`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
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`UNILOC 2017 LLC,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`GOOGLE LLC,
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`Defendant.
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`Civil Action No. 2:18-cv-00551-JRG
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`
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`PATENT CASE
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`
`OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF OF UNILOC 2017
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`
`
`James L. Etheridge
`Ryan S. Loveless
`Etheridge Law Group, PLLC
`2600 E. Southlake Blvd., Suite 120 / 324
`Southlake, TX 76092
`Tel.: (817) 470-7249
`Fax: (817) 887-5950
`
`Counsel for Plaintiff Uniloc 2017 LLC
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`Page 1 of 15
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`GOOGLE EXHIBIT 1011
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`
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`Case 2:18-cv-00551-JRG Document 121 Filed 01/09/20 Page 2 of 15 PageID #: 5261
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I. BACKGROUND ......................................................................................................................... 1
`
`A.
`
`The ’960 Patent ....................................................................................................... 1
`
`II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES ............................................................................................................... 1
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`Claim Construction ................................................................................................. 1
`
`Departing from the Ordinary Meaning of a Claim Term ........................................ 4
`
`Definiteness Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 ................................................................ 5
`
`II. NO AGREED TERMS.............................................................................................................. 6
`
`III. THE DISPUTED PATENT TERMS ........................................................................................ 6
`
`IV. CONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED ’960 PATENT TERMS .................................................. 6
`
`A.
`
`The Allegedly Indefinite Terms .............................................................................. 6
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`1.
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`2.
`
`3.
`
`“wherein the recursive filtering step is intended to use a recursive filter
`such as: Rf[i]=(1-.alpha.[i]) (R1[i]+Rmc[i]), where Rf[i], R1[i] and
`Rmc[i] are transformed coefficients comprised in the transformed
`signals (Rf, R1, Rmc) and .alpha.[i] is a filter coefficient comprised
`between 0 and 1” (claim 1) .............................................................................. 6
`
`“comprised in the transformed signals (Rf, R1, Rmc)” (claim 1) .................... 7
`
`“predicting a transformed motion-compensated signal from a
`transformed encoding error derived from the encoding step, said
`prediction step being situated between the encoding and decoding
`steps” (claims 1, 4) ............................................................................................ 7
`
`B.
`
`The “Transformed” Terms ...................................................................................... 8
`
`4.
`
`“transformed coefficients (claim 1), and “transformed signal[s]”
`(claims 1, 4) ...................................................................................................... 8
`
`5.
`
`“transformed motion-compensated signal (claims 1, 4) ................................... 8
`
`
`
`
`
`i
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`Page 2 of 15
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`Case 2:18-cv-00551-JRG Document 121 Filed 01/09/20 Page 3 of 15 PageID #: 5262
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`
`3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Tredegar Corp.,
`725 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ........................................................................................ 5
`
`Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`342 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2003) .......................................................................................... 2
`
`Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc.,
`757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .......................................................................................... 2
`
`Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg.,
`73 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996) .......................................................................................... 3
`
`Avid Tech., Inc. v. Harmonic, Inc.,
`812 F.3d 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2016) .......................................................................................... 5
`
`Azure Networks, LLC v. CSR PLC,
`771 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .......................................................................................... 2
`
`Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns Group, Inc.,
`262 F.3d 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2001) .......................................................................................... 1
`
`Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc.,
`783 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2015) .......................................................................................... 6
`
`C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp.,
`388 F.3d 858 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ................................................................................... 1, 2, 3
`
`Centricut, LLC v. Esab Grp., Inc.,
`390 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004)........................................................................................... 8
`
`Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp.,
`156 F.3d 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ...................................................................................... 2, 3
`
`Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc.,
`848 F.2d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ........................................................................................ 3
`
`Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag,
`210 U.S. 405 (1908) ............................................................................................................ 3
`
`Cordis Corp. v. Boston Sci. Corp.,
`561 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2009) .......................................................................................... 4
`
`Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc.,
`417 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ........................................................................................ 6
`
`Elcommerce.com, Inc. v. SAP AG,
`564 Fed. Appx 599 (Fed. Cir. Jun. 6, 2014) ....................................................................... 8
`
`ii
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`Page 3 of 15
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`Case 2:18-cv-00551-JRG Document 121 Filed 01/09/20 Page 4 of 15 PageID #: 5263
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`Elcommerce.com, Inc. v. SAP AG,
`745 F.3d 490 (Fed. Cir. 2014)............................................................................................. 8
`
`ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc.,
