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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`____________
`
`ROKU, INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`UNIVERSAL ELECTRONICS INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`
`____________
`
`Case IPR2020-01012
`U.S. Patent 7,589,642
`
`____________
`
`PATENT OWNER PRELIMINARY RESPONSE
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page(s)
`
`LIST OF EXHIBITS .............................................................................................. VII
`
`I.
`
`THE BOARD SHOULD NOT INSTITUTE INTER PARTES
`REVIEW .......................................................................................................... 1
`
`A.
`
`Joinder Should Be Denied, Making Petitioner’s Challenge
`Untimely under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) ...................................................... 2
`
`1.
`
`Same Party Joinder is Not Allowed by 35 U.S.C. §
`315(c) .......................................................................................... 2
`
`2. Windy City Abrogated Proppant Express and the Board
`has no Discretion to Allow Same Party Joinder ......................... 4
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`The Board Should Deny Institution Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) in
`View of the Upcoming ITC Trial .......................................................... 5
`
`The Board Should Deny Institution Under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d)
`Because of Petitioner’s Multiple Petitions ............................................ 8
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`4.
`
`5.
`
`6.
`
`7.
`
`Petitioner previously filed a petition on several claims of
`the ’642 Patent ............................................................................ 9
`
`Petitioner has known of the prior art asserted in its
`follow-on petition since February 2019 ...................................... 9
`
`Petitioner had received the institution decision on its
`previous Petition before filing the follow-on Petition ..............10
`
`The long delay between Petitioner’s notice of the
`references in the follow-on Petition and filing the follow-
`on Petition weighs against institution .......................................11
`
`Petition has no adequate explanation for the delay in
`filing its follow-on Petition .......................................................11
`
`The finite resources of the Board are not well spent on
`this follow-on Petition ...............................................................14
`
`Instituting trial on the follow-on Petition will disrupt the
`schedule .....................................................................................14
`
`II.
`
`PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO SHOW THAT THERE IS A
`REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE CHALLENGED
`
`i
`
`

`

`CLAIMS OF THE ‘642 PATENT ARE UNPATENTABLE AS
`OBVIOUS. .....................................................................................................16
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`Technology Background .....................................................................17
`
`U.S. Patent No. 7,589,642 ...................................................................18
`
`Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art .....................................................20
`
`Claim Construction..............................................................................20
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`4.
`
`5.
`
`“Key Code” ...............................................................................21
`
`“Keystroke Indicator Signal” ....................................................21
`
`“Key Code Signal” ....................................................................23
`
`“Key Code Generator Device” ..................................................24
`
`“Means for receiving a key code” .............................................26
`
`E.
`
`Ground 1: Mishra in Combination with Dubil Does Not Render
`the Challenged Claims Obvious ..........................................................28
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`Petitioner has not shown that Mishra or Dubil discloses,
`teaches or suggests Element 1.2: “generating a key code
`within a key code generator device using the keystroke
`indictor signal” ..........................................................................29
`
`a. Mishra does not disclose using a keystroke
`indicator signal to generate a key code ..........................29
`
`b.
`
`Each of Mishra and Dubil does not disclose a “key
`code generator device” ...................................................31
`
`Petitioner has not shown that Mishra or Dubil discloses,
`teaches, or suggests Element 1.3: “modulating said key
`code onto a carrier signal, thereby generating a key code
`signal” .......................................................................................31
`
`a.
`
`b.
`
`c.
`
`Each of Mishra and Dubil does not disclose
`“modulating said key code onto a carrier signal” ...........31
`
`Each of Mishra and Dubil does not disclose a “key
`code signal” separate from a “keystroke indicator
`signal” .............................................................................34
`
`Each of Mishra and Dubil does not disclose
`“generating a key code signal” .......................................35
`
`3.
`
`Petitioner has not shown that Mishra or Dubil discloses,
`teaches, or suggests Element 1.4: “transmitting said key
`code signal from said key code generator device to said
`remote control device” ..............................................................35
`
`ii
`
`

