`Case 2:19-cv-06301-AB-KS Document 102 Filed 08/28/20 Page 1 of 45 Page ID #:3457
`
`UNITED STATE-S DISTRICT COURT
`
`CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
`
`Case No.:
`
`2:19—cv-06301—AB-KS
`
`Date: August 28, 2020
`
`Title:
`
`Philips North America LLC v. Garmin Int’l, Inc. at of.
`
`
`
`Present: The Honorable
`
`ANDRE BIROTTE JIL, United States District Judge
`
`Carla Badirian
`
`Deputy Clerk
`
`N/A
`
`Court Reporter
`
`Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs:
`
`Attorneys Present for Defendants:
`
`None Appearing
`
`None Appearing
`
`Proceedings:
`
`[IN CHAMBERS] CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ORDER
`(DKTS. 75, 77, 79, 80)
`
`Plaintiff Philips North America LLC (“Plaintiff”) and Defendants Garmin
`International, Inc. and Garmin Ltd. (collectively, “Defendants”) have filed claim
`construction briefs asking the Court to construe 28 disputed claim terms found in six
`asserted patents: (1) U.S. Patent No. 6,013,007 (“the ’007 Patent”); (2) US. Patent No.
`7,088,233 (“the ’233 Patent”), (3) US. Patent No. 6,976,958 (“the ”958 Patent”); (4) U.S.
`Patent No. 8,277,377 (“the ’377 Patent”); (5) US Patent No. 9,314,192 (“the ’192
`Patent”); and (6) US Patent No. 9,801,542 (“the ’542 Patent”) (collectively, “the
`Asserted Patents”).
`
`The parties filed a Joint Claim Construction and Prehearing Statement on June 23,
`2020. (“Joint Statement,” Dkt. No. 73). The parties filed their Opening Claim
`Construction Briefs on June 26, 2020. (“Plaintiffs Opening Brief,” Dkt. No. 77;
`“Defendants” Opening Brief,” Dkt. No. 75.) The parties filed Responsive Claim
`Construction Briefs on July 9, 2020. (“Plaintiff s Responsive Brief,” Dkt. No. 80;
`“Defendants’ Responsive Brief,” Dkt. No. 79.) Finding this motion suitable for resolution
`without oral argument, the Court vacated the hearing set for July 31, 2020. (See Dkt. No.
`86, Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); CD. Cal. L.R. 7-15.)
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`EX. 3002
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`Ex. 3002
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`Case 2:19-cv-06301-AB-KS Document 102 Filed 08/28/20 Page 2 of 45 Page ID #:3458
`The disputed terms are construed as set forth in this Order.
`I. TECHNOLOGICAL SUMMARY
`The Asserted Patents generally relate to monitoring a subject’s activity or health
`condition.
`The ’007 Patent, titled “Athlete’s GPS-Based Performance Monitor,” issued on
`January 11, 2000 and generally describes a “Global Positioning System (GPS) based
`personal athletic performance monitor.” ’007 Patent at Abstract.
`The ’233 Patent, titled “Personal Medical Device Communication System and
`Method,” issued on August 8, 2006 and generally describes “[a] personal and/or
`institutional health and wellness communications system, which may be used for a
`variety of emergency and non-emergency situations using two-way communications
`devices and a bi-directional communication network.” ’233 Patent at Abstract.
`The ’958 Patent, titled “Method and Apparatus for Health and Disease
`Management Combining Patient Data Monitoring with Wireless Internet Connectivity,”
`issued on December 20, 2005 and generally describes “a method and apparatus for a
`wireless health monitoring system for interactively monitoring a disease or health
`condition of a patient by connecting an internet-enabled wireless web device (‘WWD’) to
`a digital camera or other health monitoring device.” ’958 Patent at Abstract.
`The ’377 Patent, titled “Method and Apparatus for Monitoring Exercise with
`Wireless Internet Connectivity,” issued on October 2, 2012 and generally describes a
`method and apparatus for providing “wireless monitoring of exercise, fitness, or nutrition
`by connecting a web-enabled wireless phone to a device which provides exercise-related
`information, including physiological data and data indicating an amount of exercise
`performed.” ’377 Patent at Abstract.
