IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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` FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
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`WACO DIVISION
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`PARUS HOLDINGS INC.
`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`LG ELECTRONICS INC. AND LG
`ELECTRONICS U.S.A., INC.
`Defendant
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`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
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`CIVIL ACTION 6:19-CV-00432-ADA
`Lead case
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`
`CIVIL ACTION 6:19-CV-00437-ADA
`Member case
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`
`
`
`ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT LG’S
`MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
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`Came on for consideration this date the Motion of Defendant LG Electronics Inc. and LG
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`Electronics U.S.A., Inc. (“LG”) to transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) filed on January 3, 2020.
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`ECF No. 62. Plaintiff Parus Holdings Inc. (“Parus”) filed its response on January 10, 2020 (ECF
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`No. 70, and Parus replied on January 9, 2020 (ECF No. 69). After careful consideration of the
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`arguments made, the Court GRANTS LG’s motion to transfer the case to the Northern District of
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`California.
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`I.
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`Factual Background and Procedural History
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`
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`Parus filed its original complaint on July 22, 2019. Pl.’s Compl., ECF No. 1. On October
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`21, 2019, Parus submitted its amended complaint alleging infringement of two patents-in-suit.1
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`Pl.’s Am. Compl. at 1. ECF No. 28. Parus alleges that LG makes, uses, sells, and/or offers for sale
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`its smartphone products implementing the Google Android operating system, including the Google
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`Assistant. Pl.’s Compl. at 1, ECF No. 1. Parus alleges that Google Assistant has infringed upon
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`1 3 U.S. Patent No. 7,076,431 (the “’431 Patent”) and 9,451,084 (the “’084 Patent”), (collectively, the “Asserted
`Patents”). ECF No. 1 at ¶ 3.
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`
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`1
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`Google Exhibit 1032
`Google v. Parus
`IPR2020-00846
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`

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`the asserted patents. Id. at 3–17, 17–29. According to the Complaint, the Asserted Patents enable
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`users to search and retrieve publicly available information by controlling a web browsing server
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`using spoken voice commands. Id. Additionally, these technologies incorporate a methodology
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`that allows for the detection of changes from the websites and adapt those changes in real-time.
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`Id. Finally, the technology allows users to control and monitor household devices connected to a
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`network using verbal commands through a voice-enabled device. Id.
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`
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`On December 20, 2019, this Court ordered the consolidation of this case with four related
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`actions in the interests of justice and convenience of the parties. Pl.’s Am. Compl. ECF No. 34.
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`On January 3, 2020, LG filed its Motion to Transfer Venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) requesting
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`that the case be transferred to the Northern District of California (“NDCA”). Def.’s Mot. at 1, ECF
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`No. 62.
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`II.
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`Standard of Review
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`Title 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) provides that, for the convenience of parties and witnesses, a
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`district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been
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`brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented. “Section 1404(a) is
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`intended to place discretion in the district court to adjudicate motions for transfer according to an
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`‘individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness.’” Stewart Org., Inc. v.
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`Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988) (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964)).
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`The party moving for transfer carries the burden of showing good cause. In re Volkswagen of Am.,
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`Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 314 (5th Cir. 2008) (hereinafter “Volkswagen II”)(“When viewed in the context
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`of § 1404(a), to show good cause means that a moving party, in order to support its claim for a
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`transfer, must . . . clearly demonstrate that a transfer is ‘[f]or the convenience of parties and
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`witnesses, in the interest of justice.’”) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)).
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`2
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`“The preliminary question under § 1404(a) is whether a civil action ‘might have been
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`brought’ in the destination venue.” Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 312. If so, in the Fifth Circuit, the
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`“[t]he determination of ‘convenience’ turns on a number of public and private interest factors,
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`none of which can be said to be of dispositive weight.” Action Indus., Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar.