`

`a.
`
`b.
`
`Each of Mishra and Dubil does not disclose a “key
`code signal” ....................................................................35
`
`Each of Mishra and Dubil does not disclose a “key
`code generator device” ...................................................36
`
`4.
`
`5.
`
`Petitioner has failed to establish motivation to combine
`Mishra and Dubil ......................................................................36
`
`A POSITA would not have combined Mishra and Dubil .........40
`
`F.
`
`Ground 2: Rye in Combination with Dubil Does Not Render the
`Challenged Claims Obvious ................................................................42
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`4.
`
`5.
`
`Petitioner has not shown that Rye or Dubil discloses,
`teaches, or suggests Element 2.2: “generating a key code
`within a key code generator device using the keystroke
`indictor signal” ..........................................................................43
`
`a.
`
`Each of Rye and Dubil does not disclose a “key
`code generator device” ...................................................43
`
`Petitioner has not shown that Rye or Dubil discloses,
`teaches, or suggests Element 2.3: “modulating said key
`code onto a carrier signal, thereby generating a key code
`signal” .......................................................................................45
`
`a.
`
`Each of Rye and Dubil does not disclose
`“modulating said key code onto a carrier signal” ...........45
`
`Petitioner has not shown that Rye or Dubil discloses,
`teaches, or suggests Element 2.4: “transmitting said key
`code signal from said key code generator device to an
`electronic consumer device” .....................................................45
`
`a.
`
`b.
`
`Each of Rye and Dubil does not disclose a “key
`code signal” ....................................................................45
`
`Each of Rye and Dubil does not disclose a “key
`code generator device” ...................................................46
`
`Petitioner has failed to establish motivation to combine
`Rye and Dubil ...........................................................................46
`
`A POSITA would not have combined Rye and Dubil ..............50
`
`III. THIS PROCEEDING SHOULD BE DISMISSED AS
`UNCONSTITUTIONAL ...............................................................................52
`
`IV. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................53
`
`CERTIFICATION UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.24 .......................................................54
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................55
`
`iii
`
`

`

`
`
`
`FEDERAL CASES
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc.,
`694 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ........................................................ 39, 40, 49, 50
`
`Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc.,
`IPR2020-00019, Paper 15 (P.T.A.B. May 13, 2020) ................................... 5, 6, 7
`
`Arris Group v. Cirrex Systems LLC,
`IPR2015-00530, Paper No. 12 (P.T.A.B. July 27, 2015) ................................... 12
`
`Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc.,
`No. 2018-2140, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 32613 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 31,
`2019) ................................................................................................................... 52
`
`Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC,
`805 F.3d 1064 (Fed. Cir. 2015) .................................................................... 39, 49
`
`Duncan Parking Techs., Inc. v. IPS Group Inc.,
`IPR2016-01145, Paper No. 9 (Nov. 21, 2016) ................................................... 11
`
`E-One, Inc. v. Oshkosh Corp.,
`No. IPR2019-00161, Paper 16 (P.T.A.B. May 15, 2019) .................................... 5
`
`Facebook, Inc. v. Windy City Innovations, LLC,
`953 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ........................................................................ 3, 4
`
`General Plastic Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha,
`Case IPR2016-01357, slip op. (P.T.A.B. Sept. 6, 2017) ............................ 8, 9, 16
`
`Infinera Corp. v. Core Optical Technologies LLC,
`IPR2018-01259, Paper 9 ............................................................................... 23, 25
`
`Intel Corporation v. VLSI Technology LLC,
`IPR2020-00112, Paper 15 (P.T.A.B. May 19, 2020) ........................................... 5
`
`KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
`550 U.S. 398 (2007) ...................................................................................... 39, 49
`
`iv
`
`