`The ’192 Patent, titled “Detection and Compensation Method for Monitoring the
`Place of Activity on the Body,” issued on April 19, 2016 and generally describes “[a]
`measuring system compris[ing] a sensor arranged to be attached to a subject for obtaining
`a measured value representing a physical or a physiological quantity of the subject.” ’192
`Patent at Abstract.
`The ’542 Patent, titled “Health Monitoring Appliance,” issued on October 31, 2017
`and generally describes a “heart monitoring system for a person [that] includes one or
`more wireless nodes; and wearable appliance in communication with the one or more
`wireless nodes, the appliance monitoring vital signs.” ’542 Patent at Abstract.
`Relevant disclosures from each of the Asserted Patents will be discussed in greater
`detail in relation to each of the parties’ specific claim construction disputes.
`
`2
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`Case 2:19-cv-06301-AB-KS Document 102 Filed 08/28/20 Page 3 of 45 Page ID #:3459
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`II. LEGAL STANDARD
`A. General Claim Construction Principles
`
`As established in Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370 (1996), claim
`construction is a matter wholly within the jurisdiction of the court. Markman v. Westview
`Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996) (“[T]he construction of a patent . . . is exclusively
`within the province of the court.”). The purpose of claim construction is to “determin[e]
`the meaning and scope” of a patented invention in order to define the patent owner’s
`rights. Id.; Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Claim
`construction is a legal issue that may require subsidiary findings of fact. Teva Pharm.
`USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318, 332 (2015).
`
`Generally, a claim term is given its “ordinary and customary meaning.” Phillips,
`415 F.3d at 1312 (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.
`Cir. 1996)). In patent cases, “the ordinary and customary meaning . . . is the meaning that
`the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of
`invention.” Philips, 415 F.3d at 1313. “In some cases, the ordinary meaning . . . may be
`readily apparent,” requiring only common sense application of a widely accepted
`meaning. Id. at 1314. However, when claim meaning is not so readily apparent, a court
`must determine what a skilled person in the appropriate field of art would understand a
`claim term to mean. Id.
`
`Courts first consider the intrinsic evidence, which includes the patent claims,
`patent specification, and prosecution history. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. “Attending this
`principle, a claim construction analysis must begin and remain centered on the claim
`language itself, for that is the language the patentee has chosen to ‘particularly point out
`and distinctly claim the [patented] subject matter.’” Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari
`Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Interactive Gift
`Express, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). A term’s use in
`context may help to distinguish or clarify its meaning from other potential definitions.
`See, e.g., Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314 (illustrating that “steel baffles” implies that “baffles”
`are not intrinsically made of steel). Claim terms are commonly used consistently
`throughout a patent, and thus “the usage of a term in one claim can often illuminate the
`meaning of the same term in other claims.” Id.
`
`The claim terms must be read in light of the specification. Id. at 1315 (citing
`Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582 (“[T]he specification ‘is always highly relevant . . . . Usually,
`it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’”)). The
`specification may provide insight into an inventor’s understanding of her invention at the
`time of patenting, as it might contain an intentional disclaimer of claim scope that reveals
`
`3
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`Case 2:19-cv-06301-AB-KS Document 102 Filed 08/28/20 Page 4 of 45 Page ID #:3460
`limits on an inventor’s intended invention. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. The Federal Circuit
`has also recognized that an inventor may invoke a particular definition of a term in her
`specification or otherwise use a term in the specification in a manner that differs from the
`term’s ordinary usage. Id. “In such cases, the inventor’s lexicography governs.” Id.
`
`In addition to the patent itself, the Court “should also consider the patent’s
`prosecution history, if it is in evidence.” Id. at 1317. The prosecution history consists of
`“all the proceedings before the Patent and Trademark Office, including any express
`representations made by the applicant regarding the scope of the claims.” Vitronics, 90
`F.3d at 1582. However, because the prosecution history, also called the “file history” or
`“file wrapper,” is a product of negotiations between the inventor and the United States
`Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”), “it often lacks the clarity of the specification
`and thus is less useful for claim construction purposes.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317.
