`
`TIDE 1015
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`Case 8:19-cv-01201-RSWL-KS Document 83 Filed 04/10/20 Page 2 of 19 Page ID #:2089
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`A.
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`(1) the preamble is not limiting and thus “low compact”
`need not be construed; (2) the term “dispersing agent”
`shall be construed as “an agent that assists with
`dispersion”; (3) the term “antifoaming agent” shall
`mean “an agent that reduces or prevents the formation
`of foam”; and (4) the term “stabilizer” shall be “an
`agent that promotes physical or chemical stability.”
`I. BACKGROUND
`Factual Background
`Plaintiff UPL NA, Inc., (“Plaintiff”) is a supplier
`of crop protection products and plant technologies
`designed for agricultural, professional, and aquatics
`markets in the United States. Compl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 1.
`Defendant Tide International (USA), Inc.; Defendant
`Zhejiang Tide CropScience, Co., Ltd.; and Defendant
`Ningbo Tide Imp. & Exp. Co., Ltd., (collectively
`“Defendants”) comprise part of a group informally known
`as the “Tide Group,” which “has a strong sales network”
`and “has established several companies or offices”
`outside of China. Id. ¶ 9. In the United States,
`Defendants’ business includes the sale of pesticide
`technical and formulate products, utilizing the
`advantages of EPA registrations and localized
`operations in the United States. Id. ¶ 11. Plaintiff
`alleges that Defendants invested around $1,000,000 to
`improve their formulation for abamectin so that they
`could market the product in California without the
`warning statement that “the product contains organic
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`Case 8:19-cv-01201-RSWL-KS Document 83 Filed 04/10/20 Page 3 of 19 Page ID #:2090
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`chemical composition, use of same in California may
`cause physical deficiency or harm to birth,” with the
`expectation that farmers in California would naturally
`choose more healthy products. Id. ¶ 15.
`On January 6, 2009, the United States Patent and
`Trademark Office duly and legally issued the Patent
`Number 7,473,685, titled “Process for Preparation of
`Chemically Stable, Dry-Flow, Low Compact, Dust Free,
`Soluble Granules of Phosphoroamidothioates” (the “’685
`Patent”).
`Id. ¶ 24. The ’685 Patent relates to, among
`other things, a specific formula for a chemically
`stable, dry flow, low compact, dust free soluble
`phosphoramidothioate granule consisting of an active
`ingredient, a dispersing agent, a wetting agent, an
`antifoaming agent, a stabilizer, and fillers. Id. ¶
`25. Plaintiff claims that the ’685 Patent is valid and
`enforceable, and Plaintiff is the owner and assignee of
`the patent with full rights to pursue damages for
`infringement of the ’685 Patent. Id. ¶¶ 27-28.
`Plaintiff alleges that Defendants use and sell or
`import into the United States Tide Acephate 90 WDG,
`Tide Acephate 90 WSG, and Tide Acephate 97 SG
`(collectively the “Tide Acephate Products”). Id. ¶ 30.
`On or about June 5, 2017, Plaintiff’s counsel sent a
`letter to Mr. Zhengyu Yang (“Yang”), the General
`Manager of Ningbo Tide and Chairman of the Tide Group
`notifying Defendants of three U.S. patents, including
`the ’685 Patent, in relation to the Tide Acephate
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`Case 8:19-cv-01201-RSWL-KS Document 83 Filed 04/10/20 Page 4 of 19 Page ID #:2091
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`Products. Id. ¶ 31. Plaintiff alleges that one or
`more of the Tide Acephate Products literally or
`equivalently meet every limitation of at least claim 1
`of the ’685 Patent. Id. ¶ 33.
`Plaintiff claims that Defendants have infringed and
`will continue to infringe one or more claims of the
`’685 Patent, including at least claim 1 of the ’685
`Patent, by making, using, selling, and/or offering to
`sell in the United States and/or importing into the
`United States the Tide Acephate Products in violation
`of 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(a), (b), and/or (c). Id. ¶ 48.
`Plaintiff states that it has been injured and will
`continue to suffer additional irreparable harm unless
`Defendants are enjoined from infringing the ’685
`Patent. Id. ¶ 50.
`B.