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`Co., 358 F.3d 337, 340 (5th Cir. 2004). The private factors include: “(1) the relative ease of access
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`to sources of proof; (2) the availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of
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`witnesses; (3) the cost of attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all other practical problems that
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`make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” In re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d 201, 203
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`(5th Cir. 2004) (hereinafter “Volkswagen I”) (citing to Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235,
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`241 n.6 (1982)). The public factors include: “(1) the administrative difficulties flowing from court
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`congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized interests decided at home; (3) the familiarity
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`of the forum with the law that will govern the case; and (4) the avoidance of unnecessary problems
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`of conflict of laws of the application of foreign law.” Id. Courts evaluate these factors based on
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`“the situation which existed when suit was instituted.” Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343
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`(1960).
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`Courts may “consider undisputed facts outside the pleadings, but it must draw all
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`reasonable inferences and resolve all factual conflicts in favor of the non-moving party.”
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`Weatherford Tech. Holdings, LLC v. Tesco Corp., No. 2:17-CV-00456-JRG, 2018 WL 4620636,
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`at *2 (E.D. Tex. May 16, 2019).
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`A plaintiff’s choice of venue is not an independent factor in the venue transfer analysis,
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`and courts must not give inordinate weight to a plaintiff’s choice of venue. Volkswagen II, 545
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`F.3d at 314 n.10, 315 (“[W]hile a plaintiff has the privilege of filing his claims in any judicial
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`3
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`division appropriate under the general venue statute, § 1404(a) tempers the effects of the exercise
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`of this privilege.”). However, “when the transferee venue is not clearly more convenient than the
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`venue chosen by the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s choice should be respected.” Id. at 315; see also QR
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`Spex, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 507 F.Supp.2d 650, 664 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (characterizing movant’s
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`burden under § 1404(a) as “heavy”).
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`III. Discussion regarding transfer to the Northern District of California
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`As a preliminary matter, neither party contests the fact that venue is proper in NDCA and
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`that Parus could have filed this action in NDCA.
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`a. Relative ease of access to sources of proof
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`In considering the relative ease of access to proof, a court looks to where the parties store
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`documentary evidence, such as documents and physical evidence. Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 316.
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`LG argues that this factor weighs heavily in favor of transfer for several reasons. First, LG
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`points out that the action against LG is reliant upon the asserted technology as developed by
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`Google in the form of Google Assistant, and that Google researches, designs, develops, and tests
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`Google Assistant in NDCA. Def.’s Mot. at 8, ECF No. 62. LG also points out that two of five
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`Parus executives live in the San Francisco Bay area. Id. Based on this contention, LG infers that
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`most of Parus’ documents relevant to this case are located in NDCA. Id. Finally, LG points out
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`that all of the prior art witnesses and evidence are in NDCA, and that there is no relevant evidence,
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`witnesses, or documents in the WDTX. Id.
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`Counter to LG’s contentions, Parus argues that LG has not shown that it is clearly more
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`convenient to access sources of proof in NDCA than this district. Pl.'s Resp. at 4, ECF No. 70.
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`Parus states that LG has not shown that it would be difficult or burdensome to access any
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`documents electronically, nor has it shown that any specific relevant documents are in NDCA. Id.
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`4
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`Further, Parus asks the Court to discount the distance that some documents may have to travel
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`because access to documents found on a server can be instantaneous. Pl.’s Resp. at 5, ECF No. 70.
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`Parus additionally argues that LG is misguided in stating that Parus witnesses, certain prior art
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`witnesses, and associated evidence are in NDCA. Id. Parus says that their executives and other
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`potentially relevant witnesses reside in several states throughout the country and that an inventor
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`of the asserted patent lives in New Hampshire. Id. Finally, Parus argues that the Court should give
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`the location of prior art witnesses little weight. Id.
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`In its reply, LG claims that Parus does not provide any evidence that WDTX is a more
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`convenient source of proof than NDCA. Def.’s Reply at 4, ECF No. 68. LG states that Parus
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`concedes that its executives and employees are in NDCA and that NDCA is also home to key LG,
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`Google, and other third-party witnesses whose documents and evidence are located in NDCA as
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`well. Id. LG claims that its documents relevant to this case are significantly harder to access from
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`WDTX than from NDCA because LG has no offices, facilities or relevant employees in WDTX.