`700 F.3d 509 (Fed. Cir. 2012)............................................................................................. 6
`
`GE Lighting Solutions, LLC v. AgiLight, Inc.,
`750 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .......................................................................................... 4
`
`Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Apple Inc.,
`758 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .......................................................................................... 4
`
`In re Hiniker Co.,
`150 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1998).......................................................................................... 2
`
`Innova/Pure Water Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc.,
`381 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .......................................................................................... 1
`
`Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc.,
`766 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .......................................................................................... 6
`
`Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc.,
`358 F.3d 898 (Fed. Cir. 2004)............................................................................................. 3
`
`Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
`52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) .............................................................................. 2
`
`Mobile Telecommunications Techs., LLC v. Sprint Nextel Corp.,
`2014 WL 10726788 (E.D. Tex. May 2, 2014) .................................................................... 7
`
`Nautilus Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
`134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014) ........................................................................................................ 5
`
`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
`572 U.S. 898 (2014) ............................................................................................................ 7
`
`On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc.,
`442 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ......................................................................................... 5
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) ................................................................. 1, 2, 3
`
`Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni,
`158 F.3d 1243 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ....................................................................................... 2, 4
`
`Schumer v. Lab. Computer Sys., Inc.,
`308 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2002)........................................................................................... 8
`
`Sonix Tech. Co. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd.,
`844 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2017)........................................................................................... 8
`
`Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp.,
`
`iii
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`Page 4 of 15
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`
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`Case 2:18-cv-00551-JRG Document 121 Filed 01/09/20 Page 5 of 15 PageID #: 5264
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`299 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ........................................................................................ 2
`
`Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.,
`135 S. Ct. 831 (2015) .......................................................................................................... 4
`
`Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC,
`669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ......................................................................................... 4
`
`Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Symantec Corp.,
`811 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2016) .......................................................................................... 5
`
`Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.,
`90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ............................................................................................ 2
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112 ............................................................................................................................... 5
`
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`iv
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`Page 5 of 15
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`Case 2:18-cv-00551-JRG Document 121 Filed 01/09/20 Page 6 of 15 PageID #: 5265
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`I. BACKGROUND
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`Pursuant to the Court’s Docket Control Order, Plaintiff Uniloc 2017, LLC (“Uniloc”)
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`submits its opening claim construction brief and evidence supporting its constructions of the
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`disputed claim terms of Uniloc’s U.S. Patent No. 7,012,960 (“the ’960 patent,” Exhibit 1).1
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`A. The ’960 Patent
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`The ’960 patent is generally directed to a method of transcoding a primary encoded signal
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`into a secondary encoded signal, where the primary encoded signal is comprised of a sequence of
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`pictures. Ex. 1, 1:7-10. The invention is particularly relevant to transcoding MPEG encoded video
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`signals. Id., 1:19-20. The method includes a decoding step which includes a dequantizing sub-
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`step for producing a first transformed signal. The method further includes an encoding step
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`following the decoding step for obtaining a secondary encoded signal – the encoding step including
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`a quantizing sub-step. Id., 1:11-16. The method includes a filtering step between the dequantizing
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`sub-step and the quantizing sub-step. Id., 1:64-67. The filtering can be used to control the static
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`and dynamic resolution, and to reduce noise. Id., 2:3-5. The filtering can be temporal filtering or
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`spatial filtering. Id., 2:9-17, 2:22-28.
`
`A. Claim Construction
`
`II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
`
`“It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention
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`to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,
`
`1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Innova/Pure Water Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys.,
`
`Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). To determine the meaning of the claims, courts start
`
`by considering the intrinsic evidence. Id. at 1313; C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 388
`
`F.3d 858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns Group, Inc.,
`
`262 F.3d 1258, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The intrinsic evidence includes the claims themselves, the
`
`
`1 All references to a patent specification is made in the xx:yy-zz format, where “xx” refers to a
`column number and “yy-zz” refers to line numbers.