`Nevertheless, like the specification, the prosecution history may still be useful in
`understanding the inventor’s understanding of her own invention. Id. (citing Vitronics, 90
`F.3d at 1582-83). Moreover, during prosecution history, a patent applicant may disclaim
`claim scope by making a clear and unequivocal disavowal of the plain meaning of
`ordinary claim language. Id. at 1319 (citing Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc.,
`308 F.3d 1193, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
`
`After looking at the intrinsic evidence, courts may consider extrinsic evidence,
`including inventor and expert testimony, dictionaries, and treatises. Phillips, 415 F.3d at
`1317. However, extrinsic evidence is “less significant than the intrinsic record” because it
`is generally “less reliable.” Id. at 1317-18. Additionally, extrinsic evidence cannot be
`used to change the meaning of a term as used in the specification. Merck & Co. v. Teva
`Pharm. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Thus, the extrinsic evidence
`should always be considered in context of the intrinsic evidence. Phillips, 415 F.3d at
`1319.
`
`Technical dictionaries are a particular type of extrinsic evidence that may provide
`information about the ways a term is used in a particular field of art. Id. at 1318. Expert
`testimony may also be useful in several ways, “such as to provide background on the
`technology at issue, to explain how an invention works, to ensure that the court’s
`understanding . . . is consistent with that of a person of skill in the art, or to establish that
`a particular term . . . has a particular meaning in the pertinent field.” Id. However, as with
`all extrinsic evidence, courts will “discount any expert testimony ‘that is clearly at odds
`with [the intrinsic evidence] of the patent,’” as well as expert testimony that is conclusory
`or unsupported. Id. (quoting Key Pharm. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed.
`Cir. 1998)).
`
`4
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`Case 2:19-cv-06301-AB-KS Document 102 Filed 08/28/20 Page 5 of 45 Page ID #:3461
`B. Claim Term Indefiniteness
`
`“[A] patent is invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the
`specification delineating the patent, and the prosecution history, fail to inform, with
`reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention.” Nautilus,
`Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 901 (2014); see also 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2.
`This standard “mandates clarity, while recognizing that absolute precession is
`unattainable.” Id. at 910. “General principles of claim construction apply to
`indefiniteness allegations.” HZNP Medicines LLC v. Actavis Labs. UT, Inc., 940 F.3d
`680, 688 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citing Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 783 F.3d
`1374, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). To the extent subsidiary facts are presented to support
`that a claim term is indefinite, they must be proven by clear and convincing
`evidence. Microsoft Corp. v. I4I Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 95 (2011).
`C. Means-Plus-Function Claim Construction Principles
`
`Under Section 112, Paragraph 61 of the Patent Act,
`
`An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step
`for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material,
`or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the
`corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and
`equivalents thereof.
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. “[U]se of the word ‘means’ creates a presumption that § 112, ¶ 6
`applies.” Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
`(quoting Personalized Media Commc’ns, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 161 F.3d 696, 703
`(Fed. Cir. 1998)); but see Skky, Inc. v. MindGeek, s.a.r.l., 859 F.3d 1014, 1019 (Fed. Cir.
`2017) (claim term “wireless device means” does not invoke § 112, ¶ 6 because it denotes
`a class of structures).
`
`Conversely, when a claim term lacks the word “means,” there is a presumption
`against “means-plus-function” claiming. Id. “[T]he presumption can be overcome and
`§ 112, para. 6 will apply if the challenger demonstrates that the claim term fails to ‘recite
`sufficiently definite structure’ or else recites ‘function without reciting sufficient structure
`for performing that function.’” Id. (citing Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 880 (Fed.
`
`1 The America Invents Act (“AIA”) amended the labeling convention of sub-sections of
`§ 112 of the Patent Act, so that the sub-sections correspond to letters instead of numbers.
`Thus, 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 was relabeled to 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). Because the Asserted
`Patents in this case were filed before the AIA took effect, the Court refers to the prior
`labeling convention in this Order.
`
`5
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`Case 2:19-cv-06301—AB-KS Document 102 Filed 08/28/20 Page 6 of 45 Page ID #:3462
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`Cir. 2000)). This often occurs with certain “well-known nonce word[s]” like “module,”
`“mechanism,” “element,” and “device” that “operate as a substitute for ‘means,’ in the
`context of § 112, para. 6.” Id. at 1350. “In assessing whether the claim limitation is in
`means-plus-function format, [courts] do not merely consider the introductory phrase (e. g.,
`‘mechanical control assembly”) in isolation, but look to the entire passage including
`functions performed by the introductory phrase.” MTD Prod. Inc. v. Iancn, 933 F.3d
`1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2019). The critical question is whether “the claim language, read in
`light of the specification, recites sufficiently definite structure to avoid § 112, 11 6.” Media.