`Procedural Background
`Plaintiff filed its Complaint [1] on June 17, 2019,
`alleging patent infringement. After the parties
`stipulated to extend the time to answer the Complaint
`[23], Defendants filed their Answer [24] on August 12,
`2019. On December 3, 2019, Defendants filed a Motion
`for Leave to File an Amended Answer [58], which this
`Court granted on February 5, 2020 [64].
`The Court’s scheduling order set the Markman/Claim
`Construction hearing (“Markman Hearing”) for March 10,
`2020 at 10:00 am [49]. The parties filed their Joint
`Claim Construction and Prehearing Statement (“Joint
`Markman Statement”) on February 4, 2020 [63].
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`Case 8:19-cv-01201-RSWL-KS Document 83 Filed 04/10/20 Page 5 of 19 Page ID #:2092
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`Subsequently, Plaintiff filed its Opening Claim
`Construction Brief (“Plaintiff’s Opening Brief”) [66]
`and Defendants filed their Opening Claim Construction
`Brief (“Defendants’ Opening Brief”) [69]. On February
`25, 2020, Plaintiff filed its Responsive Brief
`(“Plaintiff’s Responsive Brief”) [71]. That same day,
`Defendants filed their Rebuttal Claim Construction
`Brief (“Defendants’ Rebuttal Brief”) [72].
`Five days before the Markman Hearing, on March 5,
`2020, the parties filed a Joint Stipulation to Stay
`Case Pending Lifting of Travel Restrictions due to
`Coronavirus [76], which this Court granted in part and
`denied in part [77]. The Markman Hearing was held on
`March 10, 2020.
`
`II. DISCUSSION
`
`A.
`
`Legal Standard
`Claim construction of a patent, including terms of
`art within claims, is exclusively within the province
`of the court, not the jury.
`Markman v. Westview
`Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388-89 (1996). Claim
`construction usually involves resolving disputes about
`the “ordinary and customary meaning” that the words of
`the claim would have had “to a person of ordinary skill
`in the art in question at the time of the invention” (a
`“POSITA”).
`Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-
`13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (internal quotations and citations
`omitted).
`Claim construction begins with an analysis of the
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`Case 8:19-cv-01201-RSWL-KS Document 83 Filed 04/10/20 Page 6 of 19 Page ID #:2093
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`Interactive Gift Express, Inc.
`claim language itself.
`v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed. Cir.
`2001). That is because the claims define the scope of
`the claimed invention.
`Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312.
`But “the person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed
`to read the claim term not only in the context of the
`particular claim in which the disputed term appears,
`but in the context of the entire patent.”
`Id. at 1313.
`Thus, claims “must be read in view of the
`specification,” which is “always highly relevant to the
`claim construction analysis.”
`Id. at 1315 (internal
`quotations omitted). “Usually, it is dispositive; it
`is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed
`term.”
`Id. Nevertheless, “[w]hile claims often
`receive their interpretative context from the
`specification and the prosecution history, courts may
`not read limitations into the claims.”
`Rambus Inc. v.
`Infineon Technologies Ag., 318 F.3d 1081, 1088 (Fed.
`Cir. 2003).
`Courts also look to the prosecution history as part
`of the intrinsic evidence consulted during claim
`construction. See Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am.
`Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2002). “Yet
`because the prosecution history represents an ongoing
`negotiation between the PTO and the applicant, rather
`than the final product of that negotiation, it often
`lacks the clarity of the specification and thus is less
`useful for claim construction purposes.” Phillips, 415
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`Case 8:19-cv-01201-RSWL-KS Document 83 Filed 04/10/20 Page 7 of 19 Page ID #:2094
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`F.3d at 1317.
`Finally, in addition to the use of intrinsic
`evidence, courts may also rely on extrinsic evidence,
`which consists of all evidence “external to the patent
`and file history, such as expert testimony, inventor
`testimony, dictionaries, and technical treatises and
`articles.” Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,
`182 F.3d 1298, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citation and
`quotation omitted). However, extrinsic evidence is
`viewed “as less reliable than the patent and its
`prosecution history in determining how to read claim
`terms.”
`Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318.
`B.
`Discussion
`1.
`Low Compact and Preamble Limitations
`Whether to treat a preamble as a limitation is “a
`determination ‘resolved only on review of the
`entire[] . . . patent to gain an understanding of what
`the inventors actually invented and intended to
`encompass by the claim.” Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v.
`Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir.