`
`1
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`Page 6 of 15
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`Case 2:18-cv-00551-JRG Document 121 Filed 01/09/20 Page 7 of 15 PageID #: 5266
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`specification, and the prosecution history. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314; C.R. Bard, Inc., 388 F.3d at
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`861. The general rule—subject to certain specific exceptions discussed infra—is that each claim
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`term is construed according to its ordinary and accustomed meaning as understood by one of
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`ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention in the context of the patent. Phillips, 415 F.3d
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`at 1312–13; Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Azure
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`Networks, LLC v. CSR PLC, 771 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“There is a heavy presumption
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`that claim terms carry their accustomed meaning in the relevant community at the relevant time.”)
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`(vacated on other grounds).
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`“The claim construction inquiry . . . begins and ends in all cases with the actual words of
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`the claim.” Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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`“[I]n all aspects of claim construction, ‘the name of the game is the claim.’” Apple Inc. v. Motorola,
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`Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting In re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 1998)). First, a term’s context in the asserted claim can be instructive. Phillips, 415 F.3d at
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`1314. Other asserted or unasserted claims can also aid in determining the claim’s meaning,
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`because claim terms are typically used consistently throughout the patent. Id. Differences among
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`the claim terms can also assist in understanding a term’s meaning. Id. For example, when a
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`dependent claim adds a limitation to an independent claim, it is presumed that the independent
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`claim does not include the limitation. Id. at 1314–15.
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`
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`“[C]laims ‘must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.’” Id. (quoting
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`Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)). “[T]he
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`specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive;
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`it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’” Id. (quoting Vitronics Corp. v.
`
`Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299
`
`F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002). But, “‘[a]lthough the specification may aid the court in
`
`interpreting the meaning of disputed claim language, particular embodiments and examples
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`appearing in the specification will not generally be read into the claims.’” Comark Commc’ns, Inc.
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`v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting Constant v. Advanced Micro-
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`2
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`Page 7 of 15
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`Case 2:18-cv-00551-JRG Document 121 Filed 01/09/20 Page 8 of 15 PageID #: 5267
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`Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); see also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. “[I]t
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`is improper to read limitations from a preferred embodiment described in the specification—even if
`
`it is the only embodiment—into the claims absent a clear indication in the intrinsic record that the
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`patentee intended the claims to be so limited.” Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898,
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`913 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Care must be taken to avoid limiting the claims to the embodiments described
`
`in the specification as it is the claims, not the specific that defines the scope of the patent right.
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`Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag, 210 U.S. 405, 419 (1908); see also Comark
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`Communications, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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`The prosecution history is another tool to supply the proper context for claim
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`construction because, like the specification, the prosecution history provides evidence of how the
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`U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) and the inventor understood the patent. Phillips, 415
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`F.3d at 1317. However, “because the prosecution history represents an ongoing negotiation
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`between the PTO and the applicant, rather than the final product of that negotiation, it often lacks
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`the clarity of the specification and thus is less useful for claim construction purposes.” Id. at
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`1318; see also Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., 73 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
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`(ambiguous prosecution history may be “unhelpful as an interpretive resource”).
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`Although extrinsic evidence can also be useful, it is “‘less significant than the intrinsic
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`record in determining the legally operative meaning of claim language.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d at
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`1317 (quoting C.R. Bard, Inc., 388 F.3d at 862). Technical dictionaries and treatises may help a
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`court understand the underlying technology and the manner in which one skilled in the art might
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`use claim terms, but technical dictionaries and treatises may provide definitions that are too
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`broad or may not be indicative of how the term is used in the patent. Id. at 1318. Generally,
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`extrinsic evidence is “less reliable than the patent and its prosecution history in determining how
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`to read claim terms.” Id. The Supreme Court has explained the role of extrinsic evidence in claim
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`construction:
`
`In some cases, however, the district court will need to look beyond the
`patent’s intrinsic evidence and to consult extrinsic evidence in order to
`understand, for example, the background science or the meaning of a
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`3
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`Page 8 of 15
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`Case 2:18-cv-00551-JRG Document 121 Filed 01/09/20 Page 9 of 15 PageID #: 5268
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`term in the relevant art during the relevant time period. See, e.g.,
`Seymour v. Osborne, 11 Wall. 516, 546 (1871) (a patent may be “so
`interspersed with technical terms and terms of art that the testimony of
`scientific witnesses is indispensable to a correct understanding of its
`meaning”). In cases where those subsidiary facts are in dispute,
`courts will need to make subsidiary factual findings about that extrinsic
`evidence. These are the “evidentiary underpinnings” of claim
`construction that we discussed in Markman, and this subsidiary
`factfinding must be reviewed for clear error on appeal.