`Rights Techs, Inc. v. Capital? One Fin. Corp, 800 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
`
`After concluding that a. term is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112 11 6, courts engage in a
`two-step process to construe the term. Noah Sys, Inc. v. Intuit Inc., 675 F.3d 1302, 1311
`(Fed. Cir. 2012). First, the court identifies the claimed function. Id. Second, “the court
`must determine what structure, if any, disclosed in the specification corresponds to the
`claimed function.” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1351 (citations omitted). When a. claimed
`function requires the special programing ofa general-purpose computer or processor, the
`specification must “disclose an algorithm for performing the claimed function” “in any
`understandable terms including as a mathematical formula, in prose, or as a flow chart, or
`in any other manner that provides sufficient structure.” Noah, 675 F.3d at 1312. Further,
`“[w]here there are multiple claimed functions .
`.
`. the patentee must disclose adequate
`corresponding structure to perform all of the claimed functions.” Williamson, 792 F.3d at
`1351-52. “If the patentee fails to disclose adequate corresponding structure, the claim is
`indefinite.” Id.
`
`III. ANALYSIS
`
`A. Agreed Constructions
`
`to the same application
`
`“the application” (’377 Patent, Claim 1) The parties agree that where the claim
`recites “the application” it is referring
`
`Agreed Construction
`
`(See Dkt. No. 73-1 at 1.)
`
`The Court accepts the parties’ agreed construction, which will bind them. See
`MyMafl, Ltd. 1). Am. Onltne, Inc., 476 F.3d 1372, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (rejecting
`appellate challenge to claim construction agreed to by party in district court).
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`Case 2:19-cv-06301—AB-KS Document 102 Filed 08/28/20 Page 7 of 45 Page ID #:3463
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`B. Disputed Terms
`
`1. “means for computing athletic performance feedback data from the
`series of time-stamped waypoints obtained by said GPS receiver”
`(”007 Patent, Claims 1, 21)
`
`Plaintiff‘s Proposed Construction
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`Indefinite
`
`
`
`
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112, 1] 6
`
`Structure:
`
`a. processor and equivalents thereof
`
`Function:
`
`computing athletic performance
`feedback data [as construed above as
`elapsed distance of an athlete; current or
`average speed of an athlete; and/or
`current or average pace of an athlete]
`from the series of time-stamped
`waypoints obtained by said GPS
`receiver
`
`“3 processor (and equivalents thereof)
`that determines any of the following
`from a series of time—stamped
`waypoints obtained by said GPS
`receiver during an exercise session:
`Structure or algorithm:
`elapsed distance of an athlete; current or Not disclosed
`average speed of an athlete; current or
`average pace of an athlete”
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112,116
`
`Function:
`computing athletic performance
`feedback data from the series of time-
`
`stamped waypoints obtained by said
`GPS receiver
`
`
`
`The parties agree that the term “means for computing athletic performance
`feedback data from the series of time-stamped waypoints” is subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112
`11 6 as a means-plus-function term. The parties dispute (1) the proper interpretation of the
`claimed function and (2) whether a corresponding structure has been adequately
`disclosed for the term.
`
`First, the parties specifically dispute the meaning of the phrase “athletic
`performance feedback data” as it appears in this claim limitation. Plaintiff argues that in
`the context of the full claim limitation, which requires computation “from the series of
`time-stamped waypoints,” the phrase “athletic performance feedback data.” only refers to
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`Case 2:19-cv-06301-AB-KS Document 102 Filed 08/28/20 Page 8 of 45 Page ID #:3464
`“elapsed distance of an athlete; current or average speed of an athlete; [or] current or
`average pace of an athlete.” (See Dkt. No. 77 at 5.) Plaintiff asserts that the ’007 Patent
`describes certain types of athletic performance feedback data that are not computed from
`time-stamped GPS waypoints but instead through other means, such as through a
`barometric pressure sensor. (Id.) Plaintiff further asserts that the ’007 Patent “describes
`the types of data that can be calculated from GPS position and time information.” (Id.