`2002). Generally, a preamble limits the invention “if
`it recites essential structure or steps, or if it is
`‘necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality’ to the
`claim.” Id. (quoting Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d 1298 at
`1035). “[C]lear reliance on the preamble during
`prosecution to distinguish the claimed invention from
`prior art transforms the preamble into a claim
`limitation because such reliance indicates use of the
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`Case 8:19-cv-01201-RSWL-KS Document 83 Filed 04/10/20 Page 8 of 19 Page ID #:2095
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`preamble to define, in part, the claimed invention.”
`Id. Conversely, “a preamble is not limiting ‘where a
`patentee defines a structurally complete invention in
`the claim body and uses the preamble only to state a
`purpose or intended use for the invention.’” Id.
`(quoting Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 478 (Fed. Cir.
`1997)).
`Here, Defendants contend that the preamble words
`are limiting. Specifically, they argue that the
`preamble term “low compact” describes a necessary and
`fundamental feature of the technology and was used to
`distinguish the patent from prior art, therefore the
`language is limiting. Defs.’ Opening Brief 5:1-6. On
`the other hand, Plaintiff claims that the term “low
`compact” has very little, if any, significance to the
`patented invention and therefore it is not limiting.
`Pl.’s Opening Brief 5:22-24.
`In the context of the entire patent, it is clear
`that the term “low compact” is meant to describe the
`intended use of the invention, “but not to import a []
`limitation or to exclude from the reach of the claims”
`a granule that is not low compact. Georgetown Rail
`Equip. Co. v. Holland L.P., 867 F.3d 1229, 1237 (Fed.
`Cir. 2017) (holding district court properly found
`preamble not limiting because the claim body describes
`a complete invention and the preamble’s reference to a
`specific location of an element contained in the claim
`body was nonessential).
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`Case 8:19-cv-01201-RSWL-KS Document 83 Filed 04/10/20 Page 9 of 19 Page ID #:2096
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`Neither the density of the granules, nor the
`process for manufacturing these granules is at issue in
`the ’685 Patent. Despite the preamble’s reference to
`“low compact,” the words “low compact” have very little
`significance on the claimed invention. The ’685 Patent
`claims address only the formula and composition of the
`granules not whether they are “high compact” or “low
`compact”. Further, the claim body describes a
`“structurally complete invention,” Rowe, 112 F.3d at
`478, because it defines the active ingredient and other
`required components, range of granule size, and
`appropriate amounts of each ingredient without any need
`to consider compactness.
`Further, the patent applicant never relied upon the
`term low compact to distinguish the claimed invention.
`At the Markman Hearing Defendants pointed out that the
`patent examiner mentioned low compact when comparing
`the application to prior art, see Ex. JX-2 Patent
`Prosecution in Supp. of Joint Markman Statement pt. 2
`(“Patent Prosecution Pt. 2”), ECF No. 63-4, 14 (“As to
`the preamble . . . is met as the Chan pellets are
`attrition resistant, hard, of low compact density . . .
`of the instant concentration”); however, the applicant
`exclusively relied upon the specific ingredients and
`the amounts associated with each to draw distinctions
`not the compactness of the granule. See Patent
`Prosecution Pt. 2, 27 (specifying the composition of
`the granules without reference to the term “low
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`Case 8:19-cv-01201-RSWL-KS Document 83 Filed 04/10/20 Page 10 of 19 Page ID #:2097
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`compact”). The preamble language here simply provides
`a description of the complete invention—it is not, as
`Defendants suggest, a limitation. See IMS Tech., Inc.
`v. Haas Automation, Inc., 206 F.3d 1422, 1434 (Fed.
`Cir. 2000) (“The phrase ‘control apparatus’ in the
`preamble merely gives a descriptive name to the set of
`limitations in the body of the claim that completely
`set forth the invention.”).
`Because the preamble language is not necessary to
`interpret the claims and the applicant did not rely on
`it to distinguish the instant invention from prior art,
`the Court finds that the preamble is not limiting and
`therefore the term “low compact” does not require
`further construction.
`2.
`Dispersing Agent
`“Words of a claim ‘are generally given their
`ordinary and customary meaning.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d
`at 1312. “Importantly, the person of ordinary skill in
`the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in
`the context of the particular claim in which the
`disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire
`patent, including the specification.” Id. at 1313.