`

`Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Space Systems/Loral, Inc.,
`324 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2003) .......................................................................... 27
`
`Medtronic, Inc. v. Norred, Troy
`IPR2014-00823, Paper 12 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 8, 2014) ......................................... 2, 4
`
`Microsoft Corp. v. Enfish, LLC,
`662 Fed. Appx 981 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ....................................................... 38, 48, 49
`
`NHK Spring Co. v. Intri-Plex Techs., Inc.,
`No. IPR2018-00752, Paper 8 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 12, 2018) ................................ 5, 14
`
`Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp.,
`334 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2003) .......................................................................... 22
`
`Orthopediatrics Corp. v. K2M, Inc.,
`IPR2019-01548, Paper 9 ............................................................................... 23, 25
`
`Personal Web Techs. v. Apple Inc.,
`848 F.3d 987 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ...................................................................... 39, 49
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) .................................................................... 20, 21
`
`Proppant Express Investments, LLC v. Oren Technologies,
`IPR2018-00914 (PTAB March 13, 2019) ............................................................ 4
`
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC,
`IPR2015-00820, Paper No. 12 (P.T.A.B. May 15, 2015) .................................. 10
`
`Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GMBH v. Mylan Pharms. Inc.,
`No. 2019-1368, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 34328 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 19,
`2019) ................................................................................................................... 52
`
`Securus Technologies, Inc. v. Global Tel*Link Corp.,
`701 Fed. App’x. 971 (Fed. Cir. 2017) .......................................................... 38, 48
`
`Shenzhen Silver Star Intelligent Technology Co., Ltd. et al v. iRobot
`Corporation,
`IPR2018-00761, Paper No. 15 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 5, 2018) .................................... 10
`
`Sierra Wireless America, Inc. v. M2M Solutions LLC,
`IPR2016-00853, Paper 16 at (P.T.A.B. Sept. 20, 2016) ..................................... 15
`
`v
`
`

`

`SpaceCo Business Solutions, Inc. v. Moscovitch,
`IPR2015-00127, Paper 16 (P.T.A.B. May 14, 2015) ....................... 36, 38, 46, 48
`
`Thryv, Inc. v. Click-to-Call Technologies, LP,
`140 S. Ct. 1367 (2020) .......................................................................................... 3
`
`TriMed, Inc. v. Stryker Corp.,
`514 F.3d 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .......................................................................... 26
`
`UEI v. Roku,
`Case No. 8:18-cv-01580-JVS-ADS (C.D. Cal.) ..................................... 10, 12, 13
`
`FEDERAL STATUTES
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112(6) ....................................................................................... 25, 26, 27
`
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a) ............................................................................................. 1, 5, 8
`
`35 U.S.C. § 314(d) ................................................................................................. 3, 4
`
`35 U.S.C. § 315(b) ............................................................................................. 1, 2, 5
`
`35 U.S.C. § 315(c) ............................................................................................. 2, 3, 4
`
`35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) ......................................................................................... 9, 16
`
`35 U.S.C. § 325(d) ................................................................................................. 1, 8
`
`REGULATIONS
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) .............................................................................................. 20
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) and (4) ................................................................. 23, 25, 26
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c) ......................................................................................... 16, 17
`
`
`
`vi
`
`

`

`
`
`Exhibit No.
`
`LIST OF EXHIBITS
`
`Description
`
`Roku’s Proposed Constructions in the District Court
`
`Claim Construction Order, UEI, Inc. v. Peel Techs., Inc., Case No.
`8:13-cv-01484 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 17, 2017) (Dkt. 66).
`Facebook, Inc. v. Windy City Innovations, Case Nos. 2018-1400,
`2018-1401, 2018-1402, 2018-1403, 2018-1537, 2018-1540, 2018-
`1541, Slip Opinion (Fed. Cir. Sept. 4, 2020).
`EX2004 Order Setting Target Date, UEI, Inc. v. Roku, Inc. et al., ITC Inv.
`337-TA-1200 (Order No. 6)
`Roku’s July 10, 2020 Supplemental Responses to Complainant’s
`Third Set of Interrogatories, UEI, Inc. v. Roku, Inc. et al., ITC Inv.
`337-TA-1200
`Roku’s Invalidity Contentions Cover Pleading, UEI, Inc. v. Roku,
`Inc., Case No. 8:18-cv-01580-JVS-ADS (C.D. Cal.)
`Roku’s Reply in support of Motion to Supplement Invalidity
`Contentions, UEI, Inc. v. Roku, Inc., Case No. 8:18-cv-01580-JVS-
`ADS (C.D. Cal. July 1, 2019) (Dkt. 95)
`Complaint, UEI, Inc. v. Roku, Inc., Case No. 8:18-cv-01580-JVS-
`ADS, Dkt. (C.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2018) (Dkt. 1)
`EX2009 UEI’s Infringement Contentions Cover Pleading, UEI, Inc. v. Roku,
`Inc., Case No. 8:18-cv-01580-JVS-ADS (C.D. Cal.)
`EX2010 Order on Motion to Limit Claims, UEI, Inc. v. Roku, Inc., Case No.
`8:18-cv-01580-JVS-ADS (C.D. Cal. March 14, 2019) (Dkt. 64)
`Joint Claim Construction Chart, ITC Inv, 337-TA-1200
`IPR2019-01612, Transcript of Deposition of Dr. Russ, dated June
`17, 2020 (“Russ Depo Tr. (June 17, 2020)”)
`IPR2019-01614 Declaration of Dr. Michael D. Sprenger in support
`of Patent Owner’s Response to Petition for Inter Partes Review of
`U.S. Patent No. 9,911,325 (“Sprenger Decl.”)
`
`EX2001
`
`
`EX2002
`
`
`EX2003
`
`EX2005
`
`EX2006
`
`EX2007
`
`EX2008
`
`EX2011
`
`EX2012
`
`EX2013
`
`
`
`
`
`vii
`
`

