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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`___________________
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`___________________
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`YITA LLC,
`Petitioner
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`v.
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`MACNEIL IP LLC,
`Patent Owner
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`___________________
`
`Case IPR2020-01139
`U.S. Patent No. 8,382,186
`___________________
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`
`
`
`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO
`PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO STRIKE
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`
`
`
`
`
`Mail Stop “PATENT BOARD”
`Patent Trial and Appeal Board
`U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
`P.O. Box 1450
`Alexandria, VA 22313-1450
`
`
`
`Case IPR2020-01139
`U.S. Patent No. 8,382,186
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`
`I.
`II.
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`Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1
`Yita’s Reply arguments are proper. ................................................................. 2
`A.
`Legal Principles ..................................................................................... 2
`B.
`Yita’s reasonable expectation of success arguments are proper. .......... 6
`C.
`Yita’s arguments about Rabbe and thermoplastics are proper. ............. 9
`D. Yita’s arguments about addressing alleged difficulties in using Yung’s
`thermoplastics are proper. ................................................................... 11
`III. Yita’s Reply does not incorporate by reference ............................................ 14
`IV. Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 15
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`Case IPR2020-01139
`U.S. Patent No. 8,382,186
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
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`In the POR, MacNeil (and its declarants) made assertions that are false.
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`Yita’s Reply (supported by expert testimony and underlying evidence) showed that
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`MacNeil’s assertions are wrong and would not have dissuaded a POSA from
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`thermoforming Rabbe’s floor tray. Now MacNeil asks the Board to completely
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`remove Yita’s responsive arguments and expert testimony from the record because
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`they demonstrate that MacNeil is wrong.
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`There is no basis for MacNeil’s requested relief. As the Trial Practice Guide
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`states, “striking the entirety or a portion of a party’s brief is an exceptional remedy
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`that the Board expects will be granted rarely.” TPG, 80. Here, Yita’s arguments are
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`not new theories—they “expressly follow from [Yita’s] contentions raised in the
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`Petition.” Ericsson Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures I LLC, 901 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2018). In addition, Yita’s arguments (and supporting evidence) are properly
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`responsive to MacNeil’s POR arguments and “show the state of the art at the time
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`of the invention.” Genzyme Therapeutic Prods. Ltd. P’ship v. Biomarin Pharm.
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`Inc., 825 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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`Moreover, Yita’s Reply does not incorporate arguments by reference or ask
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`the Board to play archeologist with the record. Yita’s arguments are developed in
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`its Reply. And MacNeil cites no case where the Board granted a motion to strike
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`based on an alleged incorporation by reference. The Board’s practice has been to
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,382,186
`leave the record intact. Intex Recreation Corp. v. Team Worldwide Corp.,
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`IPR2018-00859, Paper 69, 5 (P.T.A.B. April 12, 2019); Arctic Cat, Inc. v. Polaris
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`Indus., Inc., IPR2015-01781, Paper 34, 2 (P.T.A.B. August 25, 2016). The Board
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`should deny MacNeil’s motion to strike.
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`II. YITA’S REPLY ARGUMENTS ARE PROPER.
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`A. Legal Principles
`There is no bar on presenting new evidence with a petitioner’s reply. Anacor
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`Pharms., Inc. v. Iancu, 889 F.3d 1372, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Indeed, the Federal
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`Circuit has repeatedly explained that “the introduction of new evidence in the
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`course of the trial is to be expected in inter partes review trial proceedings.” Id.;
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`Genzyme, 825 F.3d at 1366. The purpose of the trial “is to give the parties an
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`opportunity to build a record by introducing evidence—not simply to weigh
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`evidence of which the Board is already aware.” Genzyme, 825 F.3d at 1367. There
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`are many proper categories of reply arguments and evidence.
