throbber
Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
`
`Paper 7
`Entered: March 11, 2021
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`
`
`
`AMAZON.COM, INC., AMAZON.COM LLC, AMAZON WEB
`SERVICES, INC., A2Z DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC. D/B/A LAB126,
`RAWLES LLC, AMZN MOBILE LLC, AMZN MOBILE 2 LLC,
`AMAZON.COM SERVICES, INC. F/K/A AMAZON FULFILLMENT
`SERVICES, INC., and AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC (formerly
`AMAZON DIGITAL SERVICES LLC),
`Petitioner,
`v.
`VB ASSETS, LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`
`IPR2020-01367
`Patent 8,073,681 B2
`
`
`
`
`
`Before MICHELLE N. WORMMEESTER, SCOTT C. MOORE, and
`SEAN P. O’HANLON, Administrative Patent Judges.
`MOORE, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`DECISION
`Granting Institution of Inter Partes Review
`35 U.S.C. § 314
`
`
`
`

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`IPR2020-01367
`Patent 8,073,681 B2
`
`INTRODUCTION
`I.
`A. Background and Summary
`Amazon.com, Inc., Amazon.com LLC, Amazon Web Services, Inc.,
`A2Z Development Center, Inc. d/b/a Lab126, Rawles LLC, AMZN Mobile
`LLC, AMZN Mobile 2 LLC, Amazon Services, Inc. f/k/a Amazon
`Fulfillment Services, Inc., and Amazon.com Services LLC (formerly
`Amazon Digital Services LLC) (collectively “Petitioner”) filed a Petition
`requesting an inter partes review of claims 1–42 of U.S. Patent No.
`8,073,681 B2 (“the ’681 patent”). Paper 1 (“Pet”). VB Assets, LLC
`(“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 6 (“Prelim. Resp.”).
`An inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information
`presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a
`reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least
`1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The
`Supreme Court has held that we may not institute review of fewer than all
`claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348,
`1359–60 (2018).
`For the reasons set forth below, we conclude there is a reasonable
`likelihood that Petitioner will prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at
`least one challenged claim. We, therefore, institute inter partes review of
`claims 1–42 on all asserted grounds. See SAS, 138 S. Ct. at 1359–60; Patent
`Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 64 (Nov. 2019)
`(hereinafter, “Consolidated Trial Practice Guide”) (“The Board will not
`institute on fewer than all claims or all challenges in a petition.”), available
`at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
`tpgnov.pdf.
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`IPR2020-01367
`Patent 8,073,681 B2
`Our findings and conclusions at this stage of the proceeding are
`preliminary and are based on the evidentiary record developed thus far. This
`is not a final decision as to the patentability of any claim. Our final decision
`will be based on the record as fully developed during trial.
`B. Real Parties in Interest
`Petitioner and Patent Owner are the real parties in interest. Pet. 2;
`Paper 4, 1.
`C. Related Matters
`Patent Owner asserts the ’681 patent against Petitioner in the
`following litigation: VB Assets, LLC v. Amazon.com Inc., et al., Case No.
`1:19-cv-01410-MN (D. Del.) (filed July 29, 2019). Pet. 2.
`D. The ’681 Patent
`The ’681 patent is directed to “a cooperative conversational model for
`a human to machine voice user interface.” Ex. 1001, 1:7–8. The disclosed
`cooperative conversational voice user interface understands free-form
`human utterances, “freeing users from being restricted to a fixed set of
`commands and/or requests.” Id. at 1:63–67.
`The ’681 patent discloses a system that receives an input, which may
`include a human utterance (i.e., words, syllables, phonemes, or any other
`audible sound made by a human being), where the utterance includes one or
`more requests (i.e., command, directive, other instruction for a device,
`computer or other machine, to retrieve information, perform a task, or take
`some other action). Ex. 1001, 2:6–14. The utterance component of the input
`is processed by a speech recognition engine to generate one or more
`preliminary interpretations of the utterance. Id. at 2:16–20. The one or
`more preliminary interpretations are then provided to a conversational
`speech engine for further processing, where the conversational speech
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`IPR2020-01367
`Patent 8,073,681 B2
`engine communicates with one or more databases to generate an adaptive
`conversational response that may then be returned to the user as an output.
`Id. at 2:20–25.