`

`Roku, Inc. (“Petitioner”) petitions for Inter Partes Review of Claims 1, 2, 5,
`
`6, 7, 19, and 20 of U.S. Patent No. 7,589,642 (“the ’642 Patent”), which is owned
`
`by Universal Electronics Inc. (“Patent Owner” or “UEI”). Petitioner relies on a
`
`total of two grounds, both of which fail for several reasons.
`
`I.
`
`THE BOARD SHOULD NOT INSTITUTE INTER PARTES REVIEW
`
`The Board should not institute inter partes review for several procedural and
`
`substantive reasons. First, institution should be denied because the petition is time-
`
`barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). Petitioner’s attempt to excuse the lateness of
`
`their filing by seeking to join new issues to their prior petitions has been rejected
`
`by the Federal Circuit, which compels the same outcome here. Second, the Board
`
`should exercise its discretion under § 325(d) to deny institution of review. Third,
`
`the Board should exercise its discretion under § 314(a) because Petitioner’s new
`
`Petition is duplicative and would be an inefficient use of the Board’s resources in
`
`light of the parties’ parallel ITC action.
`
`Finally, Petitioner’s new challenges to the ’642 Patent are meritless because
`
`Petitioner’s arguments, representations, and admissions in its Petition and in its
`
`supporting expert declaration confirm that the prior art (either alone or in
`
`combination) fails to disclose, teach, or suggest each and every limitation of the
`
`challenged claims. Thus, on the face of the Petition, Petitioner has failed to show
`
`that the challenged claims of the ’642 Patent are unpatentable.
`
`1
`
`

`

`Accordingly, Patent Owner respectfully requests that the Board refuse to
`
`institute an inter partes review of the Challenged Claims of the ’642 Patent.
`
`A.
`
`Joinder Should Be Denied, Making Petitioner’s Challenge
`Untimely under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b)
`
`Petitioner’s challenge to Claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 19, and 20 of the ’642 Patent is
`
`untimely because Petitioner filed its Petition in May 2020 – 20 months after being
`
`served by Patent Owner with a complaint alleging infringement of one or more
`
`claims of the ’642 Patent, and 8 months past the deadline set in 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).
`
`Petitioner does not dispute that its Petition would otherwise be time-barred if not
`
`for a successful joinder. Since joinder should be denied for the reasons described
`
`below, institution must be denied as untimely. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Norred, Troy
`
`IPR2014-00823, Paper 12 at 3 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 8, 2014) (denying petition as
`
`untimely where joinder was denied and petition was filed more than one year after
`
`a lawsuit alleging infringement of challenged patent was filed).
`
`1.
`
`Same Party Joinder is Not Allowed by 35 U.S.C. § 315(c)
`
`As discussed in Patent Owner’s Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion for
`
`Joinder, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) a party is not permitted to join its own
`
`previously filed petitions, and a joinder petition may not raise new issues. That
`
`statute provides that after institution, the Director “may join as a party to that inter
`
`partes review any person who properly files a petition under section 311 that the
`
`Director, after receiving a preliminary response under section 313 or the expiration
`
`2
`
`