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`As a first example, “the petitioner’s reply brief [may be] responsive to
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`arguments originally raised in its petition.” Apple Inc. v. Andrea Elecs. Corp., 949
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`F.3d 697, 705-06 (Fed. Cir. 2020). “Parties are not barred from elaborating on their
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`arguments on issues previously raised.” Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. One World
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`Techs., Inc., 944 F.3d 919, 925 (Fed. Cir. 2019). In Ericsson, the Federal Circuit
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`vacated and remanded the Board’s decision for failing to consider portions of the
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,382,186
`petitioner’s reply brief because the reply properly “expand[ed] the same argument
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`made in its Petition” instead of providing a new theory. Ericsson, 901 F.3d at
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`1381. “It is unreasonable to hold petitioners to such a high standard that, if they
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`choose to rely on one example…, they must either discuss all potential
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`permutations… or risk waiving the opportunity to further discuss other relevant
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`examples in their reply.” Apple, 949 F.3d at 706. In addition to argument, evidence
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`to support a petition’s position may also be submitted after the petition stage. For
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`example, in VidStream LLC v. Twitter, Inc., the Federal Circuit concluded that “the
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`Board acted appropriately” when it allowed a petitioner to submit additional
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`evidence in its reply regarding the primary reference’s publication date because
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`“the Board permitted both sides to provide evidence concerning the reference date
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`of the Bradford book, in pursuit of the correct answer.” VidStream LLC v. Twitter,
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`Inc., 981 F.3d 1060, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
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`As a second example, a petitioner “may introduce new evidence after the
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`petition stage if the evidence is a legitimate reply to evidence introduced by the
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`patent owner.” Anacor, 889 F.3d at 1380-81; see also Apple, 949 F.3d at 705-06.
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`Submitting new evidence does not suggest that the evidence was necessary for the
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`prima facie case of obviousness. See, e.g., VidStream, 981 F.3d at 1065; Anacor,
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`889 F.3d at 1380-81. Instead, “[e]vidence admitted in rebuttal to respond to the
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`patent owner’s criticisms will commonly confirm the prima facie case. That does
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,382,186
`not make it necessary to the prima facie case.” Belden v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d
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`1064, 1079 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Notably, responding to a patent owner’s arguments
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`and evidence is a separate basis for proper reply arguments and evidence than the
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`first basis discussed above (being responsive to original petition arguments).
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`Apple, 949 F.3d at 705-06. For example, in Apple, the Federal Circuit vacated and
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`remanded the Board’s decision for failing to consider the petitioner’s reply brief
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`arguments because “any ambiguity as to whether [Petitioner] raised a new
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`argument on reply [based on considering the petition] is eliminated when [it]
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`consider[ed] whether [Petitioner’s] reply arguments are responsive to arguments
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`raised in [the] Patent Owner Response.” Id., 706.
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`As a third example, a petitioner “may introduce new evidence after the
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`petition stage … if it is used ‘to document the knowledge that skilled artisans
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`would bring to bear in reading the prior art identified as producing obviousness.’”
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`Anacor, 889 F.3d at 1380-81. The Federal Circuit “has made clear that the Board
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`may consider a prior art reference to show the state of the art at the time of the
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`invention, regardless of whether that reference was cited in the Board’s institution
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`decision” or was “identified at the petition stage as one of the pieces of prior art
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`defining a combination for obviousness.” Genzyme, 825 F.3d at 1369.1 For
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`example, in Anacor, the Federal Circuit stated that it “was not improper for the
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`1 All emphasis added unless otherwise indicated.
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,382,186
`Board to cite [additional references] as evidence of the knowledge that a skilled
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`artisan would bring to bear in reading [the references of the combination], even
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`though those references were not cited in the petition.” Anacor, 889 F.3d at 1381.
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`Notably, the additional references in Anacor were used to support the petitioner’s
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`reasonable expectation of success arguments. Id.; see also Genzyme, 825 F.3d at
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`1366-1369 (rejecting patent owner’s arguments that the Board improperly relied on
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`additional references not part of the combination to show the state of the art).
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`In sum, where a petitioner continues to rely on the same combination of
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`references and does not shift to a new reason to combine the references, it is
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`unlikely that the petitioner reply is raising new issues. Apple, 949 F.3d at 706
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`(“Apple’s legal ground did not change in its reply—its reply still asserted that
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`claims 6-9 would have been obvious over Hirsch and Martin.”); Genzyme, 825
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`F.3d at 1366 (“The Board’s final written decisions were based on the same
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`combinations of references that were set forth in its institution decisions.”);
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`Anacor, 889 F.3d at 1380 (“[T]he Board’s final written decision was based on the
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`same combination of references… and the same series of inferences that the
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`petition proposed.”). A petitioner has latitude to expand on arguments in the
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`petition, respond to patent owner’s arguments, and show the state of the art, as Yita
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`did here. And a petitioner may also submit evidence to support these arguments
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`and confirm obviousness, as Yita did here.
