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Case 2:18-cv-00100-JRG-RSP Document 420 Filed 10/15/20 Page 1 of 8 PageID #: 10495
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`
`ULTRAVISION TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`v.
`GOVISION LLC,
`Defendant.
`
`Case No. 2:18-cv-00100-JRG-RSP
`(LEAD CASE)
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`ULTRAVISION TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`LEDMAN OPTOELECTRONIC CO., LTD.,
`Defendant.
`
`ULTRAVISION TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.,
`Defendant.
`
`ULTRAVISION TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`BARCO NV,
`
`Defendant.
`
` Case No 2:18-cv-00101-JRG-RSP
`(CONSOLIDATED CASE)
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
` Case No. 2:19-cv-00252-JRG-RSP
`(CONSOLIDATED CASE)
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
` Case No. 2:19-cv-00253-JRG-RSP
`(CONSOLIDATED CASE)
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`PLAINTIFF ULTRAVISION TECHNOLOGIES, LLC’S CORRECTED OBJECTIONS
`TO THE CLAIM CONSTRUCTION MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (DKT. 407)
`
`Glux Visual Effects Tech, et al. Ex. 1026
`Page 1 of 8
`
`

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`Case 2:18-cv-00100-JRG-RSP Document 420 Filed 10/15/20 Page 2 of 8 PageID #: 10496
`
`
`
`Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Plaintiff Ultravision
`
`Technologies, LLC (“Ultravision”) hereby objects to three claim constructions issued in the above-
`
`captioned case on September 30, 2020. Ex. A, Dkt. 407.
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`The Claim Construction Memorandum and Order (the “Order”) is clearly erroneous or
`
`contrary to law regarding three specific claim constructions: (1) “waterproof”/ “sealed to be
`
`waterproof;” (2) “display module;” and (3) “structural frame”/“compound structural frame.”
`
`The construction of “[sealed to have an] ingress protection (IP) rating of IP 65 or higher”
`
`is clearly erroneous because it improperly limits these terms to achieving a specific IP rating where
`
`the dependent claims make clear that specific IP ratings are narrower than the proper construction
`
`of “waterproof.” The Court’s concern regarding indefiniteness is undermined by Plaintiff’s
`
`expert’s unrebutted testimony that its proffered construction, “preventing water from entering the
`
`interior of the panel when exposed to weather,” is not indefinite.
`
`The construction of the “display module” terms1 is clearly erroneous or contrary to law
`
`because it improperly reads the preferred embodiment into the claims. The Order limited the
`
`claimed “display module” to “a sealed display module having a pair of LED panels operatively
`
`coupled to a daughter board” based upon statements in the specification that do not rise to the level
`
`of lexicography or disclaimer.
`
`Finally, the Court’s construction of the “structural frame” terms is clearly erroneous or
`
`contrary to law because it again improperly reads a preferred embodiment into the claims. The
`
`Order limited the claimed “structural frame” to “a structural foam material or material having
`

`1 Plaintiff does not object to the “weatherized” portion of this construction, merely the limiting of
`the “display module” to a “sealed display module having a pair of LED panels operatively
`coupled to a daughter board.”
`
`Glux Visual Effects Tech, et al. Ex. 1026
`Page 2 of 8
`
`

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`Case 2:18-cv-00100-JRG-RSP Document 420 Filed 10/15/20 Page 3 of 8 PageID #: 10497
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`equivalent strength and weight properties of structural foam” based upon statements in the
`
`specification which neither disclaimed claim scope or amounted to lexicography. The Order also
`
`did not give due weight to claims that specifically claim “wherein said compound structural frame
`
`is composed of structural foam.”
`
`II. LEGAL STANDARD
`
`
`
`A non-dispositive decision must be modified or set aside if it is “clearly erroneous or
`
`contrary to law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).
`
`III. ARGUMENT
`
`A. Waterproof
`
`
`
`A person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that “waterproof” means “preventing
`
`water from entering the interior of the panel when exposed to weather.” Ex. B, ¶ 51.
`
`It was error to limit “waterproof” to display panels having an ingress protection (IP) rating
`
`of IP65 or higher because the dependent claims, which are presumed to have narrower scope than
`
`the independent claims from which they depend, see 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 4, claim display panels
`
`with IP ratings of IP65 or higher. See, e.g., Ex. C, ’782 Patent, claim 6. These dependent claims
`
`are narrower than the independent claims because they require that the display panel have an IP
`
`rating in the first place, and that the IP rating ranges from IP65 to IP68. The incorporation of IP
`
`ratings in a dependent claim gives rise to a presumption that IP ratings are not present in the
`
`independent claims. See Philips v. AWC Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314-15 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Rather
`
`than acknowledge that the dependent claims raised the presumption that the Court’s construction
`
`was incorrect, the Court found that the limitation of the dependent claims supported its reading of
`
`this limitation into the “waterproof” terms of the independent claims. See Ex. A, at 22 (citing to
`
`claims 1 and 6 of the ’782 Patent). This was clear error.
`