`

`of the time for filing such a response, determines warrants the institution of an
`
`inter partes review under section 314.” The Federal Circuit recently confirmed in
`
`Facebook, Inc. v. Windy City Innovations that “[t]he clear and unambiguous text of
`
`§ 315(c) does not authorize same party joinder, and does not authorize the joinder
`
`of new issues.” EX2003, Case Nos. 2018-1400, 2018-1401, 2018-1402, 2018-
`
`1403, 2018-1537, 2018-1540, 2018-1541, slip op. at 17 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 4, 2020).
`
`This echoes the reasoning of the Federal Circuit in a previous opinion in the same
`
`case, rendered before the Supreme Court’s decision in Thryv, Inc. v. Click-to-Call
`
`Technologies, LP, 140 S. Ct. 1367 (2020). See Facebook, Inc. v. Windy City
`
`Innovations, LLC, 953 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“The plain language of
`
`the statute contemplates joining parties, not joining several proceedings involving
`
`the same parties. the clear and unambiguous meaning of § 315(c) does not
`
`authorize joinder of two proceedings, and does not authorize the Director to join a
`
`person to a proceeding in which that person is already a party.”).
`
`The opinion in Thryv addressed the no-appeal provision of 35 U.S.C. §
`
`314(d), but ultimately limited the application of 314(d) to the institution decision
`
`and held that it did not apply to “the manner in which the agency's review
`
`‘proceeds’ once instituted.” Thryv, 140 S. Ct. at 1376. The Federal Circuit’s
`
`recent decision in Windy City explicitly addressed the Supreme Court’s opinion in
`
`Thryv, confirming that the joinder decision in that case was reviewable because the
`
`3
`
`

`

`joinder decision was one “affecting the manner in which an IPR would proceed”
`
`after institution and therefore such an assessment was not barred by Section
`
`314(d). EX2003, Windy City, slip op. at 15-16.
`
`Roku is the petitioner in the previous proceeding IPR2019-01612, and the
`
`current joinder petition raises new issues that were not addressed in the previous
`
`proceeding. As a result, the Federal Circuit’s holding in Windy City compels the
`
`Board to deny the motion for joinder pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 315(c). Without
`
`joinder, inter partes review must be denied as untimely. See Medtronic, IPR2014-
`
`00823, Paper 12 at 3.
`
`2. Windy City Abrogated Proppant Express and the Board has
`no Discretion to Allow Same Party Joinder
`
`Petitioner relies on Proppant Express Investments, LLC v. Oren
`
`Technologies, IPR2018-00914 (PTAB March 13, 2019) to assert that same party
`
`joinder may be permitted in the Board’s discretion. Paper No. 2 at 5-6. The recent
`
`Windy City opinion, however, expressly overrules Proppant Express. EX2003,
`
`Windy City, slip op. at 21 (“We recognize that the Board’s Precedential Opinion
`
`Panel analyzed this issue in Proppant Express Investments, LLC v. Oren
`
`Technologies, LLC, No. IPR2018-00914, Paper 38 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 13, 2019), and
`
`came to the opposite conclusion . . . . But that conclusion, which allowed same-
`
`party joinder, is incorrect under the unambiguous meaning of the statute.”).
`
`Because Proppant Express was expressly overruled by the Federal Circuit, Roku’s
`
`4
`
`

`

`sole argument in support of its proposed exception to the statutory bar of 35 U.S.C.
`
`§ 315(b) is extinguished. As a result, the current petition is impermissibly late and
`
`must be rejected.
`
`B.
`
`The Board Should Deny Institution Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) in
`View of the Upcoming ITC Trial
`
`In NHK Spring Co. v. Intri-Plex Techs., Inc., No. IPR2018-00752, Paper 8 at
`
`20 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 12, 2018) the Board exercised its discretion under 35 U.S.C. §
`
`314(a) to deny IPR institution, despite the IPR petition’s timely filing, because a
`
`district court trial on the same patent was scheduled over six months later. The
`
`Board held that given the advanced stage of the district court litigation, which
`
`involved the same claims and prior art, instituting the IPR would be an “inefficient
`
`use of Board resources.” Id. In E-One, Inc. v. Oshkosh Corp., No. IPR2019-
`
`00161, Paper 16 at 7-9 (P.T.A.B. May 15, 2019) the Board denied institution under
`
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a) in view of a district court trial that was eleven months away.
`
`There, the Board noted that the validity arguments in the Petition “overlap
`
`substantially” with those in the co-pending litigation. Id. at 8. See also Intel
`
`Corporation v. VLSI Technology LLC, IPR2020-00112, Paper 15 (P.T.A.B. May
`
`19, 2020); IPR2020-00113, Paper 15 (P.T.A.B. May 19, 2020); IPR2020-00114,
`
`Paper 15 (P.T.A.B. May 19, 2020) (denying institution on three petitions based on
`
`parallel district court case set for trial in October 2020, despite uncertainty caused
`
`by coronavirus pandemic); Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 15
`
`5
`
`

