throbber
Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
`
`
`
`
`
` Paper 10
`Date: January 28, 2021
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`INTEL CORPORATION,
`Petitioner,
`v.
`
`PARKERVISION, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`IPR2020-01265
`Patent 7,110,444 B1
`____________
`
`
`Before MICHAEL R. ZECHER, BART A. GERSTENBLITH, and
`IFTIKHAR AHMED, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`GERSTENBLITH, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`DECISION
`Granting Institution of Inter Partes Review
`35 U.S.C. § 314
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR2020-01265
`Patent 7,110,444 B1
`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Background
`
`Intel Corporation (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition (Paper 3, “Pet.”)
`requesting institution of inter partes review of claims 1, 3, and 5 (“the
`Challenged Claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 7,110,444 B1 (Ex. 1001, “the
`’444 patent”). ParkerVision, Inc. (“Patent Owner”) filed an Amended
`Preliminary Response (Paper 9, “Prelim. Resp.”).1
`An inter partes review may be instituted only if “the information
`presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that
`there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect
`to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a)
`(2018). For the reasons given below, Petitioner has established a reasonable
`likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one
`of the challenged claims of the ’444 patent. Accordingly, we institute an
`inter partes review of claims 1, 3, and 5 of the ’444 patent on all grounds
`raised in the Petition.
`
`
`1 Patent Owner filed a timely Preliminary Response on November 23, 2020
`(Paper 8), and, a day later, filed the Amended Preliminary Response. The
`Notice of Filing Date Accorded to Petition and Time for Filing Patent
`Owner Preliminary Response (Paper 4) was entered August 21, 2020. A
`preliminary response was thus due by November 23, 2020 (November 21st
`and 22nd fell on a weekend). Patent Owner should have requested
`authorization from the Board prior to filing its Corrected Preliminary
`Response. Nonetheless, despite Patent Owner’s failure to request
`authorization, we exercise our discretion under 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(b) to waive,
`by one day, the timing requirement under 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(b) because
`(1) Petitioner has not asserted that the additional day resulted in any
`prejudice to Petitioner and (2) the Corrected Preliminary Response appears
`to be nearly identical to the timely filed Preliminary Response.
`
`2
`
`

`

`IPR2020-01265
`Patent 7,110,444 B1
`
`
`Related Proceedings
`
`Petitioner and Patent Owner identify the following related matter:
`
`ParkerVision, Inc. v. Intel Corp., No. 6:20-cv-108-ADA (W.D. Tex.) (“the
`related litigation”). Pet. 7; Paper 5 (Patent Owner’s Mandatory Notices), 2.
`Patent Owner also states that the ’444 patent is asserted in ParkerVision, Inc.
`v. TCL Technology Group Corp., No. 5:20–cv-01030-GW-SHK (C.D. Cal.).
`Paper 5, 2. In addition, Petitioner filed a petition challenging several claims
`of U.S. Patent No. 7,539,474 B2, which is related to the ’444 patent, in
`IPR2020-01302.
`
`Real Parties in Interest
`
`Petitioner identifies Intel Corporation as the real party in interest.
`Pet. 7. Patent Owner identifies ParkerVision, Inc. as the real party in
`interest. Paper 5, 2.
`
`3
`
`