`Figure 1 of the ’681 patent, reproduced below, depicts an embodiment
`of a cooperative conversational voice user interface. Ex. 1001, 6:64–65,
`7:7–9.
`
`
`
`Figure 1 depicts a “system architecture for implementing a cooperative
`conversational voice user interface.” Ex. 1001, 7:7–9. The depicted system
`receives an input 105 from a user, where input 105 is an utterance received
`by an input device (e.g., a microphone), and where the utterance includes
`one or more requests. Id. at 7:10–13. The utterance component of input 105
`is processed by speech recognition engine 110 (i.e., Automatic Speech
`Recognizer (“ASR”) 110) to generate one or more preliminary
`interpretations of the utterance. Id. at 7:24–28. The one or more
`preliminary interpretations generated by speech recognition engine 110 are
`then provided to conversational speech engine 115 for further processing.
`Id. at 7:37–40. Conversational speech engine 115 communicates with one or
`
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`IPR2020-01367
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`more databases 130 to generate an adaptive conversational response, which
`is returned to the user as output 140. Id. at 7:43–46.
`E. Illustrative Claims
`Petitioner challenges claims 1–42 of the ’681 patent. Claims 1, 13,
`25, 37, 39, and 41 are independent. Claims 2–12 depend from claim 1,
`claims 14–24 depend from claim 13, claims 26–36 depend from claim 25,
`claim 38 depends from claim 37, claim 40 depends from claim 39, and claim
`42 depends from claim 41.
`Claims 1 and 37 are reproduced below, with bracketed references
`added.
`
`1. A method for providing a cooperative conversational voice
`user interface, comprising:
`[1.a] receiving an utterance at a voice input device during a
`current conversation with a user, wherein the utterance
`includes one or more words that have different meanings in
`different contexts;
`[1.b] accumulating short-term shared knowledge about the
`current conversation, wherein
`the short-term shared
`knowledge includes knowledge about the utterance received
`during the current conversation;
`[1.c] accumulating long-term shared knowledge about the
`user, wherein the long-term shared knowledge includes
`knowledge about one or more past conversations with the
`user;
`[1.d] determining an intended meaning for the utterance,
`wherein determining the intended meaning for the utterance
`includes:
`[1.e] identifying, at a conversational speech engine, a
`context associated with the utterance from the short-term
`shared knowledge and the long-term shared knowledge;
`and
`[1.f] establishing the intended meaning within the identified
`context, wherein the conversational speech engine
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`establishes the intended meaning within the identified
`context to disambiguate an intent that the user had in
`speaking the one or more words that have the different
`meanings in the different contexts; and
`[1.g] generating a response to the utterance, wherein the
`conversational
`speech
`engine
`grammatically
`or
`syntactically adapts the response based on the intended
`meaning established within the identified context.
`37. A method for providing a cooperative conversational voice
`user interface, comprising:
`[37.a] receiving an utterance at a voice input device during a
`current conversation with a user;
`[37.b] accumulating short-term shared knowledge about the
`current conversation, wherein
`the short-term shared
`knowledge includes knowledge about the utterance received
`during the current conversation;
`[37.c] accumulating long-term shared knowledge about the
`user, wherein the long-term shared knowledge includes
`knowledge about one or more past conversations with the
`user;
`[37.d] determining an intended meaning for the utterance,
`wherein determining the intended meaning for the utterance
`includes:
`[37.e] identifying, at a conversational speech engine, a
`context associated with the utterance from the short-term
`shared knowledge and the long-term shared knowledge;
`[37.f] inferring additional information about the utterance
`from the short-term shared knowledge and the long-term
`shared knowledge in response to determining that the
`utterance contains insufficient information to complete a
`request in the identified context; and
`[37.g] establishing the intended meaning within the
`identified context based on the additional information
`inferred about the utterance; and
`[37.h] generating a response to the utterance based on the
`intended meaning established within the identified context.
`Ex. 1001, 19:35–65, 24:24–53.
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`Independent claims 13 and 25 are similar to independent method
`claim 1, except that claims 13 and 19 are directed to a non-transitory
`computer readable medium and a system, respectively. See Ex. 1001,
`19:35–65, 21:6–35, 22:9–17. Independent claims 39 and 41 are similar to
`independent method claim 37, except that claims 39 and 41 are directed to a
`non-transitory computer readable medium and a system, respectively. See
`id. at 24:24–53, 24:58–25:17, 25:23–26:22.