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`B. Yita’s reasonable expectation of success arguments are proper.
`The Petition explained that a POSA would have had a reasonable
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`expectation of success due, in part, to the ability to use a coordinate measuring
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`machine (CMM) to scan a footwell to obtain data and use “three-dimensional data
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`modeling of the vehicle foot well” to create a mold. Pet., 67. MacNeil surprisingly
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`argued that there were “no known techniques” to scan a footwell or use the data to
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`make a mold. POR, 49. Yita responded to MacNeil’s false statement by providing
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`specific examples (relying on testimony from both Dr. Koch and Mr. Perreault and
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`other underlying evidence) of prior-art CMMs and prior-art computer-aided design
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`software that facilitated exactly what MacNeil alleged was unavailable before
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`2004. Pet. Reply, 23-25. Yita’s reasonable expectation of success arguments in the
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`Reply are proper for at least three reasons.
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`First, Yita’s arguments are not a new theory, but rather “expressly follow
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`from [Yita’s] contentions raised in the Petition.” Ericsson, 901 F.3d at 1380. Just
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`like the Petition, the Reply continues to rely on CMMs and three-dimensional
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`computer modeling to make a mold in showing that a POSA would have had a
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`reasonable expectation of success. Pet. Reply, 23-25. Contrary to MacNeil’s
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`assertion, the Petition never limited its reasonable expectation of success
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`arguments to a “stationary coordinate measure machine.” Motion, Paper 72, 4-5
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`(emphasis in original). Instead, the Petition stated that “[m]any prior-art CMM
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`machines were suitable,” without ever describing them as stationary. Pet., 67.
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`Similarly, the Petition never argued for a direct download of scan data to a
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`machine to make the mold. The Petition expressly mentioned “three-dimensional
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`data modeling of the vehicle foot well” and “creat[ing] a 3D computer model.”
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`Pet., 67. Yita’s arguments do not advance a new theory—Yita relies on the same
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`combination of references (Rabbe, Yung, Gruenwald). And Yita is permitted to
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`elaborate on these previously raised issues, as Yita did in its Reply. Chamberlain,
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`944 F.3d at 925. Indeed, MacNeil ignores that a significant portion of Section IV
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`of the Reply discusses the same evidence cited in the Petition. Pet. Reply, 23-24.
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`The Reply maintains the same argument made in Yita’s Petition.
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`Second, Yita’s arguments fall squarely under permissible “reply arguments
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`[] responsive to arguments raised in the” POR. Apple, 949 F.3d at 705-06; see also
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`Anacor, 889 F.3d at 1380-81. MacNeil asserted that, before October 2004, there
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`were “no known techniques for obtaining accurate three-dimensional position data
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`for a foot well and using that data to create a mold that could be used to
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`thermoform a tray that closely conformed to the foot well.” POR, 49. MacNeil’s
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`position that Yita cannot show this to be wrong (as Yita did in its Reply) makes no
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`sense. Yita’s reliance on another declarant (Mr. Perreault) and additional
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`underlying evidence to support Yita’s position (and show MacNeil is wrong) does
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`not cut against the Reply’s propriety. See Anacor, 889 F.3d at 1381.
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`The ’186 patent’s recognition of the prior-art FaroArm similarly does not cut
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`against the Reply’s propriety. See Ericsson, 901 F.3d at 1379-80 (listing
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`admissions within the challenged patent as a reason for finding “the Board’s
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`decision not to consider portions of Ericsson’s Reply was error”). Yita did not rely
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`on the ’186 patent as a blueprint for the claimed elements. Pet. Reply, 23-25. Yita
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`simply pointed out that even the ’186 patent shows that the technology it used was
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`a commercially available product—contrary to MacNeil’s assertion that there were
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`no known techniques to scan a footwell. Id., 23. Yita’s reasonable expectation of
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`success arguments are a proper reply to MacNeil’s incorrect POR assertion.