`

`IPR2020-01265
`Patent 7,110,444 B1
`
`
`
`
`The Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability and Declaration
`Evidence
`Petitioner challenges the patentability of claims 1, 3, and 5 of the
`’444 patent on the following grounds:
`Reference(s)/Basis
`Claim(s) Challenged
`35 U.S.C. §2
`Tayloe,3 TI Datasheet4
`1, 3, 5
`103(a)
`Tayloe, Kawada5
`1, 3, 5
`103(a)
`Pet. 10. Petitioner supports its challenge with a Declaration by Vivek
`Subramanian, Ph.D. (Ex. 1002, “the Subramanian Declaration”) and a
`Declaration by Maureen M. Honeycutt (Ex. 1019, “the Honeycutt
`Declaration”).
`
`The ’444 Patent
`
`The ’444 patent is directed to “a wireless local area network (WLAN)
`that includes one or more WLAN devices (also called stations, terminals,
`access points, client devices, or infrastructure devices) for effecting wireless
`
`
`2 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”) included revisions to
`35 U.S.C. § 103 that became effective on March 16, 2013. Because the
`’444 patent has an effective filing date before March 16, 2013, we apply the
`pre-AIA versions of the statutory bases for unpatentability.
`3 U.S. Patent No. 6,230,000 B1, issued May 8, 2001 (Ex. 1004, “Tayloe”).
`4 SN74CBT3253 Dual 1-of-4 FET Multiplexer/Demultiplexer (rev. ed.
`May 1998) (Ex. 1005, “TI Datasheet”). Petitioner refers to this exhibit, in at
`least one instance, as “SN74CBT3253D.” Pet. 9. The exhibit itself,
`however, does not include the letter “D” in the product number. Ex. 1005.
`Petitioner explains that “the ‘D’ in the product number refers simply to a
`packaging option” (Pet. 38 n.5), which is confirmed by the description on
`the first page stating “Package Options Include Plastic Small-Outline (D).”
`Ex. 1005, 1. At this stage of the proceeding, neither party asserts that the
`packaging option results in a difference of any significance to the issues
`before us.
`5 U.S. Patent No. 4,985,647, issued January 15, 1991 (Ex. 1008, “Kawada”).
`
`4
`
`

`

`IPR2020-01265
`Patent 7,110,444 B1
`
`communications over the WLAN.” Ex. 1001, 2:10–14. The ’444 patent
`explains that “[t]he WLAN device includes at least an antennae, a receiver,
`and a transmitter . . . . The WLAN receiver includes at least one universal
`frequency translation module that frequency down-converts a received
`electromagnetic (EM) signal.” Id. at 2:14–22.
`Figure 70A is reproduced below:
`
`
`Figure 70A of the ’444 patent “illustrates an IQ receiver having shunt UFT
`[universal frequency translation] modules.” Ex. 1001, 5:34–35. The
`’444 patent explains that “I/Q modulation receiver 7000 receives, down
`converts, and demodulates a[n] I/Q modulated RF input signal 7082 to an
`I baseband output signal 7084, and a Q baseband output signal 7086.” Id. at
`35:51–54; see id. at 35:60–62 (Antenna 7072 receives and outputs I/Q
`
`5
`
`

`

`IPR2020-01265
`Patent 7,110,444 B1
`
`modulated RF input signal 7082.). The ’444 patent states that, “[w]hen
`present, LNA 7018 amplifies I/Q modulated RF input signal 7082, and
`outputs amplified I/Q signal 7088.” Id. at 35:63–64. Thereafter, “[f]irst
`UFD [universal frequency down-conversion] module 7002, receives
`amplified I/Q signal 7088. . . . [,] down-converts the I-phase portion of the
`amplified input I/Q signal 7088 according to an I control signal 7090. . . .
`[, and] outputs an I output signal 7098.” Id. at 35:65–36:2. Similarly, UFD
`module 7006 “receives amplified I/Q signal 7088[,]” “down-converts the
`inverted I-phase signal portion of amplified input I/Q signal 7088 according
`to an inverted I control signal 7092[,]” and “outputs an inverted I output
`signal 7001.” Id. at 36:33–37. Thereafter, “[f]irst differential
`amplifier 7020 receives filtered I output signal 7007 . . . . subtracts filtered
`inverted I output signal 7009 from filtered I output signal 7001, amplifies the
`result, and outputs I baseband output signal 7084.” Id. at 37:3–8.
`The ’444 patent’s first and second UFD modules in Figure 70A
`include capacitors 7074 and 7076, respectively, and UFT modules 7026 and
`7038, respectively. Ex. 1001, 36:3–5 (first UFD module 7002 comprises
`first storage module 7024 and first UFT module 7026), 36:14–15 (first
`storage module 7024 comprises first capacitor 7074), 36:38–40 (second
`UFD module 7006 comprises second storage module 7036 and second UFT
`module 7038), 36:50–51 (second storage module 7036 comprises second
`capacitor 7076).
`
`6
`
`