`(emphasis in original).)
`
`In its Opening Brief, Plaintiff cites a portion of the specification to support its
`assertion about data types that “can be” calculated from time-stamped waypoints. (Id.) In
`particular, the specification refers to “elapsed distance, current and average speeds and
`paces, calories burned, miles remaining, and time remaining.” ’007 Patent at 7:40-50. In
`their briefs, Defendants emphasize “calories burned” from this list. Defendants question
`Plaintiff’s omission of “calories burned” from Plaintiff’s proposed construction and use
`“calories burned” as one example of a circumstance where Plaintiff has not shown a
`corresponding algorithm for how calories burned could be computed “from the series of
`time-stamped waypoints.” In its Responsive Brief, Plaintiff appears to walk back from its
`previously-quoted portion of the specification. It asserts that the specification refers to
`calories burned in the context of “athletic performance data,” but not in the context of
`“athletic performance feedback data.” (Dkt. No. 80 at 2 (emphasis in original).) It
`otherwise asserts that the specification’s references to “calories burned” are “ambiguous”
`and states, without support, that a person of skill in the art would not have understood
`“athletic performance feedback data” to include calories burned. (Id.)
`
`Plaintiff’s arguments for limiting the scope of what constitutes “athletic
`performance feedback data” are not persuasive. As both parties noted, the specification
`states:
`
`During the exercise session, the GPS receiver module 604 continuously
`determines the athlete’s geographical position and stores it in the memory 608
`along with other information such as the date and time that each position was
`acquired. From these positions and times, performance data such as elapsed
`distance, current and average speeds and paces, calories burned, miles
`remaining, and time remaining are calculated. Based on this data,
`recommendations to increase or decrease level of effort to meet pre-set
`performance targets are then determined.
`
`’007 Patent at 7:41-50 (emphasis added). Although Plaintiff discounts this language in its
`Responsive Brief, this passage supports Defendants’ position regarding the meaning of
`the term “athletic performance feedback data.” It specifically states that “performance
`data” like “calories burned” can be calculated based on positions and times collected by a
`GPS receiver during a session. Plaintiff does not otherwise show that the patent applicant
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`Case 2:19-cv-06301-AB-KS Document 102 Filed 08/28/20 Page 9 of 45 Page ID #:3465
`intended to limit the meaning of the claim phrase in the manner it urges in its proposed
`construction, and the Court finds Plaintiff’s interpretation of the intrinsic record in this
`regard unpersuasive. Calories burned is reasonably interpreted as a type of “athletic
`performance feedback data,” given this disclosure, and Plaintiff does not identify
`passages showing that the patent applicant intended to exclude “calories burned” from a
`construction of the term.
`
`Second, Defendants dispute whether the patent specification adequately discloses
`corresponding structure for this claim limitation. Plaintiff asserts that the claim language
`itself supplies the algorithm because the claims “require that athletic performance
`feedback data be calculated from a series of time-stamped waypoints obtained from a
`GPS receiver.” (See Dkt. No. 80 at 2.) Plaintiff suggests that this computation would
`require only “high school level math” and “involves determining the distance between
`two points” or “dividing the distance by time or time by distances.” (Dkt. No. 77 at 9.)
`Defendants note that Plaintiff’s arguments are based on limiting the types of data that
`constitute “athletic performance feedback data.” Defendants also assert that at the time of
`the invention, computing athletic performance feedback data would not be as simple as
`Plaintiff’s expert suggests because the computation would need to account for errors in
`the received GPS data. (See Dkt. No. 79 at 5-6.)
`
`As Plaintiff effectively concedes, the specification at most refers to a GPS module,
`memory, and CPU as corresponding structure for this means-plus-function term. (Dkt.
`No. 77 at 8.) Further, Plaintiff’s expert does not dispute that a CPU would require special
`programming in order to satisfy the claimed function of “computing athletic performance
`feedback data from [a] series of time-stamped waypoints.” (Dkt. No. 79 at 1 (citing Dkt.
`79-4 (Deposition of Thomas Martin (June 18, 2020) in Philips North America LLC v.