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`Third, Yita’s Reply argument and the supporting evidence properly
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`“‘document the knowledge that skilled artisans would bring to bear in reading the
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`prior art identified as producing obviousness.’” Anacor, 889 F.3d at 1380-81; see
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`also Genzyme, 825 F.3d at 1369 (“This court has made clear that the Board may
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`consider a prior art reference to show the state of the art at the time of the
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`invention, regardless of whether that reference was cited in the Board’s institution
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`decision” or was “identified at the petition stage as one of the pieces of prior art
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`defining a combination for obviousness.”). Whether a POSA would have had a
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`reasonable expectation of success is intricately tied to the state of the art. Indeed,
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`the Federal Circuit has expressly approved the Board considering additional
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`evidence to support a reasonable expectation of success beyond what was cited in
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`the Petition. Anacor, 889 F.3d at 1380-81. It would be improper for the Board to
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`ignore Yita’s additional evidence in determining the state of the art (and thus
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`whether a POSA would have had a reasonable expectation of success). See, e.g.,
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`Randall Mfg. v. Rea, 733 F.3d 1355, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
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`Here, Yita’s Reply and evidence are not necessary for the petition’s
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`obviousness case. Instead, they respond to MacNeil’s false claims and confirm Dr.
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`Koch’s original opinion that “a POSA would have understood that three-
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`dimensional data modeling of the vehicle interior at the footwell was readily
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`generated by technology existing before October 2004.” EX1003, ¶175.
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`C. Yita’s arguments about Rabbe and thermoplastics are proper.
`The Petition explained that “Rabbe’s disclosure of ‘semi-rigid rubber or
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`other material having the same properties,’ EX1005, Abstract, would have
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`suggested to a POSA to consider thermoplastics.” Pet., 36. Indeed, the Petition
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`cited this disclosure in Rabbe to support its position that “a POSA would have
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`immediately thought to use a thermoplastic.” Id., 43. MacNeil attempted to limit
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`the term “semi-rigid rubber” to a vulcanized, thermoset rubber and tried to
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`similarly limit “other material having the same properties” to a thermoset. POR,
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`13-14, 55; EX2041, ¶102. Yita responded by pointing out (relying on testimony
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`from both Dr. Koch and Mr. Strachan) that the phrase “semi-rigid rubber or other
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`material having the same properties” encompasses thermoplastic materials
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,382,186
`(including thermoplastic rubbers or elastomers). Pet. Reply, 13. Yita’s arguments
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`about Rabbe and thermoplastics are proper for at least three reasons.
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`First, Yita’s arguments are not a new theory, but rather “expressly follow
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`from [Yita’s] contentions raised in the Petition.” Ericsson, 901 F.3d at 1380. Just
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`like the Petition, the Reply continues to rely on Rabbe’s disclosure of semi-rigid
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`rubber or other material having the same properties as suggesting or leading a
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`POSA to use a thermoplastic, even though Rabbe does not explicitly use the word
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`thermoplastic. Pet. Reply, 13-14. Indeed, it was always Yita’s position that
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`Rabbe’s description provided a category of materials, which is why the Petition
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`stated that “Rabbe is silent on the exact materials” and a POSA would have
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`therefore “looked to common materials … known in the art,” which would have
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`“included thermoplastic materials.” Pet., 36. This remains Yita’s position. Pointing
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`out that the phrase “semi-rigid rubber and other materials having the same
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`properties” is broad enough to include thermoplastics (including thermoplastic
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`elastomers) does not stray from this position. Yita’s arguments do not advance a
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`new theory. At most, the Reply simply “expands the same argument made in
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`[Yita’s] Petition” and is entirely proper. Ericsson, 901 F.3d at 1381.
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`Second, Yita’s arguments fall squarely under permissible “reply arguments
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`[] responsive to arguments raised in the [POR].” Apple, 949 F.3d at 705-06; see
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`also Anacor, 889 F.3d at 1380-81. MacNeil asserted that a POSA would have
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`viewed the phrase semi-rigid rubber as meaning only thermoset rubber. POR, 13-
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`14, 55. MacNeil’s position that Yita cannot show this to be wrong (as Yita did in
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`its Reply) is nonsensical. Indeed, the very purpose of the paragraph MacNeil seeks
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`to strike has nothing to do with changing Yita’s obviousness theory; it simply
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`responds to “MacNeil alleg[ing] that Rabbe’s tray is limited to a non-
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`thermoformable semi-rigid rubber (not a thermoplastic).” Pet. Reply, 13. MacNeil
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`raised this argument, and Yita properly responded to it. Apple, 949 F.3d at 706.
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`MacNeil seeks to exclude Yita’s response because it shows MacNeil was wrong.
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`Third, Yita’s Reply argument and its supporting evidence properly
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`“‘document the knowledge that skilled artisans would bring to bear in reading the
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`prior art identified as producing obviousness.’” Anacor, 889 F.3d at 1380-81.