`

`IPR2020-01265
`Patent 7,110,444 B1
`
`
`Figure 1B is reproduced below:
`
`
`Figure 1B of the ’444 patent “is a more detailed diagram of a universal
`frequency translation (UFT) module.” Id. at 2:56–58. The ’444 patent
`explains that, “[g]enerally, the UFT module 103 includes a switch 106
`controlled by a control circuit 108.” Id. at 8:62–64 (noting that switch 106 is
`referred to as a controlled switch); see id. at 36:5–7 (first UFT module,
`shown in Figure 70A, contains a switch that opens and closes as a function
`of I control signal 7090), 36:40–42 (second UFT module, also shown in
`Figure 70A, contains a switch that opens and closes as a function of inverted
`I control signal 7092).
`
`7
`
`

`

`IPR2020-01265
`Patent 7,110,444 B1
`
`
`The ’444 patent includes two alternative configurations of switches
`and capacitors in UFD modules (Ex. 1001, 9:43–57), as shown in
`Figures 20A and 20A-1 reproduced below:
`
`
`
`Figures 20A and 20A-1 of the ’444 patent “are example aliasing modules.”
`Id. at 3:50–51. The ’444 patent explains that, in Figure 20A, switch 2008 is
`in series with input signal 2004 and capacitor 2010 is shunted to ground; in
`Figure 20A-1, however, capacitor 2010 is in series with input signal 2004
`and switch 2008 is shunted to ground. Id. at 9:48–57 (also noting that “[t]he
`electronic alignment of the circuit components is flexible”).
`
`Illustrative Claim
`
`Claims 1 and 3 are the independent claims challenged in this
`proceeding. Claim 1 is illustrative of the claimed subject matter and is
`reproduced below with Petitioner’s bracketing added for reference:
`1.
`[1preamble] A wireless modem apparatus, comprising:
`[1A] a receiver for frequency down-converting an input
`signal including,
`[1B] a first frequency down-conversion module to
`down-convert the input signal, wherein said first
`frequency down-conversion module down-converts said
`input signal according to a first control signal and outputs
`a first down-converted signal;
`
`8
`
`

`

`IPR2020-01265
`Patent 7,110,444 B1
`
`
`[1C] a second frequency down-conversion module
`to down-convert said input signal, wherein said second
`frequency down-conversion module down-converts said
`input signal according to a second control signal and
`outputs a second down-converted signal; and
`[1D] a subtractor module that subtracts said second
`down-converted signal from said first down-converted
`signal and outputs a down-converted signal;
`[1E] wherein said second control signal is delayed
`relative to said first control signal by (0.5+n) cycles of said
`input signal, wherein n is an integer greater than or equal to 1.
`Ex. 1001, 60:26–46.
`
`Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art
`
`Petitioner, supported by Dr. Subramanian’s testimony, proposes that a
`person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had
`“at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a related subject and
`two or more years of experience in the field of RF circuit design.” Pet. 47
`(citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 25). Petitioner explains that “[l]ess work experience may
`be compensated by a higher level of education, such as a master’s degree.”
`Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 25).
`Patent Owner does not express a position on the level of ordinary skill
`in the art in the Preliminary Response. See generally Prelim. Resp.
`At this stage of the proceeding, we find Petitioner’s proposal
`consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the
`’444 patent and the prior art of record, see Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d
`1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir.
`1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978), and, therefore, we adopt
`Petitioner’s unopposed position as to the level of ordinary skill in the art for
`purposes of institution.
`
`9
`
`

`

`IPR2020-01265
`Patent 7,110,444 B1
`
`
`II.
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`In this inter partes review, claims are construed using the same claim
`construction standard that would be used to construe the claims in a civil
`action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b). See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2020). The
`claim construction standard includes construing claims in accordance with
`the ordinary and customary meaning of such claims as understood by one of
`ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. See id.; Phillips v. AWH
`Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–14 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). In construing
`claims in accordance with their ordinary and customary meaning, we take
`into account the specification and prosecution history. Phillips, 415 F.3d at
`1315–17.
`Additionally, only terms that are in controversy need to be construed,
`and these need be construed only to the extent necessary to resolve the
`controversy. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795,
`803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that
`are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the
`controversy”); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co.,
`868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of
`an inter partes review).
`At this preliminary stage, we need not construe expressly any claim
`terms because none are in dispute. See Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803.
`
`10
`
`

