always be moving continuously and
`concurrently with sensing. Id. 3:37. And GSI profoundly
`overreaches by arguing that Cypress's expert had previously
`argued that actual movement is required to satisfy the claim
`language. While this is true, the expert stated that “data that
`Patent
`Claim Term
`
`
`'477
`Latch
`
`
`In Parallel
`
`While
`
`Non-Interruptible
`
`
`'134
`
`
`Predetermined number of internal
`address signals
`
`
`is sitting in the register or in the buffer qualifies as moving
`data.” Exh. J to Hoffman Decl.
`
`Cypress, on the other hand, has a stronger argument from
`the specification. Figure 5 includes a graphic depiction of
`the “read” and “write” processes. That figure indicates data
`momentarily at various components within the circuit while
`still in the process of being sent. The shaded hexagonal
`between overlap 98 and overlap 100 depicts a point in the
`process in which the data arrives and waits at the final stage
`of the write path for reading, or “sensing” to finish. This
`demonstrates that the claimed “sending” process claimed is
`not necessarily limited to one in which data continually moves
`throughout the process. As Cypress is entitled to the broadest
`possible scope of the claim language, the Court does not
`construe the term to contain the limitation GSI urges the Court
`to impose.
`
`*7 The Court adopts Cypress's construction of this term.
`
`E. Agreed Constructions
`The parties agree on the following constructions, see ECF No.
`88, and the Court adopts them at the parties' request:
`
`Joint Proposed Construction
`
`One or more latches
`
`Separately from
`
`Partially concurrent or concurrent
`
`Cannot be stopped or terminated once
`initiated
`
`A fixed number of internal address
`signals
`
`
`IV. CONCLUSION
`The Court construes the identified claim terms as stated
`above.
`
`IT IS SO ORDERED.
`
`All Citations
`
`Not Reported in F.Supp.3d, 2014 WL 3735903, 2014
`Markman 3735903
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`Footnotes
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`
`2
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`3
`
`For this reason, the court does not endorse the approach urged by Cypress's counsel at the hearing. Counsel
`urged a narrower approach to construction, arguing that the only relevant term is “memory” itself. Counsel
`argued that GSI's construction arguments were off-point because “if [the term] is further limited by other
`language, that's fine,” but irrelevant to claim construction. Neighboring claim language must be relevant to
`the task of construction, since the task is to determine the plain and ordinary meaning of the language in
`the context of the intrinsic record.
`That is to say, Cypress pointedly does not argue that the language following the words “memory comprising”
`is merely exemplary; it acknowledges the language is limiting. This concession is a little surprising because
`“[t]he term ‘comprising’ is well understood to mean ‘including but not limited to.’ ” CIAS, Inc. v. Alliance Gaming
`Corp., 504 F.3d 1356, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng'g, Inc., 200 F.3d
`795, 811 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). But what CIAS and other cases generally mean by this is that “the claims do
`not exclude the presence in the accused device or method of factors in addition to those explicitly recited.”
`CIAS, 504 F.3d at 1360 (quoting In Georgia–Pacific Corp. v. United States Gypsum Co., 195 F.3d 1322,
`1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Here, the “comprising” language is “open” in the sense that the claimed memory
`might conceivably include elements other than the two identified limiting elements. But they still cannot fail
`to include those limiting elements.
`In most situations, the Court strongly discourages parties from proposing new and revised constructions for
`the first time at a claim construction hearing, since it unfairly prejudices the other party. But here, the parties
`had exchanged claim construction slides well before the hearing, and Cypress was aware of GSI's new
`proposal. In this situation, the process of briefing and arguing the parties' competing constructions clarified
`the dispute over claim scope.
`
`End of Document
`
`© 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
`
` © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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