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`Rabbe is one of the pieces of prior art identified as part of the combination
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`demonstrating obviousness (together with Yung and Gruenwald). The Reply
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`argument and supporting evidence are properly about the state of the art and how
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`skilled artisans would read Rabbe. Pet. Reply, 13.
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`D. Yita’s arguments about addressing alleged difficulties in using
`Yung’s thermoplastics are proper.
`MacNeil argues that “the Petition relied upon polyethylene as the material
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`that one would have used to make Rabbe’s tray” and is now shifting to other
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`materials. Motion, 7-10. But MacNeil mischaracterizes the Petition and the Reply
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`arguments. In the POR, MacNeil took a far-too-narrow approach to obviousness,
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`bodily incorporating specific materials, arguing that Yung’s tri-layer structure
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`could not be thermoformed, and alleging that Yung’s polyethylene was a foam and
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`therefore could not be thermoformed and maintain waterproofness. POR, 16-17,
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`56-58, 61-62. In response, Yita demonstrated that MacNeil was wrong and also
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`explained that any alleged difficulties with polyethylene by itself (whether foam or
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`not) do not overcome the obviousness position because a POSA would have
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`understood how to address the alleged difficulties. Pet. Reply, 21. Yita’s arguments
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`are proper.
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`First, Yita’s arguments are not a new theory. Just like the Petition, the Reply
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`continues to rely on polyethylene as an example thermoplastic material used in
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`thermoforming. Id. The Petition provided Yung’s polyethylene as an example
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`thermoplastic material for thermoforming, but also relied more broadly on
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`thermoplastics generally. See, e.g., Pet., 36-37 (“Thermoforming Rabbe’s floor
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`tray from a sheet of thermoplastic, as disclosed in Yung, would have been a simple
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`combination of known prior art elements (Rabbe’s floor tray and Yung’s
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`thermoplastic)”), 45 (relying on the “thermoplastic materials [plural] disclosed by
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`Yung”), 61 (in addition to giving polyethylene as an example, relying on a POSA
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`being “aware of numerous other prior-art floor trays made of thermoplastic” using
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`thermoforming), 66 (“(e.g., polyethylene disclosed by Yung)”). Indicating that a
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`POSA would have been able to “adjust the polyethylene (or polyethylene foam)”
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`does not stray from the Petition. Pet. Reply, 21. Neither does using Yung’s tri-
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`laminate because all of the materials are thermoplastics. Id. Indeed, the Petition
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`refers to Yung’s thermoplastic materials in the plural. Pet., 45. More broadly, the
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`Petition did not limit itself to only polyethylene and the Reply continues to rely on
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`Yung’s thermoplastic materials. In sum, Yita’s position has not changed. And
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`Yita’s arguments do not advance a new theory.
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`Second, Yita’s arguments are directly responsive to POR arguments.
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`MacNeil alleged issues with using polyethylene by itself (whether foam or
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`otherwise) and with thermoforming Yung’s tri-layer structure. POR, 16-17, 56-58,
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`61-62. MacNeil’s position that Yita cannot show this to be wrong again defies
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`logic. The paragraph at issue does not change Yita’s obviousness theory; it simply
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`responds to “alleged problems with Yung’s specific material” by showing that
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`MacNeil’s alleged problems (if any) would have been readily overcome by a
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`POSA. Pet. Reply, 21. The Petition need not provide a detailed instruction manual
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`for combining teachings from multiple references, Caterpillar Inc. v. Wirtgen Am.,
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`Inc., IPR2017-02186, Paper 10, 23 (P.T.A.B. May 1, 2019), and it would be
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`unreasonable to require a petitioner to discuss all possible permutations in the
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`Petition. Apple, 949 F.3d at 706. Yita’s dispelling alleged difficulties in using
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`Yung’s thermoplastics is a proper reply to MacNeil’s POR assertions.
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`Third, Yita’s Reply argument and its supporting evidence properly
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`document the state of the art. Yung is a reference identified as part of the
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`combination producing obviousness. The Reply argument and supporting evidence
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`are about the state of the art and how skilled artisans would read Yung, Pet. Reply,
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`21, showing that a POSA would use thermoforming based on Yung’s disclosed
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`materials as discussed in the Petition, Pet., 36-37, 45, 61, 66.