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`Id.
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`Parus relies upon the language as previously stated in this Court, referring to the modern-
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`day patent litigation circumstances which surround document and information evidence. See
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`Fintiv, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No. 6:18-cv-00372-ADA, 2019 WL 4743678, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Sept.
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`10, 2019) (Albright, J) (“In modern patent litigation, all (or nearly all) produced documents exist
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`as electronic documents on a party’s server. Then, with a click of a mouse or a few keystrokes, the
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`party produces these documents. In modern patent litigation, documents are located on a server,
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`which may or may note in the transferee district . . . and are equally accessible from both the
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`transferee and transferor districts.”). While the court recognizes the relevance of this element in
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`the current day, it must adhere to the precedent of the Fifth Circuit when considering the location
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`5
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`of relevant documents and information. See, e.g., Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 316. Thus, the court
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`finds that the “relative ease of access to sources of proof” slightly weighs in favor of transfer for
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`the following reasons.
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`LG asserts that Google researches, designs, develops, and tests Google assistant in NDCA.
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`Further, LG claims that LG integrates Google Assistant into its Android products in NDCA. Given
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`that LG is the accused infringer by integrating Google Assistant into its products, it is likely that
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`LG and Google will have the bulk of the documents relevant to this case in NDCA. See, e.g., In re
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`Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“In patent infringement cases, the bulk of
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`the relevant evidence usually comes from the accused infringer. Consequently, the place where the
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`defendant's documents are kept weighs in favor of transfer to that location.”). Therefore, the Court
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`finds that the location of the documents relevant in this case weighs towards transfer.
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`Second, the Court finds that, for party witnesses, NDCA and WDTX are equally
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`convenient. This Court looks at the totality of the circumstances, including but not limited to, the
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`witness’s title and relevant experience, the likelihood that a witness may have relevant information,
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`the number of witnesses, the location of those witnesses, whether the testimony of the witnesses
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`goes to an element of a claim, the amount of public information available to the parties, etc. Fintiv,
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`2019 WL 4743678, at *5 While LG has identified several employees in NDCA with relevant
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`information, Parus asserts that there are Google engineers who reside within WDTX who have
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`personal knowledge regarding the functionality of Google assistant. Pl.’s Resp. Ex. E-G., ECF No.
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`70. Because the parties have identified potential witnesses in both NDCA and WDTX, the Court
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`finds that party witnesses are neutral in terms of transfer.
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`6
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`Given that the location of the documents favors transfer and the party witnesses’ factor is
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`neutral, the Court finds that the relative ease of access to sources of proof slightly favors transfer
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`to NDCA.
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`b. Availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses
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`“In this factor, the Court considers the availability of compulsory process to secure the
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`attendance of witnesses, particularly non-party witnesses whose attendance may need to be secured
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`by a court order.” Fintiv, 2019 WL 4743678, at *5 (citing Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 316). A court
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`may subpoena a witness to attend trial only (a) “within 100 miles of where the person resides, is
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`employed, or regularly transacts business in person,”; or (b) “within the state where the person
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`resides, is employed, or regularly transacts business in person.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(1)(A),
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`(B); Gemalto S.A. v. CPI Card Grp. Inc., No. 15-CA-0910, 2015 WL 10818740, at *4 (W.D. Tex.
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`Dec. 16, 2015). Moreover, the ability to compel live trial testimony is crucial for evaluating a
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`witnesses’ testimony. Aguilar-Ayala v. Ruiz, 973 F.2d 411, 419 (5th Cir. 1992).