`

`(P.T.A.B. May 13, 2020) (denying institution where parallel district court
`
`proceeding would conclude before IPR).
`
`On April 16, 2020 Patent Owner filed a complaint at the International Trade
`
`Commission entitled Certain Electronic Devices. Including Streaming Players,
`
`Televisions, Set Top Boxes, Remote Controller, and Components Thereof, DN3450
`
`against various respondents, including Petitioner. The ITC complaint alleges
`
`infringement of six patents, including the ’325 Patent. The ITC instituted
`
`Investigation No. 337-TA-1200 on May 18, 2020. The final initial determination
`
`is due by May 24, 2021. The target date for completing the investigation is
`
`September 22, 2021. See EX2004, Order Setting Target Date.
`
`The Fintiv decision set forth the following factors for the Board to weigh
`
`when deciding whether to deny institution of review based upon a co-pending
`
`parallel action:
`
`1. Whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be
`granted if a proceeding is instituted;
`
`2. Proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory
`deadline for a final written decision;
`
`3. Investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties;
`
`4. Overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel
`proceeding;
`
`5. Whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are
`the same party; and
`
`6. Other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion,
`
`6
`
`

`

`including the merits.
`
`Id. at 5-6.
`
`“[I]n evaluating the factors, the Board takes a holistic view of whether
`
`efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting
`
`review.” Id. at 6 (citations omitted). Here, the Fintiv factors favor denying
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`institution to efficiently use Board resources because otherwise, the same parties
`
`would be proceeding with the same invalidity-related arguments at the same time
`
`before two separate tribunals.
`
`First, Petitioner has not sought, and the ITC has not granted, a stay in the
`
`ITC Action.
`
`Second, the Board’s statutory deadline for a final written decision in this
`
`action (November 28, 2021) is eight months after the trial and two months after the
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`target date for completion of the investigation in the ITC Action. See EX2004. The
`
`Court and the parties will have already invested substantial resources at the ITC by
`
`the time the Board is due to issue its final written decision. For example, the
`
`parties will have completed claim construction proceedings (briefing and the
`
`hearing are currently complete), fact discovery, expert discovery, pre-trial briefing,
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`trial, and post-trial briefing.
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`Third, the issues raised in the Petition directly overlap with the invalidity
`
`arguments presented in the ITC Action. Petitioner identified every reference from
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`7
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`

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`the present Petition as prior art it intends to rely on for invalidity arguments in the
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`ITC. EX2005, Roku’s July 10, 2020 Supplemental Responses to Complainant’s
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`Third Set of Interrogatories at 24-26. The ITC will thus resolve all of the validity
`
`questions raised in the Petition and the Board should deny institution under 35
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`U.S.C. § 314(a).
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`Fourth, Petitioner is a named respondent in the ITC Action.
`
`Fifth, the weakness of Petitioner’s invalidity arguments also supports
`
`denying institution.
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`C. The Board Should Deny Institution Under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d)
`Because of Petitioner’s Multiple Petitions
`
`35 U.S.C. §325(d) provides that the Board has the discretion to deny
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`institution of duplicative follow-on petitions. In General Plastic Industrial Co.,
`
`Ltd. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, Case IPR2016-01357, slip op. at 16 (P.T.A.B.
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`Sept. 6, 2017) (Paper 19) the Board provided a non-exclusive list of factors to
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`consider when exercising its discretion to institute follow-on petitions:
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`1. whether the same petitioner previously filed a petition directed to the
`same claims of the same patent;
`
`
`2. whether at the time of filing of the first petition the petitioner knew
`of the prior art asserted in the second petition or should have known
`of it;
`
`
`3. whether at the time of filing of the second petition the petitioner
`already received the patent owner’s preliminary response to the first
`petition or received the Board’s decision on whether to institute
`review in the first petition;
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`8
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`