`

`IPR2020-01265
`Patent 7,110,444 B1
`
`
`III. ANALYSIS
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a)
`
`Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), the Director has discretion to deny
`institution. In determining whether to exercise that discretion on behalf of
`the Director, we are guided by the Board’s precedential decision in NHK
`Spring Co. v. Intri-Plex Techs., Inc., IPR2018-00752, Paper 8 (PTAB
`Sept. 12, 2018) (precedential).
`In NHK, the Board found that the “advanced state of the district court
`proceeding” was a “factor that weighs in favor of denying” the petition
`under § 314(a). NHK, Paper 8 at 20. The Board determined that
`“[i]nstitution of an inter partes review under these circumstances would not
`be consistent with ‘an objective of the AIA . . . to provide an effective and
`efficient alternative to district court litigation.’” Id. (citing Gen. Plastic
`Indus. Co. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, IPR2016-01357, Paper 19 at 16–17
`(PTAB Sept. 6, 2017) (precedential as to § II.B.4.i)).
`“[T]he Board’s cases addressing earlier trial dates as a basis for denial
`under NHK have sought to balance considerations such as system efficiency,
`fairness, and patent quality.” Apple Inc. v. Fintiv Inc., IPR2020-00019,
`Paper 11 at 5 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (collecting cases). Fintiv
`sets forth six non-exclusive factors for determining “whether efficiency,
`fairness, and the merits support the exercise of authority to deny institution
`in view of an earlier trial date in the parallel proceeding.” Id. at 6. These
`factors consider:
`1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one
`may be granted if a proceeding is instituted;
`2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected
`statutory deadline for a final written decision;
`
`11
`
`

`

`IPR2020-01265
`Patent 7,110,444 B1
`
`
`3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the
`parties;
`4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the
`parallel proceeding;
`5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel
`proceeding are the same party; and
`6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of
`discretion, including the merits.
`
`Id.
`
`We discuss the parties’ arguments in the context of considering the
`above factors. In evaluating the factors, we take a holistic view of whether
`efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or
`instituting review. Id.
`
` Whether the Court Granted a Stay or Evidence Exists
`That One May Be Granted If a Proceeding Is Instituted
`On the present record, neither party has produced evidence that a stay
`has been requested by either party or considered by the district court in the
`related litigation.6 See Pet. 82–85; Prelim. Resp. 4–7. Thus, this factor does
`not weigh in favor of or against exercising our discretion to deny institution.
`
`
`
`Proximity of the Court’s Trial Date to the Board’s
`Projected Statutory Deadline for a Final Written
`Decision
`The current scheduling order governing the related litigation indicates
`a trial date of February 7, 2022. Ex. 2003 (“Amended Scheduling Order”),
`3; see Pet. 83 (referring to February 7, 2022); Prelim. Resp. 7. The projected
`
`
`6 Patent Owner notes that Petitioner filed petitions challenging claims of
`only two of the twelve patents asserted by Patent Owner in the related
`litigation. Prelim. Resp. 5.
`
`12
`
`

`

`IPR2020-01265
`Patent 7,110,444 B1
`
`statutory deadline for a final written decision is prior to the trial date. Thus,
`this factor weighs against exercising our discretion to deny institution.
`
`
`
`Investment in the Parallel Proceeding by the Court and
`the Parties
`The Amended Scheduling Order reflects that a Markman hearing was
`scheduled for January 22, 2021, and that fact discovery opens on January 29,
`2021. Ex. 2003, 2. Petitioner asserts this schedule reflects that the related
`litigation is in its preliminary stage and the court has not yet issued any
`substantive orders related to the ’444 patent. Pet. 84. Patent Owner
`contends this schedule reflects that the parties and the court have invested
`significant resources in the related litigation, including preparing claim
`construction briefing. Prelim. Resp. 8–11.
`The “investment factor is related to the trial date factor, in that more
`work completed by the parties and court in the parallel proceeding tends to
`support the arguments that the parallel proceeding is more advanced, a stay
`may be less likely, and instituting would lead to duplicative costs.” Fintiv,
`Paper 11 at 10. Here, the related litigation is at a very early stage. The only
`substantive briefing submitted by the parties in the related litigation is their
`claim construction briefs. See Ex. 2003, 2. And, as relevant to the claims at
`issue here, the dispute involves only two terms recited in claim 3.7 Paper 7
`(“Petitioner’s Supplemental Notice Regarding Claim Construction”), 1–2.
`For one term, Petitioner proposes an express construction, while Patent
`Owner proposes plain and ordinary meaning; and, for the other term, the
`parties’ proposed constructions are very similar. Id. Additionally, Petitioner
`
`
`7 The two terms are “frequency down-conversion module” and “storage
`element.” Paper 7, 1–2.
`
`13
`
`