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`LG relies upon the subpoena power of NDCA over the executives of three important
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`companies that sold widely available prior art systems and four specific developers of SRI’s prior
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`art Open Agent Architecture system to argue that this factor weighs in favor of transfer. Def.’s
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`Mot. at 9, ECF no. 68. LG claims that these parties are within the subpoena power of NDCA, but
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`not the trial subpoena power of this Court. Id. Therefore, LG states that this Court could not compel
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`these witnesses to testify if the case is not transferred. Id. Moreover, LG argues that Google
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`engineers who are the key witnesses with knowledge of how the accused technology works are
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`only within the subpoena power of NDCA. LG asserts that it is not aware of any relevant third-
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`party witnesses in WDTX. Id.
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`7
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`Parus contends that this factor is neutral at best for LG. Pl.’s Resp. at 6, ECF No. 70. Parus
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`argues that the location of prior art witnesses should not be given much weight. Id. Further, Parus
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`notes that the compulsory process factor focuses on unwilling non-party witnesses. Id. There is
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`nothing in the record that indicates that Google employees would be unwilling non-party
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`witnesses. Id. Parus states that, if the Court denies Google and LG’s motions, Google will have a
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`strong incentive to willingly provide witnesses in the LG case because LG and Google collaborate
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`extensively to implement Google technology into LG products. Id. Therefore, Parus concludes that
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`Google witnesses are not indeed unwilling third parties. Id.
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` In its reply, LG asserts that Parus fails to dispute that the key Google engineers and prior
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`art witnesses are not within the subpoena power of WDTX. Def.’s Reply at 4, ECF no. 68. LG
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`contends that Parus is misguided in trying to minimize the importance of the subpoena power. Id.
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`Rather, LG states that the court should weigh in favor of transfer when more third-parties reside
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`within the transferee venue than the transferor venue. Id.
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`After considering the parties’ arguments, the Court finds that this factor is neutral for the
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`reasons as follows. Because prior art witnesses are very unlikely to testify (and that LG may have
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`cherry-picked them to begin with), the Court gives their location “minimal” weight. East Tex. Boot
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`Co., LLC v. Nike, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-0290-JRG-RSP, 2017 WL 28559065 at *4 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 15,
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`2017). Accordingly, prior art witnesses do not weigh for or against transfer. Further, while LG
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`points to Google employees as witnesses within the subpoena power of NDCA, the Court is
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`reluctant to give these witnesses weight. Google collaborates with LG to implement its technology
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`into LG products, which makes it unlikely that the employees would be unwilling to testify at a
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`trial concerning LG. Though Google engineers are technically non-party witnesses for the purpose
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`of this order, there is pending action against Google regarding the same asserted technology in this
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`8
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`case, which the Court consolidated with several other actions involving the same patents-in-suit.
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`The consolidation of this case means that, although technically a third party, Google engineers
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`would likely not be unwilling to testify. Therefore, the Court finds that the availability of
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`compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses is neutral.
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`c. Cost of attendance for willing witnesses
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`The convenience of witnesses is the single most important factor in the transfer analysis.
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`In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The Court should consider all
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`potential material and relevant witnesses. See Alacritech Inc. v. CenturyLink, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-
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`693, 2017 WL 4155236, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 19, 2017). “When the distance between an existing
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`venue for trial of a matter and a proposed venue under § 1404(a) is more than 100 miles, the factor
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`of inconvenience to witnesses increases in direct relationship to the additional distance to be
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`traveled.” Id. at 1343. The Court gives the convenience of party witnesses little weight. See ADS
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`Sec. L.P. v. Advanced Detection Sec. Servs., Inc., No. A-09-CA-773-LY, 2010 WL 1170976, at *4
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`(W.D. Tex. Mar. 23, 2010), report and recommendation adopted in A-09-CA-773-LY (ECF No.
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`20) (Apr. 14, 2010).