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`Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 41 (2015).
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`B. Departing from the Ordinary Meaning of a Claim Term
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`There are “only two exceptions to [the] general rule” that claim terms are construed
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`according to their plain and ordinary meaning: “1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts
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`as his own lexicographer, or 2) when the patentee disavows the full scope of the claim term
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`either in the specification or during prosecution.”
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`
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`Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Apple Inc., 758
`
`F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d
`
`1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); see also GE Lighting Solutions, LLC v. AgiLight, Inc., 750 F.3d
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`1304, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[T]he specification and prosecution history only compel departure
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`from the plain meaning in two instances: lexicography and disavowal.”). The standards for finding
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`lexicography or disavowal are “exacting.” GE Lighting Solutions, 750 F.3d at 1309.
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`To act as his own lexicographer, the patentee must “clearly set forth a definition of the
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`disputed claim term,” and “clearly express an intent to define the term.” Id. (quoting Thorner,
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`669 F.3d at 1365); see also Renishaw, 158 F.3d at 1249. The patentee’s lexicography must
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`appear “with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision.” Renishaw, 158 F.3d at 1249. To
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`disavow or disclaim the full scope of a claim term, the patentee’s statements in the specification
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`or prosecution history must amount to a “clear and unmistakable” surrender. Cordis Corp. v.
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`Boston Sci. Corp., 561 F.3d 1319, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1366
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`(“The patentee may demonstrate intent to deviate from the ordinary and accustomed meaning of
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`a claim term by including in the specification expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction,
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`representing a clear disavowal of claim scope.”) “Where an applicant’s statements are amenable
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`to multiple reasonable interpretations, they cannot be deemed clear and unmistakable.” 3M
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`4
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`Page 9 of 15
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`Case 2:18-cv-00551-JRG Document 121 Filed 01/09/20 Page 10 of 15 PageID #: 5269
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`Innovative Props. Co. v. Tredegar Corp., 725 F.3d 1315, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2013); see also Avid
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`Tech., Inc. v. Harmonic, Inc., 812 F.3d 1040, 1045 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“When the prosecution history
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`is used solely to support a conclusion of patentee disclaimer, the standard for justifying the
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`conclusion is a high one.”).
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`Although a statement of lexicography or disavowal must be exacting and clear, it need
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`not be “explicit.” See Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir.
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`2016) (“a patent applicant need not expressly state ‘my invention does not include X’ to indicate
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`his exclusion of X from the scope of his patent”). Lexicography or disavowal can be implied
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`where, e.g., the patentee makes clear statements characterizing the scope and purpose of the
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`invention. See On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc., 442 F.3d 1331, 1340 (Fed. Cir.
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`2006) (“[W]hen the scope of the invention is clearly stated in the specification, and is described
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`as the advantage and distinction of the invention, it is not necessary to disavow explicitly a
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`different scope.”). Nonetheless, the plain meaning governs “[a]bsent implied or explicit
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`lexicography or disavowal.” Trs. of Columbia Univ., 811 F.3d at 1364 n.2.
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`C. Definiteness Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2
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`Patent claims must particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter regarded
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`as the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2. A claim, when viewed in light of the intrinsic evidence,
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`must “inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.”
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`Nautilus Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014). If it does not, the claim
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`fails § 112, ¶ 2 and is therefore invalid as indefinite. Id. at 2124. Whether a claim is indefinite is
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`determined from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art as of the time the application
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`for the patent was filed. Id. at 2130. As it is a challenge to the validity of a patent, the failure of
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`any claim in suit to comply with § 112 must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at
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`2130 n.10. “[I]ndefiniteness is a question of law and in effect part of claim construction.” ePlus,
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`Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 700 F.3d 509, 517 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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`5
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`Page 10 of 15
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`Case 2:18-cv-00551-JRG Document 121 Filed 01/09/20 Page 11 of 15 PageID #: 5270
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`When a term of degree is used in a claim, “the court must determine whether the patent
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`provides some standard for measuring that degree.” Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc.,
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`783 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). Likewise, when a subjective
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`term is used in a claim, “the court must determine whether the patent’s specification supplies
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`some standard for measuring the scope of the [term].” Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc.,
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`417 F.3d 1342, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2005); accord Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 766 F.3d
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`1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing Datamize, 417 F.3d at 1351).