`

`IPR2020-01265
`Patent 7,110,444 B1
`
`acted diligently and without much delay to file the Petition on July 13, 2020
`(see Paper 4, 1), which is less than a month after service of Patent Owner’s
`preliminary infringement contentions (see Ex. 1018 (“ParkerVision, Inc.’s
`Disclosure of Preliminary Infringement Contentions,” dated June 26, 2020)).
`Pet. 84. On these facts, we find that the related litigation is at a very early
`stage and the investment by the court and the parties therein is relatively
`minimal. Thus, this factor weighs strongly against exercising our discretion
`to deny institution.
`
`
`
`Overlap Between Issues Raised in the Petition and in the
`Parallel Proceeding
`Patent Owner contends that, although there are twelve patents at issue
`in the related litigation, there are significant issues in common between this
`proceeding and the related litigation as it pertains to the ’444 patent. Prelim.
`Resp. 12. Specifically, Patent Owner asserts Petitioner relies upon the same
`primary references to challenge claims of the ’444 patent in the related
`litigation as asserted in the Petition, and Petitioner’s Preliminary Invalidity
`Contentions incorporate, by reference, the entirety of the Petition. Id. at 13
`(citing Ex. 2006 (excerpts of Defendant Intel Corporation’s Preliminary
`Invalidity Contentions)).
`Petitioner contends this proceeding will not duplicate the related
`litigation because the claims at issue do not overlap completely. Pet. 84–85.
`While Petitioner challenges claims 1, 3, and 5 here, Patent Owner asserts
`claims 2–5 in the related litigation. Id. (citing Ex. 1018 (“ParkerVision,
`Inc.’s Disclosure of Preliminary Infringement Contentions”)). Additionally,
`Petitioner contends it “also expects to assert in the district court litigation
`
`14
`
`

`

`IPR2020-01265
`Patent 7,110,444 B1
`
`additional grounds of invalidity that are not presented in [the] [P]etition.”
`Id. at 85.
`We find that there is a significant overlap between the issues raised in
`the Petition and the related litigation. Specifically, in addition to Patent
`Owner’s representation that Petitioner relies upon the same primary
`references,8 Petitioner incorporates the entirety of the Petition in its
`Preliminary Invalidity Contentions. Ex. 2006, 1.
`Additionally, two of the three claims challenged in the Petition
`(claims 3 and 5) also are asserted in the related litigation. We recognize that
`Petitioner includes claim 1 in the Petition and that Patent Owner has not
`asserted claim 1 in the related litigation. Nonetheless, claim 5, which is
`asserted in the related litigation, depends from claim 1, and, thus, to
`demonstrate that Petitioner practices claim 5, Patent Owner also will need to
`establish that Petitioner practices claim 1. Therefore, the addition of claim 1
`to the Petition does not alter, in any significant degree, the overlap of issues
`raised between the claims asserted in the related litigation and the
`Challenged Claims.9
`Further, we find it notable that claim 2 (an independent claim) and
`claim 4 (a claim that depends from claim 3) are not challenged in the
`Petition, although they are asserted by Patent Owner in the related litigation.
`
`
`8 The excerpts of Petitioner’s Invalidity Contentions submitted as
`Exhibit 2006 do not appear to include the prior art that forms the basis for
`Petitioner’s assertions in the related litigation (see generally Ex. 2006), but
`Petitioner has not sought leave to clarify the record in this proceeding, e.g.,
`via a preliminary reply.
`9 Similarly, the potential inclusion of additional grounds of invalidity in the
`related litigation does not detract from the fact that the grounds raised in the
`Petition also are raised in the related litigation.
`
`15
`
`