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`LG argues that the convenience of willing witnesses overwhelmingly favors transfer to
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`NDCA. Def.’s Mot. at 5, ECF No. 62. Because the accused technology is researched and designed
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`by Google, LG argues that the testimony of Google engineers is essential to this litigation. LG
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`points to several prior art witnesses who are located in NDCA to say that this element weighs in
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`favor of transfer. Id. LG also states that the LG witnesses who are knowledgeable about the accused
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`functionality are in NDCA and that Parus witnesses also live in NDCA. Id. Based on these
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`contentions, LG asserts that it is more convenient for witnesses to testify at home and that, absent
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`transfer, all of the aforementioned parties and third parties would have to fly and drive to Waco,
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`9
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`increasing travel expense and decreased employee activity. Id. at 6. LG then continues to describe
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`the level of inconvenience posed by making the parties and third parties travel to WDTX. Id.
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`Finally, LG states that no relevant witness is at home in WDTX and that Parus did not identify any
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`relevant witnesses at home in WDTX. Id. at 7.
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`
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`Parus argues that LG relies far too heavily on technical witnesses and ignores potential
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`witnesses related to other prevalent issues surrounding the case. Pl.’s Resp. at 7, ECF No. 70. Parus
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`asserts that LG’s argument is founded upon the knowledge of Google witnesses who may have
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`knowledge of the technological aspects of the alleged infringing technology, but not an
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`understanding of the other elements of the claims such as speech recognition. Id. Parus points out
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`that “Google concedes that additional engineers located in Google offices around the world work
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`on the narrow task of summarizing web page excerpts” to conclude that it is entirely plausible that
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`Google employees or consultants have relevant information about the Accused Products. Id. Parus
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`further explains that LG is misguided in stating that NDCA is more convenient for both parties’
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`witnesses because Parus is headquartered in Illinois with its employees and officers in more than
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`a half dozen states throughout the country. Id. Moreover, Parus states that its lead scientist and
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`inventor of the Asserted Patents resides in New Hampshire. Finally, Parus notes that both officers
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`who reside in NDCA are willing to appear in this district and that this district is a more central
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`location than NDCA for all potential witnesses. Id. at 8.
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`
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`The court finds that this factor weighs slightly in favor of transfer. The prior art and party
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`witnesses that the parties identified do not receive much weight when considering the
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`determination of this factor. Fintiv, 2019 WL 4743678, at *5 This Court has expressed that the it
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`should not give the convenience of these witnesses any weight “because prior art witnesses are
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`very unlikely to testify” at trial. Id. Therefore, the court declines to assign weight to prior art
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`10
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`witnesses. The convenience of Parus and LG witnesses are also given little weight. The court finds
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`that the convenience of LG and Parus witnesses is neutral in this factor.
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`
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`LG relies on the convenience of Google witnesses in NDCA to assert that NDCA is more
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`convenient. Under this factor, “it is the convenience of non-party witnesses, rather than of
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`employee witnesses, however, that is the more important factor accorded greater weight.” In re
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`Triton Ltd. Sec. Litig., 70 F.Supp.2d 678, 690 (E.D.Tex.1999). Therefore, the Court must give
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`more weight to the convenience of Google engineers as witnesses identified by LG than that of the
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`party witnesses. The Court recognizes that LG has established that Google would have few
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`potential witnesses in the WDTX and that it would be more convenient for Google engineers to
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`testify in NDCA. This court has recognized that NDCA is the more convenient forum for a high
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`percentage of its employees who may be relevant witnesses. However, this case is consolidated
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`meaning, although Google is technically a non-party for the purposes of this order, they are a party
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`to the consolidated suit. Order Consolidating Cases, ECF No. 48. Therefore, if this case were a
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`part of a separate action in which Google was a complete non-party to the suit, the Court would
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`assign significant weight to the location and convenience of Google engineers and witnesses under
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`this factor. However, because this is a consolidated action, Google is not a wholly disconnected
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`third party. The Court cannot weigh the convenience of Google witnesses as heavily as it would if
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`this were a separate action.