`
`2
`
`Glux Visual Effects Tech, et al. Ex. 1026
`Page 3 of 8
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`

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`Case 2:18-cv-00100-JRG-RSP Document 420 Filed 10/15/20 Page 4 of 8 PageID #: 10498
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`The remainder of the intrinsic record does not support limiting the claims in a manner
`
`inconsistent with their plain and ordinary meaning. The portions of the specification cited in the
`
`Order do not equate “waterproof” with an IP rating, but describe how IP ratings can be used to
`
`evaluate the degree to which a display panel is protected from the elements. See Ex. A, at 21 (citing
`
`’782 Patent specification). Moreover, the prosecution history cited in the Order refers to an
`
`argument distinguishing prior art where the claim limitation at issue was “the panel comprises an
`
`ingress protection (IP) rating of IP67 or IP68.” See Ex. D, Dkt. 304-5 at 10. The applicant did not
`
`argue that the term “waterproof” was understood to require a certain IP rating.
`
`Separate from this issue, the intrinsic record and Plaintiff’s unrebutted expert testimony
`
`makes clear that “waterproof” is not limited to a particular IP rating at all, but rather that the
`
`product can operate for its intended purpose when used outdoors and exposed to the weather. Ex.
`
`E, Dkt. 297, at 7-8. The Order expressed uncertainty regarding the definiteness of Ultravision’s
`
`proposed construction (Ex. A at 22-23), but ranges of waterproofing dependent on application have
`
`been previously approved by this court. Biosonix, LLC v. Hydrowave, LLC, 230 F. Supp. 3d 598,
`
`610-11 (E.D. Tex. 2017).
`
`Further, Plaintiff presented unrebutted expert testimony that its construction of
`
`“waterproof” would be understood by the person of ordinary skill in the art to be definite. See Ex.
`
`B, Dkt. 297-20 ¶ 51. The POSITA would understand that the term “waterproof” used in the
`
`asserted claims refer to preventing water from entering the panels in the conditions under which
`
`they were designed to operate. The Order raises concerns that “a manufacturer would not know
`
`whether the device infringes until it is shipped and installed,” Ex. A, at 22, but this concern is not
`
`valid because Plaintiff’s proposed construction did not depend on the specific weather at the site
`
`of installation. Rather, the construction requires waterproof sufficient to protect against weather in
`

`
`3
`
`Glux Visual Effects Tech, et al. Ex. 1026
`Page 4 of 8
`
`

`

`Case 2:18-cv-00100-JRG-RSP Document 420 Filed 10/15/20 Page 5 of 8 PageID #: 10499
`
`general because display panels, when manufactured, contain a level of sealing that are either
`
`sufficient or insufficient to protect them from weather, a determination that a skilled expert can
`
`make without seeing the panel operate. See Ex. B, ¶ 52. The evidence on this issue presented by
`
`Plaintiff’s expert was unrebutted by Defendants’ expert but given no weight by the Court.
`
`B. Display Module
`
`The Order limited this term to a “module having a pair of LED display panels operatively
`
`coupled to a daughter board” (Ex. A, at 67) for two reasons. First, it noted that the daughter board
`
`and pair of panels are “important and unique feature[s] of the present invention.” Id. (quoting ’791
`
`Patent (Ex. F), 34:50-52). Second, it noted that “every disclosed embodiment includes a pair of
`
`LED panels operatively coupled to a daughter board.” Id. (citing ’791 Patent, 25:30-33, 27:1-7,
`
`38:9-14, and 43:62-67).
`
`Absent lexicography or disavowal of claim scope, it is improper to limit the claims to the
`
`preferred embodiment. Cont’l Circuits LLC v. Intel Corp., 915 F.3d 788, 796 (Fed. Cir. 2019). The
`
`Order cites no precedent holding that a statement that the feature is an “important and novel” rises
`
`to the level of lexicography. While claim terms are construed in light of the specification, departing
`
`from the plain meaning based on the specification can only occur in instances of lexicography or
`
`disavowal. Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
`
`The standard for lexicography is exacting. The patentee must “clearly set forth a definition
`
`of the disputed claim term” and “’clearly express an intent’ to define the term.” Id. The statement
`
`that this feature is “important and unique” does not rise to the level of lexicography. Although in
`
`some instances an “important” feature can be found to limit the claims, it is also required that
`
`alternatives to that feature are disparaged. Inpro II Licensing, S.A.R.L. v. T-Mobile USA Inc., 450
`
`F.3d 1350, 1354-55 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Here, while the patent describes the daughter board and dual
`