`Fitbit, Inc., Case No. 1:19-cv-11586-IT (D. Mass.)) at 48:6-50:14).) In these
`circumstances, legal authority requires the asserted patent to disclose an algorithm
`representing the corresponding structure for this specially-programmed function:
`
`[T]he algorithm requirement is necessary ‘[b]ecause general purpose
`computers can be programmed to perform very different tasks in very
`different ways . . . .” [Aristocrat Techs. Australia Pty Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech.,
`521 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008).] Without disclosing any corresponding
`structure, “one of skill simply cannot perceive the bounds of the invention.”
`[Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2008).]
`
`Noah, 675 F.3d at 1318.
`
`Particularly when the phrase “athletic performance feedback data” is not limited to
`Plaintiff’s proposed data types, there is insufficient disclosure supporting how to compute
`various types of “athletic performance feedback data.” As Defendants note as just one
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`example, the ’007 Patent fails to disclose an algorithm for computing “calories burned”
`from the series of time—stamped waypoints. The “calories burned” example does not
`appear to fit with Plaintist examples where Plaintiff asserts the use of “high school
`math” provides sufficient structure. Even where Plaintiff and its expert do attempt to
`propose an algorithm for certain limited types of athletic performance feedback data, the
`Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs expert’s assertions are based on
`assumptions that are not sufficiently reflected in the disclosure of the ”007 Patent
`(including the claim language itself), and thus are insufficient to constitute corresponding
`structure. The claim solely refers to “computing” data; this is insufficient information to
`glean an appropriate manner of performing such a computation. See Noah, 675 F.3d at
`1318.
`
`Because the ”007 Patent does not disclose any algorithms for “computing athletic
`performance feedback data. from the series of time-stamped waypoints,” there is no
`corresponding structure disclosed for this claim term. The Court accordingly finds that
`the term “means for computing athletic performance feedback data from the series of
`time-stamped waypoints” is indefinite for lack of corresponding structure under 35
`U.S.C. § 112.
`
`2. Other Terms in the ’00? Patent
`
`Construction
`
`Construction
`
`No construction necessary.
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112, 'i[ 6
`
`
`
`“means for presenting the
`athletic performance
`Structure:
`feedback data to an athlete Alternatively, “a. display
`(’00? Patent, Claims 1, 21)
`andfor audio headphones Wired headset (including
`(and equivalents thereof)
`all technical components
`that presents the athletic
`for audio connections,
`performance feedback data
`amplification, speech
`to an athlete"
`synthesizer etc). Feedback
`data is optionally also
`scrolled across the display
`while it is also being
`announced via the audio
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112, 1[ 6
`
`Structure:
`
`a display and/or audio
`headphones and
`e I uivalents thereof
`
`headphones.
`
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`Case 2:19-cv-06301-AB-KS Document 102 Filed 08/28/20 Page 11 of 45 Page ID #:3467
`Indefinite
`“a processor (and
`“means for suspending and
`equivalents thereof) that
`resuming operation of said
`suspends said computing
`means for computing when
`when a speed of the athlete
`a speed of the athlete falls
`is below a predetermined
`below a predetermined
`threshold and resumes said
`threshold” (’007 Patent,
`computing when a speed of
`Claim 7)
`the athlete is not below said
`predetermined threshold”
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6
`
`Structure:
`Not disclosed
`
`Function:
`suspending and resuming
`operation of said means for
`computing when a speed of
`the athlete falls below a
`predetermined threshold
`
`Indefinite
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.
`
`Structure:
`Not disclosed
`
`Function:
`exchanging GPS route
`waypoints via
`said Internet web site
`
`“means for exchanging GPS
`route waypoints via said
`Internet web site” (’007
`Patent, Claim 25)
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6
`
`Structure:
`a processor and equivalents
`thereof
`
`Function:
`suspending and resuming
`operation of said means for
`computing when a speed of
`the athlete falls below a
`predetermined threshold (as
`construed above)
`No construction necessary
`
`Alternatively, “an Internet
`web site (and equivalents
`thereof) that exchanges
`GPS route waypoints”
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.