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`II. NO AGREED TERMS
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`There are no agreed terms for the ’960 patent.
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`III. THE DISPUTED PATENT TERMS
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`The Markman claim construction process was created to resolve latent ambiguities in a
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`claim, and to determine when principles of equity should foreclose a patentee from asserting a scope
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`surrendered in the patent or the prosecution history. Claim construction was never intended to
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`provide a mechanism by which an accused infringer can redefine the scope of the patent so as to
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`create a basis to assert non-infringement. Re-definition of a claim term should be undertaken
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`sparingly as even a good interpretation of an existing claim term can change the scope of the claim
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`allowed by the Patent Office.
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`IV. CONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED ‘960 PATENT TERMS
`
`A. The Allegedly Indefinite Terms
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`1. “wherein the recursive filtering step is intended to use a recursive filter such as:
`Rf[i]=(1-.alpha.[i]) (R1[i]+Rmc[i]), where Rf[i], R1[i] and Rmc[i] are
`transformed coefficients comprised in the transformed signals (Rf, R1, Rmc) and
`.alpha.[i] is a filter coefficient comprised between 0 and 1” (claim 1)
`
`Uniloc’s Proposed Construction
`No construction necessary; plain and
`ordinary meaning
`
`
`
`Defendant’s Proposed Construction
`Indefinite as to the terms “is intended to” and
`“such as”
`
`OR
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`Plain and ordinary meaning
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`6
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`Page 11 of 15
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`Case 2:18-cv-00551-JRG Document 121 Filed 01/09/20 Page 12 of 15 PageID #: 5271
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`2. “comprised in the transformed signals (Rf, R1, Rmc)” (claim 1)
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`Uniloc’s Proposed Construction
`No construction necessary; plain and
`ordinary meaning
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`Defendant’s Proposed Construction
`Indefinite as to the term “comprised in”
`
`OR
`
`Plain and ordinary meaning
`
`3. “predicting a transformed motion-compensated signal from a transformed
`encoding error derived from the encoding step, said prediction step being
`situated between the encoding and decoding steps” (claims 1, 4)
`
`Uniloc’s Proposed Construction
`No construction necessary; plain and
`ordinary meaning
`
`Defendant’s Proposed Construction
`Indefinite
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`OR
`
`Plain and ordinary meaning
`
`
`
`
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`Each of these three terms does not need construction apart from their plain and ordinary
`
`meaning. Indeed, Google offers the “plain and ordinary meaning” as an alternative to its assertion
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`that the terms are indefinite. That should end the discussion.
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`Moreover, Google has effectively waived its alternate theories of indefiniteness by failing
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`to preserve the right to rely on expert testimony in its Patent Rule 4-2 and 4-3 disclosures. The
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`Supreme Court reiterated in Nautilus that “[d]efiniteness is measured from the viewpoint of a
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`person skilled in [the] art at the time the patent was filed.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments,
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`Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 908 (2014). Here, Google has waived any reliance on any expert declaration
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`or testimony to establish how the challenged claim terms would be understood by a person of
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`ordinary skill in the art. Because attorney argument is not evidence, Google will not be able to
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`meet its burden to prove indefiniteness by clear and convincing evidence. See Mobile
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`Telecommunications Techs., LLC v. Sprint Nextel Corp., No. 2:12-CV-832-JRG-RSP, 2014 WL
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`10726788, at *29 (E.D. Tex. May 2, 2014) (“Defendants have failed to present any evidence of
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`the understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art, such as through an expert declaration or
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`expert testimony. Defendants have therefore failed to meet their burden of proving indefiniteness
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`by clear and convincing evidence.”) (citing Elcommerce.com, Inc. v. SAP AG, 745 F.3d 490, 505-
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`06 (Fed. Cir. 2014), vacated on other grounds (settlement), 564 Fed. Appx 599, 600 (Fed. Cir. Jun.
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`7
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`Page 12 of 15
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`Case 2:18-cv-00551-JRG Document 121 Filed 01/09/20 Page 13 of 15 PageID #: 5272
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`6, 2014)); see also Centricut, LLC v. Esab Grp., Inc., 390 F.3d 1361, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting
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`that “‘typically’ expert testimony will be necessary in cases involving complex technology.”)
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`(quoting Schumer v. Lab. Computer Sys., Inc., 308 F.3d 1304, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see also
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`Sonix Tech. Co. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 844 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Indefiniteness must
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`be proven by clear and convincing evidence.”). Google thus cannot show that the claims do not
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`“inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty” without
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`evidence of how a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the term.
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`B. The “Transformed” Terms
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`4. “transformed coefficients (claim 1), and “transformed signal[s]” (claims 1, 4)
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`Uniloc’s Proposed Construction
`No construction necessary; plain and ordinary
`meaning
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`Defendant’s Proposed Construction
`“data concerning video that has been discrete
`cosine transformed and inverse quantized”
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`5. “transformed motion-compensated signal (claims 1, 4)
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`Uniloc’s Proposed Construction
`No construction necessary; plain and ordinary
`meaning
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`Defendant’s Proposed Construction
`“motion-compensated data that has been discrete
`cosine transformed and inverse quantized”
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`Neither of these terms requires construction. The plain and ordinary meaning, which is the
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`claim language itself, should be adopted.
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`In Google’s proposed construction, a transformed signal is one that has been “discrete
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`cosine transformed and inverse quantized.” In other words, both steps must be performed to
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`generate a transformed signal. But this construction is not supported by the specification of the
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`’960 patent. The specification explains that a transformed signal can be generated by a variable
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`length decoder and a dequantizer.2 For example, the specification states that “a decoding unit,
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`comprising a variable length decoder VLD and a first dequantizer IQ for decoding a current picture
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`of the primary encoded signal and for delivering a first transformed signal.” Ex. 1, 3:14-17
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`(emphasis added). No discrete cosine transform step was used by transcoder 200 to generate the
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`“first transformed signal.”
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`2 A dequantizer is also referred to as an inverse quantizer, and is depicted in the figures of the
`‘960 patent as “IQ.”
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`Page 13 of 15
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`Case 2:18-cv-00551-JRG Document 121 Filed 01/09/20 Page 14 of 15 PageID #: 5273
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`The specification also explains that a “second transformed signal (R2)” is generated by a
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`second dequantizer IQ. “[A] second dequantizer IQ (15) [is] for delivering a second transformed
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`signal (R2).” Ex. 1, 5:24-25. Again, no discrete cosine transform step was used by transcoder 200
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`to generate the “second transformed signal.”
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`The ’960 patent describes how a discrete cosine transform circuit generates a transformed
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`signal. Transcoder 200 includes “a discrete cosine transform circuit DCT (19), for predicting a
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`transformed motion-compensate signal (Rmc).” Ex. 1, 5:33-34. In this case, the “transformed
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`motion-compensated signal (Rmc)” was generated without an inverse quantizer step.
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`Nothing in the specification requires that a transformed signal must be generated by a
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`discrete cosine transform step and an inverse quantizer step. Google’s proposed constructions for
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`these terms is incorrect.
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`Dated: January 9, 2020
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`
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`Respectfully submitted,
`
`/s/ James L. Ethridge
`James L. Etheridge
`TX Bar No. 24059147
`Ryan S. Loveless
`TX Bar No. 24036997
`Brett A. Mangrum
`TX Bar No. 24065671
`Travis L. Richins
`TX Bar No. 24061296
`Jeff Huang (Admitted E.D. Tex.)
`Etheridge Law Group, PLLC
`2600 E. Southlake Blvd., Suite 120 / 324
`Southlake, TX 76092
`Tel.: (817) 470-7249
`Fax: (817) 887-5950
`Jim@EtheridgeLaw.com
`Ryan@EtheridgeLaw.com
`Brett@EtheridgeLaw.com
`Travis@EtheridgeLaw.com
`Jeff@EtheridgeLaw.com
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiff Uniloc 2017 LLC
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`9
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`Page 14 of 15
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`Case 2:18-cv-00551-JRG Document 121 Filed 01/09/20 Page 15 of 15 PageID #: 5274
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`
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I hereby certify that all counsel of record who are deemed to have consented to electronic
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`service are being served with a copy of this document via the Court’s CM/ECF system per Local
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`Rule CV-5(a)(3).
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`DATED: January 9, 2020
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`/s/ James L. Etheridge
`James L. Etheridge
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