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`III. YITA’S REPLY DOES NOT INCORPORATE BY REFERENCE
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`MacNeil alleges multiple instances of incorporation by reference but
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`provides no analysis as to what alleged arguments from the expert declarations are
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`incorporated by reference. Motion, 10-15. The Board need not play archeologist
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`with the record to figure out what Yita’s arguments are—they are provided in the
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`Reply, which properly cites the declarations as supporting evidence; it does not
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`incorporate arguments. See Silicon Labs., Inc. v. Cresta Tech. Corp., IPR2015-
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`00615, Paper 64, 17 (P.T.A.B. August 11, 2016) (“[A]n expert declaration, such as
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`that at issue here, generally is considered evidence, not argument.”). In sum, the
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`Reply fully explains the significance of the evidence.
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`MacNeil’s focus on the number of pages of expert testimony is irrelevant.
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`Yita’s declarants provided expert testimony evidence (supported by underlying
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`evidence) responsive to hundreds of pages of MacNeil’s declarants’ testimony.
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`And to comply with 37 C.F.R. § 42.65, Yita’s declarants “disclose[d] the
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`underlying facts or data on which the[ir] opinion[s] [are] based.” This does not
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`make Yita’s citations an incorporation by reference—it simply shows that Yita’s
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`Reply arguments are well-supported by evidence (both expert testimony and
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`underlying evidence). Moreover, MacNeil’s examples of alleged incorporation by
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`reference are misleading. Motion, 11. Yita’s citation to Mr. Strachan’s declaration
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`at the end of page 21 of the Reply reiterates points already discussed in previous
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`pages. See Pet. Reply, 17-19, 21 (citing smaller portions of the same segment of
`
`Mr. Strachan’s testimony). And the paragraphs of Mr. Perreault’s declaration cited
`
`on page 24 of the Reply are similarly cited multiple times. Id., 23-24 (citing to
`
`EX1044, ¶¶46-56 multiple times). The Reply provides thorough arguments that are
`
`supported by the cited evidence. Pet. Reply, 17-19, 21, 23-24. MacNeil’s other
`
`alleged instances of incorporation by reference are wrong for similar reasons.
`
`Regardless, the proper remedy for incorporation by reference is not to strike
`
`the evidence, let alone portions of the reply. Intex, IPR2018-00859, Paper 69 at 5
`
`(including Fn. 4). Instead, it is to not consider any arguments that are made solely
`
`in the declarations and not adequately described in the reply. Id. That is not the
`
`case here, so the Board should consider all of Yita’s arguments and supporting
`
`evidence.
`
`IV. CONCLUSION
`
`For the reasons above, the Board should deny MacNeil’s motion to strike.
`
`
`
`- 15 -
`
`
`
`Case IPR2020-01139
`U.S. Patent No. 8,382,186
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`STERNE, KESSLER, GOLDSTEIN & FOX P.L.L.C.
`
`/Jason A. Fitzsimmons/
`
`Jason A. Fitzsimmons (Reg. No. 65,367)
`Attorney for Petitioner
`
`Date: September 29, 2021
`1100 New York Avenue, N.W.
`Washington, D.C. 20005
`(202) 371-2600
`
`
`
`- 16 -
`
`
`
`Case IPR2020-01139
`U.S. Patent No. 8,382,186
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the
`
`foregoing PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S MOTION
`
`TO STRIKE was served electronically via e-mail on September 29, 2021, in its
`
`entirety on the following counsel for Patent Owner:
`
`David G. Wille (Lead Counsel)
`Chad C. Walters (Back-up Counsel)
`Clarke W. Stavinoha (Back-up Counsel)
`BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.
`david.wille@bakerbotts.com
`chad.walters@bakerbotts.com
`clarke.stavinoha@bakerbotts.com
`
`Jefferson Perkins (Back-up Counsel)
`PERKINS IP LAW GROUP LLC
`jperkins@perkinsip.com
`
`STERNE, KESSLER, GOLDSTEIN & FOX P.L.L.C.
`
`/Jason A. Fitzsimmons/
`
`Jason A. Fitzsimmons (Reg. No. 65,367)
`Attorney for Petitioner
`
`
`
`
`
`Date: September 29, 2021
`1100 New York Avenue, N.W.
`Washington, D.C. 20005
`(202) 371-2600
`
`17376154.docx
`
`
`
`
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