`F. Challenged Claims and Asserted Grounds
`Petitioner asserts the following grounds of unpatentability:
`Ground Claims Challenged 35 U.S.C. §
`Reference(s)/Basis
`1, 2, 9, 13, 14, 21,
`25, 26, 33, 37, 39, 41 103(a)1
`1
`Kennewick2
`5, 8, 17, 20, 29, 32
`103(a)
`10, 22, 34, 38, 40, 42 103(a)
`
`2
`3
`
`Kennewick, Huang3
`Kennewick, Seneff4
`Kennewick, Huang,
`Seneff
`Kennewick, Coffman5
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6, 7, 18, 19, 30, 31
`
`103(a)
`
`11, 12, 23, 24, 35, 36 103(a)
`
`
`1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125
`Stat. 284, 287–88 (2011), amended 35 U.S.C. § 103, effective March 16,
`2013. Because the application from which the ’681 patent issued was filed
`before this date, the pre-AIA version of § 103 applies.
`2 U.S. Patent App. Pub. No. 2004/0193420 A1 (pub. Sept. 30, 2004)
`(Ex. 1003, “Kennewick”).
`3 Huang, Xuedong et al., “Spoken Language Processing: A Guide to
`Theory, Algorithm and System Development,” Prentice Hall (2001)
`(Ex. 1011, “Huang”).
`4 Seneff, et al., “Hypothesis Selection and Resolution in the Mercury
`Flight Reservation System” Spoken Language Systems Group, MIT (2001)
`(Ex. 1025, “Seneff”).
`5 U.S. Patent No. 6,839,896 B2 (iss. Jan. 4, 2005) (Ex. 1027, “Coffman”).
`
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`IPR2020-01367
`Patent 8,073,681 B2
`Ground Claims Challenged 35 U.S.C. §
`6
`3, 4, 15, 16, 27, 28
`103(a)
`
`Reference(s)/Basis
`Kennewick, Mitsuyoshi6
`
`Pet. 4. Petitioner also relies on the Declaration testimony of Padhraic
`Smyth, Ph.D (Ex. 1002, the “Smyth Decl.”).
`II. ANALYSIS
`
`A. Claim Construction
`We generally give the words of a claim their ordinary and customary
`meaning. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
`(en banc). “[T]he ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the
`meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in
`question at the time of the invention.” Id. at 1313. “[T]he person of
`ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the
`context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the
`context of the entire patent, including the specification.” Id.
`“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to
`the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Nidec Motor Corp. v.
`Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
`(quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803
`(Fed. Cir. 1999)).
`In this case, Petitioner proposes a construction for the “implicit
`hypothesis” term of claims 38, 40, and 42. Pet. 7–8. Patent Owner,
`however, does not ask us to construe any claim terms. Prelim. Resp. 2–4.
`Patent Owner also does not dispute at the institution stage that the cited
`references teach or suggest an “implicit hypothesis” of the type recited in
`
`
`6 U.S. Patent App. Pub. No. 2003/0182123 A1 (pub. Sept. 25, 2003)
`(Ex. 1028, “Mitsuyoshi”).
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`claims 38, 40, and 42. See id. at 4–21 (not addressing claims 38, 40, or 42).
`Accordingly, it is not necessary at this stage of the proceeding for us to
`address Petitioner’s arguments regarding the claim term “implicit
`hypothesis.”
`We determine that it is unnecessary at this stage of the proceeding to
`adopt explicit constructions of any claim terms.
`B. Obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103
`1. Principles of Law
`An invention is not patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 “if the
`differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art
`are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the
`time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to
`which said subject matter pertains.” The question of obviousness is resolved
`on the basis of underlying factual determinations including: (1) the scope
`and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject
`matter and the prior art; (3) the level of skill in the art; and, (4) where in
`evidence, so-called secondary considerations, including commercial success,
`long-felt but unsolved needs, and failure of others.7 Graham v. John Deere
`Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17−18 (1966).
`When evaluating a combination of teachings, we must also “determine
`whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the
`fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550
`U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (citing In re Kahn, 441, F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir.