`
`4
`
`Glux Visual Effects Tech, et al. Ex. 1026
`Page 5 of 8
`
`

`

`Case 2:18-cv-00100-JRG-RSP Document 420 Filed 10/15/20 Page 6 of 8 PageID #: 10500
`
`panel design as “important and unique,” it does not disparage other designs. GE Lighting Sols.,
`
`LLC v. AgiLight, Inc., 750 F.3d 1304, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2014). And the ’791 Patent explicitly states
`
`that in one embodiment, the display module comprises “at least one LED board coupled to the
`
`frontside of the frame” and in another embodiment “the at least one LED board includes two LED
`
`boards disposed in a side-by-side arrangement along the X-axis.” Ex. F, 2:9-29.
`
`C. Structural Frame
`
`
`
`The Order improperly limited the “structural frame” and “compound structural frame” to
`
`a “frame composed of a structural foam material or material having equivalent strength and weight
`
`properties of structural foam.”2 Ex. A at 83.
`
`Other claims in this patent family support plaintiff’s proposal. When the patentee sought
`
`to specifically claim structural foam, it did so. Taking for example the related patent 9,230,458
`
`(Ex. G), claim 1 recites “a compound structural frame” and claim 5 claims “wherein said
`
`compound structural frame is composed of structural foam to help minimize frame weight for hand
`
`lifting and mounting of said compound structural frame by one person without the use of a
`
`mechanical frame lifting arrangement.” (emphasis added). The Order recognized this claim
`
`differentiation but found that it was “overcome by a contrary construction dictated by the written
`
`description or prosecution history.” Ex. A at 81. Here, again, the specification describes the
`
`structural foam construction as a “unique and novel feature” of the preferred embodiment. Ex. E,
`
`at 32:7-13. But absent disparagement of the alternatives, this is not sufficient to find lexicography.
`
`Inpro II Licensing, 450 F.3d at 1354-55. The structural frame being made of structural foam is
`
`merely the preferred embodiment.
`

`2 The Court also limited the compound structural frame to a frame “having a plurality of bay
`members.” This portion of the construction is not objected to. The Court’s construction of the
`phrase “weatherized” is also not objected to.
`

`
`5
`
`Glux Visual Effects Tech, et al. Ex. 1026
`Page 6 of 8
`
`

`

`Case 2:18-cv-00100-JRG-RSP Document 420 Filed 10/15/20 Page 7 of 8 PageID #: 10501
`
`Dated: October 15, 2020
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted
`
`
`
`
`
` /s/ Alfred R. Fabricant
`Alfred R. Fabricant
`NY Bar No. 2219392
`Email: ffabricant@fabricantllp.com
`Peter Lambrianakos
`NY Bar No. 2894392
`Email: plambrianakos@fabricantllp.com
`Vincent J. Rubino, III
`NY Bar No. 4557435
`Email: vrubino@fabricantllp.com
`Joseph M. Mercadante
`NY Bar No. 4784930
`Email: jmercadante@fabricantllp.com
`Daniel J. Shea
`NY Bar No. 5430558
`Email: dshea@fabricantllp.com
`FABRICANT LLP
`230 Park Avenue, 3rd Floor W.
`New York, New York 10169
`Telephone: (212) 257-5797
`Facsimile: (212) 257-5796
`
`Samuel F. Baxter
`State Bar No. 01938000
`Email: sbaxter@mckoolsmith.com
`Jennifer L. Truelove
`State Bar No. 24012906
`Email: jtruelove@mckoolsmith.com
`MCKOOL SMITH, P.C.
`104 E. Houston Street, Suite 300
`Marshall, Texas 75670
`Telephone: (903) 923-9000
`Facsimile: (903) 923-9099
`
`ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
`ULTRAVISION TECHNOLOGIES,
`LLC
`
`

`
`6
`
`Glux Visual Effects Tech, et al. Ex. 1026
`Page 7 of 8
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`

`

`Case 2:18-cv-00100-JRG-RSP Document 420 Filed 10/15/20 Page 8 of 8 PageID #: 10502
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`The undersigned hereby certifies that on October 15, 2020, a true and correct copy of the
`
`above and foregoing document has been served on counsel of record via the Court’s CM/ECF
`
`system per Local Rule CV-5(a)(3).
`
`
`
`/s/ Alfred R. Fabricant
` Alfred R. Fabricant
`
`Glux Visual Effects Tech, et al. Ex. 1026
`Page 8 of 8
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`

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