`“There are only two exceptions to this general rule: 1)
`when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his
`own lexicographer, or 2) when the patentee disavows the
`full scope of a claim term either in the specification
`or during prosecution.”
`Thorner v. Sony Computer
`Entm’t America LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
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`Case 8:19-cv-01201-RSWL-KS Document 83 Filed 04/10/20 Page 11 of 19 Page ID #:2098
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`2012). Both the standards for disavowal and when a
`patentee acts as her own lexicographer are “exacting”
`and require that the specification or prosecution
`history make clear that the patentee is rejecting the
`ordinary and customary meaning of a term. See Kegel
`Co., Inc. V. AMF Bowling, Inc., 127 F.3d 1420, 1427
`(Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Without an express intent to impart
`a novel meaning to a claim term, the term takes on its
`ordinary meaning.”).
`Here, the parties agree that a dispersing agent is
`an agent that assists with dispersion; however, the
`crux of the disagreement is whether the Court should
`construe the term to include the language “when the end
`user mixes the granule in water.” See Chart of
`Disputed Terms in Supp. Joint Markman Statement
`(“Disputed Terms Chart”), ECF No. 63-1. Defendants
`suggest a POSITA would understand that a dispersing
`agent in the context of the ’685 Patent would only be
`beneficial when added to water by an end user. Defs.’
`Opening Brief 22:27-23:2. But Plaintiff argues there
`is no basis to unnecessarily narrow the construction to
`only “when the end user mixes the granules in water,”
`because a dispersing agent could be beneficial outside
`of this context. Pl.’s Opening Brief 13:17-28.
`In support of their position, Defendants point to
`other patents’ definitions and discussions of
`“dispersing agents”; however, other patents’
`construction of a term is not controlling. Defendants
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`Case 8:19-cv-01201-RSWL-KS Document 83 Filed 04/10/20 Page 12 of 19 Page ID #:2099
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`also emphasize the process for using the granules to
`show that a dispersing agent would have no benefit
`outside of when the “end user mixes it with water.”
`But this argument ignores that this is a composition
`patent and not a process patent. How the granules are
`eventually utilized is beyond the scope of the ’685
`Patent and does not influence construction of a term
`whose ordinary meaning is well-known in the art.
`The Court must consider whether the intrinsic
`evidence supports straying from the ordinary meaning of
`the term. Here, at no point in the prosecution history
`was there any mention of an “end user” or “mixing” the
`granules with water. Instead, the prosecution history
`primarily discusses the specific measurements that make
`up the composition of the granules. See Patent
`Prosecution Pt. 2, 56-57 (rejecting the application
`because “[O]ne in the art can achieve the concentration
`of each ingredient chosen as taught within these
`ranges” outlined).
`While Defendants contend that construction must
`consider the context of the specification, there is no
`evidence to support that the applicant intended
`dispersing agent to mean anything other than its
`ordinary and plain meaning: “an agent that assists with
`dispersion.” There is no evidence that the applicant
`acted as his own lexicographer or explicitly disavowed
`the ordinary meaning of “dispersing agent” within the
`specification or prosecution history to justify
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`Case 8:19-cv-01201-RSWL-KS Document 83 Filed 04/10/20 Page 13 of 19 Page ID #:2100
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`Defendants’ requested construction. Cf. Yoon Ja Kim,
`465 F.3d at 1318 (holding while specification did not
`explicitly define an ingredient term as an “oxidizing
`agent,” the specification clearly intended the
`ingredient term to be an “oxidizing agent.”).
`Further, extrinsic evidence supports the ordinary
`and customary meaning. In fact, Defendants’ own
`evidence supports that a dispersing agent is not
`strictly added to assist dispersal once in a spray
`tank, but also may have a benefit during manufacturing.
`See Chemistry and Technology of Agrochemical
`Formulations (“Agrochemical Formulations”) at 3.4.8 in
`Supp. of Joint Markman Statement, ECF No. 63-16
`(“Dispersing agents are added to agrochemical
`formulations to facilitate dispersion during
`manufacture, and to ensure particles redisperse into
`water in a spray tank.”). Defendants’ attempt to
`distinguish this evidence by pointing out that
`Plaintiff failed to present an example of how a
`dispersing agent is beneficial in the manufacture of
`soluble granules; however, the question is not whether
`Plaintiff can present an example, but rather if a
`POSITA would construe “dispersing agent” to mean an
`agent that assists with dispersion only “when an end
`user mixes with water.”