`2006)).
`
`
`7 At this stage of the proceeding, the parties have not directed us to any such
`secondary considerations.
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`2. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art
`The level of skill in the art is “a prism or lens” through which we view
`the prior art and the claimed invention. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d
`1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“the level of skill in the art is a prism or lens
`through which a judge, jury, or the Board views the prior art and the claimed
`invention”). Petitioner asserts the person of ordinary skill “would have at
`least a Bachelor-level degree in computer science, computer engineering,
`electrical engineering, or a related field in computing technology, and two
`years of experience with automatic speech recognition and natural language
`understanding, or equivalent education, research experience, or knowledge.”
`Pet. 4–5 (citing Smyth Decl. ¶¶ 28–31). Patent Owner does not propose any
`particular skill level in its Preliminary Response. See generally Prelim.
`Resp.
`
`For purposes of this Decision, we accept and apply Petitioner’s
`formulation regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art.
`3. Scope and Content of the Prior Art; Differences between Claimed
`Subject Matter and Prior Art; Obviousness
`a) Ground 1: Obviousness of Claims 1, 2, 9, 13, 14, 21, 25, 26,
`33, 37, 39, and 41 over Kennewick
`(1) Kennewick
`Kennewick is directed to “the retrieval of online information and
`processing of commands through a speech interface in a vehicle
`environment.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 2. Kennewick discloses “a mobile interactive
`natural language speech system . . . that includes a speech unit.” Id. ¶ 12.
`The system includes “a speech interface device that receives spoken natural
`language queries, commands and/or other utterances from a user, and a
`computer device or system that receives input from the speech unit[,]
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`processes the input (e.g., retrieves information responsive to the query, takes
`action consistent with the command, [etc.]), and responds to the user with a
`natural language speech response.” Id. ¶ 14.
`Figure 5, reproduced below, illustrates an interactive natural language
`speech processing system. Ex. 1003 ¶ 92.
`
`
`
`Figure 5 depicts components of an “interactive natural language speech
`processing system.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 118. The main user interface for the system
`is speech unit 128. Id. ¶ 121. Speech unit 128 includes one or more
`microphones (e.g., array microphone 134) to receive the utterances of a user.
`Id. Speech unit 128 encodes the received speech via speech code 138 and
`transmits the coded speech via transceiver module 130 to the main unit 98.
`Id. The coded speech is then passed to speech coder 122 for decoding. Id.
`¶ 123. The decoded speech is then processed by the speech recognition
`engine 120 using data in the dictionary and phrases module 112 and data
`
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`received from agents 106. Id. The recognized words and phrases are then
`“processed by parser 118, which transforms them into complete commands
`and questions using data supplied by the agents,” where the agents “then
`process the commands or questions.” Id. The agents are used to determine
`context for the questions and commands. Id. ¶ 128.
`(2) Analysis of Claim 1
`Petitioner contends that to the extent the preamble of claim 1 is
`limiting, Kennewick’s description of a “complete speech-based natural
`language query and response environment” discloses a “method for
`providing a cooperative conversational voice user interface.” Pet. 15 (citing
`Ex. 1003, code (57), ¶ 14; Smyth Decl. ¶ 68). Regarding limitations [1.b]
`and [1.c], Petitioner asserts that Kennewick’s dialog history and personal
`profile information, respectively, constitute “short-term shared knowledge
`includ[ing] knowledge about the utterance received during the current
`conversation” and “long-term shared knowledge about the user . . . [that]
`includes knowledge about one or more past conversations with the user.”
`Pet. 17–19 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 31, 143, 155–157, 162, 164, 170; Smyth
`Decl. ¶¶ 71–75). Petitioner further asserts that Kennewick discloses a multi-
`step process for “determining an intended meaning for the utterance” as
`recited in limitation [1.d]. Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 28, 29, 162–169;
`Smyth Decl. ¶ 76). Patent Owner does not presently dispute the above
`assertions regarding the preamble, and limitations [1.b], [1.c], and [1.d].8
`See Prelim. Resp. 5–16.
`
`
`8 Patent Owner does not dispute that Kennewick “determines an intended
`meaning for the utterance,” but does contend that this determination is not
`performed “using the specific steps recited in limitations” [1.e] and [1.f].”
`See Prelim. Resp. 9.