`
`4. the length of time that elapsed between the time the petitioner learned
`of the prior art asserted in the second petition and the filing of the
`second petition;
`
`
`5. whether the petitioner provides adequate explanation for the time
`elapsed between the filings of multiple petitions directed to the same
`claims of the same patent;
`
`
`6. the finite resources of the Board; and
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`7. the requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) to issue a final
`determination not later than 1 year after the date on which the
`Director notices institution of review.
`
`
`Id. at 16. Each of these factors weighs against instituting review of Petitioner’s
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`follow-on Petition.
`
`1.
`
`Petitioner previously filed a petition on several claims of the
`’642 Patent
`
`Petitioner’s previous petition in IPR2019-01612 also covered independent
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`claims 1 and 2 and several of their dependents. The instant petition also covers
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`claims 1 and 2, and some of their dependents Petitioner excluded from its first
`
`petition. Petitioner’s piecemeal challenges weigh against institution.
`
`2.
`
`Petitioner has known of the prior art asserted in its follow-
`on petition since February 2019
`
`Petitioner’s follow-on petition relies on three references – Mishra, Dubil,
`
`and Rye – each of which were relied on Petitioner’s previous petition against the
`
`’642 Patent in IPR2019-01612 (filed in September 2019). Moreover, Petitioner
`
`has known about two of references since at least February 2019, when it cited
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`9
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`

`

`Mishra and Rye as prior art references in its invalidity contentions in the district
`
`court litigation with Patent Owner. See EX2006 at 8, Roku’s Invalidity
`
`Contentions in UEI v. Roku, Case No. 8:18-cv-01580-JVS-ADS (C.D. Cal.). The
`
`fact that Petitioner indisputably knew of all three references at the time of filing its
`
`first petition weighs against institution. See Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v.
`
`Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC, IPR2015-00820, Paper No. 12 at 4 (P.T.A.B. May 15,
`
`2015) (fact that newly asserted reference was publicly available at time of previous
`
`petition weighed against institution).
`
`3.
`
`Petitioner had received the institution decision on its
`previous Petition before filing the follow-on Petition
`
`By the time Petitioner filed this follow-on petition in May 2020 it had
`
`already received Patent Owner’s preliminary response and the Board’s institution
`
`decision in IPR2019-01612. See IPR2019-01612, Paper No. 6 (Patent Owner
`
`Preliminary Response filed January 1, 2020); IPR2019-01612, Paper No. 7
`
`(Institution Decision issued April 1, 2020); IPR2020-01610 (new Petition filed
`
`May 28, 2020). Such strategic timing raises a presumption of gamesmanship and
`
`suggests that Petitioner used the insights from the preliminary response and
`
`institution decision as a roadmap for its new arguments. See Shenzhen Silver Star
`
`Intelligent Technology Co., Ltd. et al v. iRobot Corporation, IPR2018-00761,
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`Paper No. 15 at 11-12 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 5, 2018). This factor also weighs against
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`institution.
`
`10
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`

`

`4.
`
`The long delay between Petitioner’s notice of the references
`in the follow-on Petition and filing the follow-on Petition
`weighs against institution
`
`Petitioner has indisputably known of the Mishra and Rye references since
`
`February 2019, when it identified those references in its invalidity contentions in
`
`the District Court. EX2006 at 8. Moreover, in the District Court Petitioner
`
`asserted that it undertook an “exhaustive” prior art search as of February 2019. See
`
`EX2007, Dkt. 95, Roku’s Reply in support of Motion to Supplement Invalidity
`
`Contentions at 1. Petitioner either knew or should have known of the publicly
`
`available Dubil reference at least as of February 2019. Fifteen months elapsed
`
`between when Petitioner knew or should have known of these references and when
`
`it filed the instant petition. This factor also weighs against institution. See Duncan
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`Parking Techs., Inc. v. IPS Group Inc., IPR2016-01145, Paper No. 9 at 9-10 (Nov.
`
`21, 2016) (finding that 8-month delay between learning of prior art and filing
`
`follow-on petition weighed against institution).
`
`5.
`
`Petition has no adequate explanation for the delay in filing
`its follow-on Petition
`
`Petitioner does not have an adequate explanation for the delay in filing its
`
`follow-on Petition. In its Motion for Joinder Petitioner asserts that it was unaware
`
`of the allegation of infringement of the challenged claims until Patent Owner filed
`
`its ITC Complaint in April 2020. But Petitioner has been on notice of Patent
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`Owner’s claim that it infringes “one or more claims” of the ’642 Patent since
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`11
`