`Defs.’ Rebuttal Brief 9:9-24.
`Having considered the parties’ papers and oral argument
`presented at the Markman Hearing, the Court does not
`find any reason to narrow the definition of “dispersing
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`agent” beyond its ordinary meaning.
`The relevant evidence does not suggest that the
`applicant intended “dispersing agent” to be limited or
`construed beyond its customary meaning as “an agent
`that assists with dispersion.” Further, given that a
`dispersing agent may be beneficial outside of just the
`limited situation of when an end user mixes the
`granules with water, the Court finds no justification
`to limit the construction of this term at this time.
`Neither the intrinsic nor extrinsic evidence supports
`Defendants’ construction of “dispersing agent,” and
`therefore, the Court construes the term according to
`its ordinary meaning: “an agent that assists with
`dispersion.”
`3.
`Antifoaming Agent
`Similarly to the above, the parties agree that an
`antifoaming agent should be defined as an agent or
`substance that reduces or prevents the formation of
`foam; however, the parties again dispute whether to
`include the language “when the end user mixes the
`granule in water.”
`Just as with the above “dispersing agent,” there is
`no evidence to support construing “antifoaming agent”
`as being helpful only when the end user mixes the
`granules in water. In support of their position,
`Defendants rely on the Declaration of William Geigle,
`an individual with forty years of experience in
`formulation and development of pesticides and
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`herbicides, which states that “the only time at which
`an antifoaming agent is needed is when the end user
`mixes the granules in water.” Decl. of William Geigle
`in Supp. of Defs.’ Opening Brief (“Geigle Opening
`Decl.”) ¶ 82, ECF No. 69-2. Defendants argue that, in
`the context of the ’685 Patent, a POSITA would only
`understand an antifoaming agent to be beneficial once
`an end user mixes the granules with water. But even if
`the antifoaming agent’s primary benefit is realized
`once the granules are mixed with water, the broad
`ordinary meaning of the term controls given the absence
`of intrinsic evidence to suggest that the applicant
`intended to limit the definition. Just as with the
`above “dispersing agent,” the additional phrase
`Defendants request the Court include requires that the
`Court read in limitations to the claims which are not
`supported by the intrinsic evidence.
`As such, the Court construes “antifoaming agent” to
`have its ordinary meaning: “an agent that reduces or
`prevents the formation of foam.”
`4.
`Stabilizer
`A patent is presumed valid under 35 U.S.C. § 282,
`and the party asserting invalidity bears the burden to
`establish this invalidity by clear and convincing
`evidence. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S.
`91, 95 (2011). “A patent is invalid for indefiniteness
`if its claims, read in light of the specification
`delineating the patent, and the prosecution history,
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`fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those
`skilled in the art about the scope of the invention.”
`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S.
`898, 901 (2014). Reasonable certainty does not require
`“absolute precision.” BASF Corp. v. Johnson Matthey
`Inc., 875 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citation
`and quotations omitted). But “a patent must be precise
`enough to afford clear notice of what is claimed,
`thereby ‘appris[ing] the public of what is still open
`to them.’” Nautilus, 572 U.S. 898 at 909. The Court’s
`role during claim construction is to “read claims in
`view of the specification, of which they are a party”;
`however, the Court does “not read limitations from the
`embodiments in the specification into the claims.”
`Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367,
`1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
`Here, Plaintiff argues that the term “stabilizer”
`is definite and does not require construction as it has
`a common and well-understood meaning in the art: “an
`agent that promotes physical or chemical stability.”
`Conversely, Defendants argue that while stabilizer is
`common in the industry, stabilizer in the context of
`the ’685 Patent is too broad to provide a POSITA with
`enough information to understand the scope of the
`invention and therefore it is indefinite.
`Contrary to Defendants’ contentions, just because a
`term is broad does not mean that it is indefinite. See
`Ultimax Cement Mfg. Corp. v. CTS Cement Mfg. Corp., 587
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`Case 8:19-cv-01201-RSWL-KS Document 83 Filed 04/10/20 Page 17 of 19 Page ID #:2104
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`F.3d 1339, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding simply
`claiming a broad construction “does not render a claim
`insolubly ambiguous, nor does it prevent the public
`from understanding the scope of the patent”). The
`Court acknowledges that there are many different
`stabilizers; however, this alone is insufficient to
`conclude that the term stabilizer is indefinite.