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`On this record, we find that Petitioner’s contentions and the
`supporting portions of the Smyth Declaration provide adequate support at
`this stage of the proceeding for Petitioner’s contentions that Kennewick
`teaches or suggests the preamble of claim 1 (to the extent it is limiting), as
`well as limitations [1.b], [1.c], and [1.d]. See Pet. 15–19; Ex. 1003
`¶¶ 68–75. We will now address the disputed portions of claim 1: limitations
`[1.a], [1.e], [1.f], and [1.g]. See Prelim. Resp. 5–16.
`Petitioner contends that Kennewick discloses two instances of
`receiving an utterance that “includes one or more words that have different
`meanings in different contexts,” as recited in limitation [1.a]: the receipt of
`the word “temperature” described in paragraph 160, and the receipt of the
`phrase “flight one hundred and twenty t[w]o” described in paragraph 163.
`Pet. 16–17. With respect to limitations [1.e] and [1.f], Petitioner contends
`that Kennewick discloses determining the intended meanings of both of
`these utterances by “identifying . . . a context associated with the utterance
`from the short-term shared knowledge and the long-term shared knowledge”
`and “establishing the intended meaning within the identified context . . . to
`disambiguate an intent that the user had in speaking the one or more words
`that have different meanings in the different contexts.” Pet. 19–21 (citing
`Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 29, 31, 32, 78–81, 160, 161, 163; Smyth Decl. ¶¶ 77–79).
`Petitioner contends that Kennewick also discloses grammatically or
`syntactically adapting responses to these utterances “based on the intended
`meaning established within the identified context” in the manner required by
`limitation [1.g]. Pet. 21–23 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 14, 23, 162, 168, 170, 171,
`175, 178; Smyth Decl. ¶¶ 80–82).
`Patent Owner argues in response that the word “temperature” has the
`same meaning in both contexts described in Kennewick and that the
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`Petitioner-cited disclosure describes the use of the word “temperature” to
`determine context, not meaning. Prelim. Resp. 6–7. On this record, we
`generally agree with Patent Owner’s arguments.
`The Petitioner-cited portion of Kennewick does describe a process by
`which the parser uses the keyword “temperature” to identify context. See
`Ex. 1003 ¶ 160. Patent Owner does not dispute that this context is
`determined from short-term shared knowledge (Kennewick’s dialog history)
`and long-term shared knowledge (Kennewick’s profile information). See
`Pet. 19–20 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 78–81, 160; Smyth Decl. ¶ 77); Prelim.
`Resp. 9–10. Thus, setting aside the issue of whether the recited “utterance”
`satisfies limitation [1.a], Kennewick’s “temperature” example does appear to
`teach or suggest limitation [1.e]. With respect to limitations [1.a], [1.f], and
`[1.g], however, Petitioner does not appear to identify any teaching or
`suggestion in Kennewick that the keyword “temperature” has different
`meanings in different contexts that are disambiguated in the recited manner
`to generate a response. See id. Dr. Smyth’s declaration testimony that the
`keyword “‘temperature’ could be interpreted as an outdoor temperature or as
`a body temperature depending on context” (see Smyth Decl. ¶ 69) is not
`persuasive because the word “temperature” has the same meaning in both of
`these examples. In both instances, the word “temperature” refers to a
`measurement of warmth or coolness. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 160.
`Regarding Petitioner’s “flight one hundred and twenty t[w]o”
`example, Patent Owner concedes that this term is ambiguous, but argues that
`this ambiguity exists within a single context and is not the result of the term
`having different meanings in different contexts. See Prelim. Resp. 7–8. On
`this record, we agree with Patent Owner. Petitioner does not appear to
`identify any teaching or suggestion in Kennewick that the term “flight one
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`hundred and twenty t[w]o” has different meanings in different contexts. See
`Ex. 1003 ¶ 163. We are not persuaded by Dr. Smyth’s assertion that “A
`context in which ‘flight 122’ exists would result in a different meaning than
`a context where the system just listed several flight options including ‘flight
`100’ and ‘flight 20’” at least because Dr. Smyth does not provide any
`support for his assertion that these hypothetical situations would constitute
`different contexts. Smyth Decl. ¶ 70. Based on our review of Kennewick,
`we find that the “flight one hundred and twenty t[w]o” example describes an
`ambiguity that exists within a single, previously-identified context, and not
`an ambiguity resulting from a word or phrase having different meanings in
`different potential contexts. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 163. Accordingly, on the
`current record, this “flight” example does not appear to teach or suggest
`limitations [1.a], [1.f], and [1.g].