`

`IPR2020-01265
`Patent 7,110,444 B1
`
`Despite this difference raising a distinction in the overlap, we find the
`difference raises concerns of inefficiency in that even if we were to
`conclude, after a final written decision, that the Challenged Claims are
`unpatentable, our determination would not resolve the parties’ present
`dispute regarding the ’444 patent because claims 2 and 4 would remain for
`disposition by the district court.
`Thus, this factor weighs strongly in favor of exercising our discretion
`to deny institution.
`
` Whether the Petitioner and the Defendant in the Parallel
`Proceeding Are the Same Party
`Petitioner and Patent Owner are the defendant and plaintiff,
`respectively, in the related litigation. Prelim. Resp. 14. As we explain
`above, however, we are likely to reach the merits before the trial date in the
`district court. Thus, this factor does not weigh in favor of or against
`exercising our discretion to deny institution.
`
`
`
`Other Circumstances that Impact the Board’s Exercise of
`Discretion, Including the Merits
`Petitioner contends that “the merits of this [P]etition alone warrant
`institution.” Pet. 85. In particular, Petitioner relies upon Tayloe for teaching
`most of the limitations of the claims including a multiplexer/demultiplexer,
`but turns to either TI Datasheet (Ground 1) or Kawada (Ground 2) for
`teaching how “to implement Tayloe’s multiplexer/demultiplexer.” Id. at 43.
`And, as asserted by Petitioner, “Tayloe specifically refers to a TI
`‘SN74BCT3253D’ multiplexer,” which the current record shows is the
`
`16
`
`

`

`IPR2020-01265
`Patent 7,110,444 B1
`
`multiplexer taught by TI Datasheet. Id. at 38 n.5 (citing Ex. 1019 ¶ 12).10
`Thus, Petitioner contends Tayloe includes an express reference to TI
`Datasheet’s multiplexer/demultiplexer providing strong evidence of
`motivation to combine. Id. at 44.
`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response does not address the merits of
`the Petition (see Prelim. Resp. 15 n.6 (explaining that the Preliminary
`Response only addresses the discretionary bases for denial of institution)),
`but instead argues that (1) “institution . . . will also give rise to substantial
`duplication of efforts” because the related litigation will continue in parallel
`and (2) because of the pending decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in the
`appeal of Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 941 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir.
`2019), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 2020 WL
`6037206 (Oct. 13, 2020), “institution of further [inter partes reviews] is ill
`advised at this time.” Id. at 15.
`On the present record before us, we are persuaded that the merits of
`the Petition appear strong. Although we recognize that the district court
`proceeding may occur in parallel, we find that this factor moderately weighs
`against exercising our discretion to deny institution.11
`
`
`10 Relying on the Honeycutt Declaration, Petitioner contends that the “BCT”
`in Tayloe’s disclosure is a typographical error and the correct lettering is
`“CBT” as reflected in TI Datasheet. Pet. 38 n.5 (citing Ex. 1019 ¶ 12).
`Petitioner’s argument and evidence, at present, are undisputed.
`11 Regarding Patent Owner’s argument as to the constitutionality of the
`appointments of the Administrative Patent Judges (see Prelim. Resp. 15–17
`(discussing this issue as part of Fintiv factor six as well as raising it
`separately as a reason to deny institution)), we decline to consider the
`argument because the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
`addressed this issue in Arthrex.
`
`17
`
`

`

`IPR2020-01265
`Patent 7,110,444 B1
`
`
` Weighing the Factors
`As discussed above, factors 1 and 5 weigh neutrally, factor 4 weighs
`in favor of exercising discretion, and factors 2, 3, and 6 weigh against
`exercising discretion to deny institution. Although factor 4 weighs strongly
`in favor of exercising discretion, on balance, factor 4 is outweighed by
`factors 2, 3, and 6 on the present record. In particular, the projected
`statutory deadline of a final written decision is prior to the district court’s
`trial date, the investment in the related litigation is relatively minimal, and
`the merits of the Petition appear strong. After weighing all of the factors and
`taking a holistic view of the relevant circumstances of this proceeding, we
`determine that, on balance, the factors favor not exercising discretion to
`deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
`
`Legal Standards – Obviousness
`
`The U.S. Supreme Court set forth the framework for applying the
`statutory language of 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) in Graham v. John Deere Co. of
`Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966):
`Under § 103[(a)], the scope and content of the prior art are to be
`determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at
`issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the
`pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the
`obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is
`determined. Such secondary considerations as commercial
`success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc.,
`might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding
`the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented.
`As explained by the Supreme Court in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex
`Inc.:
`
`Often, it will be necessary for a court to look to interrelated
`teachings of multiple patents; the effects of demands known to
`
`18
`
`