`Defendants outline numerous types of stabilizers in
`an attempt to argue that a POSITA would not be able to
`reasonably understand the constraints of the ’685
`Patent; however, “[t]he fact that there are many
`possible [stabilizers] that can be found does not make
`the claim indefinite . . . .” EcoServices, LLC v.
`Certified Aviation Servs., LLC, CV 16-1824-RSWL-SP(x),
`2017 WL 2783486, at *7 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2017)
`(finding “types of solid(s)” not indefinite even though
`the plaintiff did not identify the specific types of
`solids because a POSITA would be aware of the types of
`solids that would be present in the claimed invention).
`In the context of the ’685 Patent, a POSITA would
`be able to understand what the term stabilizer means.
`Both parties’ experts appear to agree that stabilizer
`in the context of the ’685 Patent relates to chemical
`stability. Particularly, the specification states that
`“[t]hese granules of phosphoroamidothioates are
`characterized by aging stability for a minimum of two
`year.” ’685 Patent 2:65-67, ECF No. 63-2. Both Mr.
`Geigle’s and Dr. Rockstraw’s, Plaintiff’s expert,
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`Case 8:19-cv-01201-RSWL-KS Document 83 Filed 04/10/20 Page 18 of 19 Page ID #:2105
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`declarations confirm that “aging stability” relates to
`“chemical stability.” See Geigle Opening Decl. ¶ 95;
`see also Decl. of David Rockstraw, Ph.d. in Supp. of
`Pl.’s Opening Decl. (“Rockstraw Opening Decl.”) ¶ 59,
`ECF No. 66-3. Additionally, the term stabilizer is
`mentioned throughout the patent prosecution, which
`provides a POSITA further context to understand the
`scope of the claimed invention. See Patent Prosecution
`Pt. 2, at 15, 45, 56. Further, Hawley’s Condensed
`Chemical Dictionary defines a stabilizer as “[a]ny
`substance that tends to keep a compound, mixture, or
`solution from changing its form or chemical nature.”
`Hawley’s Condensed Chemical Dictionary (“Hawley’s
`Dictionary”) 8, ECF No. 63-9. Hawley’s Dictionary goes
`on to say that “[s]tabilizers may retard a reaction
`rate, preserve a chemical equilibrium, act as
`antioxidants, keep pigments and other compounds in
`emulsion form, or prevent the particles in a colloidal
`suspension from precipitating”—an inherently broad
`definition. Id.
`Despite Defendants’ contentions, “‘breadth is not
`indefiniteness.’” BASF Corp., 875 F.3d 1360 at 1367
`(citation omitted). The fact that many possible
`stabilizers exist does not mean the claim is
`indefinite. In the context of the specification, a
`POSITA would be able to understand the parameters of a
`stabilizer within the ’685 Patent to be an agent that
`promotes physical or chemical stability. Simply
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`Case 8:19-cv-01201-RSWL-KS Document 83 Filed 04/10/20 Page 19 of 19 Page ID #:2106
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`because there are many different functions for a
`stabilizer, does not mean that the term is so amorphous
`or “insolubly ambiguous” as to be indefinite.
`Nautilus, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 906 (2014).
`Because the term “stabilizer” is not indefinite and
`the Court finds no evidence of disavowal or
`lexicography, the term stabilizer should be given its
`ordinary meaning. As such, the Court construes
`“stabilizer” to mean: “an agent that promotes physical
`or chemical stability.”
`III. CONCLUSION
`For the reasons set forth above, the Court FINDS
`that the preamble language of the ’685 Patent is not
`limiting and CONSTRUES the disputed terms as follows:
`(1) “dispersing agent” shall be construed as “an
`agent that assists with dispersion”;
`(2) “antifoaming agent” shall be construed as “an
`agent that reduces or prevents the formation of
`foam”; and
`(3) “stabilizer” shall be construed as “an agent
`that promotes physical and chemical stability.”
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`IT IS SO ORDERED.
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`DATED: April 10, 2020 /s/ Ronald S.W. Lew
`HONORABLE RONALD S.W. LEW
` Senior U.S. District Judge
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