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`
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`Given the little weight that party and prior art witnesses have in the analysis of this factor
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`combined with the appropriate weight given to Google engineers as third party witnesses who
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`would be best served by a transfer to NDCA in the context of the consolidation of this case, the
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`Court finds that this factor weighs slightly in favor of transfer.
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`11
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`d. All other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and
`inexpensive
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`In this factor, the court considers the practical problems that make a trial easy, expeditious,
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`and inexpensive for private parties. In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d at 1342. “Judicial economy is
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`served by having the same district court try the cases involving the same patents.” In re
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`Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 566 F.3d 1349, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009). “To permit a situation in which
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`two cases involving precisely the same issues are simultaneously pending in different District
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`Courts leads to the wastefulness of time, energy, and money that § 1404(a) was designed to
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`prevent.” Continental Grain Co. v. The FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19, 26 (1960).
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`LG argues that judicial economy weighs in favor of transfer to NDCA for two reasons.
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`Def.’s Mot. at 9, ECF No. 62. First, the case is in its early stages, and transfer at this point would
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`not cause delays. Id. Second, NDCA is significantly more convenient for all of the cases that have
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`been filed by Parus alleging infringement upon the patents in suit. LG makes this argument based
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`off of other parties consolidated in this suit. LG claims that NDCA is clearly a more convenient
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`forum for LG, Google, Samsung, and Apple, and is therefore the most practical venue for all Parus
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`litigations. Id. LG points to the strong ties of all parties to NDCA and the alleged nonexistent ties
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`to WDTX to claim that this factor weighs in favor of transfer. Id. at 10.
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`In its response, Parus argues that Judicial economy dictates that the Court should deny
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`LG’s transfer request for several reasons. Pl.’s Resp. at 8, ECF No. 70. First, Parus notes that LG’s
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`argument related to the other 1404 motions is not sound because these transfer motions are
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`pending, and each individual defendant bears its own burden of showing that NDCA is clearly
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`more convenient than this district. Id. Second, Parus argues that this Court has already invested
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`significant time and resources into this litigation, which favors denial of transfer. Id. Parus argues
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`that when there is co-pending litigation before the trial court involving the same patent and
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`12
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`underlying technology, the judicial economy factor has heightened importance. Id. Thus, multiple
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`suits involving the same or similar issues may create practical problems that will weigh heavily
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`against transfer. Id. at 9.
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`In its reply, LG asserts that Parus has mischaracterized the current action within this Court
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`as being “significant motion practice” when in reality, the case is still in its early stages. Def.’s
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`Reply at 5, ECF No. 68.
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`The Court finds that this factor is neutral. In considering the presence of co-pending
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`litigation, the Court must also consider the presence of co-pending motions to transfer. In re
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`Google Inc., No. 2017-107, 2017 WL 977038, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 23, 2017) (“Based on the
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`district court’s rationale, therefore, the mere co-pendency of related suits in a particular district
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`would automatically tip the balance in non-movant’s favor regardless of the existence of co-
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`pending transfer motions and their underlying merits. This cannot be correct.”). While all other
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`defendants have filed motions to transfer venue to NDCA, these motions are still pending.2 This
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`means that LG’s argument stating that NDCA is clearly more convenient for all parties related to
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`this suit does not apply. Each defendant has the burden to show that its chosen venue is more
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`convenient than the WDTX, and the Court will provide an independent evaluation of its motion to
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`transfer on the merits. Therefore, the presence of co-pending litigation is neutral with respect to
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`transfer. Further, this case is in its early stages, meaning any increase in judicial economy from
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`the Court’s experience in these early stages of litigation is likely to be limited. The Court finds that
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`“all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive” is neutral.
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`2 ECF No. 55, ECF No. 42, ECF No. 60, ECF No. 75.
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`13
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`e. Administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion
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`The relevant inquiry under this factor is actually “[t]he speed with which a case can come
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`to trial and be resolved[.]” In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2009). In its
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`motion, LG admits that this Court’s time-to-trial is currently 25% faster than the NDCA. Def.’s
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`Mot. at 10, ECF No. 62. Despite their admission, LG argues that this factor should be given the
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`least weight because the Federal Circuit has held that time to trial is the most speculative factor.
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`Id. In its response, Parus agrees that the time-to-trial favors retention but that this factor should not
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`be given the least weight. Pl.’s Resp. at 9, ECF No. 70.
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`Because the time-to-trial statistics in this Court is currently 25% faster than the NDCA, the
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`Court finds that this factor weighs against transfer.
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`f. Local interest in having localized interests decided at home
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`In its motion, LG argues that the NDCA has a stronger local interest in this litigation than
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`the WDTX because third-party Google developed the accused Google Assistant feature in the
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`NDCA. Def.’s Mot at 10, ECF No. 62. Moreover, LG claims that it has offices in NDCA where it
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`integrated the accused functionality into their products. Id. In its response, Parus argues that LG
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`incorrectly downplays Google’s presence in WDTX. Pl.’s Resp. at 10, ECF No. 70. Particularly,
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`Parus points to the properties that Google owns and the fact that Google is a significant employer
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`in the region “with more than 1,100 employees” working in a variety of technical and non-technical
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`roles. Id. Parus also points to Google recently signing a lease for nearly 900,00 square feet of office
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`space within WDTX, including an entire 35 story tower in Austin. Id.
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`In its reply, LG contends that the local interest factor weighs in favor of transfer to a venue
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`where there are significant connections between the particular venue and the events that gave rise
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`to the suit. Def.’s Reply at 5, ECF No. 68. Thus, LG argues that because the NDCA is where
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`Google researched, designed, and developed the accused functionality, and where LG integrates
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`Google Assistant into its products, the local interest factor favors transfer to the NDCA. Id.
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`The Court finds that this factor is neutral. Google undoubtedly has a large presence in this
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`district. Parus shows that Google will have the capacity for 5,000 employees in Austin by 2023
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`and that they already have a large skyscraper with its logo downtown. Id. Therefore, Google is
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`“local” in WDTX. However, LG integrates Google Assistant into their products in offices within
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`NDCA. Given that LG relies heavily on Google’s technology and Google’s presence in both
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`districts is neutral, but LG integrates Google Assistant into their products within NDCA, this factor
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`weighs very slightly towards transfer.
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`
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`The Court also finds that Parus does not have a significant presence in either district. While
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`Salil Pradhan, Parus’s former Chief Technology Officer, and Darius Reneau, Parus’s Chief
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`Marketing Officer, were once located in the San Francisco Bay Area, Mr. Pradhan is no longer
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`employed by Parus, and Mr. Reneau now lives in Arizona. Parus has identified no relevant
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`connections to the WDTX. Therefore, Parus’s contribution to this factor is also neutral.
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`The Court finds that the “local interest in having localized interests decided at home” is
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`very slightly in favor of transfer.
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`g. Familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case
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`Both parties agree that this factor is neutral. ECF No. 62 (LG), ECF No. 70 (Parus). The
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`Court also agrees.
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`h. Avoidance of unnecessary problems of conflict of laws or in the application
`of foreign law
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`Both parties agree that this factor is neutral. ECF No. 62 (LG), ECF No. 70 (Parus). The
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`Court also agrees.
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`IV. Conclusion
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`Having found that (1) access to proof, cost of attendance of witnesses, and local interests
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`slightly or very slightly in favor of transfer; (2) court congestion weighs against transfer; and (3) all
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`other factors being neutral, the Court finds that LG has met its burden to demonstrate that NDCA
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`is “clearly more convenient.” Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 314 n.10, 315; QR Spex, 507 F. Supp. 2d
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`at 664.
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`It is therefore ORDERED that LG’s motion for transfer venue to the Northern District of
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`California is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED that LG’s above-styled case be
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`TRANSFERRED to the Northern District of California.
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`SIGNED this 6th day of August, 2020.
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`ALAN D ALBRIGHT
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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