`For the foregoing reasons, the Petition does not appear to make a
`sufficient showing that Kennewick teaches or suggests receiving an
`utterance of the type required by limitation [1.a], establishing an intended
`meaning in the manner recited in limitation [1.f], or generating a response in
`the manner recited in limitation [1.g]. Accordingly, Petitioner does not
`appear to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its contention
`that claim 1 is unpatentable over Kennewick pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
`(3) Analysis of Claims 13 and 25
`Claims 13 and 25 recite a non-transitory computer readable medium
`and a system, but both parties agree that these claims are otherwise
`substantively similar to claim 1. Pet. 25; Prelim. Resp. 16–17.
`In particular, claims 13 and 25 both recite an utterance that “includes
`one or more words that have different meanings in different contexts,” and
`require computer-executable instructions or processors configured “to
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`disambiguate an intent that the user had in speaking the one or more words
`that have different meanings,” and to generate a response “based on the
`intended meaning established within the identified context.” See Ex. 1001,
`21:6–35, 22:55–23:16. Petitioner argues that Kennewick teaches or suggests
`these limitations for the same reasons Kennewick teaches or suggests the
`corresponding limitations of claim 1 (i.e., limitations [1.a], [1.f], and [1.g]).
`See Pet. 25–27.
`Petitioner’s assertions regarding the above limitations of claims 13
`and 25 are not persuasive for the same reasons discussed above with respect
`to limitations [1.a], [1.f], and [1.g]. Accordingly, Petitioner does not appear
`to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its contention that
`claims 13 and 25 are unpatentable over Kennewick pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §
`103(a).
`
`(4) Analysis of Claims 2, 9, 14, 21, 26, and 33
`Claims 2, 9, 14, 21, 26, and 33, all depend from and incorporate all
`limitations of claim 1, claim 13, or claim 25. For the same reasons discussed
`above with respect to claims 1, 13, and 25, Petitioner does not appear to
`demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its contention that
`claims 2, 9, 14, 21, 26, and 33 are unpatentable over Kennewick pursuant to
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
`(5) Analysis of Claim 37
`Petitioner contends that the preamble of claim 37 and limitations
`[37.b] through [37.e] are substantively identical to the preamble of claim 1
`and limitations [1.b] through [1.e], and that these portions of claim 37 are
`taught or suggested by Kennewick for the same reasons discussed above
`with respect to claim 1. Pet. 29 (citing Smyth Decl. ¶¶ 107–116). Patent
`Owner does not presently dispute these contentions. See Prelim. Resp. 17–
`
`16
`
`

`

`IPR2020-01367
`Patent 8,073,681 B2
`21. On this record, and for substantially the same reasons discussed above
`with respect to the corresponding limitations of claim 1, we determine that
`Petitioner has made a sufficient showing that Kennewick teaches or suggests
`the preamble of claim 37 and limitations [37.b] through [37.e].
`Petitioner contends that limitation [37.a] is similar to limitation [1.a]
`but lacks the limitation “wherein the utterance includes one or more words
`that have different meanings in different contexts.” Pet. 29. Petitioner
`contends that limitation [37.h] is similar to limitation [1.g], but lacks the
`limiting language “wherein the conversational speech engine grammatically
`or syntactically adapts the response based on the intended meaning
`established within the identified context.” Id. Patent Owner does not
`presently dispute that Kennewick teaches or suggests limitations [37.a] and
`[37.h]. Prelim. Resp. 17–21. On this record, we find Petitioner has made a
`sufficient showing that Kennewick teaches or suggests both of these
`limitations. See Pet. 16–17 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 156; Smyth Decl. ¶ 69), 21–
`22 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 14, 162, 168, 170, 171, 175, 178; Smyth Decl. ¶¶ 80,
`81), 29 (citing Smyth Decl. ¶¶ 107–116). We will now address the disputed
`limitations of claim 37: limitations [37.f] and [37.g]. See Prelim. Resp. 17–
`21.