`

`IPR2020-01265
`Patent 7,110,444 B1
`
`
`the design community or present in the marketplace; and the
`background knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary
`skill in the art, all in order to determine whether there was an
`apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion
`claimed by the patent at issue. To facilitate review, this
`analysis should be made explicit.
`550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir.
`2006) (“[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere
`conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning
`with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of
`obviousness.”)).
`“Whether an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to
`modify the teachings of a reference is a question of fact.” WBIP, LLC v.
`Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citations omitted).
`“[W]here a party argues a skilled artisan would have been motivated to
`combine references, it must show the artisan ‘would have had a reasonable
`expectation of success from doing so.’” Arctic Cat Inc. v. Bombardier
`Recreational Prods. Inc., 876 F.3d 1350, 1360–61 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting
`In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent
`Litig., 676 F.3d 1063, 1068–69 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
`
` Obviousness over Tayloe and TI Datasheet
`Petitioner asserts the combination of Tayloe and TI Datasheet would
`have rendered the subject matter of claims 1, 3, and 5 obvious to one of
`ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Pet. 43–47 (discussing
`motivation to combine), 47–78 (discussing the application of the art to the
`Challenged Claims).
`
`19
`
`

`

`IPR2020-01265
`Patent 7,110,444 B1
`
`
`Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art
`
`For the reasons discussed above, on the present record at this stage of
`the proceeding, we find that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the
`invention would have “at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering
`or a related subject and two or more years of experience in the field of RF
`circuit design.” See supra § I.G.
`
`
`
`Scope and Content of the Prior Art
`a.
`Tayloe
`Tayloe is directed to a direct conversion receiver (also referred to as a
`“product detector”) “for converting a signal to baseband.” Ex. 1004,
`code (57); see id. at 1:51–52 (describing Figure 3). Tayloe explains that its
`direct conversion receiver
`includes a commutating switch which serves to sample an RF
`waveform four times per period at the RF frequency. The
`samples are integrated over time to produce an average voltage
`at 0 degrees, 90 degrees, 180 degrees and 270 degrees. The
`average voltage at 0 degrees is the baseband in-phase
`signal . . . .
`Id. at code (57). Tayloe teaches that, “[a]lternatively, to increase gain, the
`0 degree average can be differentially summed with the 180 degree average
`to form the baseband in-phase signal . . . .” Id. Tayloe states that “[d]irect
`conversion receivers are desirable in part because they convert signals of
`interest directly to baseband (or near zero hertz) from a radio frequency (RF)
`or an intermediate frequency (IF).” Id. at 1:10–13.
`
`20
`
`

`

`IPR2020-01265
`Patent 7,110,444 B1
`
`
`Tayloe’s Figure 3 is reproduced below:
`
`
`Tayloe’s Figure 3 “shows a direct conversion receiver.” Ex. 1004, 1:51–52.
`Tayloe teaches the following regarding the operation of the direct
`conversion receiver shown in the Figure 3:
`[A]n RF or IR signal f1 is received at resistor 32. . . . After
`passing through resistor 32, the input signal is received by
`commutating switch 38 at input 36. Commutating switch 38
`switches input 36 to outputs 42, 44, 46, and 48. The rate at
`which commutating switch 38 operates is controlled by a signal
`present at control input 40. In the preferred embodiment as
`shown in FIG. 3, the control signal input to control input 40 is
`substantially equal to four times the local oscillator frequency
`that would exist in a simple direct conversion receiver. As a
`result, input 36 is switched to each of the four outputs
`substantially once during each period of the input signal f1.
`
`In the preferred embodiment, commutating switch 38
`remains closed at each of the four outputs for substantially
`90 degrees at the frequency of the input signal. In alternate
`embodiments, commutating switch 38 remains closed at each of
`the four outputs for less than 90 degrees.
`
`During the time that commutating switch 38 connects
`input 36 to output 42, charge builds up on capacitor 72.
`Likewise, during the time commutating switch 38 connects
`input 36 to output 44, charge builds up on capacitor 74. The
`same principle holds true for capacitors 76 and 78 when
`commutating switch 38 connects input 36 to outputs 46 and 48
`
`21
`
`

`

`IPR2020-01265
`Patent 7,110,444 B1
`
`
`respectively. As commutating switch 38 cycles through the
`four outputs, capacitors 72–78 charge to voltage val

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket