`
`
`
`United States Court of Appeals
`for the Federal Circuit
`______________________
`
`PARUS HOLDINGS, INC.,
`Appellant
`
`v.
`
`GOOGLE LLC,
`Appellee
`______________________
`
`2022-1269, 2022-1270
`______________________
`
`Appeals from the United States Patent and Trademark
`Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Nos. IPR2020-
`00846, IPR2020-00847.
`______________________
`
`Decided: June 12, 2023
`______________________
`
`JOHN BRUCE CAMPBELL, McKool Smith, P.C., Austin,
`TX, argued for appellant. Also represented by JOEL LANCE
`THOLLANDER.
`
` NATHAN R. SPEED, Wolf Greenfield & Sacks, PC, Bos-
`ton, MA, argued for appellee. Also represented by
`GREGORY F. CORBETT, RICHARD GIUNTA, ELISABETH H.
`HUNT; GREGORY S. NIEBERG, New York, NY.
` ______________________
`
`Before LOURIE, BRYSON, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.
`
`
`
`Case: 22-1269 Document: 48 Page: 2 Filed: 06/12/2023
`
`2
`
`PARUS HOLDINGS, INC. v. GOOGLE LLC
`
`LOURIE, Circuit Judge.
`Parus Holdings, Inc. (“Parus”) appeals from two final
`written decisions of the United States Patent and Trade-
`mark Office Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“the Board”)
`holding claims 1, 2, 4–7, 10, 13, and 14 of U.S. Patent
`7,076,431 (“the ’431 patent”) and claims 1, 2, 4–7, 10, and
`14 of U.S. Patent 9,451,084 (“the ’084 patent”) unpatenta-
`ble as obvious. Parus Holdings, Inc. v. Google LLC,
`IPR2020-00846, Paper 31 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 19, 2021) (“Deci-
`sion”), J.A. 1–67; Parus Holdings, Inc. v. Google LLC,
`IPR2020-00847, Paper 31 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 19, 2021), J.A.
`68–95.1 For the reasons provided below, we affirm.
`BACKGROUND
`The challenged patents are directed to an interactive
`voice system that allows a user to request information from
`a voice web browser. ’431 patent, Abstract. Their shared
`specification discloses two preferred embodiments: a voice-
`based web browser system and a voice-activated device
`controller. See, e.g., ’431 patent, col. 4 ll. 30–34, col. 17 ll.
`36–46. Claim 1 of the ’084 patent, reproduced below, is
`representative.
`1. A system for acquiring information from
`one or more sources maintaining a listing of
`web sites by receiving speech commands ut-
`tered by users into a voice-enabled device and
`
`1 The two final written decisions in the inter partes
`reviews (“IPRs”) consolidated on appeal are largely similar
`for the purposes of this appeal. The decision in Parus Hold-
`ings, Inc. v. Google LLC, IPR2020-00846, Paper 31
`(P.T.A.B. Oct. 19, 2021), J.A. 1–67 is cited throughout as
`representative of both decisions unless specified otherwise.
`Because the challenged patents share a specification, cita-
`tions of the ’431 patent specification are likewise repre-
`sentative, unless otherwise stated.
`
`
`
`Case: 22-1269 Document: 48 Page: 3 Filed: 06/12/2023
`
`PARUS HOLDINGS, INC. v. GOOGLE LLC
`
`3
`
`for providing information retrieved from the
`web sites to the users in an audio form via the
`voice-enabled device, the system comprising:
`. . .
`the computing device further configured to ac-
`cess at least one of the plurality of web sites
`identified by the instruction set to obtain the
`information to be retrieved, wherein the com-
`puting device is further configured to periodi-
`cally search via the one or more networks to
`identify new web sites and to add the new web
`sites to the plurality of web sites, the compu-
`ting device configured to access a first web
`site of the plurality of web sites and, if the in-
`formation to be retrieved is not found at the
`first web site, the computer configured to ac-
`cess the plurality of web sites remaining in an
`order defined for accessing the listing of web
`sites until the information to be retrieved is
`found in at least one of the plurality of web
`sites or until the plurality of web sites have
`been accessed;
`. . . .
`’084 patent, col. 24 ll. 2–59 (emphasis added). The chal-
`lenged patents are continuations of and claim priority from
`an application filed on February 4, 2000, which eventually
`was published as U.S. Published Patent Application
`2001/0047262 (“Kurganov-262”). Appellant’s Br. at 16.
`Kurganov-262 and the challenged patents share a specifi-
`cation. Id.
`Google LLC, Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Samsung
`Electronics America, Inc., LG Electronics Inc., and LG
`Electronics USA, Inc. (collectively, “Appellees”) petitioned
`for inter partes review of the ’431 and ’084 patents, assert-
`ing that the challenged claims would have been obvious
`
`
`
`Case: 22-1269 Document: 48 Page: 4 Filed: 06/12/2023
`
`4
`
`PARUS HOLDINGS, INC. v. GOOGLE LLC
`
`based on a number of asserted prior art references, includ-
`ing WO 01/050453 to Kovatch (“Kovatch”) and Kurganov-
`262 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
`The parties disputed whether or not Kovatch qualified
`as prior art to the challenged patents. Kovatch was filed
`on July 12, 2001 and had an earliest possible priority date
`of January 4, 2000. J.A. 1827. Parus argued that Kovatch
`was not prior art because the claimed inventions had been
`conceived at least by July 12, 1999, and reduced to practice
`at least by December 31, 1999, prior to Kovatch’s earliest
`priority date. To the extent that the Board found that the
`invention had not been reduced to practice prior to that
`date, Parus argued that the inventors had diligently
`worked on reducing it to practice until then. In support of
`its contentions, Parus submitted approximately 40 exhibits
`totaling 1,300 pages, in addition to claim charts exceeding
`100 pages. Appellant’s Br. at 15. However, despite sub-
`mitting that material as record evidence, Parus only mini-
`mally cited small portions of that material in its briefs
`without meaningful explanation. See, e.g., J.A. 1333–36
`(Patent Owner Response), J.A. 1435–41 (Patent Owner
`Sur-Reply).
`The Board declined to consider Parus’s arguments and
`evidence that the challenged patents were conceived and
`reduced to practice prior to Kovatch’s priority date because
`it found that Parus had failed to comply with 37 C.F.R.
`§ 42.6(a)(3), which prohibits incorporation by reference.
`Specifically, the Board found that
`Patent Owner has not presented its argu-
`ments regarding prior conception and reduc-
`tion to practice in its Response or Sur-reply;
`rather, Patent Owner presents its arguments
`in several declarations and improperly incor-
`porates those arguments by reference into its
`Response and Sur-reply, in violation of Rule
`42.6(a)(3).
`
`
`
`Case: 22-1269 Document: 48 Page: 5 Filed: 06/12/2023
`
`PARUS HOLDINGS, INC. v. GOOGLE LLC
`
`5
`
`Decision, J.A. 16. The Board noted that Parus did not pro-
`vide any “meaningful explanation in the Response,” id. at
`J.A. 13, did “not cite [] any [] evidence or testimony with
`specificity,” id. at 13–14, and did “not explain the basis for
`[its] conclusion or cite [] any evidence to support it,” id. at
`14. The Board therefore concluded that Parus had failed
`to meet its burden of production and that Kovach was prior
`art to the challenged patents.
`Appellees also argued that Kurganov-262, the publica-
`tion of the application from which the challenged patents
`claim priority, is prior art because the common specifica-
`tion failed to provide written description support for all the
`challenged claims of the ’084 patent and claim 9 of the ’431
`patent. According to Appellees, those claims were not en-
`titled to the earlier effective filing date. Parus responded
`that the claims were fully described in Kurganov-262 and
`therefore entitled to its February 4, 2000 priority date.
`The Board found that the evidence demonstrated that
`the challenged claims were not entitled to the February 4,
`2000 priority date and Kurganov-262 therefore qualified as
`prior art. Specifically, the Board found that the claim lim-
`itations requiring a computing device “configured to peri-
`odically search via one or more networks to identify new
`web sites and to add the new web sites to the plurality of
`web sites” were not supported by the earlier application.
`Decision, J.A. 58. The Board did not dispute that the com-
`mon specification disclosed a device browsing server that
`operated similarly to the web browsing server, and that the
`device browsing server could detect and incorporate new
`devices. Id. at J.A. 59–61 (citing ’431 patent at col. 17 ll.
`59–62, col. 19 ll. 19–28). But the Board concluded that that
`teaching was inapplicable to the web browsing server be-
`cause the specification “indicates that the devices ‘appear
`as “web sites”’ connected to the network,” but were not “web
`sites,” and the teachings were not interchangeable. See id.
`(citing ’431 patent at col. 17 ll. 50–52).
`
`
`
`Case: 22-1269 Document: 48 Page: 6 Filed: 06/12/2023
`
`6
`
`PARUS HOLDINGS, INC. v. GOOGLE LLC
`
`After concluding that both Kurganov-262 and Kovatch
`qualified as prior art, the Board held the challenged claims
`unpatentable as obvious. Parus appealed. We have juris-
`diction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A).
`DISCUSSION
`Parus raises two main arguments on appeal: (1) that
`the Board erred in holding that Kovatch qualified as prior
`art because it improperly declined to consider Parus’s ar-
`guments and evidence regarding antedating, and (2) that
`the Board erred in holding that the challenged claims lack
`written description support and were therefore not entitled
`to their earlier priority date. We address each in turn.
`I
`We must set aside any agency action found to be “arbi-
`trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in
`accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). We review “de
`novo whether the Board’s procedures satisfy the [Adminis-
`trative Procedure Act].” FanDuel, Inc. v. Interactive Games
`LLC, 966 F.3d 1334, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2020). When the
`Board finds a failure to comply with its own procedures,
`such decision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, Intelli-
`gent Bio-Systems, Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821
`F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016), which occurs when the
`Board’s decision “is clearly unreasonable, arbitrary, or fan-
`ciful,” Bilstad v. Wakalopulos, 386 F.3d 1116, 1121 (Fed.
`Cir. 2004).
`35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(8) requires the United States Patent
`and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) to promulgate rules gov-
`erning patent owners’ submission of evidence. Pursuant to
`that statutory mandate, the USPTO issued regulations set-
`ting various restrictions and requirements on briefs sub-
`mitted during IPRs. One of those regulations, 37 C.F.R.
`§ 42.6(a)(3), provides that, “Arguments must not be incor-
`porated by reference from one document into another doc-
`ument.” Because the Board found that Parus failed to
`
`
`
`Case: 22-1269 Document: 48 Page: 7 Filed: 06/12/2023
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`PARUS HOLDINGS, INC. v. GOOGLE LLC
`
`7
`
`comply with that regulation, it declined to consider Parus’
`arguments and evidence on antedating.
`On appeal, Parus does not dispute that it incorporated
`arguments by reference and therefore violated 37 C.F.R.
`§ 42.6(a)(3). For that reason alone, the Board’s disregard-
`ing of Parus’s arguments found to be in violation of the rule
`cannot be an abuse of discretion. But Parus argues that
`the Board’s refusal to consider evidence of antedating is not
`in accordance with the law. Specifically, Parus argues that
`the Board erred in declining to consider its evidence of an-
`tedating, despite its antedating argument being incorpo-
`rated by reference, because such an action (a) is a violation
`of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), (b) improp-
`erly placed a burden of persuasion on the patent owner,
`and (c) conflicts with statutes and regulations governing
`IPRs. These contentions boil down to two main arguments:
`(1) that Parus need not have submitted briefs pointing to
`and explaining the relevant record evidence, and (2) that
`the Board needed to have considered all record evidence,
`regardless of the manner of presentation. We disagree for
`the reasons provided below.
`Parus first argues that the governing IPR statutory
`and regulatory provisions require specific and persuasive
`attorney argument only from the petitioner, and not the pa-
`tent owner. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 312 (requiring that a pe-
`tition “identifies, in writing and with particularity, each
`claim challenged, the grounds on which the challenge to
`each claim is based, and the evidence that supports the
`grounds for the challenge to each claim”), with id. § 313
`(with no such requirement for preliminary responses to a
`petition). Parus also points out that patent owners are not
`required to file a response, citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.120(a).
`It is true that patent owners have no requirement to
`respond to petitions. However, here, Parus chose to take
`on an affirmative burden to show that it was the first to
`make its claimed inventions. Once Parus chose to submit
`
`
`
`Case: 22-1269 Document: 48 Page: 8 Filed: 06/12/2023
`
`8
`
`PARUS HOLDINGS, INC. v. GOOGLE LLC
`
`a response and assume that burden, it bore the responsi-
`bilities that came with it—including submitting a response
`that complied with the rules and regulations of the
`USPTO. And that includes not incorporating material by
`reference pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3) and the inclu-
`sion of “a detailed explanation of the significance of the ev-
`idence including material facts” pursuant to 37 C.F.R.
`§ 42.44.2 See also 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.23(a), 42.120.
`Parus next argues that requiring it to include argu-
`ments relating to antedating in its briefs improperly placed
`a burden of persuasion on the patent owner. Parus notes
`that it was Appellees who bore the burden to prove that
`Kovatch was prior art; Parus only bore a burden of produc-
`tion, which it claims it fulfilled. Parus is correct that, in an
`IPR, the petitioner bears the ultimate burden of persuasion
`on invalidity, which never shifts to the patent owner. Dy-
`namic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d
`1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). However, when a patent
`owner attempts to antedate an asserted prior art reference,
`the patent owner assumes a temporary burden of produc-
`tion. Id. at 1378–79; see also In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l,
`Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[A] patentee
`bears the burden of establishing that its claimed invention
`is entitled to an earlier priority date than an asserted prior
`art reference.”).
`The burden of production cannot be met simply by
`throwing mountains of evidence at the Board without ex-
`planation or identification of the relevant portions of that
`evidence. One cannot reasonably expect the Board to sift
`through hundreds of documents, thousands of pages, to
`find the relevant facts. As the Seventh Circuit articulated
`
`2 Although the Board did not explicitly cite 37 C.F.R.
`§ 42.44, it faulted Parus for not including a “detailed expla-
`nation of the evidence,” just as that rule requires. Decision,
`J.A. 21.
`
`
`
`Case: 22-1269 Document: 48 Page: 9 Filed: 06/12/2023
`
`PARUS HOLDINGS, INC. v. GOOGLE LLC
`
`9
`
`in United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir.
`1991), “Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried
`in briefs.” We echoed that refrain in General Access Solu-
`tions, Ltd. v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., 811 F. App’x 654, 657
`(Fed. Cir. 2020) (unpublished), explaining that the Board
`should not be forced to “play arch[a]eologist with the rec-
`ord.” See also DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 181 F.3d 865, 866–
`67 (7th Cir. 1999) (“A brief must make all arguments ac-
`cessible to the judges, rather than ask them to play archae-
`ologist with the record.”). The burden of production cannot
`be met without some combination of citing the relevant rec-
`ord evidence with specificity and explaining the signifi-
`cance of the produced material in briefs. Here, Parus did
`neither.
`As we explained in General Access, there are compel-
`ling reasons why these USPTO regulations exist. In that
`case, as here, the patent owner attempted to incorporate by
`reference a lengthy claim chart allegedly evidencing con-
`ception of the challenged claims. General Access, 811 F.
`App’x at 656 n.1. We upheld the Board’s decision finding
`that the conclusory assertions in the Patent Owner Re-
`sponse were insufficient to meet the Patent Owner’s bur-
`den of establishing prior conception. Id. at 658. In so
`doing, we found that the “prohibition against incorporation
`of arguments from other documents serves various policy
`goals, including to ‘minimize the chance that an argument
`may be overlooked’ and to ‘eliminate[] abuses that arise
`from incorporation and combination.’” Id. at 657 (quoting
`Rules of Practice for Trials Before the Patent Trial and Ap-
`peal Board and Judicial Review of Patent Trial and Appeal
`Board Decisions, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,612, 48,617 (Aug. 14,
`2012)). See also DeSilva, 181 F.3d at 866–67 (Incorpora-
`tion “by reference amounts to a self-help increase in the
`length of the [] brief,” and “is a pointless imposition on the
`court’s time.”). Further, Parus’s suggestion that patent
`owners need only submit evidence—regardless how volu-
`minous or argumentative—would eviscerate all page limits
`
`
`
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`
`10
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`PARUS HOLDINGS, INC. v. GOOGLE LLC
`
`for patent owners while maintaining restrictions on peti-
`tioners. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.24.
`Parus further argues that, according to our decision in
`Aqua Products v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290, 1325 (Fed. Cir.
`2017) (en banc), the APA requires the Board to review “the
`entirety of the record,” and that obligation cannot be obvi-
`ated by rule or regulation. However, Parus’s argument is
`misplaced. Aqua Products stands for the principle that the
`Board must decide all issues properly before it, even if they
`are contrary to its result. Nothing in Aqua Products man-
`dates that the Board review evidence and issues introduced
`by a party in violation of its rules or not introduced at all.
`See Hunting Titan, Inc. v. DynaEnergetics Europe GmbH,
`28 F.4th 1371, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (explaining that Aqua
`Products does not place on the Board “an affirmative duty,
`without limitation or exception, to sua sponte raise patent-
`ability challenges to a proposed substitute claim,” even if
`based on record evidence); Magnum Oil, 829 F.3d at 1381
`(“[T]he Board must base its decision on arguments that
`were advanced by a party, and to which the opposing party
`was given a chance to respond.”). Just as a district court
`has the power to strike or not consider submissions that
`exceed its page limits, are untimely filed, or otherwise do
`not comply with its orders and rules, so too does the Board.
`See, e.g., Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1081
`(Fed. Cir. 2015) (explaining that “the Board’s rules and
`practices establish standards bearing similarities to those
`often applied in district-court litigation” and that the
`Board “has broad discretion to regulate the presentation of
`evidence”).
`And Parus was not without recourse. Parus had almost
`3,000 unused words in its Patent Owner Response. J.A.
`1355. Moreover, if Parus had needed more room to explain
`its position, it could have sought leave to exceed its word
`count under 37 C.F.R. § 42.24(a)(2) or reallocated more of
`its briefs to that argument. Parus chose not to use the av-
`enues available to it.
`
`
`
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`PARUS HOLDINGS, INC. v. GOOGLE LLC
`
`11
`
`Because we do not find the Board’s decision to disre-
`gard Parus’s alleged evidence and argument of antedating
`to be a violation of the APA or any other provision of law,
`we affirm the Board’s holding that Kovatch qualifies as
`prior art to the challenged patents under 35 U.S.C.
`§ 103(a). Because Parus does not otherwise challenge the
`Board’s holding of obviousness based on Kovatch in combi-
`nation with other references, we likewise affirm the
`Board’s holding that Appellees demonstrated by a prepon-
`derance of the evidence that claims 1, 2, 4–7, 9, 10, 13, and
`14 of the ’431 patent are unpatentable.
`II
`For a claim to be entitled to the “the filing date of an
`earlier application under 35 U.S.C. § 120, each application
`in the chain leading back to the earlier application must
`comply with the written description requirement of
`35 U.S.C. § 112.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d
`1565, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Each application in the chain
`must therefore “reasonably convey[] to those skilled in the
`art that the inventor had possession of the [later-claimed]
`subject matter as of the filing date.” Ariad Pharms., Inc. v.
`Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en
`banc). “Sufficiency of written description is a question of
`fact, reviewed for substantial evidence.” Gen. Hosp. Corp.
`v. Sienna Biopharms., Inc., 888 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
`2018).
`Parus argues that (a) the Board’s determinations re-
`garding written description exceeded its statutory author-
`ity under 35 U.S.C. § 311(b), and (b) that the Board erred
`in finding that the challenged claims did not have sufficient
`written description support to entitle them to an earlier
`priority date. We address each argument in turn.
`A
`Parus first argues that the Board’s determinations re-
`garding the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C.
`
`
`
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`
`12
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`PARUS HOLDINGS, INC. v. GOOGLE LLC
`
`§ 112 exceeded its statutory authority under 35 U.S.C.
`§ 311(b), which limits the scope of IPRs to the cancellation
`of claims based “only on a ground that could be raised un-
`der section 102 or 103.” Appellees respond that Parus
`waived that argument by only raising it in its Preliminary
`Response, and not its Response, and even if not waived, its
`argument is foreclosed by our decision in Arthrex Inc. v.
`Smith & Nephew, Inc., 35 F.4th 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2022). We
`agree with Appellees on both points.
`By raising an argument in its Preliminary Response,
`but not its Response, a patent owner waives said argument.
`In re NuVasive, Inc., 842 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
`Even if Parus had not waived such argument, it is without
`merit. As we decided in Arthrex, § 311(b) “merely dictates
`the grounds on which an IPR petition may be based, not
`the issues that the Board may consider to resolve those
`grounds.” 35 F.4th at 1344–45. As in that case, Appellees
`complied with § 311(b) by asserting invalidity grounds un-
`der § 103. Because Parus asserted that Kurnagov-262 is
`not prior art by claiming priority from the application from
`which it stems, the Board needed to determine whether the
`challenged claims satisfied the written description require-
`ment. The Board therefore did not exceed its statutory au-
`thority.
`
`B
`Parus argues that the challenged claims have suffi-
`cient written description support and are therefore entitled
`to their earlier priority date. The Board and the parties
`agree that the specification discloses two preferred embod-
`iments: one involving networked “web sites,” the other in-
`volving networked “devices.” See, e.g., ’431 patent at col. 4
`ll. 30–34, col. 17 ll. 36–46. The specification further teaches
`that the device browsing embodiment “provides the same
`robustness and reliability features described in the first
`embodiment,” including the ability to detect “new devices”
`and mark them “as being . . . new” in the system. Id., col.
`
`
`
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`PARUS HOLDINGS, INC. v. GOOGLE LLC
`
`13
`
`19 ll. 10–19. Parus argues that, as demonstrated by expert
`testimony, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have
`understood the teachings of the second embodiment to be
`applicable to the first embodiment. Appellees argue that,
`as the Board found, the first embodiment relates to actual
`web sites but does not add “new web sites,” whereas the
`second embodiment relates to adding “new devices,” which
`may “appear as ‘websites’” but are not web sites, and that
`these teachings may not be combined. Decision, J.A.
`58–61.
`We agree with Appellees that the Board’s determina-
`tion that “configured to periodically search via one or more
`networks to identify new web sites and to add the new web
`sites to the plurality of web sites” lacks written description
`support is supported by substantial evidence. Parus’s ar-
`guments amount to a request for us to reweigh the evidence
`already considered by the Board, which we decline to do.
`“A finding is supported by substantial evidence if a reason-
`able mind might accept the evidence as adequate to sup-
`port the finding.” Henny Penny Corp. v. Frymaster, LLC,
`938 F.3d 1324, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2019). That the Board gave
`more credit to one expert witness than another is not
`grounds for reversal. The Board’s finding was not an un-
`reasonable assessment of the evidence before it, particu-
`larly in light of the plain text of the specification itself.
`Because we hold that (a) the Board did not exceed its
`statutory authority and (b) its finding that the challenged
`claims were not entitled to their earlier priority date was
`supported by substantial evidence, we affirm the Board’s
`holding that Kurganov-262 qualifies as prior art to the
`challenged patents under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Because Pa-
`rus does not otherwise challenge the Board’s holding of ob-
`viousness based on Kurganov-262 in combination with
`other references, we likewise affirm the Board’s holding
`that Appellees demonstrated by a preponderance of the ev-
`idence that claim 9 of the ’431 patent and claims 1, 2, 4–7,
`10, and 14 of the ’084 patent are unpatentable.
`
`
`
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`
`14
`
`PARUS HOLDINGS, INC. v. GOOGLE LLC
`
`CONCLUSION
`We have considered Parus’s remaining arguments but
`find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, the de-
`cisions of the Board are affirmed.
`AFFIRMED
`
`