`
`Regarding limitation [37.f], Petitioner contends that paragraphs 162
`and 163 of Kennewick disclose “inferring additional information about the
`utterance” from “short-term shared knowledge” and “long-term shared
`knowledge” in response to a determination “that the utterance contains
`insufficient information to complete a request in the identified context.” Pet.
`29–30 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 162–163; Smyth Decl. ¶¶ 113–114). Patent
`Owner argues that the missing criteria is not inferred from “Kennewick’s
`history of the dialog (which Petitioner[] map[s] to short-term shared
`
`17
`
`

`

`IPR2020-01367
`Patent 8,073,681 B2
`knowledge) or a user profile (which [P]etitioner[] map[s] to long-term
`shared knowledge.)” Prelim. Resp. 18. We disagree with Patent Owner.
`Paragraph 162 discloses that Kennewick’s parser, when formulating a
`question or command in the format required by an agent, uses criteria that
`“may have been explicitly supplied by the user or may need to be inferred.”
`Ex. 1003 ¶ 162. We are persuaded that this inference of missing criteria
`required by an agent teaches or suggests “inferring additional information
`about the utterance” in response to a determination “that the utterance
`contains insufficient information to complete a request in the identified
`context,” as recited in limitation [37.f]. Paragraph 162 further discloses that
`Kennewick’s parser may employ “criteria handlers” that determine criteria
`by “applying probabilistic or fuzzy reasoning to tables of possible values,”
`and that these “probabilities or fuzzy possibilities and associated values”
`may be received from “the history of the dialog” (i.e., short-term shared
`knowledge) and “the user profile” (i.e., long-term shared knowledge). Id.
`We are persuaded that this disclosure of determining missing criteria using
`probabilities, possibilities, or data from the dialog history and user profile
`teaches or suggests that additional information is inferred from “short-term
`shared knowledge” and “long-term shared knowledge” in the manner
`required by limitation [37.f]. Accordingly, on this record, Petitioner has
`made a sufficient showing with respect to limitation [37.f].
`Regarding limitation [37.g], Petitioner argues that the criteria
`extracted by Kennewick’s criteria handlers are used by the parser to
`establish the intended meaning of the user’s utterance. Pet. 30–31 (citing
`Ex. 1003 ¶ 162; Smyth Decl. ¶ 115). Patent Owner argues in response that
`Kennewick’s criteria handlers extract information from a user’s question or
`command, but do not infer missing information. Prelim. Resp. 20 (citing
`
`18
`
`

`

`IPR2020-01367
`Patent 8,073,681 B2
`Ex. 1003 ¶ 162). We disagree with Patent Owner. Paragraph 162 discloses
`that some of the criteria required by Kennewick’s agents “may need to be
`inferred” by the parser, and then explains that the parser may use “criteria
`handlers” to “extract[] the criteria or parameters” by applying “probabilistic
`or fuzzy reasoning to tables of possible values.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 162. Though
`paragraph 162 uses the word “extracting” to describe the actions of the
`criteria handlers, the surrounding context makes clear that Kennewick’s
`criteria handlers also infer missing values by using probabilistic of fuzzy
`reasoning. See id. On this record, Petitioner has made a sufficiently
`persuasive showing that Kennewick teaches or suggests limitation [37.g].
`For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner has made sufficient showings
`that Kennewick teaches or suggests all limitations of claim 37. In so doing,
`Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its
`contention that claim 37 is unpatentable over Kennewick pursuant to
`35 U.S.C § 103(a).
`(6) Analysis of Claims 39 and 41
`Claims 39 and 41 recite a non-transitory computer readable medium
`and a system, but both parties agree that these claims are otherwise
`substantively similar to claim 1. Pet. 31–32; Prelim. Resp. 21. Patent
`Owner responds to Petitioner’s contentions regarding claims 39 and 41 by
`reiterating the arguments it raised with respect to claim 37, but Patent Owner
`does not raise any additional arguments for patentability. See Prelim.
`Resp. 21.
`Patent Owner’s arguments regarding claims 39 and 41 are
`unpersuasive for substantially the same reasons those same arguments were
`not persuasive with respect to claim 37. Petitioner has made sufficient
`showings that Kennewick teaches or suggests all limitations of claims 39
`
`19
`

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