`
`Structure:
`an Internet web site and
`equivalents thereof (See,
`e.g., original claim, col. 9
`ll. 52-62)
`
`Function:
`exchanging GPS route
`waypoints
`
`11
`
`Ex. 3002
`
`
`
`Case 2:19-cv-06301-AB-KS Document 102 Filed 08/28/20 Page 12 of 45 Page ID #:3468
`Case 2:19-cv-06301—AB-KS Document 102 Filed 08/28/20 Page 12 of 45 Page ID #:3468
`
`The parties also dispute the proper construction of the phrases (1) “means for
`presenting the athletic performance feedback data to an athlete,” which appears in Claims
`1 and 21 of the ’00? Patent; (2) “means for suspending and resuming operation of said
`means for computing when a speed of the athlete falls below a predetermined threshold,”
`which appears in dependent Claim 7 of the ’007 Patent; and (3) “means for exchanging
`GPS route waypoints via said Internet web site,” which appears in dependent Claim 25 of
`the ”007 Patent. In the preceding section of this Order, the Court finds the phrase “means
`for computing athletic performance feedback data from the series of time-stamped
`waypoints,” which appears in Claims 1 and 21 of the ’007 Patent, indefinite. Because the
`Court has already found a claim phrase in Claims 1 and 21 of the ’00? Patent indefinite,
`the parties’ disputes regarding other claim terms that appear in Claims 1 and 21 or in
`dependent claims that depend from either Claim 1 or 21 are moot. The Court declines to
`issue advisory opinions regarding the meaning of those claim phrases, and they are not
`construed at this time.
`
`
`
`3. “governing information transmitted between the first personal device
`and the second device” (’233 Patent, Claim 1)
`
`Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`“controlling the transmission of
`Original Construction:
`information between the first personal
`Plain and ordinary meaning
`device and the second device”
`
`Revised Construction:
`
`
`
`
`
`“a security mechanism continuously
`controlling multiple levels of access
`to information transmitted between
`
`the first personal [medical] device and
`the second device”
`
`The term “governing information transmitted between the first personal device and
`the second device” appears in Claim 1 of the ’233 Patent. Claim 1 recites:
`
`A bi-directional wireless communication system comprising:
`(a) a first personal device, the first personal device further comprising:
`(i) a processor,
`(ii) a memory;
`(iii) a power Supply :
`(iv) at least one detector input; and
`(v)
`a
`short-range bi-directional wireless
`module;
`(b) a second device communicating with the first device, the second
`device
`having
`a
`short-range
`bi-directional wireless
`communications module compatible with the short-range bi-
`directional wireless communications module of the first device;
`and
`
`communications
`
`12
`
`Ex. 3002
`
`Ex. 3002
`
`
`
`Case 2:19-cv-06301-AB-KS Document 102 Filed 08/28/20 Page 13 of 45 Page ID #:3469
`(c) a security mechanism governing information transmitted between
`the first personal device and the second device.
`’233 Patent at Claim 1 (emphasis added).
`Both parties refer to Figure 5 of the ’233 Patent as a relevant example in
`understanding this claim term. Figure 5 shows a personal medical device 100 belonging
`to “Victim V.” It further shows connections between personal medical device 100 and a
`“Bystander B,” “Responding Personnel R,” and “Dispatcher or Medial Caregiver D.” The
`specification explains how each of these other parties can use devices of their own to
`communicate with and/or collect relevant information from personal medical device 100,
`in the event of an emergency. Both parties appear to agree at a high level that the purpose
`of Claim 1’s requirement for “a security mechanism governing information transmitted
`between the first personal device and the second device” is to ensure that only
`appropriate information is available to the appropriate second party.
`The parties differ, however, in their additional characterization of the claim
`language. Defendants refer to the security mechanism’s function as requiring
`“continuous” control that allows for “multiple levels of access” to relevant information.
`Although not necessarily reflected in its proposed construction, Plaintiff appears to focus
`specifically on the issue of the ability of the security mechanism to make a determination
`about whether information can actually be transmitted between the claimed devices or
`not. It is worth noting that the parties initially supported these competing positions with
`competing general-purpose dictionaries and broad statements about the specification’s
`goals in governing or “controlling” information transmission.
`In presenting these arguments, the parties also initially gloss over what, exactly,
`the specification considers to be a “s